










4 O 







ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 



COMPRISING 






THE SUBSTANCE OP THE ARTICLE 

IN THE 

ENCYCLOPEDIA METROPOLITANA : 
WITH ADDITIONS, &c. 



BY RICHARD WHATELY, D. D„ 
\\ 

ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN. 



FROM THE LAST LONDON EDITION. 



NEW YORK: 

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM JACKSON. 

BOSTON : 

JAMES MUNROE & CO. 

1836. 



I b - 



^V 



Gift 



THE RIGHT REVEREND 

EDWARD COPLESTON,D.D., 

LORD BISHOP OP LLANDAFF, 
&c. &C. 



Mr dear Lord, 

To enumerate the advantages I have derived from your 
instructions, hoth in regular lectures and in private con- 
versation, would be needless to those acquainted with the par- 
ties, and to the Public, uninteresting. My object at present 
is simply to acknowledge how greatly I am indebted to you 
in respect of the present Work ; not merely as having origi- 
nally imparted to me the principles of the Science, but also 
as having contributed remarks, explanations, and illustra- 
tions, relative to the most important points, to so great an 
amount that I can hardly consider myself as the Author of 
more than half of such portions of the treatise as are not 
borrowed from former publications. I could have wished, 
indeed, to acknowledge this more explicitly, by marking 
with some note of distinction those parts which are least my 
own. But I found it could not be done. In most instances 
there is something belonging to each of us ; and even in 
those parts where your share is the largest, it would not be 
fair that you should be made responsible for any thing that 
is not entirely your own. Nor is it possible, in the case of 
a Science, to remember distinctly how far one has been, in 
each instance, indebted to the suggestions of another. Infor- 
1* 



4 DEDICATION, 

mation, as to matters of fact, may easily be referred in the 
mind to the person from whom we have derived it: but 
scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced, become much 
more a part of the mind, as it were ; since they rest, not on 
the authority of the instructor, but on reasoning from data 
which we ourselves furnish: they are scions engrafted on 
the stems previously rooted in our own soil ; and we are 
apt to confound them with its indigenous productions. 

You yourself also, I have reason to believe, have forgotten 
the greater part of the assistance you have afforded in the 
course of conversations on the subject; as I have found 
more than once, that ideas which I distinctly remember to 
have received from you, have not been recognised by you 
when read or repeated. As far, however, as I can recol- 
lect, though there is no part of the following pages in which 
I have not, more or less, received valuable suggestions from 
you, I believe you have contributed less to the Analytical 
Outline, and to the Treatise on Fallacies, and more, to the 
subjoined Dissertation, than to the rest of the Work. 

I take this opportunity of publicly declaring, that as, on 
the one hand, you are not responsible for any thing contain- 
ed in this Work, so, on the other hand, should you ever favor 
the world with a publication of your own on the subject, the 
coincidence which will doubtless be found in it with many 
things here brought forward as my own, is not to be regard- 
ed as any indication of plagiarism, at least on your side. 
Believe me to be, 
My dear Lord, 

Your obliged and affectionate 

Pupil and Friend, 
RICHARD WHATELY. 



PREFACE. 



The following Treatise contains the substance of the 
Article "Logic" in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. It 
was suggested to me that a separate publication of it might 
prove acceptable, not only to some who are not subscribers 
to that work, but also to several who are; but who, for 
convenience of reference, would prefer a more portable 
volume. 

I have accordingly revised it, and made such additions, 
chiefly in the form of Notes, as I thought likely to increase 
its utility. 

I have taken without scruple whatever appeared most 
valuable from the works of former writers ; especially the 
concise, but in general accurate, treatise of Aldrich : but 
while I acknowledge my obligations to my predecessors, 
of whose labours I have largely availed myself, I do not 
profess to be altogether satisfied with any of the treatises 
that have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly judged it 
any unreasonable presumption to point out what seem to 
me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever deference 
an Author may profess for the authority of those who have 
preceded him, the veiy circumstance of his publishing a 
work on the same subject, proves that he thinks theirs open 
to improvement. In censuring, however, as I have had 
occasion to do, several of the doctrines and explanations 
of logical writers, and of Aldrich in particular, I wish it 
to be understood that this is not from my having formed 
a low estimate of the merits of the Compendium drawn up 
by the Author just mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its 
deserved popularity, — from the impossibility of noticing 
particularly all the points in which we agree, — and from 
the consideration that errors are the more carefully to be 
pointed out in proportion to the authority by which they 
are sanctioned. 

In the later editions I have introduced, in the Appendix, 
under the word " Person," an extract from the theological 
works of my illustrious predecessor in the teaching of 
Logic, Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry in this University. 

I have also to acknowledge assistance received from 



o PREFACE. 

several friends, who have at various times suggested re- 
marks and alterations. But I cannot avoid particularizing 
the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who actually 
composed a considerable portion of the work as it now 
stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication, and 
who is the original author of several pages. Some valuable 
illustrations of the importance of attending to the ambiguity 
of the terms used in Political-Economy, were furnished by 
the kindness of my friend and former pupil, Mr. Senior, of 
Magdalen College and of Lincoln's Inn, late Professor of 
Political-Economy at Oxford, and now, at King's College, 
London. They are printed in the Appendix. But the 
friend to whom it is inscribed has contributed far more, 
and that, in the most important parts, than all others to- 
gether ; so much, indeed, that, though there is in the trea- 
tise nothing of his which has not undergone such expansion 
or modification as leaves me solely responsible for the 
whole, there is not a little of which I cannot fairly claim to 
be the Author. 

The present edition has been revised with the utmost 
care. But though the work has undergone not only the 
close examination of myself and several friends, but the 
severer scrutiny of determined opponents, I am happy to 
find that no material errors have been detected, nor any 
considerable alterations found necessary. Some small 
additions have, however, been introduced into the third 
and fourth editions; and also a change in the arrange- 
ment, which 1 trust will somewhat lighten the student's 
labor. I have removed into an Appendix a considerable 
portion of what was in the first two editions placed in Part 
I. (now Chap, i.) of the Compendium ; as being (though 
highly important, not only from its connexion with the rea- 
soning process, but for other purposes, yet) not necessary, 
after the perusal of the Analytical Outline, for the under- 
standing of the Second and Third Chapters. It may be 
studied, at the learner's choice, either before or after the 
Compendium. 

On the utility of Logic many writers have said much in 
which I cannot coincide, and which has tended to bring 
the study into unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic 
as furnishing the sole instrument for the discovery of truth 
in all subjects, and as teaching the use of the intellectual 
faculties in general, they raised expectations which could 
not be realized, and which naturally led to a re-action. 
The whole system, whose unfounded pretensions had been 
thus blazoned forth, has come to be commonly regarded as 
Utterly futile and empty : like several of our most valuable 



PREFACE. 7 

medicines, which, when first introduced, were proclaimed, 
each, as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite dis- 
orders; and which consequently, in many instances, fell 
for a time into total disuse ; though, after a long interval, 
they were established in their just estimation, and em- 
ployed conformably to their real properties. 

To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be done 
only in the course of an explanation of the system itself. 
One preliminary observation only (for the original sugges- 
tion of which I am indebted to the same friend to whom 
this work is inscribed) it may be worth while to offer in 
this place. If it were inquired what is to be regarded as 
the most appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as 
man, what would be the answer ? The Statesman is en- 
gaged with political affairs ; the Soldier with military ; the 
Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and mag- 
nitudes ; the Merchant with commercial concerns, &c. ; 
but in what are all and each of these employed? — em- 
ployed, I mean, as men; for there are many modes of 
exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which 
are in great measure common to us with the lower animals. 
Evidently, in Reasoning. They are all occupied in de- 
ducing, well or ill, Conclusions from Premises ; each, con- 
cerning the Subject of his own particular business. If, 
therefore, it be found that the process going on daily, in 
each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the 
same, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be 
reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced 
from that system, for the better conducting of the process, 
then, it can hardly be denied that such a system and such 
rules must be especially worthy the attention, not of the 
members of this or that profession merely, but of every one 
who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To under- 
stand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual 
occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well, 
which every one will and must do, whether well or ill, may 
surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal edu- 
cation. 

Even supposing that no practical improvement in argu- 
mentation resulted from the study of Logic, it would not 
by any means follow that it is unworthy of attention. The 
pursuit of knowledge on curious and interesting subjects, 
for its own sake, is usually reckoned no misemployment 
of time; and is considered as, incidentally, if not directly, 
useful to the individual, by the exercise thus afforded to 
the mental faculties. AH who study Mathematics are not 
training themselves to become Surveyors or Mechanics: 



8 PREFACE. 

some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even ex- 
pected in a man liberally educated, though without any 
view to his practising Surgery or Medicine. The investi- 
gation of a process which is peculiarly and universally the 
occupation of Man, considered as Man, can hardly be 
reckoned a less philosophical pursuit than those just in- 
stanced. 

It has usually been assumed, however, in the case of the 
present subject, that a theory which does not tend to the 
improvement of practice is utterly unworthy of regard ; 
and then, it is contended that Logic has no such tendency, 
on the plea that men may and do reason correctly without 
it: an objection which would equally apply in the case of 
Grammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, &c, in all of 
which systems the practice must have existed previously 
to the theory. 

But many who allow the use of systematic principles in 
other things, are accustomed to cry up Common-Sense as 
the sufficient and only safe guide in reasoning. Now by 
Common-sense is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is 
used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the judg- 
ment unaided by any Art or system of rules ; such an 
exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless 
cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established 
principles to guide us, — no line of procedure, as it were, 
distinctly chalked out, — we must needs act on the best 
extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is 
eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior 
degree of Common-Sense. But that Common-Sense is 
only our second-best guide ; — that the rules of Art, if judi- 
ciously framed, are always desirable when they can be 
had, is an assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to 
the testimony of mankind in general ; which is so much 
the more valuable, inasmuch as it may be accounted the 
testimony of adversaries. For the generality have a strong 
predilection in favor of Common-Sense, except in those 
points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge 
of a system of rules ; but in these points they deride any 
one who trusts to unaided Common-Sense. A Sailor, e. g. 
will, perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical men, and 
prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense : but he would 
ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by Common- 
Sense, without regard to the maxims of nautical art. A 
Physician, again, will perhaps contemn systems of Political 
Economy,* of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the 

* See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, p. 28. 



PREFACE. 



9 



superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such 
matters ; but he would never approve of trusting to Com- 
mon-Sense in the treatment of diseases. Neither, again, 
would the Architect recommend a reliance on Common- 
Sense alone in building, nor the Musician in music, to the 
neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective 
arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided 
by experience. And the induction might be extended to 
every department of practice. Since, therefore, each gives 
the preference to unassisted Common-Sense only in those 
cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and 
invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses 
the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally 
bear their testimony, though unconsciously and often un- 
willingly, to the preferableness of systematic knowledge 
to conjectural judgments. 

There is, however, abundant room for the employment 
of Common-Sense in the application of the system. To 
bring arguments, out of the form in which they are ex- 
pressed in conversation and in books, into the regular 
logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common- 
Sense, aided by practice ; for such arguments are, by sup- 
position, not as yet within the province of Science ; else 
they would not be irregular, but would be already strict 
syllogisms. To exercise the learner in this operation, I 
have subjoined, in the Appendix, some examples, both of 
insulated arguments, and (in the last two editions) of the 
analysis of argumentative works. It should be added, 
however, that a large portion of what is usually introduced 
into Logical treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments, 
— the different kinds of them, &c, I have referred to the 
head of Rhetoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements 
of that Art. 

It was doubtless from a strong and deliberate conviction 
of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing from an 
acquaintance with Logic, that the University of Oxford, 
when re-modelling their system, not only retained that 
branch of study, regardless of the clamors of many of the 
half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by 
making it an indispensable part of the Examination for the 
first Degree. This last circumstance, however, I am con- 
vinced, has, in a great degree, produced an effect opposite 
to what was designed. It has contributed to lower instead 
of exalting, the estimation of the study ; and to withhold 
from it the earnest attention of many who might have applied 
to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any 
System can ensure great proficiency in any pursuit what- 



10 Preface. 

ever, either in all students, or in a very large proportion of 
them : " we sow many seeds to obtain a few flowers ;" but 
it might have been expected (and doubtless was expected) 
that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive 
some benefit worth mentioning from their logical pursuits; 
and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished 
candidates would prove respectable, if not eminent logi- 
cians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, 
or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been 
called upon to judge at that period when our experience 
was all to come. But that experience has shown that those 
expectations have been very inadequately realized. The 
truth is, that a very small proportion, even of distinguished 
students, ever become proficients in Logic ; and that by 
far the greater part pass through the University without 
knowing any thing at all of the subject. I do not mean that 
they have not learned by rote a string of technical terms ; 
but that they understand absolutely nothing whatever of 
the principles of the Science. 

I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford will 
censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply 
that such is the truth ; and that I think too well of, and 
know far too well, the University in which I have been 
employed in various academical occupations above a 
quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputa- 
tion from declaring the exact truth. With all its defects, 
and no human institution is perfect, the University would 
stand, I am convinced, higher in public estimation than it 
does, were the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in 
all points respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty 
and partial success of the measures employed to promote 
logical studies is the consequence, I apprehend, of the uni- 
versality of the requisition. That which must be done by 
every one, will, of course, often be done but indifferently ; 
and when the belief is once fully established, which it cer- 
tainly has long been, that any thing which is indispensable 
to a testimonial, has little or nothing to do with the attain- 
ment of honors,* the lowest standard soon becomes the 
established one in the minds of the greater number ; and pro- 
vided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the can- 
didate from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any 
such branch of study is regarded as a matter of indifference, 
as far as any views of academical distinction are concerned. 

* Iii the last-framed Examination-statute an express declaration 
lias been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have weight in the 
assignment of honors. 



PREFACE. 1J 

Divinity is one of these branches; and to this also 
most of what has been said concerning Logic might be 
considered as equally applicable ; but, in fact, there are 
several important differences between the two cases. In the 
first place, most of the students who are designed for the 
Church, and many who are not, have a value for theo- 
logical knowledge, independently of the requisition of the 
schools ; and on that ground do not confine their views to 
the lowest admissible degree of proficiency : whereas this 
can be said of very few in the case of Logic. And more- 
over, such as design to become candidates for holy Orders, 
know that another examination in Theology awaits them. 
But a consideration, which is still more to the present pur- 
pose, is, that Theology, not being a science, admits of 
infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is within 
the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attainable by the 
most exalted genius; every one of which degrees is ines- 
timably valuable as far as it goes. If any one understands 
tolerably the Church-catechism, or even the half of it, he 
knows something of divinity ; and that something is incal- 
culably preferable to nothing. But it is not so with a 
Science : one who does not understand the principles of 
Euclid's demonstrations, whatever number of questions 
and answers he may have learned by rote, knows abso- 
lutely nothing of geometry : unless he attain this point, all 
his labour is utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he is 
led to believe that he has learned something of a Science, 
when, in truth, he has not. And the same is the case with 
Logic, or any other Science. It does not admit of such 
various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. Of course I 
am far from supposing that all who understand any thing 
at all of Logic stand on the same level ; but I mean, what 
is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the 
fundamental principles, of that, or any other Science, what- 
ever he may have taken on authority, and learned by rote, 
knows, properly speaking, nothing of that Science. And 
such, I have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a con- 
siderable proportion even of those candidates who obtain 
testimonials, including many who gain distinction. There 
are some persons, (probably not so many as one in ten, of 
such as have in other respects tolerable abilities,) who are 
physically incapable of the degree of steady abstraction 
requisite for really embracing the principles of Logic or of 
any other Science, whatever pains may be taken by them- 
selves or their teachers. But there is a much greater 
number to whom this is a great difficulty, though not an im- 
possibility ; and who having, of course, a strong disinclina- 
2 



12 PREFACE. 

tion to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest 
admissible standard. And the example of such examina* 
tions in Logic as must be expected in the case of men of 
these descriptions, tends, in combination with popular pre- 
judice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of the 
generality. 

It was from these considerations, perhaps, that it was 
proposed, a few years ago, to leave the study of Logic 
altogether to the option of the candidates ; but the sug- 
gestion was rejected ; the majority appearing to think (in 
which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly as the 
tide of popular opinion sets against the study, the result 
would have been, within a few years, an almost universal 
neglect of that Science. Matters were accordingly left, at 
that time, in respect of this point, on their former footing ; 
which I am convinced was far preferable to the proposed 
alteration. 

But a middle course between these two was suggested, 
which I was persuaded would be infinitely preferable to 
either; a persuasion which I had long entertained, and 
which is confirmed by every day's observations and reflec- 
tions ; of which, few persons, I believe, have bestowed 
more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, 
be made optional to those who are merely candidates for 
a degree, but indispensable to the attainment of academical 
honors; and the consequence would be, that it would 
speedily begin, and progressively continue, to rise in esti- 
mation and to be studied with real profit. The examina- 
tion might then, it was urged, without any hardship, be 
made a strict one ; since no one could complain that a cer- 
tain moderate degree of scientific ability, and a resolution 
to apply to a certain prescribed study, should be the con- 
ditions of obtaining distinction. The far greater part 
would still study Logic ; since there would be (as before) 
but few who would be willing to exclude themselves from 
the possibility of obtaining distinction ; but it would be 
studied with a very different mind, when ennobled, as it 
were, by being made part of the passport to University 
honors, and when a proficiency in it came to be regarded 
generally as an honorable distinction. And in proportion 
as the number increased of those who really understood 
the Science, the number, it was contended, would increase 
of such as would value it on higher and better grounds. It 
would in time come to be better known and better appre- 
ciated by all the well-informed part of society : and lectures 
in Logic at the University would then, perhaps, no longer 
consist exclusively of an explanation of the mere elements. 



PREFACE. 13 

This would be necessary indeed for beginners ; but to the 
more advanced students, the tutors would no more think of 
lecturing in the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in the 
Latin and Greek Grammar ; but in the same manner as they 
exercise their pupils in Grammar, by reading with them 
Latin and Greek authors with continual reference to gram- 
mar-rules, so, they would exercise them in Logic by read- 
ing some argumentative work, requiring an analysis of it 
on Logical principles. 

These effects could not indeed, it was acknowledged, be 
expected to show themselves fully till after a considerable 
lapse of time ; but that the change would begin to appear, 
(and that, very decidedly,) within three or four years, was 
confidently anticipated. 

To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that no 
one should be allowed to obtain the Degree of B. A. without 
a knowledge of Logic. This answer carries a plausible 
appearance to those unacquainted with the actual state of 
the University, though in fact it is totally irrelevant For 
it goes on the supposition, that hitherto this object has been 
accomplished ; — that every one who passes his examination 
does possess a knowledge of Logic ; which is notoriously 
not the fact, nor ever can be, without some important 
change in some part of our system. The question there- 
fore is, not, as the above objection would seem to imply, 
whether a real, profitable knowledge of Logic shall be 
strictly required of every candidate for a Degree, (for this 
in fact never has been done,) but whether, in the attempt to 
accomplish this by requiring the form of a logical examina- 
tion from every candidate without exception, we shall con- 
tinue to degrade the Science, and to let this part of the 
examination be regarded as a mere form, by many who 
might otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and with 
advantage: — whether the great majority of candidates, and 
those too of a more promising description, shall lose a real 
and important benefit, through the attempt, (which, after 
alJ. experience has proved to be a vain attempt) to com- 
prehend in this benefit a very small number, and of the 
least promising. 

Something of an approach to the proposed alteration, 
was introduced into the Examination-statute passed in 
1830 ; in which, permission is granted to such as are can- 
didates merely for a testimonial, to substitute for Logic a 
portion of Euclid. I fear, however, that little or nothing 
will be gained by this ; unless indeed the Examiners re- 
solve to make the examinations in Logic far stricter than 
#?ose in Euclid. For since every one who is capable of 



J4 PREFACE. 

really understanding Euclid must be also capable of Logic, 
the alteration does not meet the case of those whose in- 
aptitude for Science is invincible ; and these are the very 
description of men whose (so called) logical-examinations 
tend to depress the Science. Those few who really are 
physically incapable of scientific reasoning, and the far 
greater number who fancy themselves so, or who at least 
will rather run a risk than surmount their aversion and set 
themselves to study in earnest, — all these will be likely, 
when the alternative is proposed, to prefer Logic to Euclid ; 
because in the latter, it is hardly possible, at least not near 
so easy as in Logic, to present the semblance of prepara- 
tion by learning questions and answers by rote: — in the 
cant phrase of undergraduates, by getting crammed. Ex- 
perience has proved this, in the case of the Responsive- 
examinations, where the alternative of Logic or Euclid has 
always been proposed to the candidates ; of whom those 
most averse to Science, or incapable of it, are almost 
always found to prefer Logic* 

The determination may indeed be formed, and acted on 
from henceforth, that all who do in reality know nothing, 
properly speaking, of any Science, shall be rejected : all I 
know is, that this has never been the case hitherto. 

Still, it is a satisfaction to me, that attention has been 
called to the evil in question, and an experimental measure 
adopted for its abatement. A confident hope is thus af- 
forded, tuat in the event (which I much fear) of the failure 
of the experiment, some other more effectual measure may 
be resorted to. 

I am sensible that many may object, that this is not the 
proper place for such remarks as the foregoing : what has 
the public at large, they may say, to do with the statutes 
of the University of Oxford? To this it might fairly be 
replied, that not only all who think of sending their sons 
or other near relatives to Oxford, but all likewise who are 
placed under the ministry of such as have been educated 
there, are indirectly concerned, to a certain degree, in the 
system there pursued. But the consideration which had 
the chief share in inducing me to say what I have, is, that 
the vindication of Logic from the prevailing disregard and 
contempt under which it labours, would have been alto- 
gether incomplete without it, For let it be remembered 

* Since this was written, the experiment has been tried. In the 
Examination-list for the present Term (Easter, 1831) of 125 can- 
didates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty-five present 
Euclid for their examination, and one hundred JjOgic ! 



PREFACE 15 

that the Science is judged of by the Public in this country, 
in a very great degree, from the specimens displayed, and 
the reports made, by those whom Oxford sends forth. 
Every one, on looking into the University Calendar or 
Statute Book, feels himself justified in assuming, that who- 
ever has graduated at Oxford must be a Logician: not, 
indeed, necessarily a first-rate Logician ; but such as to 
satisfy the public examiners that he has a competent know- 
ledge of the Science. Now, if a very large proportion of 
these persons neither are, nor think themselves at all bene- 
fited by their (so called) logical education, and if many of 
them treat the study with contempt, and represent it as a 
mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon, which it is a 
mere waste of time to attend to, let any one judge what 
conclusions respecting the utility of the study, and the 
wisdom of the University in upholding it, are likely to be 
the result. 

That prejudices so deeply-rooted as those I have alluded 
to, and supported by the authority of such eminent names, 
especially that of Locke, and (as is commonly, though not 
very correctly supposed) Bacon, should be overthrown at 
once by the present treatise, I am not so sanguine as to 
expect ; but if I have been successful in refuting some of the 
most popular objections, and explaining some principles 
which are in general ill-understood, it maybe hoped that 
in time just notions on the subject may gain ground : espe- 
cially if, as I have some reason to hope a more able advo- 
cate of the same cause should be induced to step forward. 

It may be permitted me to mention, that as I have 
addressed myself to various classes of students, from the 
most uninstructed tyro, to the furthest-advanced Logician, 
and have touched accordingly both on the most elementary 
principles, and on some of the most remote deductions 
from them, it must be expected that readers of each class 
will find some parts not well calculated for them. Some 
explanations will appear to the one too simple and puerile ; 
and for another class, some of the disquisitions will be at 
first too abstruse. If to each description some portions are 
found interesting, it is as much as I can expect. 

With regard to the style, I have considered perspicuity 
not only, as it always must be, the first point, but as one 
of such paramount importance in such a subject, as to 
justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity of explanation, — 
homeliness in illustration, — and baldness of expression, I 
have regarded as blemishes not worth thinking of, when 
any thing was to be gained in respect of clearness. 

Of the correctness of the fundamental doctrines main- 
2* 



16 PREFACE. 

tained in the work, I maybe allowed to feel some confidence ; 
not so much from the length of time (about eighteen years) 
that I have been more or less occupied with it, enjoying at 
the same time the advantage of frequent suggestions and 
corrections from several judicious friends, as from the 
nature of the subject. In works of taste an author cannot 
be sure that the judgment of the public will coincide with 
his own ; and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails of his sole 
or most appropriate object. But in the case of truths which 
admit of Scientific demonstration, it is possible to arrive by 
reasoning at as full an assurance of the justness of the con- 
clusions established, as the imperfection of the human 
faculties will admit ; and experience, accompanied with 
attentive observation, and with repeated trials of various 
methods, may enable one long accustomed to tuition, to 
ascertain with considerable certainty what explanations 
are the best comprehended. Many parts of the detail, how- 
ever, may probably be open to objections ; but if (as expe- 
rience now authorizes me the more confidently to hope) 
no errors are discovered, which materially affect the sub- 
stantial utility of the work, but only such as detract from 
the credit of the author, the object will have been attained 
which I ought to have had principally in view. 

No credit, I am aware, is given to an author's own dis- 
claimer of personal motives, and profession of exclusive 
regard for public utility ; since even sincerity cannot, on 
this point, secure him from deceiving himself; but it may 
be allowable to observe that one whose object was the in- 
crease of his reputation as a writer, could hardly have 
chosen a subject less suitable for his purpose than the 
present. Though the interest in it has greatly exceeded 
what I had anticipated, it still can hardly be called a popu- 
lar subject, or one likely to become so, in any considerable 
degree at least during the lifetime of a writer of the present 
day. Ignorance, fortified by prejudice, opposes its recep- 
tion, even in the minds of those who are considered as both 
candid and well-informed. Besides that a great majority 
of readers not only know not what Logic is, but have no 
curiosity to learn, the greater part of those who imagine 
that they do know, are wedded to erroneous notions of it. 
The multitude never think of paying any attention to the 
correctness of their reasoning; and those who do are 
usually too confident that they are already completely suc- 
cessful in this point, to endure the thought of seeking in- 
struction upon it. 

And as, on the one hand, a large class of modern phi- 
losophers may be expected to raise a clamour against 



PREFACE. 17 

"obsolete prejudices ;" "bigoted devotion to the decrees 
of Aristotle j" " confining the human mind in the trammels 
of the Schoolmen," &c, so on the other hand, all such as 
really are thus bigoted to every thing that has been long 
established, merely because it has been long established, 
will be ready to exclaim against the presumption of an 
author, who presumes to depart in several points from the 
track of his predecessors. 

There is another circumstance, also, which tends mate- 
rially to diminish the credit of a writer on this and some 
other kindred subjects. We can make no discoveries of 
striking novelties : the senses of our readers are not struck, 
as with the return of a Comet which had been foretold, or 
the extinction of a taper in carbonic-acid gas : the mate- 
rials we work upon are common and familiar to all, and, 
therefore, supposed to be well understood by all. And not 
only is any one's deficiency in the use of these materials, 
such as is generally unfelt by himself, but when it is re- 
moved by satisfactory explanations — when the notions, 
which had been perplexed and entangled, are cleared up 
by the introduction of a few simple and apparently obvious 
principles, he will generally forget that any explanation at 
all was needed, and consider all that has been said as mere 
truisms, which even a child could supply to himself. Such 
is the nature of the fundamental principles of a Science — 
they are so fully implied in the most evident and well- 
known truths, that the moment they are fully embraced, it 
becomes a difficulty to conceive that we could ever have 
been not aware of them. And hence, the more simple, 
clear, and obvious any principle is rendered, the more 
likely is its exposition to elicit those common remarks, " of 
course ! of course !" " no one could ever doubt that ;" " this 
is all very true, but there is nothing new brought to light ; — 
nothing that was not familiar to every one ;" " there needs 
no ghost to tell us that." I am convinced that a verbose, 
mystical, and partially obscure way of writing on such a sub- 
ject, is the most likely to catch the attention of the multitude. 
The generality verify the observation of Tacitus, " omne 
ignotum pro mirifico :" and when any thing is made very 
plain to them, are apt to fancy that they knew it already ; 
so that the explanations of scientific truths are likely, for a 
considerable time at least, to be, by most men, underrated 
the more, the more perfectly they accomplish their object. 

A very slow progress, therefore, towards popularity is 
the utmost that can be expected for such a treatise as I 
have endeavoured to make the present. I have felt my- 
self bound, however, not only as a member of Society, but 



iS PREFACE. 

more especially as a minister of the Gospel, to use my 
endeavours towards promoting an object which to me 
appears highly important, and what is much more, whose 
importance is appreciated by very few besides. The cause 
of Truth universally, and not least, of religious Truth, is 
benefited by every thing that tends to promote sound rea- 
soning and facilitate the detection of fallacy. The adver- 
saries of our faith would, I am convinced, have been on 
many occasions more satisfactorily answered, and would 
have had fewer openings for cavil, had a thorough ac- 
quaintance with Logic been a more common qualification 
than it is. In lending my endeavours, therefore, whether 
with greater or less success, towards this object, I trust that 
I am neither uselessly nor unsuitably employed. 

I have seen in several writers, a sort of sneering allu- 
sions to " Logic ;" and also to " Truth," (the latter, in 
reference, I presume, to an Essay on that subject) which 
I cannot but feel to be consolatory and even nattering. If 
such expressions had been accompanied by an attempt to 
refute the fundamental principles I have endeavoured to 
maintain, it would have been understood that such implied 
censure was meant to be directed against false pretensions. 
But as it is, such writers seem to admit that it is Truth as 
Truth, and Logical reasoning, as such, that they dislike. 
And certainly any who wish to propagate errors, or to 
defend abuses, are perfectly right in disliking the cultiva- 
tion of Logic, though they may not be prudent in avowing 
this feeling. The clear day-light could not be more un- 
welcome to the " Children of the Mist," than the establish- 
ment and diffusion of accurate principles of reasoning, to 
the advocates of what they are aware is unsound. 

Many indeed whose opinions on various points are op- 
posed, are sincerely convinced of the truth of what they 
maintain : but all of these ought to feel a full confidence 
that truth, wherever it may lie, will be best ascertained 
and best supported, by a system of sound reasoning. 

Those who are engaged in, or designed for the Sacred 
Ministry, and all others who are sensible that the cause of 
true Religion is not a concern of the Ministry alone, should 
remember that this is no time to forego any of the ad- 
vantages which that cause may derive from an active and 
judicious cultivation of the faculties. Among the enemies 
of Christianity in the present day, are included, if I mistake 
not, a veiy different description of persons from those who 
were chiefly to be met with a centuiy, or even half a cen- 
tury ago : what were called " men of wit and pleasure about 
town ;" — ignorant, shallow, flippant declaimers, or dull and 



PREFACE. 19 

powerless pretenders to Philosophy. Among the enemies 
of the Gospel now, are to be found men not only of learn- 
ing and ingenuity, but of cultivated argumentative powers, 
and not unversed in the principles of Logic. If the advo 
cates of our Religion think proper to disregard this help, 
they will find, on careful inquiry, that their opponents do 
not. And let them not trust too carelessly to the strength 
of their cause : Truth will, indeed, prevail, where all other 
points are nearly equal ; but it may suffer a temporary dis- 
comfiture, if hasty assumptions, unsound arguments, and 
vague and empty declamation, occupy the place of a train 
of close, accurate, and luminous reasoning. 

It is not, however, solely or chiefly for polemical pur- 
poses that the cultivation of the reasoning faculty is de- 
sirable ; in persuading, and investigating, in learning, or 
teaching, — in all the multitude of cases in which it is our 
object to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead others to 
them, it is most important. A knowledge of logical rules 
will not indeed supply the want of other knowledge ; nor 
was it ever proposed, by any one who really understood 
this Science, to substitute it for any other ; but it is no less 
true that no other can be substituted for this: that it is 
valuable in every branch of study ; and that it enables us 
to use the knowledge we possess to the greatest advantage. 
It is to be hoped, therefore, that those academical bodies, 
who have been wise enough to retain this Science, will, 
instead of being persuaded to abandon it, give their atten- 
tion rather to its improvement and more effectual cultiva- 
tion. 



CONTENTS. 



Introduction 



Pag* 
2C 



BOOK I. 
Analytical Outline of the Science . 

BOOK II. 



40 



Synthetical Compendium 68 

Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms 68 
Chap. II. — Of Propositions ..... 74 
Chap. III.— Of Arguments ..... 84 
Chap. IV. — Supplement to Chap. III. . . . 102 
Chap. V.— Supplement to Chap. 1 125 



BOOK IIL 



Of Fallacies 



BOOK IV. 



Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning 
Chap. I. — Of Induction .... 
Chap. II. — On the Discovery of Truth . 
Chap. III. — Of Inference and Proof 
Chap. IV. — Of Verbal and Real Questions 
Chap. V.— Of Realism .... 



144 



106 
107 
212 

244 
249 



2i CONTENTS. 

APPENDIX. 

Page 
No. 1. — On certain Terms which are peculiarly liable 

to be used ambiguously . . . . 261 
No. II. — Miscellaneous Examples for the exercise of 

Learners ....... 324 

No. III. — Example of Analysis 350 

Index 353 






ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 



INTRODUCTION. 

Logic, in the most extensive sense which the Definition of 
name can with propriety be made to bear, may Loglc - 
be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Rea- 
soning. It investigates the principles on which argumenta- 
tion is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind 
from error in its deductions. Its most appropriate office, 
however, is that of instituting an analysis of the process of 
the mind in Reasoning ; and in this point of view it is, as 
has been stated, strictly a Science : while, considered in 
reference to the practical rules above mentioned, it may be 
called the Art of Reasoning. This distinction, as will 
hereafter appear, has been overlooked, or not clearly point- 
ed out by most writers on the subject ; Logic having been in 
general regarded as merely an art ; and its claim to hold 
a place among the sciences having been expressly denied. 

Considering how early Logic attracted the at- Pl . eva j lin(T 
tention of philosophers, it may appear surprising ™s S p|ctir.g 
that so little progress should have been made, as ° s ' c * 
is confessedly the case, in developing its principles, and per- 
fecting the detail of the system ; and this circumstance has 
been brought forward as a proof of the barrenness and fu- 
3 



26 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 

tility of the study. But a similar argument might have 
been urged with no less plausibility, at a period not very 
remote, against the study of Natural Philosophy ; and r very 
recently, against that of Chemistry. No science can be 
expected to make any considerable progress, which is not 
cultivated on right principles. Whatever may be the inhe- 
rent vigor of the plant, it will neither be flourishing nor fruit- 
ful, till it meet with a suitable soil and culture : and in no 
case is the remark more applicable than in the present ; the 
greatest mistakes having always prevailed respecting the 
nature of Logic, and its province having in consequence 
been extended by many writers to subjects with which it has 
no proper connexion. Indeed, with the exception of 
Aristotle, (who is himself not entirely exempt from the 
errors in question,) hardly a writer on Logic can be 
mentioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in 
view throughout, its real nature and object. Before his 
time, no distinction was drawn between the science of 
which we are speaking, and that which is now usually 
called Metaphysics ; a circumstance, which alone shows 
how small was the progress made in earlier times. In- 
deed, those who first turned their attention to the subject, 
hardly thought of inquiring into the process of Reasoning 
itself, but confined themselves almost entirely to certain 
preliminary points, the discussion of which is (if logically 
considered) subordinate to that of the main inquiry. 
Early writers Zeno, the Eleatic, whom most accounts repre- 
on Logic. sent as t ^ e ear ii es t systematic writer on the sub- 
ject of Logic, or, as it was then called, Dialectics, divided 
his work into three parts; the first of which (upon conse- 
quences) is censured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen.] for 
obscurity and confusion. In his second part, however, he 



INTRODUCTION. 27 

furnished that interrogatory method of disputation [iptirnaiq) 
which Socrates adopted, and which has since borne his 
name. The third part of his work was devoted to what may 
not be improperly termed the art of wrangling- [ipicnKhl 
which supplied the disputant with a collection of sophistical 
questions, so contrived, that the concession of some point 
which seemed unavoidable, immediately involved some 
glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all 
falling within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be 
regarded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly repre- 
sented it) as its principal or proper business. The Greek 
philosophers generally have unfortunately devoted too 
much attention to it; but we must beware of falling into 
the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have regarded 
as a serious and intrinsically important study, that which 
in fact they considered as an ingenious recreation. The 
disputants diverted themselves in their leisure hours by 
making trial of their own and their adversary's acuteness, 
in the endeavour mutually to perplex each other with subtle 
fallacies; much in the same way as men amuse them- 
selves with propounding and guessing riddles, or with the 
game of chess ; to each of which diversions the sportive 
disputations of the ancients bore much resemblance. 
They were closely analogous to the wrestling and other 
exercises of the Gymnasium ; these last being reckoned 
conducive to bodily vigor and activity, as the former were 
to habits of intellectual acuteness : but the immediate 
object in each was a sportive, not a serious contest j 
though doubtless fashion and emulation often occasioned 
an undue importance to be attached to success in each. 

Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any 

; - i • . , r , • Zcno - 

further a logician than as to what respects his 



28 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

erotetic method of disputation; a course of arg-ument con- 
structed on this principle being properly an hypothetical 
Sorites, which may easily be reduced into a series of syl- 
logisms. 

Euclid and ^0 Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and 
Antisthenes. Antisthenes ; both pupils of Socrates. The for- 
mer of these prosecuted the subject of the third part of his 
predecessor's treatise, and is said to have been the author 
of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school. 
Of the writings of the latter nothing certain is known ; if, 
however, we suppose the abovementioned sect to be his 
disciples in this study, and to have retained his principles, 
he certainly took a more correct view, of the subject than 
Euclid. The Stoics divided all Ae*™, every thing that 
could be said, into three classes: 1st, the Simple Term; 
2d, the Proposition; 3d, the Syllogism; viz. the hypo- 
thetical ; for they seem to have had little notion of a more 
rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar form. 

We must not here omit to notice the merits 
of Archytas, to whom we are indebted for the 
doctrine of the Categories. He, however, (as well as the 
other writers on the subject) appears to have had no dis- 
tinct view of the proper object and just limits of the science 
of Logic ; but to have blended with it metaphysical discus- 
sions not strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt on the 
investigation of the nature of terms and propositions, without 
maintaining a constant reference to the principles of Rea- 
soning ; to which all the rest should be made subservient. 

The state, then, in which Aristotle found the 

science (if indeed it can properly be said to have 

existed at all before his time) appears to have been nearly 

this: the division into Simple Terms, Propositions, and 



INTRODUCTION. 29 

Syllogisms, had been slightly sketched out ; the doctrine of 
the Categories, and perhaps that of the Opposition of pro- 
positions, had been laid down; and, as some believe, the 
analysis of Species into Genus and Differentia, had been in- 
troduced by Socrates. These, at best, were rather the ma- 
terials of the system, than the system itself; the foundation 
of which indeed he distinctly claims the merit of having 
laid, and which remains fundamentally the same as he left it. 
It has been remarked, that the logical system is one 
of those few theories which have been begun and perfect- 
ed by the same individual. The history of its discovery, 
as far as the main principles of the science are concerned, 
properly commences and ends with Aristotle; and this 
may perhaps in part account for the subsequent perver- 
sions of it. The brevity and simplicity of its fundamental 
truths (to which point indeed all real science is perpetually 
tending) has probably led many to suppose that something 
much more complex, abstruse, and mysterious, remained 
to be discovered. The vanity, too, by which all men are 
prompted unduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led 
unphilosophical minds, not in this case alone, but in many 
others, to extend the boundaries of their respective sci- 
ences, not by the patient development and just application 
of the principles of those sciences, but by wandering into 
irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers 
by Pythagoras, in matters utterly foreign to arithme- 
tic, is perhaps the earliest instance of the kind. A more 
curious and important one is the degeneracy of astronomy 
into judicial Astrology ; but none is more striking than the 
misapplication of Logic, by those who have treated of it 
as " the art of rightly employing the rational faculties," or 
who have intruded it into the province of Natural Phi- 
3* 



30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

losophy, and regarded the Syllogism as an engine for the 
investigation of nature : while they overlooked the bound- 
less field that was before them within the legitimate limits 
of the science ; and perceived not the importance and dif- 
ficulty of the task, of completing and properly filling up 
the masterly sketch before them. 

The writings of Aristotle were not only absolutely lost 
to the world for about two r.mturies, bui seem to have 
been but little studied for a long time after their recovery. 
An art, however, of Logic, derived from the principles 
traditionally preserved by his disciples, seems to have 
been generally known, and to have been employed by 
Cicero in his philosophical works ; but the pursuit of the 
science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. 
Early in the Christian era, the Peripatetic doctrines expe- 
rienced a considerable revival; and Ave meet with the 
Galen, names of Galen and Porphyry as logicians : but 

Porphyry. ^ ^ nQt till tJie fifth century . that Aristotle's logi- 
cal works were translated into Latin by the cele- 
Boethius. orated Boethius. Not one of these seems to have 
made any considerable advances in developing the theory 
df reasoning. Of Galen's labors little is known; and 
Porphyry's principal work is merely on the predicables. 
We have little of the science till the revival of learning 
among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on this 
as well as on other subjects were eagerly studied. 

Passing by the names of some Byzantine writers of no 
great importance, we come to the times of the school- 
Schooimen. men, whose waste of ingenuity and frivolous 
subtlety of disputation need not be enlarged upon. It 
may be sufficient to observe, that their fault did not lie in 
their diligent study of Logic, and the high value they set 



INTRODUCTION. 31 

upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature and 
object of the science; and by the attempt to employ it 
for the purpose of physical discoveries, involving every 
subject in a mist of words, to the exclusion of sound phi- 
losophical investigation. Their errors may serve to ac- 
count for the strong terms in which Bacon 

. . Bacon. 

sometimes appears to censure logical pursuits ; 
but that this censure was intended to bear against the 
extravagant perversions, not the legitimate cultivation of 
the science, may be proved from his own observations on 
the subject, in his Advancement of Learning. 

His moderation, however, was not imitated in other 
quarters. Even Locke confounds in one sweep- 
ing censure the Aristotelic theory, with the ab- 
surd misapplications and perversions of it in later years. 
His objection to the science, as unserviceable in the 
iiscovery of truth, (which has of late been often repeated,) 
while it holds good in reference to many (misnamed) lo- 
gicians, indicates that, with regard to the true nature of the 
science itself, he had no clearer notions than they have, of 
the proper province of Logic, viz. Reasoning ; and of the 
distinct character of that operation from the observations 
and experiments w T hich are essential to the study of nature. 

An error apparently different, but substantially 
the same, pervades the treatises of Watts and oth- 
er modern writers on the subject. Perceiving the inade- 
quacy of the syllogistic theory to the vast purposes to which 
others had attempted to apply it, he still craved after the at- 
tainment of some equally comprehensive and all-powerful 
system ; which he accordingly attempted to construct, under 
the title of The Right Use of Reason, — which was to be a 
method of invigorating and properly directing all the pow- 



32 LEMENTS OF LOGIC, 

ers of the mind: — a most magnificent object indeed, but 
one which not only does not fall under the province of 
Logic, but cannot be accomplished by any one science or 
system that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt 
to comprehend so wide a field, is no extension of science, 
but a mere verbal generalization, which leads only to 
vague and barren declamation. In every pursuit, the 
more precise and definite our object, the more likely we 
are to attain some valuable result ; if, like the Platonists, 
who sought after the airayadov, — the abstract idea of 
good, — we pursue some specious but ill-defined scheme 
of universal knowledge, we shall lose the substance while 
grasping at a shadow, and bewilder ourselves in empty 
generalities. 

It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still 
later times several ingenious writers, forming their notions 
of the science itself from professed masters in it, such as 
have just been alluded to, and judging of its value from 
their failures, should have treated the Aristotehc system 
with so much reprobation and scorn. Too much preju- 
diced to bestow on it the requisite attention for enabling 
them clearly to understand its real character and object, 
or even to judge correctly from the little they did under- 
stand, they have assailed the study wi*h a host of objec- 
tions, so totally irrelevant, and consequently impotent, that, 
considering the talents and general information of those 
from whom they proceed, they might excite astonishment 
in any one who did not fully estimate the force of very 
early prejudice. 

incorrect Logic has usually been considered by these 

Sureofthe objectors as professing to furnish a peculiar meth- 
science. Q( j Q f reason j n g 5 instead of a method of analyzing 



INTRODUCTION. 33 

that mental process which must invariably take place in all 
correct reasoning; and accordingly they have contrasted 
the ordinary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic, and 
have brought forward with an air of triumph the argumenta- 
tive skill of many who never learned the system ; a mistake 
no less gross than if any one should regard Grammar as a 
peculiar Language, and should contend against its utility, on 
the ground that many speak correctly who never studied the 
principles of grammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, 
the Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward the 
regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of argumentation, de- 
signed to be substituted for any other mode; but as the 
form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately 
reduced; and which, consequently, serves the purpose 
(when we are employing Logic as an art) of a test to try 
the validity of any argument ; in the same manner as by 
chemical analysis we develop and submit to a distinct ex- 
amination the elements of which any compound body is 
composed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent so- 
phistication and impurity. 

Complaints have also been made that Logic leaves un- 
touched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the 
sources of the chief errors in reasoning; viz. the ambi- 
guity or indistinctness of Terms, and the doubts respecting 
the degrees of evidence in various Propositions : an ob- 
jection which is not to be removed by any such attempt 
as that of Watts, to lay down "rules for forming clear 
ideas, and for guiding the judgment;" but by replying 
that no art is to be censured for not teaching more than 
falls within its province, and indeed more than can be 
taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of univer- 
sal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning or 



34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, — cer- 
tainty or uncertainty, — of every proposition, thus super- 
seding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to ex* 
pect, or even to imagine. And to find fault with Logic 
for not performing this, is as if one should object to the 
science of Optics for not giving sight to the blind ; or as 
if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a story in his 
Div. Leg.) one should complain of a reading-glass for 
being of no service to a person who had never learned to 
read. 

In fact, the difficulties and errors above alluded to are 
not in the process of Reasoning itself, (which alone is the 
appropriate province of Logic,) but in the subject-matter 
about which it is employed. This process will have been 
correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical 
rules, which preclude the possibility of any error creeping 
in between the principles from which we are arguing, and 
the conclusions we deduce from them. But still that con- 
clusion may be false, if the principles we start from are 
so. In like manner, no arithmetical skill will secure a 
correct result to a calculation, unless the data are correct 
from which we calculate: nor does any one on that 
account undervalue Arithmetic ; and yet the objection 
against Logic rests on no better foundation. 

There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect be- 
tween the two sciences. All numbers (which are the sub- 
ject of Arithmetic) must be numbers of some things, 
whether coins, persons, measures, or any thing else ; but 
to introduce into the science any notice of the things re- 
specting which calculations are made, would be evidently 
irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character : we 
proceed therefore with arbitrary signs representing num* 



INTRODUCTION. 35 

bers in the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on 
the validity of a regularly constructed argument, equally 
well, though arbitrary symbols may have been substituted 
for the terms ; and, consequently, without any regard to 
the things signified by those terms. And the possibility 
of doing this (though the employment of such arbitrary 
symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers 
who understood not only Arithmetic but Algebra) is a 
proof of the strictly scientific character of the system. 
But many professed logical writers, not attending to the 
circumstances which have been just mentioned, have wan- 
dered into disquisitions on various branches of knowledge ; 
disquisitions which must evidently be as boundless as hu- 
man knowledge itself, since there is no subject on which 
Reasoning is not employed, and to which, consequently, 
Logic may not be applied. The error lies in regarding 
every thing as the proper province of Logic to which it is 
applicable. A similar error is complained of by Aristotle, 
as having taken place with respect to Rhetoric ; of which, 
indeed, we find specimens in the arguments of several of 
the interlocutors in Cic. de Oratore. 

From what has been said, it will be evident that there 
is hardly any subject to which it is so difficult to introduce 
the student in a clear and satisfactory manner, as the one 
we are now engaged in. In any other branch of know- 
ledge, the reader, if he have any previous acquaintance 
with the subject, will usually be so far the better prepared 
for comprehending the exposition of the principles ; or if 
he be entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to the 
study with a mind unbiassed, and free from prejudices and 
misconceptions: whereas, in the present case, it cannot 
but happen, that many who have given some attention to 



36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 

'ogical pursuits (or what are usually considered as such) 
will have rather been bewildered by fundamentally erro- 
neous views, than prepared, by the acquisition of just prin- 
ciples, for ulterior progress ; and that not a few who pre- 
tend not to any acquaintance whatever with the science, 
will yet have imbibed either such prejudices against it, or 
such false notions respecting its nature, as cannot but 
prove obstacles in their study of it. 

There is, however, a difficulty which exists more or 
less in all abstract pursuits; though it is perhaps more 
felt in this, and often occasions it to be rejected by begin- 
ners as dry and tedious ; viz. the difficulty of perceiving 
to what ultimate end — to what practical or interesting 
application — the abstract principles lead, which are first 
laid before the student; so that he will often have to work 
his way patiently through the most laborious part of the 
system before he can gain any clear idea of the drift and 
intention of it. 

• This complaint has often been made by chemical stu- 
dents, who are wearied with descriptions of oxygen, hy- 
drogen, and other invisible elements, before they have any 
knowledge respecting such bodies as commonly present 
themselves to the senses. And accordingly some teach- 
ers of chemistry obviate in a great degree this objection, 
by adopting the analytical instead of the synthetical mode 
of procedure, when they are first introducing the subject 
to beginners; i. e. instead of synthetically enumerating 
the elementary substances, — proceeding next to the sim- 
plest combinations of these, — and concluding with those 
more complex substances which are of the most common 
occurrence, they begin by analyzing these last, and re- 
solving them step by step into their simple elements ; thus 



INTRODUCTION. 



37 



at once presenting the subject in an interesting point of 
view, and clearly setting forth the object of it. The syn- 
thetical form of teaching is indeed sufficiently interesting 
to one who has made considerable progress in any study ; 
and being more concise, regular, and systematic, is the 
form in which our knowledge naturally arranges itself in 
the mind, and is retained by the memory : but the ana- 
lytical is the more interesting, easy, and natural kind of 
introduction ; as being the form in which the first inven- 
tion or discovery of any kind of system must originally 
have taken place. 

It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by giving a 
slight sketch, in this form, of the logical system, before 
we enter regularly upon the details of it. The reader 
will thus be presented with a kind of imaginary history of 
the course of inquiry by which that system may be con* 
ceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind. 



BOOK I. 

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE. 

* 1. 

In every instance in which we reason, in the strict 
sense of the word, i. e. make use of arguments, whether 
for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying in- 
struction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, 
whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain 
process takes place in the mind, which is one and the 
same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted. 

Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is even 
conscious of this process in his own mind ; much less, is 
competent to explain the principles on which it proceeds. 
This indeed is, and cannot but be, the case with every 
other process respecting which any system has been form- 
ed ; the practice not only may exist independently of the 
theory, but must have preceded the theory. There must 
have been Language before a system of Grammar could 
be devised; and musical compositions, previous to the 
science of Music. This, by the way, will serve to ex- 
pose the futility of the popular objection against Logic, 
that men may reason very well who know nothing of it* 

* Locke has a great deal to this purpose ; e. g. in chap. 
xviL " on Reason," (which, by the way, he perpetually con- 



40 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 

The parallel instances adduced, show that such an object- 
tion might be applied in many ether cases, where its ab- 
surdity would be obvious; and that there is no ground for 



founds with Reasoning.) He says, in § 4, "If syllogisms must 
be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means 
of knowledge, it will follow, that before Aristotle there was not 
one man that did or could know any thing by reason ; and that 
since the invention of syllogisms there is not one in ten thou- 
sand that doth. But God has not been so sparing to men to 
make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle 
to make them rational, i. e. those few of them that he could get 
so to examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above 
threescore ways that three propositions may be laid together, 
there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that the con- 
clusion is right," &c. &c. " God has been more bountiful to 
mankind than so : He has given them a mind that can reason 
without being instructed in methods of syllogizing," &c. &c. 
All this is not at all less absurd than if aDy one, on being told 
of the discoveries of modern chemists respecting caloric, and 
on hearing described the process by which it is conducted 
through a boiler into the water, which it converts into a gas 
of sufficient elasticity to overcome the pressure of the atmos- 
phere, <f«c., should reply, " If all this were so, it would follow 
that before the time of these chemists no one ever did or could 
make any liquor boil." 

In an ordinary, obscure, and trilling writer, all this confusion 
of thought and common-place declamation might as well have 
been left unnoticed; but it is due to the general ability and to 
the celebrity of such an author as Locke, that errors of this 
kind should be exposed. 

He presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle, in 
which he is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for the " in- 
vention of syllogisms;" to which he certainly had no more 
claim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants and animals; or 
Hervey, to the praise of having made the blood circulate ; or 
Lavoisier, to that of having farmed the atmosphere we breathe. 



5 1.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 41 

deciding thence, either that the system has no tendency 
to improve practice, or that even if it had not, it might not 
still be a dignified and interesting pursuit. 

One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a 
just view of the nature and object of Logic, is the not ful- 
ly understanding, or not sufficiently keeping in mind, the 
sameness of the reasoning process in all cases. If, as 
the ordinary mode of speaking would seem to indicate, 
mathematical reasoning, and theological, and metaphysi- 
cal, and political, &c. were essentially different from each 
other, i. e. different kinds of reasoning, it would follow, 
that supposing there could be at all any such science, as 
we have described Logic, there must be so many different 
species or at least different branches of Logic. And 
such is perhaps the most prevailing notion. Nor is this 
much to be wondered at; since it is evident to all, that 
some men converse and write, in an argumentative way, 
very justly on one subject, and very erroneously on anoth- 
er, in which again others excel, who fail in the former. 
This error may be at once illustrated and re- Reaslonin( , 
moved, by considering the parallel instance of f a r r °f„ a y 3 
Arithmetic; in which every one is aware that jects ' 
the process of a calculation is not affected by the nature 
of the objects whose numbers are before us : but that 
(e. g.) the multiplication of a number is the very same 
operation, whether it be a number of men, of miles, or of 

And the utility of this invention consists, according to him, in 
the great service done against " those who were not ashamed 
to deny any thing:" a service which never could have been 
performed, had syllogisms been an invention of Aristotle's; 
for what sophist could ever have consented to restrict himself 
to one particular kind of arguments, dictated by his opponent ? 

4* 



42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

pounds ; though nevertheless persons may perhaps be 
found who are accurate in calculations relative to natural 
philosophy, and incorrect in those of political economy, 
from their different degrees of skill in the subjects of these 
two sciences; not surely because there are different arts 
of arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively. 

Others again, who are aware that the simple system of 
Logic may be applied to all subjects whatever, are yet 
disposed to view it as a peculiar method of reasoning, and 
not, as it is, a method of unfolding and analyzing our rea- 
soning : whence many have been led (e. g. the author of 
the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk of comparing Syllo- 
gistic reasoning with Moral reasoning ; taking it for grant- 
ed that it is possible to reason correctly without reasoning 
logically ; which is, in fact, as great a blunder as if any 
one were to mistake grammar for a peculiar language, 
and to suppose it possible to speak correctly without 
speaking grammatically. They have in short considered 
Logic as an art of reasoning ; whereas (so far as it is an 
art) it is the art of reasoning ; the logician's object being, 
not to lay down principles by which one may reason, but, 
by which all must reason, even though they are not dis- 
tinctly aware of them: — to lay down rules, not which 
may be followed with, advantage, but which cannot pos- 
sibly be departed from in sound reasoning. These misap- 
prehensions and objections being such as lie on the very 
threshold of the subject, it would have been hardly pos- 
sible, without noticing them,, to convey any just notion of 
the nature and design of the logical system. 



§2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 43 

§2. 

Supposing it then to have been perceived that the ope- 
ration of reasoning is in all cases the same, the analysis of 
that operation could not fail to strike the mind as an inte- 
resting matter of inquiry. And moreover, since (apparent) 
arguments which are unsound and inconclusive, are so of- 
ten employed, either from error or design ; and since even 
those who are not misled by these fallacies, are so often at 
a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory 
to others, or even to themselves : it could not but appear 
desirable to lay down some general rules of reasoning, ap- 
plicable to all cases ; by which a person might be enabled 
the more readily and clearly to state the grounds of his 
own conviction, or of his objection to the arguments of an 
opponent ; instead of arguing at random, without any fixed 
and acknowledged principles to guide his procedure. 
Such rules would be analogous to those of Arithmetic, 
which obviate the tediousness and uncertainty of calcula- 
tions in the head; wherein, after much labor, different 
persons might arrive at different results, without any of 
them being able distinctly -to point out the error of the 
rest. A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead 
of deserving to be called the art of wrangling, be more 
justly characterized as the "art of cutting short wrang- 
ling," by bringing the parties to issue at once, if not to 
agreement ; and thus saving a waste of ingenuity. 

In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will Analysis of 
be found that every conclusion is deduced, in ar » wnenU 
reality, from two other propositions ; (thence called Prem- 
ises;) for though one of these may be,, and commonly is, 
suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admit- 



44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1. 

ted ; as may easily be made evident by supposing the de- 
nial of the suppressed premiss, which will at once invali- 
date the argument : e. g. if any one, from perceiving that 
" the world exhibits marks of design," infers that " it must 
have had an intelligent author," though he may not be 
aware in his own mind of the existence of any other 
premiss, he will readily understand, if it be denied that 
" whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an in- 
telligent author," that the affirmative of that proposition 
is necessary to the validity of the argument. An argu- 
ment thus stated regularly and at full length, is called a 
Syllogism: which therefore is evidently not a peculiar 
kind of argument, but only a peculiar form of expression, 
in which every argument may be stated. 

When one of the premises is suppressed (which for 
brevity's sake it usually is) the argument is called an En- 
thymeme. And it may be worth while to remark, that 
when the argument is in this state, the objections of an op- 
ponent are (or rather appear to be) of two kinds; viz. 
either objections to the assertion itself, or objections to its~ 
force as an argument. E. G. In the above instance, an 
atheist may be conceived either denying that the world 
docs exhibit marks of design, or denying that it follows 
from thence that it had an intelligent author. Now it is 
important to keep in mind that the only difference in the 
two cases is, that in the one the expressed premiss is de- 
nied, in the other the suppressed; for the force as an ar- 
gument of either premiss depends on the other premiss : 
if both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately connected 
with them cannot be denied. 

It is evidently immaterial to the argument whether the 
conclusion be placed first or last ; but it may be proper to 



§2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. £> 

remark, that a premiss placed after its conclusion is called 
the Reason* of it, and is introduced by one of those con- 
junctions which are called causal ; viz. " since," " be- 
cause," Sfc. which may indeed be employed to designate 
a premiss, whether it came first or last. The illative con- 
junctions, " therefore," fyc. designate the conclusion. 

It is a circumstance w r hich often occasions error and 
perplexity, that both these classes of conjunctions have 
also another signification, being employed to denote, re- 
spectively, Cause and Effect, as well as Premiss and Con- 
clusion : e. g. If I say, " this ground is rich, because the 
trees on it are flourishing," or " the trees are flourishing, 
and therefore the soil must be rich," I employ these con- 
junctions to denote the connexion of Premiss and Conclu- 
sion; for it is plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not 
the cause of the soil's fertility, but only the cause of my 
knowing it. If again I say, " the trees flourish, because 
the ground is rich," or " the ground is rich, and therefore 
the trees flourish," I am using the very same conjunctions 
to denote the connexion of cause and effect ; for Proof and 
in this case, the luxuriance of the trees being cause# ' 
evident to the eye, would hardly need to be proved, but 
might need to be accounted for. There are, however, 
many cases, in which the cause is employed to prove the 
existence of its effect ; especially in arguments relating to 
future events ; as, e. g. when from favorable weather any- 
one argues that the crops are likely to be abundant: f the 



* The Major premiss is often called the Principle ; and the 
word Reason is then confined to the Minor. 

t See Appendix, No. I. art. Reason. See also Rhetori^ Part 
I ch. 2. § ii, 



46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

cause and the reason, in that case, coincide. And this 
contributes to their being so often confounded together 
in other cases. ; 



In an argument, such as the example above given, it is, 
as has been said, impossible for any one, who admits both 
premises, to avoid admitting the conclusion. But there 
a arent w ^ ^ e fr e( l uent ly an apparent connexion of 
arguments premises with a conclusion which does not in 
reality follow from them, though to the inattentive or un- 
skilful the argument may appear to be valid: and there 
are many other cases in which a doubt may exist whether 
the argument be valid or not: i. e. whether it be possible 
or not to admit the premises and yet deny the conclusion. 

It is of the highest importance, therefore, to lay down 
some regular form to which every valid argument may be 
reduced, and to devise a rule which shall show the validity 
of every argument in that form, and consequently the un- 
soundness of any apparent argument which cannot be 
reduced to it : — e. g. if such an argument as this be pro- 
posed, " every rational agent is accountable ; brutes are 
not rational agents; therefore they are not accountable:" 
or again, " all wise legislators suit their laws to the genius 
of their nation ; Solon did this ; therefore he was a wise 
legislator:" there are some, perhaps, who would not per- 
ceive any fallacy in such arguments, especially if envelop- 
ed in a cloud of words ; and still more, when the conclu- 
sion is true, or (which comes to the same point) if they 
are disposed to believe it : and others might perceive in- 
deed, but might be at a loss to explain, the fallacy. Now 
these (apparent) arguments exactly correspond, respect- 



5 3.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 47 

ively, with the following, the absurdity of the conclusions 
from which is manifest ; " every horse is an animal ; sheep 
are not horses; therefore they are not animals:" and, 
" all vegetables grow ; an animal grows ; therefore it is a 
vegetable." These last examples, I have said, corre- 
spond exactly (considered as arguments) with the former; 
the question respecting the validity of an argument being, 
not whether the conclusion be true, but whether it follows 
from the premises adduced. This mode of exposing a 
fallacy, by bringing forward a similar one whose conclu- 
sion is obviously absurd, is often, and very advantageously, 
resorted to in addressing those who are ignorant of Logi- 
cal rules ; * but to lay down such rules, and employ them 
as a test, is evidently a safer and more compendious, as 
well as a more philosophical mode of proceeding. To 
attain these, it would plainly be necessary to analyse some 
clear and valid arguments, and to observe in what their 
conclusiveness consists. 

Let us suppose, then, such an examination to be made 
of the syllogisms above mentioned: "whatever exhibits 
marks of design had an intelligent author; the world ex- 



*An exposure of some of Hume's fallacies in his "Essay on 
Miracles" and elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan, a few 
years ago, in a pamphlet (published anonymously, as the nature 
of the argument required, but which I see no reason against 
acknowledging, entitled "Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon 
Bonaparte;" in which it was shown that the existence of that 
extraordinary person could not, on Hume's principles, be receiv- 
ed as a well-authenticated fact; since it rests on evidence less 
strong than that which supports the Scripture-histories. 

For a clear development of the mode in which this last evi- 
dence operates on most minds, see " Hints on Inspiration," p. 
30-46. 



48 ELEMENTS OF LO&IC. [Book I 

hibits marks of design ; therefore the world had an intel- 
ligent author." In the first of these premises we find it 
assumed universally of the class of "things which exhibit 
marks of design," that they had an intelligent author ; and 
in the other premiss, " the world" is referred to that class 
as comprehended in it : now it is evident, that whatever is 
said of the whole of a class, may be said of any thing 
comprehended in that class; so that We are thus author- 
ized to say of the world, that " it had an intelligent author." 
Again, if we examine a syllogism with a negative conclu- 
sion, as, e. g. " nothing which exhibits marks of design 
could have been produced by chance : the world exhibits, 
&c. ; therefore the world could not have been produced 
by chance," the process of Reasoning will be found to 
be the same; since it is evident, that whatever is denied 
universally of any class may be denied of any thing that 
is comprehended in that class. 

On further examination it will be found, that all valid 
arguments whatever may be easily reduced to such a form 
as that of the foregoing syllogisms ; and that consequently 
the principle on which they are constructed is the Uni- 
versal Principle of Reasoning. So elliptical, indeed, 
is the ordinary mode of expression, even of those who 
are considered as prolix writers, — i. e. so much is 
implied and left to be understood in the course of argu- 
ment, in comparison of what is actually stated, (most men 
being impatient, even to excess, of any appearance of un- 
necessary and tedious formality of statement,) that a single 
sentence will often be found, though perhaps considered 
as a single argument, to contain, compressed into a short 
compass, a chain of several distinct arguments. But if 
each of these be fully developed, and the whole of what 



§ 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 49 

the author intended to imply be stated expressly, it will 
be found that all the steps, even of the longest and most 
complex train of reasoning, may be reduced into the above 
form. 

It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely worthy of 
notice, had not so many, even esteemed writers, fallen 
into it) to imagine that Aristotle and other logicians meant 
to propose that this prolix form of unfolding arguments 
should universally supersede, in argumentative discourses, 
the common forms of expression ; and that " to reason 
logically," means, to state all arguments at full length in 
the syllogistic form : and Aristotle has even been charged 
with inconsistency for not doing so. It has been said, that 
" in his Treatises of Ethics, Politics, fyc. he argues like a 
rational creature, and never attempts to bring his own sys- 
tem into practice."* As well might a chemist be charg- 
ed with inconsistency for making use of any of the com- 
pound substances that are commonly employed, without 
previously analyzing and resolving them into their simple 
elements ; as well might it be imagined that, to speak 
grammatically, means, to parse every sentence we utter. 
The chemist (to pursue the illustration) keeps by him his 
tests and his method of analysis, to be employed when 
any substance is offered to his notice, the composition of 
which has not been ascertained, or in which adulteration 
is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly be compared to 
some adulterated compound ; " it consists of an ingenious 
mixture of truth and falsehood, so entangled, — so inti- 
mately blended, — that the falsehood is (in the chemical 
phrase) held in solution: one drop of sound logic is that 

* Lord Karnes. 



#> ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I 

test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign 
substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom."* 

m, 

Aristotle's -^ ut to resum e the investigation of the princi 
pies cf reasoning: the maxim resulting from, the 
examination of a syllogism in the foregoing form, and of the 
application of which, every valid argument is in reality an 
instance, is, " that whatever is predicated (i. e. affirmed or 
denied) universally, of any class of things, may be predicat- 
ed, in like manner, {viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing 
comprehended in that class." This is the principle, com- 
monly called the dictum dc omni et nullo, for the estab- 
lishment of which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which 
is the keystone of his whole logical system. It is not a 
little remarkable that some, otherwise judicious writers, 
should have been so carried away by their zeal against 
that philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule of 
this principle, on account of its obviousness and simpli- 
city; though they would probably perceive at once in 
any other case, that it is the greatest triumph of phnbsophy 
to refer many, and seemingly very various phenomena to 
one, or a very feAv, simple principles : and that the more 
simple and evident such a principle is, provided it be truly 
applicable to all the cases in question, the greater is its 
value and scientific beauty. If, indeed, any principle bw 
regarded as not thus applicable, that is an objection to it 
of a different kind. Such an objection against Aristotle's 

* This excellent illustration is cited from a passage in an 
anonymous pamphlet, " An Examination of Rett's Logic." The 
author displa3 r s. though in a hasty production, great reach of 
thought, as well as knowledge of his subject. 



§4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 51 

dictum, no one has ever attempted to establish by any kind 
of proof; but it has often been taken for granted; it being 
(as has been stated) very commonly supposed, without 
examination, that the syllogism is a distinct kind of argu- 
ment, and that the rules of it accordingly do not apply, 
nor were intended to apply, to all reasoning whatever. 
Under this misapprehension, Dr. Campbell * labors with 
some ingenuity, and not without an air of plausibility, to 
show that every syllogism must be futile and worthless, 
because the premises virtually assert the conclusion : little 
dreaming, of course, that his objections, however specious, 
lie against the process of reasoning itself universally ; and 
will therefore, of course, apply to those very arguments 
which he is himself adducing. 

It is more extraordinary to find another eminent 
author f adopting, expressly, the very same objections, 
and yet distinctly admitting (within a few pages) the pos- 
sibility of reducing every course of argument to a series of 
syllogisms. 

The same writer brings an objection against the dictum 
of Aristotle, which it may be worth while to notice briefly, 
for the sake of setting m a clearer light the real character 
and object of that principle. Its application being, as has 
been seen, to a regular and conclusive syllogism, he sup- 
poses it intended to prove and make evident the conclu- 
siveness of such a syllogism ; and remarks how unphiloso- 
phical it is to attempt giving a demonstration of a demon- 
stration. And certainly the charge would be just, if we 
could imagine the logician's object to be, to increase the. 
certainty of a conclusion which we are supposed to have 

* " Philosophy of Rhetoric." 

t Dugald Stewart : Philosophy, vol. ji. 



53 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1. 

already arrived at by the clearest possible mode of proof. 
But it is very strange that such an idea should ever have 
occurred to one who had even the slightest tincture of 
natural philosophy: for it might as well be imagined 
that a natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is to 
strengthen the testimony of our senses by d priori reason- 
ing, and to convince us that a stone when thrown will fall 
to the ground, and that gunpowder will explode when 
fired; because they show that according to their princi- 
ples those phenomena must take place as they do. But 
it would be reckoned a mark of the grossest ignorance 
and stupidity not to be aware that their object is not to 
prove the existence of an individual phenomenon, which 
our eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is) to account 
for it : i. e. to show according to what principle it takes 
place; — to refer, in short, the individual case to a gen- 
eral law of nature. The object of Aristotle's dictum is pre- 
cisely analogous : he had, doubtless, no thought of adding 
to the force of any individual syllogism; his design was 
to point out the general principle on which that process is 
conducted which takes place in each syllogism. And as 
the Laws * of nature (as they are called) are in reality 
merely generalized facts, of which all the phenomena 
coming under them are particular instances ; so, the proof 
drawn from Aristotle's dictum is not a distinct demonstra- 
tion brought to confirm another demonstration, but is 
merely a generalized and abstract statement of all demon- 
stration whatever; and is, therefore, in fact, the very 
demonstration which, (mutatis mutandis,) accommodated 
to the various subject-matters, is actually employed in 
each particular case 



* Appendix, No. I. art. Law, 






9 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 53 

In order to trace more distinctly the different The dictum a 
steps of the abstracting process, by which any J^SSent m 
particular argument may be brought into the 1C a s rac ' 
most general form, we may first take a syllogism stated 
accurately and at full length, such as the example for- 
merly given, " whatever exhibits marks of design, fyc." 
and then somewhat generalize the expression, by substi- 
tuting (as in Algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for the 
significant terms that were originally used ; the syllogism 
will then stand thus ; " every B is A ; C is B ; therefore 
C is A." The reasoning is no less evidently valid when 
thus stated, whatever terms A, B, and C, respectively 
may be supposed to stand for ; such terms may indeed 
be inserted as to make all or some of the assertions 
false? but it will still be no less impossible for any one 
who admits the truth of the premises, in an argument thus 
constructed, to deny the conclusion ; and this it is that con- 
stitutes the conclusiveness of an argument. 

Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, it appears 
clearly, that " A stands for any thing whatever that is 
affirmed of a whole class," {viz. of every B,) " which class 
comprehends or contains in it something else" viz. C (of 
which B is, in the second premiss, affirmed;) and that, 
consequently, the first term (A) is, in the conclusion, 
predicated of the third (C.) 

Now to assert the validity of this process, now before 
us, is to state the very dictum we are treating o£ with 
hardly even a verbal alteration ; viz. : 

1. Any thing whatever, predicated of a whole class 

2. Under which class something else is contained, 

3. May be predicated of that which is so contained. 

The three members into which the maxim is here dis- 
5* 



54 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1. 

tributed, correspond to the three propositions of the syllo- 
gism to which they are intended respectively to apply. 

The advantage of substituting- for the terms, in a regu- 
air syllogism, arbitrary, unmeaning symbols, such as letters 
of the alphabet, is much the same as in geometry : the 
reasoning itself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and 
without any risk of our being misled by the truth or falsity 
of the conclusion ; which is, in fact, accidental and varia- 
ble ; the essential point being, as far as the argument is 
concerned, the connexion betvieen the premises and the 
conclusion. We are thus enabled to embrace the general 
principle of all reasoning, and to perceive its applicability 
to an indefinite number of individual cases. That Aris- 
totle, therefore, should have been accused of making use 
of these symbols for the purpose of darkening his demon- 
strations, and that too by persons not unacquainted with 
geometry and algebra, is truly astonishing. If a geometer, 
instead of designating the four angles of a square by four 
letters, were to call them north, south, east, and west, he 
would not render the demonstration of a theorem the 
easier ; and the learner would be much more likely to be 
perplexed in the application of it. 

It belongs then exclusively to a syllogism, properly so 
called, (i. e. a valid argument, so stated that its conclusive- 
ness is evident from the mere form of the expression,) 
that if letters, or any other unmeaning symbols, be substi- 
tuted for the several terms, the validity of the argument 
shall still be evident. Whenever this is not the case, the 
supposed argument is either unsound and sophistical, or 
else may be reduced (without any alteration of its mean- 
ing) into the syllogistic form ; in which form, the test just 
mentioned may be applied to it 






Detection of 

unsound 

arguments. 



S 4.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 55 

What is called an unsound or fallacious argu- 
ment, i. e. an apparent argument, which is, in 
reality, none, cannot, of course, be reduced into 
this form; but when stated in the form most nearly ap- 
proaching to this that is possible, its fallaciousness becomes 
more evident, from its nonconformity to the foregoing 
rule : e. g. " whoever is capable of deliberate crime is 
responsible ; an infant is not capable of deliberate crime ; 
therefore, an infant is not responsible," (see § 3:) here 
the term " responsible" is affirmed universally of " those 
capable of deliberate crime;" it might, therefore, accord- 
ing to Aristotle's dictum, have been affirmed of any thing 
contained under that class ; but, in the instance before us, 
nothing is mentioned as contained under that class ; only, 
the term " infant" is excluded from that class ; and though 
what is affirmed of a whole class may be affirmed of any 
thing that is contained under it, there is no ground for 
supposing that it may be denied of whatever is not so con- 
tained ; for it is evidently possible that it may be applica- 
ble to a whole class and to something else besides : to say, 
e. g. that all trees are vegetables, does not imply that 
nothing else is a vegetable. Nor, when it is said, that all 
who are capable of deliberate crime are responsible, does 
this imply that no others are responsible ; for though this 
may be very true, it has not been asserted in the premiss 
before us j and in the analysis of an argument, we are to 
discard all consideration of what might be asserted; con- 
templating only what actually is laid down in the premises 
It is evident, therefore, that such an apparent argument as 
the above does not comply with the rule laid down, nor 
can be so stated as to comply with it, and is consequently 
invalid. 



56 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

Again, in this instance, " food is necessar, { xife ; corn 
rs food; therefore, corn is necessary to lif :' : the term 
"necessary to life" is affirmed of food, but not univer- 
sally ; for it is not said of every kind of food : the mean- 
ing of the assertion being manifestly that some food is 
necessary to life : here again, therefore, the rule has not 
been complied with, since that which has been predicated, 
(i. e. affirmed or denied.) not of the whole, but of a part 
only of a certain class, cannot be, on that ground, predi- 
cated of any thing whatever which is contained under that 
class. 

fc5. 

The fallacy in this last case is, what is usually described 
in logical language as consisting in the " non-distribution of 
the middle term ;" i. e. its not being employed to denote 
all the objects to which it is applicable. In order to un- 
derstand this phrase, it is necessary to observe, that a pro- 
position being an expression in which one thing is affirmed 
or denied of another ; e. g. " A is B," both that of which 
something is said, and that which is said of it (i. e. both A 
and B,) are called " terms," from their being (in their na- 
ture) the extremes or boundaries of the proposition ; and 
there are, of course, two, and but two, terms in a propo- 
sition (though it may so happen that either of them may 
consist either of one word, or of several :) and a term is 
Distribution sa ^ to be " distributed," when it is taken uni- 
of terms. V ersally, so as to stand for every thing it is 
capable of being applied to ; and consequently " undis- 
tributed," when it stands for a portion only of the things 
signified by it : thus, " all food," or every kind of food, 
are expressions which imply the distribution of the term 






$ 5J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 57 

" food ;'' " some food" would imply its non-distribution : 
and it is also to be observed, that the term of which, in 
one premiss, something is affirmed or denied, and to 
which, in the other premiss, something- else is referred as 
contained in it, is called the "middle" term in the syllo- 
gism, as standing between the other two (viz. the two 
terms of the conclusion,) and being the medium of proof. 
Now it is plain, that if in each premiss a part only of this 
middle term is employed, i. e. if it be not at all distributed, 
no conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if, in the example 
formerly adduced, it had been merely stated that " some- 
thing" (not " whatever,' 11 or " every thing") " which ex- 
hibits marks of design, is the work of an intelligent au- 
thor," it would not have followed, from the world's exhib- 
iting marks of design, that that is the work of an intelligent 
author. 

It is to be observed, also, that the words " all" and 
" every," which mark the distribution of a term, and 
" some," which marks its non-distribution, are not always 
expressed : they are frequently understood, and left to be 
supplied by the context; e. g. "food is necessary;" viz. 
" some food ;" " man is mortal ;" viz. " every man." 
Propositions thus expressed are called by logicians " in- 
definite" because it is left undetermined by the form of 
the expression whether the "subject" (the term of which 
something is affirmed or denied being called the " sub- 
ject" of the proposition, and that which is said of it, the 
" predicate") be distributed or not. Nevertheless it is 
plain that in every proposition the subject either is, or is 
not, distributed, though it be not declared whether it is or 
not; consequently, every proposition, whether expressed 
indefinitely or not, must be either "universal" or "par- 



58 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. (Book I. 

ticular ;" those being called universal, in which the predi- 
cate is said of the whole of the subject (or, in other words, 
where the subject is distributed ;) and those particular, in 
which it is said only of a part of the subject : e. g. " All 
men are sinful," is universal ; " some men are sinful," 
particular: and this division of propositions is, in logical 
language, said to be according to their " quantity" 

But the distribution or non-distribution of the 

Quantity and 7 . . . , . .. , . . 

quality of predicate is entirely independent of the quantity 

propositions. . . . 

of the proposition ; nor are the signs " air and 
" some" ever affixed to the predicate ; because its distri- 
bution depends upon, and is indicated by, the " quality" 
of the proposition ; i. e. its being affirmative or negative ; 
it being a universal rule, that the predicate of a negative 
proposition is distributed, and of an affimative, undis- 
tributed.* The reason of this may easily be understood, 
by considering that a term which stands for a whole class 
may be applied to (i. e. affirmed of) any thing that is com- 
prehended under that class, though the term of which it is 
thus affirmed may be of much narrower extent than that 
other, am 1 may, therefore, be far from coinciding with the 
whole of it : thus it may be said with truth, that " the Ne- 



* The learner may perhaps be startled at being told that the 
predicate of an affirmative is never distributed; especially as 
Aldrich has admitted that accidentally this may take place ; as 
in such a proposition as " all equilateral triangles are equian- 
gular ;" but this is not accurate : he might have said that in 
such a proposition as the above the predicate is distributable , 
out not that it is actually distributed : i. e. it so happens that " all 
equiangular triangles are equilateral ;" but this is not implied 
in the previous assertion; and the point to be considered is, not 
what might be said with truth, but what actually has been said 



* 5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. f>9 

groes are uncivilized," though the term " uncivilized" be of 
much wider extent than " Negroes," comprehending, be- 
sides them, Hottentots, tyc. ; so that it would not be 
allowable to assert, that " all who are uncivilized are 
Negroes;" it is evident, therefore, that it is a part only 
of the term " uncivilized" that has been affirmed of "Ne- 
groes :" and the same reasoning applies to every affirma- 
tive proposition; for though it may so happen that the 
subject and predicate coincide, i. e. are of equal extent, 
as, e. g. "all men are rational animals;" "all equilateral 
triangles are equiangular ;" (it being equally true, that " all 
rational animals are men," and that "all equiangular tri- 
angles are equilateral;") yet this is not implied by the 
form of the expression ; since it would be no less true, 
that "all men are rational animals," even if there were 
other rational animals besides man. 

It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the predicate is 
applicable to the subject, it may be affirmed, and, of 
course, cannot be denied, of that subject, and conse- 
quently, when the predicate is denied of the subject ; it is 
implied that no part of that predicate is applicable to 
that subject ; i. e. that the whole of the predicate is denied 
of the subject: for to say, e. g. that "no beasts of prey 
ruminate," implies that beasts of prey are excluded from 
the whole class of ruminant animals, and consequently that 
" no ruminant animals are beasts of prey." And henc^ 
results the above-mentioned rule, that the distribution of 
the predicate is implied in negative propositions, and its 
non-distribution in affirmatives. 

It is to be remembered, therefore, that it is Distrii.mion 

rn ' c i • i ii • of middle 

not sufficient lor the middle term to occur in a terms. 
universal proposition; since if that proposition be an 



60 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

affirmative, and the middle term be the 'predicate of it, it 
will not be distributed : e. g. if in the example formerly- 
given, it had been merely asserted, that "all the works of 
an intelligent author show marks of design," and that " the 
univrrse shows marks of design," nothing could have been 
proved; since, though both these propositions are univer- 
sal, the middle term is made the predicate in each, and 
both are affirmative ; and accordingly, the rule of Aristo- 
tle is not 'iere complied with, since the term " work of an 
intelligent author," which is to be proved applicable to 
11 the universe," would not have been affirmed of the mid- 
dle term (•' what shows marks of design") under which 
"universe" is contained; but the middle term, on the 
contrary, would have been affirmed of it. 

If, however, one of the premises be negative, the mid- 
dle term may then be made the predicate of that, and will 
thus, according to the above remark, be distributed : e. g. 
"no ruminant animals are predacious; the lion is preda- 
cious ; therefore the lion is not ruminant :" this is a valid 
syllogism; and the middle term (predacious) is distributed 
by being made the predicate of a negative proposition. * 
The form, indeed, of the syllogism is not that prescribed 
by the dictum of Aristotle, but it may easily be reduced 
to that form, by stating the first proposition thus: "no 
predacious animals are ruminant;" which is manifestly 
implied (as was above remarked) in the assertion that 
"no ruminant animals are predacious." The syllogism 
will thus appear in the form to which the dictum applies. 

It is not every argument, indeed, that can be reduced 
o this form by so short and simple an alteration as in the 
case before us : a longer and more complex process will 
often be required; and rules will hereafter be laid down 



§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. Gl 

to facilitate this process in certain cases : but there is no 
sound argument but what can be reduced into this form, 
without at all departing from the real meaning and drift of 
it; and the form will be found (though more prolix than 
is needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which 
an argument can be exhibited. 

All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one simple 
principle laid down by Aristotle, that " what is predicated, 
either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, 
may be predicated in like manner (i. e. affirmatively or 
negatively) of any thing contained under that term." So 
that when our object is to prove any proposition, i. e. to 
show that one term may rightly be affirmed or denied of 
another, the process which really takes place in our minds 
is, that we refer that term (of which the other is to be thus 
predicated) to some class (i. e. middle term) of which that 
other may be affirmed, or denied, as the case may be. 
Whatever the subject matter of an argument may be, the 
reasoning itself, considered by itself, is in every case the 
same process ; and if the writers against Logic had kept 
this in mind, they would have been cautious of expressing 
their contempt of what they call "syllogistic reasoning," 
which is in truth all reasoning; and instead of ridiculing 
Aristotle's principle for its obviousness and simplicity, 
would have perceived that these are, in fact, its highest 
praise : the easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, 
provided it answer the purpose of explanation, being evei 
the best. 

§6. 

If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, in his in- 
vestigation of the theory of reasoning, the point to which we 
6 



62 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I 

have now arrived, a question which would be likely next 
to engage his attention, is that of Predication ; i. e. since 
in reasoning we are to find a middle term, which may he 
predicated affirmatively of the subject in question, we are 
led to inquire what terms may be affirmed, and what de- 
nied, of what others. 

It is evident that proper names, or any other 
singular terms which denote each but a single individual, 

terms. 

as " Caesar," "the Thames," "the Conqueror 
of Pompey," "this river," (hence called in Logic "sin- 
gular terms,") cannot be affirmed of any thing besides 
themselves, and are therefore to be denied of any thing 
else; we may say, "this river is the Thames," or "Cae- 
sar was jhe conqueror of Pompey;" but we cannot say 
of any thing else that it is the Thames, <SfC. 
. On the other hand, those terms which are called "com- 
mon," as denoting any one individual of a whole class, as 
" river," " conqueror," may of course be affirmed of any, 
or all that "belong to that class : as, " the Thames is a 
river ;" " the Rhine and the Danube are rivers." 

Common terms, therefore, are called " predicables," 
(viz. affirmatively predicable,) from their capability of be- 
ing affirmed of others : a singular term, on the contrary, 
may be the Subject of a proposition, but never the Predi- 
cate, unless it be; of a negative proposition ; (as, e. g. the 
first -born of Is~ac was not Jacob ;) or, unless the subject 
and predicate be only two expressions for the sanie indi- 
vidual object; as in some of the above instances. 

The process by which the mind arrives at 

Abstraction , . . , , „ . 

and general- the notions expressed by these " common (or 

ization. , 

in popular language, " general) terms, is pro- 
perly called Generalization ; though it is usually , (and 



§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 63 

truly) said to De the business of abstraction ; for Generali- 
zation is one of the purposes to which Abstraction is ap- 
plied: when we draio off, and contemplate separately, any 
part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the 
rest of it, we are said to abstract that part. Thus, a per- 
son might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, make 
the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all 
thought of the color, form, fyc. ; and thus, even though it 
were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be 
employing the faculty of Abstraction* but if, in contem* 
plating several objects, and finding that they agree in cer- 
tain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, 
disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of 
these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this 
agreement, i. e. a common name, as *' rose," we are then 
said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not 
necessarily imply Generalization, though Generalization 
implies Abstraction. 

Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting the 
results of this process ; many having contended, and per- 
haps more having taken for granted, that there must be 
some - really existing thing* corresponding to each of 
those general or common terms, and of which such term 
is the name, standing for and representing it ; e. g. that as 
there is a really existing Being corresponding to the pro- 
per name, " iEtna," and signified by it, so the common 
term "mountain," must have some one really existing 
thing corresponding to it, and of course distinct from each 
individual mountain, (since the term is not singular but 
common,) yet existing in each, since the term is applica- 

* &u 'tie subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 



64 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

"hie to each of them. "When many different men," it is 
said, " are at the same time thinking or speaking about a 
mountain, i. e. not any particular one, but a mountain gen- 
erally, their minds must be all employed on something ; 
which must also be one thing, and not several, and yet 
cannot be any one individual :" and hence a vast train of 
mystical disquisitions about Ideas, tyc. has arisen, which 
are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our view of 
the process which actually takes place in the mmd. 
Notions ex- ^ ne ^ act * s ' tne notlon expressed by a corn- 
common by mon term * s merely an inadequate (or incom- 
plete) notion of an individual ; and from the 
very circumstance of its inadequacy, it will apply equally 
well to any one of several individuals : e. g. if 1 omit the 
mention and the consideration of every circumstance 
which distinguishes iEtna from any other mountain, I then 
form a notion (expressed by the common term "moun- 
tain") which inadequately designates iEtna, (i. e. which 
does not imply any of its peculiarities,) and is equally ap- 
plicable to any one of several other individuals. 

Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely .extended 
by a further abstraction applied to common terms : e. g. 
as by abstraction from the term " Socrates" we obtain the 
common term " Philosopher ; " so, from " philosopher," 
by a °imilar process, we arrive at the more general term 
" man ;" from " man" we advance to " animal," <fyc. 

The employment of this faculty at pleasure has been 
regarded, and perhaps with good reason, as the character- 
istic distinction of the human mind from that of the Brutes. 
We are thus enabled not only to separate, and consider 
singly one part of an object presented to the mind, but also 
to fix arbitrarily upon whatever part we please, according as 






$ 4] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 65 

may suit the purpose we happen to have in view ; e. g. any- 
individual person to whom we may direct our attention, 
may be considered either in a political point of view, and ac- 
cordingly referred to the class of Merchant, Farmer, Law- 
yer, Sfc. as the case may be ; or physiologically, as Negro 
or White-man; or theologically, as Pagan or Christian, Pa- 
pist or Protestant ; or geographically, as European, Ameri- 
can, fyc. fyc. And so, in respect of any thing else that may 
be the subject of our reasoning: we arbitrarily fix upon 
end abstract that point which is essential to the purpose in 
hand; so that the same object may be referred Djfferent . 
to various different classes, according to the oc- ^JJliu? 
casion. Not, of course, that we are allowed to same object * 
refer any thing to a class to which it does not really be- 
long; which would be pretending to abstract from it 
something that was no part of it; but that we arbitrarily 
fix on any part of it which we choose to abstract from the 
rest. 

It is important to notice this, because men are often dis- 
posed to consider each object as really and properly be- 
longing to some one class alone,* from their having been 
accustomed, in the course of their own pursuits, to con- 
sider, in one point of view only, things which may with 
equal propriety be considered in other points of view also : 
i. e. referred to various Classes, (or predicates.) And this 
is that which chiefly constitutes what is called narrowness- 
of-mind: e. g. a mere botanist might be astonished at 
hearing such plants as Clover and Lucerne included, in 
the language of a farmer, under the term " grasses," 
which he has been accustomed to limit to a tribe of plants 



* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 
6* 



66 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

widely different in all botanical characteristics; and the 
mere farmer might be no less surprised to find the trouble- 
^.. some " weed," (as he has been accustomed to 

Different v 

modes of cias- ca n it,) known by the name of Couch-grass, 

sification. '* J & *** 

and which he has been used to class with net- 
ties and thistles, to which it has no botanical affinity, rank- 
ed by the botanist as a species of Wheat, ( Triticum Re- 
pens.) And yet neither of these classifications is in itself 
erroneous or irrational ; though it would be absurd, in a 
botanical treatise, to class plants according to their agricul- 
tural use; or, in an agricultural treatise, according to the 
structure of their flowers. 

The utility of these considerations, with a view to the 
present subject, will be readily estimated, by recurring to 
the account which has been already given of the process 
of reasoning; the analysis of which shows, that it consists in 
referring the term we are speaking of to some class, viz: a 
middle term; which term again is referred to or excluded 
from (as the case may be) another class, viz. the term 
which we wish to affirm or deny of the subject of the con- 
clusion. So that the quality of our reasoning in any case 
must depend on our being able correctly, clearly, and 
promptly, to abstract from the subject in question that 
which may furnish a Middle-term suitable to the occa- 
sion. 

The imperfect and irregular sketch which has here 
been attempted, of the logical system, may suffice (even 
though some parts of it should not be at once fully under- 
stood by those who are entirely strangers to the study) tc 
point out the general drift and purpose of the science, and 
to render the details of it both more interesting and more- 
intelligible. The analytical form, which has here been 



§6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 67 

adopted, is, generally speaking, better suited for introdu- 
cing any science in the plainest and most interesting form \ 
though the synthetical, which will henceforth be employed, 
is the more regular, and the more compendious form for 
storing it up in the memory. 



BOOK II. 

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 
Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind and of Terms. 

operations of There are three operations of the mind 
theinind. w y c i l are immediately concerned in argument ; 
1st. Simple Apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Dis- 
course or Reasoning.* 

simple ap- * st - Simple-apprehension is the notion (or con- 
prenension. ce ption) of any object in the mind, analogous 
to the perception of the senses. It is either Incomplex or 
Complex: Incomplex Apprehension is of one object, or 
of several without any relation being perceived between 



* Logical writers have in general begun by laying down that 
there are, in all, three operations of the mind : (in universum 
tres) an assertion by no means incontrovertible, and which, if 
admitted, is nothing to the present purpose ; our business is 
with argumentation, and the operations of the mind implied in 
that ; what others there may be, or whether any, are irrelevant 
questions. 

Tne opening of a treatise with a statement respecting the 
operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the prevailing 
error (from which probably the minds of the writers were not 
exempt) of supposing that Logic professes to teach " the use of 
the mental faculties in general;" — the "right use of reason," 
according to Watts. 



Chap. I. §2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. $0 

them, as of " a man," " a horse," " cards :" complex is 
of several with such a relation, as of " a man on horse- 
back," " a pack of cards." 

2d. Judgment is the comparing together in 

• r • • Judgment. 

the mind two of the notions (or ideas) which 
are the objects of Apprehension, whether complex or in- 
complex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree 
with each other : (or that one of them belongs or does not 
belong to the other.) Judgment, therefore, is either 
affirmative or negative. 

3d. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of 
proceeding from one judgment, to another 
founded upon that one, (or the result of it.) 

Language affords the signs by which these 
operations of the mind are expressed and com- 
municated. An act of apprehension expressed in lan- 
guage, is called a term; an act of judgment, a proposi- 
tion ; an act of reasoning, an argument ; (which, when 
regularly expressed, is a syllogism;) as, e. g. 

. " Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial ; 
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, 
Therefore they are beneficial :" 

is a Syllogism; (the act of reasoning being indicated by 
the word " therefore") it consists of three propositions, 
each of which has (necessarily) two terms, as " beneficial," 
" dispensations of Providence," <j*c* 

* In introducing the mention of language previously to the 
definition of Logic, I have departed from established practice, 
in order that it may be clearly understood, that Logic is entirely 



70 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Language is employed for various purposes : 

Propositions, e. g. the province of an historian is to convey 

Syllogisms. . 

■information; of an orator, to 'persuade, dye. 
Logic is concerned with it only when employed for the 
purpose of reasoning, (i. e. in order to convince ;) and 
whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable to be indistinct, 
(i. e. without any clear, determinate meaning,) proposi- 
tions to be false, and arguments inconclusive, Logic un- 
dertakes directly and completely to guard against this 
last defect, and, incidentally and in a certain degree, 
against the others, as far as can be done by the proper 
use of Language : it is, therefore, (when regarded as an 
art*) "the Art of employing language properly for the 
purpose of Reasoning." Its importance no one can rightly 
estimate who has not long and attentively considered how 
much our thoughts are influenced by expressions, and how 
much error, perplexity, and labor, are occasioned by a 
faulty use of language. 



conversant about language : a truth which most writers on the 
subject, if indeed they were fully aware of it themselves, have 
certainly not taken due care to impress on their readers. Al- 
drich's definition of Logic, for instance, does not give any hint 
of this. 

* It is to be observed, however, that as a science is conversant 
about knowledge only, an art is the application of knowledge to 
practice: hence Logic (as well as any other system of knowl- 
edge) becomes, when applied to practice, an art; while con- 
fined to the theory of reasoning, it is strictly a science : and it is 
as such that it occupies the higher place in point of dignity, 
since it professes to develop some of the most interesting and 
curious intellectual phenomena. It is surely strange, therefore, 
to find in a treatise on Logic, a distinct dissertation to prove 
that it is an Art, and not a Science ! 



Chap. I. I 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71 

A syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three 
propositions, and each proposition containing two terms , 
of these terms, that which is spoken of is called the sub- 
ject; that which is said of it, the predicate ; and these 
two are called the terms, (or extremes,) because, logically, 
the Subject is placed first, and the Predicate last : and 
in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of judg 
ment, as by it the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the 
Subject. The Copula must be either is or is not, the 
substantive verb being the only verb recognised by Logic : 
all others are resolvable, by means of the verb, " to be," 
and a participle or adjective : e. g. " the Romans con- 
quered :" the word conquered is both copula and predi- 
cate, being equivalent to "were (Cop.) victorious" 
(Pred.)* 

$3. 
It is evident, that a Term may consist either of one 
Word or of several ; and that it is not every word that is 
categorematic, i. e. capable of being employed C ate»ore- 
by itself as a Term. Adverbs, Prepositions, &c. niatic- 

* It is proper to observe, that the copula, as such, has no rela- 
tion to time ; but expresses merely the agreement or disagree- 
ment of two given terms : hence, if any other tense of the 
substantive verb, besides the present, is used, it is either to be 
tmderstood as the same in sense, (the difference of tense being 
regarded as a matter of grammatical convenience only;) or 
else, if the circumstance of time really do modify the sense of 
the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an 
essential, then, this circumstance is to be regarded as a part of 
one of the terms : " at that time,*' or some such expression, being 
understood. Sometimes the substantive verb is both copula 
and predicate ; i. e. where existence only is predicated : e. g. 
Deus est. 



72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

and also Nouns in any other case besides the. nominative, 
Syncategore- are syncategorematic, i. e. can only form part 
of a term. A nominative Noun may be by it- 
self a term. A Verb (all except the substantive verb 
Mixed. Ilsec ^ as tne C0 P u l a ) is a mixed word, being re- 
solvable into - the Copula and Predicate, to 
which it is equivalent; and, indeed, is often so resolved 
in the mere rendering out of one language into another : 
as " ipse adest" " he is present." It is to be observed, 
however, that under " verb," we do not include the In- 
finitive, which is properly a Noun-substantive, nor the 
Participle, which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals ; 
being related to their respective verbs in respect of the 
things they signify : but not verbs, inasmuch as they differ 
entirely in their mode of signification. It is worth ob- 
serving, that an Infinitive (though it often comes last in the 
sentence) is never the predicate, except when another In- 
finitive is the Subject : . e. g. 

subj. pred. 



" I hope to succeed:" i. e. " to succeed is what I hope." 

It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two 
infinitives, one in " ing?-* the same in sound and spelling 
as the participle present, from which, however, it should 

* Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity by 
speaking of the participle in " ing" being employed so and so ; 
when it is manifest that that very employment of the word con- 
stitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an infinitive and not a par- 
ticiple. The advantage of the infinitive in ing, is, that it may 
be used either in the nominative or in any oblique case ; not, 
as some suppose that it necessariry implies a habit ; e. g. " See- 
ing is believing:" "there is glory in dying for one's country:'' 
" a habit of observing," fyc. 



Chap. I. § 3] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73 

be carefully distinguished ; e. g. " rising- early is health- 
ful," and "it is healthful to rise early," are equivalent. 
In this, and in many other cases, the English word IT 
serves as a representative of the subject when that is put 
last : e. g. 

pred. subj. 



" It is to be hoped that we shall succeed." 

An adjective (including participles) cannot, by itself, be 
made the subject of a proposition ; but is often employed 
as a predicate: as " Crassus was rich;" though some 
choose to consider some substantive as understood in eve- 
ry such case, (e. g. rich man,) and consequently do not 
reckon adjectives among Simple terms; (i. e. words which 
are capable, singly, of being employed as terms.) This, 
however, is a question of no practical consequence; but 
I have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle's mode of 
statement. (See his Categ.) 

Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the Siraple . 
first part of Logic treats of,) there are many terms ' 
divisions ; of which, however, one will be sufficient for 
the present purpose ; viz. into singular and common ; be- 
cause, though any term whatever may be a subject, none 
but a common term can be affirmatively predicated of seve- 
ral others. A singular term stands for one in- „. , 

° Singular 

dividual, as "Caesar," "the Thames," (these, and common 

7 > \ ' terms. 

it is plain, cannot be said [or predicated] af- 
firmatively, of any thing but themselves.) A common 
term stands for several individuals, (which are called its' 
significates :) i. e. can be applied to any of them, as com- 
prehending them in its single signification; as "man," 
"river," "great." 






7-4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book H. 

The learner who has gone through the Analytical Out- 
line, will now be enabled to proceed to the Second and 
Third Chapters either with or without the study of the 
remainder of what is usually placed in the First Chapter, 
and which is subjoined as a Supplement. See Chap. v. 



Chap. II. — Of Propositions. 

♦ i. 

The second part of Logic treats of the proposition ; 
which is, " Judgment expressed in words" 
Definition of -^ Proposition is defined logically* " a sen- 
proposition. ience indicative" i. e. affirming or denying; 
(this excludes commands and questions.) "Sentence" 
being the genus, and " Indicative" the difference, this 
definition expresses the whole essence ; and it relates en- 
tirely to the words of a proposition. With regard to the 
matter, its property is to be true or false. Hence it must 
not be ambiguous, (for that which has more than one 
meaning is in reality several propositions,) nor imperfect, 
nor un grammatical, for such an expression has no mean- 
ing at all. 

Since the substance, (i. e. genus,\ or material part) of 
a Proposition is, that it is a sentence; and since every 
Divisions of sen ^^ c ^ (whether it be a proposition or not) 
propositions. ma y be eX p ressec j either absolutely,^ or un- 

* See Chap. v. § 6. t Ibid. § 3. 

* As, " Caesar deserved death ;" " did Coesar deserve death 3" 



Chap. II. § 1] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 75 

der an hypothesis* on this we found the division f of 
propositions according to their substance ; viz. gub 
into categorical and hypothetical. And as ge- 
nus is said to be /predicated in quid (what,) it is by the 
members of this division that we answer the question, what 
is this proposition %\qua est propositio.) Answer, Cate- 
gorical or Hypothetical. 

Categorical propositions are subdivided into pure, which 
asserts simply or purely, that the subject does or does not 
agree with the predicate, and modal, which expresses in 
what mode (or manner) it agrees ; e. g. " an intemperate 
man will be sickly;" "Brutus killed Caesar;" are pure. 
" An intemperate man will probably be sickly ;" " Bru- 
tus killed Csesar justly ;" are modal. At oresent we 
speak only of pure categorical propositions. 

It being the differentia % of a proposition that it affirms 
or denies, and its property to be true or false ; and Dif- 
ferentia being predicated in quale quid, Property in quale, 
we hence form another division of propositions, viz. ac- 
cording to their quality, into Affirmative and 
Negative, (which is the quality of the expres- Ud y " 
$ion, and therefore, in Logic, essential,) and into True and 
False (which is the quality of the matter, and therefore 
accidental.) An Affirmative proposition is one whose co- 
pula is affirmative, as "birds fly;" "not to advance is 
to go back ;" a Negative proposition is one whose copula 
is negative, as "man is not perfect;" "no miser is 
nappy." 

* As, "if Caesar was a tyrant, what did he deserve'?" "Was 
Caesar a hero or a villain V 3 " If Caesar was a tyrant, he de- 
served death ;" " He was either a hero or a villain." 

t See Chap. v. % 5, t Ibid. § 3. 



7 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Another division * of propositions is accord- 
y- i n g to their quantity (or extent:) if the predi- 
cate is said of the whole of the subject, the proposition is 
Universal : if of a part of it only, the proposition is Par- 
ticular (or partial ;) e. g. " England is an island ;" " all 
tyrants are miserable;" "no miser is rich;" are Uni- 
versal propositions, and their subjects are therefore said 
to be distributed, being understood to stand, each, for the 
whole of its Significates: but, "some islands are fertile;" 
"all tyrants are not assassinated;" are Particular, and 
their subjects, consequently, not distributed, being taken 
to stand for a part only of their Significates. 

As every proposition must be either Affirmative or 
Negative, and must also be either universal or particular, 
we reckon, in all, four kinds of pure categorical propo- 
sitions, (i. e. considered as to their quantity and quality 
both;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol (used for 
brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E ; Particular Affirma- 
tive, JT; Particular Negative, O. 

When the subject of a proposition is a Common-term, 
the universal signs ("all, no, every,") are used to indi- 
cate that it is distributed, (and the proposition consequent- 
ly is universal;) the particular signs ("some, 4* c -") tne 
contrary; should there be no sign at all to the common 
term, the quantity of the proposition (which is called an 
Indefinite proposition) is ascertained by the matter ; i. e. 
the nature of the connexion between the extremes ; which 
is either Necessary, Impossible, or Contingent. In neces- 

* See Chap. v. § 5, 



Chap. II. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77 

sary and in impossible matter, an Indefinite is 

J r • j i Indefinites. 

understood as a universal : e. g. " birds nave 
wings;" i. e. all: "birds are not quadrupeds;" i. e. 
none : in contingent matter, (i. e. where the terms partly 
(i. e. sometimes) agree, and partly not) an Indefinite is 
understood as a particular ; e. g. " food is necessary to 
life;" i. e. some food; "birds sing;" i. e. some do; 
" birds are not carnivorous ;" i. e. some are not, or, all 
are not.* 

As for singular propositions, {viz. those singular pro . 
whose subject is either a proper name, or a p0Sltl0ris ' 
common term with a singular sign,) they are reckoned as 
Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. iv. ^ 2.) because in them 
we speak of the whole of the subject ; e. g. when we say, 
" Brutus was a Roman," we mean, the whole of Brutus : 
this is the general rule ; but -some singular propositions 
may fairly be reckoned particular ; i. e. when some qual- 
ifying word is inserted, which indicates that you are not 
speaking of the whole of the subject ; e. g. " Caesar was 
not wholly a tyrant ;" " this man is occasionally intem- 
perate;" "non omnis moriar."f 

* It is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so, to 
reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in respect of quan- 
tity. They must be either universal or particular, though it is 
not declared which. Such a mode of classification resembles 
that of some grammarians, who, among the Genders, enumerate 
the doubtful gender ! 

t It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the mott 
naturally, accounted Universals ; but it is only by viewing them 
in the other light, that we can regularly state the Contradictory 
to a Singular proposition. Strictly speaking, when we regard 
such propositions as admitting of a variation in Quantity, they 
are not properly considered as Singular ; the subject being, 
e. g. not Ccesar, but the parts of his character. 
7* 



78 ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. [Book II. 

It is evident, that the subject is distributed in every 
universal proposition, and never in a particular ; (that 
being the very difference between universal and particular 
propositions :) but the distribution or non-distribution of 
the predicate, depends (not on the quantity, but) on 
the quality, of the proposition ; for, if any part of the pre- 
dicate agrees with the subject, it must be affirmed and not 
denied of the subject; therefore, for an affirmative propo- 
sition to be true,' it is sufficient that some part of the predi- 
cate agrees with the subject; and (for the same reason) 
for a negative to be true, it is necessary that the whole of 
the predicate should disagree with the subject: e. g. it is 
true that " learning is useful," though the whole of the 
term "useful" does not agree with the term "learning," 
(for many things are useful besides learning,) but " no 
vice is useful," would be false, if any part of the term 
"useful" agreed with the term "vice;" (i. e. if you 
could find any one useful thing which was a vice.) The 
two practical rules then to be observed respecting distribu- 
tion, are, 

1st. All universal propositions (and no particular) dis- 
tribute the subject. 

2d. All negative (and no affirmative) the predicate.* 

* Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is difficult 
to prove a Negative. At first sight this appears very obvious, 
from the circumstance that a negative has one more Term dis- 
tributed than the corresponding Affirmative. But then, again, 
a difficulty may be felt in accounting for this, inasmuch as any 
Negative may be expressed (as we shall see presently) as an 
Affirmative, and vice versa. The proposition, e. g. that " such a 
one is not in the Town," might be expressed by the use of an 
equivalent term, " he is absent from the Town." 

The fact is, however, that in every case where the observa- 



Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 79 

It may happen indeed, that the whole of the predicate 
in an affirmative may agree with the subject ; e. g. it is 
equally true, that "all men are rational animals;" and 
" all rational animals are men :" but this is merely acci- 
dental, and is not at all implied in the form of expression, 
which alone is regarded in Logic* 



Of Opposition. 

»& 

Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, 
when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ, 
in quantity, or quality, or both.\ It is evident, that with 
any given subject and predicate, you may state four dis- 



tion as to the difficulty of proving a Negative holds good, it 
will be found that the proposition in question is contrasted with 
one which has really a term the less, distributed, or a term of 
less extensive sense. E. G. It is easier to prove that a man has 
proposed wise measures, than that he has never proposed an 
unwise measure. In fact, the one would be, to prove thai 
" Some of his measures are wise ;" the other, that " All his 
measures are wise." And numberless such examples are to be 
found. 

But it will very often happen that there shall be Negative 
propositions much more easily established than certain Affirma- 
tive ones on the same subject. E. G. TThat " The cause of ani- 
mal-heat is not respiration," has been established by experi- 
ments ; but what the cause is, remains doubtful. See Note tc 
Chap. III. § 5. 

* When, however, a Singular Term is the Predicate, it must, 
of course, be co-extensive with the subject ; as " Romulus was the 
founder of Rome." 

t For Opposition of Terms, see Chap. V. 



80 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

tinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and O ; any two of which 
are said to be opposed; hence there are four different kinds 
of opposition, viz. 1st. the two universals (A and E) are 
Contraries, called contraries to each other ; 2d. the two par- 
subcontra- t j Gular) (j and ) suocontr aries ; 3d. A and I, 
subalterns. or E and O, subalterns ; 4th. A and O, or E and 



Contradicto- T . . 

ries. I, contradictories. 



As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of any proposi- 
tion (its quantity and quality being known) must depend 
on the matter of it, we must bear in mind, that, " in neces- 
sary matter all affirmatives are true, and negatives false ; 
in impossible matter, vice versa ; in contingent matter, all 
universals false, and particulars true;' 11 (e.g. "all isl- 
ands (or some islands) are surrounded by water," must be 
true, because the matter is necessary : to say, " no islands, 
or some — not, fyc" would have been false: again, 
" some islands are fertile ;" " some are not fertile," are 
both true, because it is Contingent Matter: put "alitor 
" no," • instead of " some," and the propositions will be 
false. ) Hence it will be evident, that Contraries will be 
both false in Contingent matter, but never both true : Sub- 
contraries, both true in Contingent matter, but never both 
false : Contradictories always one true and the other false, 
Sfc. with other observations, which will be immediately 
made on viewing the scheme ; in which the four proposi- 
tions are denoted by their symbols, the different kinds of 
matter by the initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity of 
each proposition in each matter, by the letter v. for (verum) 
tme, f. for (falsum) false. 



Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 



81 




By a careful study of this scheme, bearing in mind, and 
applying the above rule concerning matter, the learner 
will easily elicit all the maxims relating to opposition ; as 
that, in the Subalterns, the truth of the particular (which 
is called the subalternate) follows from the truth of the uni- 
versal (subalternans,) and the falsity of the universal from 
the falsity of the particular : that Subalterns differ in quan- 
tity alone ; Contraries, and also Subcontraries, in quality 
alone; Contradictories, in both: and hence, that if any 
proposition is known to be true, we infer that its Contra- 
dictory is false ; if false, its Contradictory true, &c. 



83 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Of Conversion. 

H 

A proposition is said to be converted when its terms are 
transposed ; i. e. when the subject is made the predicate, 
and the predicate the subject : when nothing more is done, 
this is called simple conversion. No conversion is em- 
ployed for any logical purpose, unless it be illative ;* i. e. 
when the truth of the Converse is implied by the truth of 
the Exposita, (or proposition given ;) e. g. 

"No virtuous man is a rebel, therefore 
No rebel is a virtuous man." 

Some boasters are cowards, therefore 
Some cowards are boasters." 

„, ,. Conversion can then only be illative when 

Illative con- J 

version. n0 f erm i s distributed in the Converse, which 
was not distributed in the Exposita : (for if that be done, 
you will employ a term universally in the Converse, 
which was only used partially in the Exposita.) Hence, 
as E distributes both terms, and I, neither, these proposi- 
tions may be illatively converted in the simple manner ; 
(vide $ 2.) But as A does not distribute the predicate, 
its simple conversion would not be illative; (e.g. from 
" all birds are animals," you cannot infer that " all animals 
are birds," as there would be a term distributed in the 
converse, which was not, before. We must therefore 

* The reader must not suppose from the use of the word 
" illative," that this conversion is a process of reasoning : it is in 
fact only stating the same Judgment in another form* 



Chap. II. §4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 83 

limit its quantity from universal to particular, and the 
Conversion will be illative : (e. g. " some animals are 
birds ;") this might be fairly named conversion by limi- 
tation ; but is commonly called " Conversion Conyersion 
per accidens." E may thus be converted also. peracc,dens * 
But in O, whether the quantity be changed or not, there 
will still be a term (the predicate of the converse) distri- 
buted, which was not before : you can therefore only con- 
vert it illatively, by changing the quality : i. e. considering 
the negative as attached to the predicate instead of to the 
copula, and thus regarding it as I. One of the terms will 
then not be the same as before; but the proposition will 
be equipollent (i. e convey the same meaning); e. g. 
" some members of the university are not learned :" you 
may consider "not-learned 1 ' as the predicate, instead of 
" learned ;" the proposition will then be I, and of course 
may be simply converted, " some who are not learned are 
members of the university." This may be named con- 
version by negation ; or as it is commonly called, by 
Contra-posi- contra-position* A may also be fairly con- 
uon. verted in this way, e. g. 

" Every poet is a man of genius ; therefore 
He who is not a man of genius is not a poet :" 
(or, " None but a man of genius can be a poet ;" 
or, " a man of genius alone can be a poet.") 

For (since it is the same thing to affirm some attribute of 
the subject, or to deny the absence of that attribute) the 



* No mention is made by Aldrich of this kind of conversion ; 
but it has been thought advisable to insert it, as being in fre- 
quent use, and also as being employed in this treatise for the 
direct reduction of Baroko and Bokardo. 



84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

original proposition is precisely equipollent to this, 

subj. pred. 

4< No poet is not-a-man-of-genius ;" 

which, being E, may of course be simply converted. 
Thus, in one of these three ways, every proposition may 
be illatively converted : viz. E, I, simply ; A, O, by nega- 
tion ; A, E, by limitation. 

Note, that as it was remarked that, in some affirmatives, 
the whole of the predicate does actually agree with the 
subject, so, when this is the case, and is granted to be so, 
A may be illatively converted, simply; but this is an acci- 
dental circumstance. In a just Definition, this is always 
the case ; for there the terms being exactly equivalent (or, 
as they are called, convertible terms) it is no matter which 
is made the subject, and which the predicate, e. g. " a 
good government is that which has the happiness of the 
governed for its object;" if this be a right definition, it 
will follow that "a government which has the happiness 
of the governed for its object is a good one." Most pro- 
positions in mathematics are of this description : e. g. 

"All equilateral triangles are equiangular;" and 
" All equiangular triangles are equilateral." 



Chap. III. — Of Arguments. 

n 

The third operation of the mind, viz. reasoning, (or 
discourse) expressed in words, is argument ; and an argu- 
ment stated at full length, and in its regular form, is called 



CiiAP. III. 5 L] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 85 

a syllogism : the third part of Logic therefore treats of the 
syllogism. Every argument* consists of two 
parts; that which is proved; and that by means 
of which it is proved: the former is called, before it is 
proved, the question; when proved, the conclusion (or 
inference ;) that which is used to prove it, if stated last, (as 
is often done in common discourse,) is called the reason, 
and is introduced by "because" or some other causal 
conjunction ; (e. g. " Caesar deserved death, because he was 
a tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death.") If the conclusion 
be stated last, (which is the strict logical form, to which 
all Reasoning may be reduced,) then that which is em- 
ployed to prove it is called the premises,^ and the Con- 
clusion is then introduced by some illative conjunction, as 
** therefore," e. g. 

"All tyrants deserve death: 
Caesar was a tyrant ; . 
therefore he deserved death."* 



* I mean, in the strict technical sense ; for in popular use the 
word " Argument" is often employed to denote the latter of 
these two parts alone : e. g. " This is an Argument to prove so and 
so f " this conclusion is established by the Argument :" i. e. 
Premises. — See Appendix, No. I. art. Argument. 

t Both the premises together are sometimes called the ante- 
cedent. 

t It may be observed that the definition here given of an 
argument is in the common treatises of logic laid down as t)^e 
definition of a syllogism ; a word which I have confined to a 
more restricted sense. There cannot evidently be any argu- 
ment, whether regularly or irregularly expressed, to which the 
definition given by Aldrich, for instance, would not apply ; so 
that he appears to employ " syllogism" as synonymous with 
u argument." But besides that it is clearer and more conven- 
8 



86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IL 

Definition of Since, then, an argument is an expression in 
Argument. lv j 1 j c ] 1 f rom something laid down and granted 
as true (i. e. the premises) something else (i. e. the Con- 
clusion,) beyond this must be admitted to be true, as follow- 
ing necessarily {or resulting) from the other; and since 
Logic is wholly concerned in the use of language, it fol- 
lows that a Syllogism (which is an argument stated in a 
Definition of re g" u l ar logical form) must he " an argument so 
Syllogism, express^ that the conclusiveness of it is mani- 
fest from the mere force of the expression," i. e. without 
considering the meaning of the terms : e. g. in this syllo- 
gism, " Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X," the conclu- 
sion is inevitable, whatever terms X, Y, and Z, respec- 
tively, are understood to stand for. And to this form all. 
legitimate arguments may ultimately be brought. 

Aristotle's The Iu ^ e or ax i° m » (commonly called " dic- 
Dictum. ium j e omn i et nu ii ^) by which Aristotle ex- 
tent, when we have these two words at hand, to employ them in 
the two senses respectively which we want to express, the truth 
is, that in so doing I have actually conformed to Aldrich's prac- 
tice : for he generally, if not always, employs the term syllogism 
in the very sense to which I have confined it: viz. to denote an 
argument stated in regular logical form ; as, e. g. in a part of his 
work (omitted in the late editions) in which he is objecting to a 
certain pretended syllogism in the work of another writer, he 
says "valet certe argumentum ; syllogismus tamen est falsissi- 
mus," &c. Now (waiving the exception that might be taken 
at this use of " falsissimus," nothing being, strictly, true or 
false, but a proposition) it is plain that he limits the word " syllo- 
gism" to the sense in which it is here defined, and is conse- 
quently inconsistent with his own definition of it. 



Chap. III. § 2.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 87 

plains the validity of this argument, is this : " whatever is 
predicated of a term distributed, whether affirmatively or 
negatively, may be predicated in like manner of every thing 
contained under itP Thus, in the examples above, X i$ 
predicated of Y distributed, and Z is contained under Y 
{i. e, is its subject;) therefore X is predicated of Z: so 
"all tyrants," <fyc. (p. 85.) This rule may be ultimately 
applied to all arguments; (and their validity ultimately 
rests on their conformity thereto ;) but it cannot be directly 
mnd immediately applied to all even of pure categorical 
syllogisms ; for the sake of brevity, therefore, some other 
axioms are commonly applied in practice, to avoid the 
occasional tediousness of reducing all syllogisms to that 
form in which Aristotle's dictum is applicable. * 

We will speak first of pure categorical syllogisms ; and 
the axioms or canons by which their validity is to be ex- 
plained : viz. first, if two terms agree vnth one and the same 



* Instead of following Aldrich's arrangement, in laying down 
first the canons which apply to all the figures of categorical 
syllogisms, and then go:ng back to the " dictum of Aristotle," 
which applies to otjly one of them, I have pursued what appears 
a simpler and more philosophical arrangement, and more likely 
to impress on the learner's mind a just view of the science : viz. 
1st. to give the rule (Aristotle's dictum) which applies to the 
most clearly and regularly-constructed argument, the Syllogism 
in the first figure, to which all reasoning may be reduced ; then 
the canons applicable to all categoricals ; then, those belonging 
to the hypotheticals ; and lastly, to treat of the Sorites ; which 
is improperly placed by Aldrich before the hypotheticals. By 
this plan the province of strict Logic is extended as far as it can 
be ; every kind of argument which is of a syllogistic character, 
and accordingly directly cognizable by the rules of logic, being 
enumerated in natural order, 



88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

third, they agree with each other : secondly, if one term 
agrees and another disagrees with one and the same third, 
these two disagree with each other. On the former of 
these canons rests the validity of affirmative conclusions ; 
on the latter, of negative : for no categorical syllogism can 
be faulty which does not violate these canons; none cor- 
rect which does : hence on these two canons are built the 
rules or cautions which are to be observed with respect to 
syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining whether those 
canons have been strictly observed or not. 

1st. Every syllogism has three, and only^ three terms: 
viz. the middle term, and the two terms (or extremes, as 
they are commonly called) of the Conclusion or Question. 
Of these, 1st, the subject of the conclusion is called the 
minor term; 2d, its predicate, the major term; and 3d, 
the middle term is that with which each of them is sep- 
arately compared, in order to judge of their agreement or 
disagreement with each other. If therefore there were 
two middle terms, the extremes (or terms of the conclu- 
sion) not being both compared to the same, could not be 
conclusively compared to each other. 

2d. Every syllogism has three, and only three proposi- 
tions ; viz. 1st, the major premiss (in which the major 
term is compared with the middle ;) 2d, the minor premiss 
(in which the minor term is compared with the middle ;) 
and 3d, the Conclusion, in which the Minor term is com 
pared with the Major. 

3d. Note, that if the middle term is ambiguous, there 
are in reality two middle terms, in sense, though but one in 
sound. An ambiguous middle term is either an equivocal 
term used in different senses in the two premises; e. g. 



Chap. til. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. £9 

" Light is contrary to darkness ; 
Feathers are light ; therefore 
Feathers are contrary to darkness :") 

or a term not distributed : for as it is then used to stand 
for a part only of its significates, it may happen that one 
of the extremes may have been compared with one part 
of it, and the other with another part of it ; e. g. 
" White is a color, 

Black is a color ; therefore 

Black is white." Again, 

" Some animals are beasts, 

Some animals are birds ; therefore 

Some birds are beasts." 

The middle term therefore must be distributed once, at 
least, in the premises; (i. e. by being the subject of an 
universal, or predicate of a negative, Chap. ii. § 2. p. 76,) 
and once is sufficient ; since if one extreme has been 
compared to a part of the middle term, and another to 
the whole of it, they must have been both compared to 
the same. 

4th. No term must be distributed in the conclusion 
which was not distributed in one of the premises ; for that 
(which is called an illicit process either of the Major or 
the Minor term) would be to employ the whole of a term 
in the Conclusion, when you had employed only a part 
of it in the Premiss ; and thus, in reality, to introduce a 
fourth term : e. g. 

" All quadrupeds are animals, 
A bird is not a quadruped : therefore 
It is not an animal." Illicit process of the major. 

5th. From negative premises you can infer nothing. 
For in them the Middle is pronounced to disagree xoiih 



90 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

both extremes; not, to agree with both; or, to agree with 

one, and disagree with the other; therefore they cannot 

be compared together ; e. g. 

" A fish is not a quadruped jV 

" A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing. 

Oth. If one premiss be negative, the conclusion must be 
negative; for in that premiss the middle term is pro- 
nounced to disagree with one of the extremes, and in the 
other premiss (which of course is affirmative by the pre- 
ceding rule) to agree with the other extreme; therefore 
the extremes disagreeing with each other, the conclusion 
is negative. In the same manner it may be shown, that 
to prove a negative conclusion^ one of the. Premises must be 
a negative. 

*By these six rules all Syllogisms are to be tried; 
and from them it will be evident, 1st, that nothing can 
be proved from two particular Premises; (for you will 
then have either the middle Term undistributed ,- or an il- 
licit process : e. g. 

" Some animals are sagacious : 
Some beasts are not sagacious : 
Some beasts are not animals.") 

And, for the same reason, 2dly, that if one of the Premises 
be particular, the conclusion must be particular; e. g. 

* Aldrich has given twelve rules, which I found might more 
conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can be faulty 
which violates none of these six rules. It is much less perplex- 
ing to a learner not to lay down as a distinct rule, that, e. g. 
against particular premises ; which is properly a result of the 
foregoing ; since a syllogism with two particular premises would 
offend against either R. 3, or R. 4. 



Chap. III. § 3. ] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 91 

" All who fight bravely deserve reward ; 

Some Soldiers fight bravely ;" you can only infer that 
" Some soldiers deserve reward :" 

for to infer a universal conclusion would be an illicit pro- 
cess of the minor. But from two universal Premises you 
cannot always infer a universal Conclusion; e. g. 

" All gold is precious, 
All gold is a mineral : therefore 
Some mineral is precious."* 

And even when we can infer a universal, we are al- 
ways at Liberty to infer a particular ; since what is predi- 
cated of all may of course be predicated of some. 



Of Moods. 

When we designate the three propositions of a syllo- 
gism in their order, according to their respective quantity 
and quality, (i. e. their symbols,) we are said to determine 
the mood of the syllogism ; e. g. the example just above, 
"all gold, SfcP is in the mood A, A, I. As there are 
four kinds of propositions, and three propositions in each 
syllogism, all the possible ways of combining these four, 
(A, E, I, O,) by threes, are sixty-four. For any one of 
these four may be the major premiss, each of these four 
majors may have four different minors, and of these six- 
teen pairs of premises, each may have four different con- 

* Aldrich, by a strange oversight, has so expressed himself as 
to imply (though he could hardly mean it) that we always may, 
if we will, infer a universal conclusion from two universal 
premises. 



#3 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

elusions. 4 X 4 (= 16) X 4 = 64. This is a mere 
arithmetical calculation of the moods, without any regard 
to the logical rules : for many of these moods are inad- 
missible in practice, from violating some of those rules; 
e. g. the mood E, E, E, must he rejected as having 
negative premises; I, O, O, for particular premises; and 
many others for the same faults ; to which must be added 
I, E, O, for an illicit process of the major, in every 
figure. By examination then of all, it will be found that, 
of the sixty-four, there remain but eleven moods which 
can be used in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A, 
A, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, O, E, A, E 
E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O. 

Of Figure. 

H- 

The Figure of a syllogism consists in the situation of 
the middle term with respect to the Extremes of the 
Conclusion, (i. e. the major and minor term.) When the 
Middle term is made the subject of the major premiss, 
and the predicate of the minor, that is called the first 
Figure; (which is far the most natural and clear of all, 
as to this alone Aristotle's Dictum may be at once ap- 
plied.) In the second Figure the Middle term is the pre- 
dicate of both premises : in the third, the subject of both : 
in the fourth, the predicate of the Major premiss, and the 
subject of the Minor. (This is the most awkward and 
unnatural of all, being the very reverse of the first.) 
Note, that the proper order is to place the Major premiss 
first, and the Minor second; but this does not constitute 



Chap. III. § 4.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 93 

the Major and Minor premises ; for that premiss (wherever 
placed) is the Major, which contains the major term, and 
the Minor, the minor (v. R. 2. p. 74.) Each of the al- 
lowable moods mentioned above will not be allowable in 
every Figure ; since it may violate some of the foregoing 
rules, in one Figure, though not in another : e. g. I, A, I, 
is an allowable mood in the third Figure ; but in the first 
it would have an undistributed middle* So A, E, E, 
would in the first Figure have an illicit process of the 
major, but is allowable in the second; and A, A, A, which 
in the first Figure is allowable, would in the third have 
an illicit process of the minor : all which may be ascer- 
tained by trying the different Moods in each figure, as per 
scheme. 

Let X represent the major term, Z the minor, Y the 
middle. 



1st Fig. 


2d Fig. 


3d Fig. 


4th Fig. 


Y, X, 


X, Y, 


Y,X, 


X, Y, 


Z,Y, 


Z, Y, 


Y, Z, 


Y, Z, 


Z, X, 


Z, X, 


Z, X, 


Z, X. 



The Terms alone being here stated, the quantity and 
quality of each proposition (and consequently the Mood 
of the whole syllogism) is left to be filled up : (i. e. be- 
tween Y and X we may place either a negative or af- 
firmative Copula: and we may prefix either a universal 
or particular sign to Y.) By applying the Moods then 



I A 

* e. g. Some restraint is salutary : all restraint is unpleasant : 

7 i 

something unpleasant is salutary. Again : Some herbs are fit 

A I 

for food : nightshade is an herb : some nightshade is fit for food. 



91 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book .II. 

to each Figure, it will be found that each Figure will ad- 
mit six Moods only, as not violating the rules against un~ 
distributed middle, and against illicit process: and of the 
Moods so admitted, several (though valid) are useless, as 
having a particular Conclusion, when a universal might 
have been drawn : e. g. A, A, I, in the first Figure, 

" All human creatures are entitled to liberty ; 
All slaves are human creatures ; therefore 
Some slaves are entitled to liberty." 

Of the twenty-four Moods, then, (six in each Figure) 
five are for this reason neglected : for the remaining nine- 
teen, logicians have devised names to distinguish both the 
Mood itself, and the Figure in which it is found; since 
when one Mood (i. e. one in itself, without regard to 
Figure) occurs in two different Figures, (as E, A, E, in 
the first and second,) the mere letters denoting the mood 
would not inform us concerning the figure. In these 
names, then, the three vowels denote the propositions of 
which the Syllogism is composed : the consonants (be- 
sides their other uses, of which hereafter) serve to keep 
in mind the Figure of the Syllogism. 

Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque prioris. 
Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstlnO, bArOk' \* secundae. 
Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptl, dlsAmls, dAtlsI, fElAptOn, 

bOkArdO,t fErlsO, habet : quarta insuper addit. 
Fig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dlmArls, f EsApo, frEsIsOn, 

By a careful study of these mnemonic lines (which 
must be committed to memory) you will perceive that A 
can only be proved in the first Figure, in which also every 



* Or, Fakoro, see § 7. t Or, Dokamo, see § 7- 



Chap. III. §4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 95 

other Proposition may be proved; that the second proves 
only negatives ; the third only particulars ; that the first 
Figure requires the major premiss to be universal, and 
the minor, affirmative, ' <Sfc. ; with many other such obser- 
vations, which will readily be made, (on trial of several 
Syllogisms, in different Moods,) and the reasons for which 
will be found in the foregoing rules: e. g. to show why 
the second figure has only negative Conclusions, we have 
only to consider, that in it the middle term being the 
predicate in both premises, would not be distributed unless 
one premiss were negative; (Chap. ii. §2.) therefore 
the Conclusion must be negative also, by Chap. iii. § 2, 
Rule 6. One Mood in each figure may suffice in this 
place by way of example : 

First, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) " Every Y is X; (bA) every 
Z is Y ; therefore (r A) every Z is X :" e. g. let the major 
term (which is represented by X) be " one who possesses 
all virtue ;" the minor term (Z) " every man who possesses 
one virtue ;" and the middle term ( Y) " every one who 
possesses prudence;" and you will have the celebrated 
argument of Aristotle, Eth. sixth book, to prove that the 
virtues are inseparable ; viz. 

" He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue ; 
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence ; 

therefore, 
He who possesses one, possesses all." 

Second, Camestres, (cAm) " every X is Y ; (Es) no 
Z is Y; (trES) no Z is X" Let the major term (X) 
be "true philosophers," the minor (Z) "the Epicureans;" 
the middle (Y) " reckoning virtue a good in itself;" and 
this will be a part of the reasoning of Cicero, Off. book 
first and third, against the Epicureans. 



90 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Third, Darapti, viz. (dA) " every Y is X ; (r Ap) 
every Y is Z; therefore (tl) some Z is X:" e. g. 

" Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals ; but 
prudence is a virtue : therefore some virtue has for its object the 
benefit of the individual," 

is part of Adam Smith's reasoning {Moral Sentiments) 
against Hutcheson and others, who placed all virtue in 
benevolence 

Fourth, Camenes, viz. {cAm) " every X is Y \ (En) 
no Y is Z ; therefore (Es) no Z is X;" e. g. 

" Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature ; 
Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to society ; 

therefore 
What is hurtful to society is never expedient," 

is part of Cicero's argument in Off. Lib. iii. ; but it is an 
inverted and clumsy way of stating what would much 
more naturally fall into the first Figure; for if you ex- 
amine the Propositions of a Syllogism in the fourth Figure, 
beginning at the Conclusion, you will see that as the ma- 
jor term is predicated of the minor, so is the minor of the 
middle, and that again of the major ; so that the major 
appears to be merely predicated of itself. Hence the 
five Moods in this Figure are seldom or never used; 
some one of the fourteen (moods with names) in the first 
three Figures, being the forms into which all arguments 
may most readily be thrown ; but of these, the four in the 
first Figure are the clearest and most natural ; as to them 
Aristotle's dictum will immediately apply.* And as it is 

* With respect to the use of the first three Figures (for the 
fourth is never employed but by an accidental awkwardness of 



Chap. HI. §4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 97 

on this dictum that all Reasoning- ultimately depends, so 
all arguments may be in one way or other brought into 
some one of these four Moods; and a Syllogism is, in 



expression) it may be remarked, that the First is that into 
which an argument will be found to fall the most naturally, 
except in the following cases : — First, When we have to dis- 
prove something that has been maintained, or is likely to be 
believed, our arguments will usually be found to take most con- 
veniently the form of the Second Figure : viz. we prove that the 
thing we are speaking of cannot belong to such a Class, either 
because it wants what belongs to the whole of that Class (Ce- 
sare,) or because it has something of which that Class is desti- 
tute (Camestres ;) e. g. "No impostor would have warned his 
followers, as Jesus did, of the persecutions they would have to 
submit to:" and again, "An enthusiast would have expatiated, 
which Jesus and his followers did not, on the particulars of a 
future state." 

The same observations will apply, mutatis mutandis, when a 
Particular conclusion is sought, as in Festino and Baroko. 

The arguments used in the process called the " Abscissio In- 
finiti," will in general be the most easily referred to this Figure. 
See Chap. v. § 1, subsection 6. 

The Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when the 
Middle Term is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a 
Subject. This is also the form into which most arguments will 
naturally fall that are used to establish an objection (Enstasis of 
Aristotle) to an opponent's Premiss, when his argument is such 
as to require that premiss to be Universal. It might be called, 
therefore, the Enstatic Figure. E. G. If any one contends that 
" this or that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it can- 
not be explained or comprehended," his suppressed major pre- 
miss maybe refuted by the argument that " the connexion of the 
Body and Soul cannot be explained or comprehended," <$*c. 

A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be ex- 
hibited in this form. 
9 



9S ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. TBook II. 

that case, said to be reduced : (i. e. to the first figure.) 
These four are called the perfect moods, and all the rest 
imperfect. 

Ostensive Reduction. 

$5. 

In reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of course, allowed 
to introduce any new Term or Proposition, having nothing 
granted but the truth of the Premises ; but these Premises 
are allowed to be illatively converted (because the truth 
of any Proposition implies that of its illative converse) or 
transposed : by taking advantage of this liberty, where 
there is need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the 
Premises originally given, either the very same Conclusion 
as the original one, or another from which the original 
Conclusion follows by illative conversion ; e. g. Darapti t 

" All wits are dreaded; 
All wits are admired ; 
Some who are admired are dreaded," 

into Darii, by converting by limitation (per accidens) the 
minor Premiss. 

" All wits are dreaded ; 
Some who are admired are wits ; therefore 
Some who are admired are dreaded." 

Camestres, 

" All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself; 
The advocates of pleasure do not account, tyc. 
Therefore they are not true philosophers," 

reduced to Cdarent, by simply converting the minor, and 
then transposing the Premises. 



Chap. III. §5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 99 

" Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not advocates of 
pleasure ; 
All true philosophers account virtue, <f«e. : therefore 
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure." 

This Conclusion may be illatively converted into the 
original one. 

Baroko ;* e.g. Reduction by 

**<»< v > a means of 

conversion 

** Every true patriot is a friend to religion; b y negation. 

Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ; 

Some great statesmen are not true patriots," 

to Ferio, by converting the major by negation, (contra- 
position,) vide Chap. ii. § 4. 

u He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot: 
Some great statesmen, <^c." 

and the rest of the Syllogism remains the same : only 
that the minor Premiss must be considered as affirmative, 
because you take " not-a-friend-to-religion," as the middle 
term. In the same manner Bokardo f to Darii ; e. g. 

" Some slaves are not discontented ; 
All slaves are wronged ; therefore 



Convert the major by negation (contraposition) ana 
then transpose them; the Conclusion will be the converse 
by negation of the original one, which therefore may be 
inferred from it ; e. g. 

f* All slaves are wronged ; 

Some who are not discontented are slaves ; 
Some who are not discontented are wronged." 

* Or Fakoro, considered i. e. as Festino. 
t Or Dokamo, considered i. e. as Disamis. 



100 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II, 

In these ways (by what is called Ostensive Reduction., 
because you prove, in the first figure, either the very same 
Conclusion as before, or one which implies it) all the im- 
perfect Moods may be reduced to the four perfect ones. 
But there is also another way, called 

Reductio ad impossibile. 

$6. 

By which we prove (in the first figure) not directly that 
the original Conclusion is true, but that it cannot be false : 
i. e. that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of 
its being false ; e. g. 

" All true patriots are friends to religion ; 
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ; 
Some great statesmen are not true patriots." 

If this Conclusion be not true, its contradictory must be 
true; viz. 

" All great statesmen are true patriots." 

Let this then be assumed, in the place of the minor 
Premiss of the original Syllogism, and a false conclusion 
will be proved ; e. g. bAr. 

" All true patriots are friends to religion ; 
b A, All great statesmen are true patriots ; 
rA, All great statesmen are friends to religion." 

for as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of the original 
minor Premiss, it must be false, since the Premises are 
always supposed to be granted ; therefore one of the 
Premises (by which it has been correctly proved) must be 
false also; but the major Premiss (being one of those 



Chap. III. § 7] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 101 

originally granted) is true ; therefore the falsity must be in 
the minor Premiss; which is the contradictory of the 
original conclusion; therefore the original Conclusion 
must be true. This is the indirect mode of Reasoning. 
(See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. § 1.) 

$7. 

This kind of Reduction is seldom employed but for 
Baroko and Bokardo, which are thus reduced by those 
who confine themselves to simple Conversion, and Con- 
version by limitation, (per accidens ;) and they framed 
the names of their Moods, with a view to point out the 
manner in which each is to be reduced ; viz. B, C, D, F, 
which are the initial letters of all the Moods, indicate to 
which Mood of the first figure (Barbara, Celarent, Darii, 
and Ferio,) each of the others is to be reduced : m indi- 
cates that the Premises are to be transposed ; s and p, 
that the Proposition denoted by the vowel immediately 
preceding, is to be converted; s, simply, p, per accidens, 
(by limitation :) thus, in Camestres, (see example, p. 95.) 
the C indicates that it must be reduced to Celarent; the 
two ss, that the minor Premiss and Conclusion must be 
converted simply; the m, that the Premises must be 
transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip, denotes 
that the premises warrant a universal conclusion in place 
of a particular. The JT, though of course it cannot be 
illatively converted per accidens, viz. : so as to become 
A, yet is thus converted in the Conclusion, because as 
soon as the premises are transposed (as denoted by the 
m,) it appears that a universal conclusion follows from 
them. 

9* 



102 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

K (which indicates the reduction ad impossibile) is a 
sign that the Proposition, denoted by the vowel immedi- 
ately before it, must be left out, and the contradictory ol 
the Conclusion substituted; viz. for the minor Premiss in 
Baroko and the major in Bokardo. But it has been 
already shown, that the Conversion by contraposition (by 
negation) will enable us to reduce these two Moods, 
ostensively* 



Chap. IV. 

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. III. 

Of Modal Syllogisms, and of all Arguments besides 
Regular and Pure-Categorical Syllogisms. 

Of Modals. 

|L 

Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical Propo- 
sitions, and the Syllogisms composed of such. A pure 
categorical proposition is styled by some logicians a propo- 
sition " de inesse" from its asserting simply that the 
Predicate is or is not (in our conception) contained in the 
Subject; as, "John killed Thomas." A modal proposi- 
tion asserts that the Predicate is or is not contained in the 



* If any one should choose that the names of these moods 
should indicate this, he might make K the index of conversion 
by negation ; and then the names would be, by a slight change, 
Falcoro, and Dokamo. 



Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 103 

Subject in a certain mode or manner ; as, " accidentally," 
" wilfully," 4-c. 

A Modal proposition may be stated as a pure one, by 
attaching the Mode to one of the Terms : and the Propo- 
sition will, in all respects, fall under the foregoing rules j 
e. g. " John killed Thomas wilfully and maliciously ;" 
here the mode is to be regarded as part of the Predicate. 
"It is probable that all knowledge is useful;" "probably 
useful" is here the Predicate. But when the Mode is 
only used to express the necessary, contingent, or impos- 
sible connexion of the Terms, it may as well be attached 
to the Subject: e. g. "man is necessarily mortal," is the 
same as " all men are mortal :" " injustice is in no case 
expedient," corresponds to " no injustice is expedient :" 
and " this man is occasionally intemperate," has the force 
of a particular : (vide Chap. ii. § 2. note.) It is thus, 
and thus only, that two singular Propositions may be 
contradictories ; e. g. " this man is never intemperate," 
will be the contradictory of the foregoing. Indeed every 
sign (of universality or particularity) may be considered 
as a Mode. 

Since, however, in all Modal Propositions, you assert 
that the dictum (i. e. the assertion itself) and the Mode, 
agree together or disagree, so, in some cases, this 
may be the most convenient way of stating a Modal, 
purely : 

subj. cop. pred. subject. 

e. g. " It is impossible that all men should be virtuous." 

subj. cop. 

Such is a proposition of the Apostle Paul's : " This is 

pred. subject. 

a faithful saying, <J*c. that Jesus Christ came into the 



104 ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. [Book II. 

subject. 

world to save sinners." In these cases one of your 
Terms (the subject) is itself an entire Proposition. 

In English the word In is often used in expressing one 
proposition combined with another, in such a manner as 
to make the two, one proposition : e. g. " You will have a 
formidable opponent to encounter in the Emperor :" this 
involves two propositions ; 1st, " You will have to en- 
counter the Emperor ;" 2d, " He will prove a formidable 
opponent:" this last is implied by the word in, which 
denotes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians men- 
tioned above, when they speak of a proposition " de 
z/iesse") that that Predicate is contained in that Subject. 
. It may be proper to remark in this place, that we may 
often meet with a Proposition whose drift and force will 
be very different, according as we regard this or that as 
its Predicate. Indeed, properly speaking, it may be 
considered as several different propositions, each indeed 
implying the truth of all the rest, but each having a 
distinct Predicate; the revision of the sentence being 
varied in each case; and ine variations marked, either 
by the collocation of the words, the intonation of the 
voice, or by the designation of the emphatic words, viz. : 
the Predicate, as scored under, or printed in italics. E. G, 

12 3 4 

11 The Organon of Bacon was not designed to supersede 

5 6 

the Organon of Aristotle :" this might be regarded as, at 
least, six different propositions : if the word numbered ( 1 ) 
were in italics, it would leave us at liberty to suppose that 
Bacon might have designed to supersede by some work of 
his, the Organon of Aristotle ; but not by his own Orga- 
non : if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand the 



Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 103 

author to be contending, that whether or no any other 
author had composed an Organon with such a design, Ba- 
con at least did not : if No. 3, then we should understand 
him to maintain that whether Bacon's Organon does or 
does not supersede Aristotle's, no such design at least was 
entertained: and so with the rest. Each of these is a 
distinct Proposition ; and though each of them implies 
the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be seen by ex- 
amining the example given,) one of them may be, in one 
case, and another, in another, the one which it is important 
to insist on. 

We should consider in each case what Question it is 
that is proposed, and what answer to it wovM in the 
instance before us, be the most opposite or contrasted to 
the one to be examined. E. G. " You will find this 
doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either with, " You 
will find in Bacon a different doctrine," or with, " You will 
find this doctrine in a different author." 

And observe, that when a proposition is contrasted with 
one which has a different predicate, the Predicate is the 
emphatic word ; as " this man is a murderer ;" i. e. not 
one who has slain another accidentally, or in self-defence . 
"this man is a murderer," with the Copula for the em- 
phatic-' word, stands opposed to " he is not a murderer ;" 
a proposition with the same terms, but a different 
Copula.* 

It will often happen that several of the Propositions 
which are thus stated in a single sentence, may require, 

* Thus if any one reads (as many are apt to do) " Thou shalt 
net steal,"—" Thou shalt not commit adultery," he implies the 
question to be, whether we are commanded to steal or to for- 
bear ; but the question really is, what things are forbidden ; and 



106 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

each, to be distinctly stated and proved: e. g. the Advo- 
cate may have to prove, first the fact, that " John killed 
Thomas j" and then the character of the act, that "the 
killing was wilful and malicious." (See Praxis, at the 
end of the vol. See also Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. 
Ch. iii. § 5.) 

Of Hypotheticals. 

$2. 

A hypothetical Proposition is defined to be, two or 
more categoricals united by a Copula (or conjunction,) and 
the different kinds of hypothetical Propositions are named 
from their respective conjunctions; viz. conditional, dis- 
junctive, causal, (Sfc. 

When a hypothetical Conclusion is inferred from a 
hypothetical Premiss, so that the force of the Reasoning- 
does not turn upon the hypothesis, then the hypothesis (as 
in Modals) must be considered as part of one of the Terms; 
so that the Reasoning will be, in effect, categorical : e. g. 

predicate. 



i \ 

" Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain ; 

Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore 

predicate. 



He was either a hero or a villain." 



the answer is, " Thou shalt not steal ;" " Thou shalt not com- 
mit adultery" frc. 

The connexion between Logic and correct Delivery is further 
pointed out in Rhet. App. I. 

Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coincide; 
for when the " is" or the " not" is emphatic, it becomes properly 
the Predicate: viz. "the statement of this man's being a mur- 
derer, is true" or, " is not true." 



CHap. IV. § 3.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 107 

" Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence ; 
subject. 



If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come from 

God; 
If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence." 

But when the Reasoning itself rests on the hypothesis 
(in which way a categorical Conclusion may be drawn 
from a hypothetical Premiss,) this is what is called a 
hypothetical Syllogism ; and rules have been devised 
for ascertaining the validity of such arguments at once, 
without bringing them into the categorical form. (And 
note, that in these Syllogisms the hypothetical Premiss is 
called the major, and the categorical one the minor.) 
They are of two kinds, conditional and disjunctive. 

Of Conditional. 

$3. 
A Conditional Proposition has in it an illative force ; 
i e. it contains two, and only two categorical Propositions, 
whereof one results from the other (or follows from 
it,) e. g. 

antecedent 

t 1 

" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, 
consequent. 

I \ 

they are entitled to respect." 

That from which the other results is called the antecedent ; 
that which results from it, the consequent (consequens ;) 
and the connexion between the two (expressed by the 
word "if") the consequence (consequential) The natural 
order is, that the antecedent should come before the conse- 
quent ; but this is frequently reversed : e. g. " the hus- 



108 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

bandman is well off if he knows his own advantages ;" 
Virg. Geor. And note, that the truth or falsity of a con- 
ditional Proposition depends entirely on the consequence: 
e. g. " if Logic is useless, it deserves to be neglecied ;" 
here both Antecedent and Consequent are false : yet the 
whole Proposition is true ; i. e. it is true that the Conse- 
quent follows from the Antecedent. " If Cromwell was 
an Englishman, he was a usurper," is just the reverse 
case : for though it is true that " Cromwell was an Eng- 
lishman," and also "that he was a usurper," yet it is not 
true that the latter of these Propositions depends on the 
former; the whole Proposition, therefore, is false, though 
both Antecedent and Consequent are true. A Condi- 
tional Proposition, in short, may be considered as an 
assertion of the validity of a certain Argument ; since to 
assert that an argument is valid, is to assert that the 
Conclusion necessarily results from the Premises, whether 
those Premises be true or not. 

The meaning, then, of a Conditional Proposition is 
this ; that the antecedent being granted, the consequent is 
granted : which may be considered in two points of view : 
first, if the Antecedent be true, the Consequent must be 
true ; hence the first rule ; the antecedent being granted, 
the consequent may be inferred ; secondly, if the Antece- 
dent were true, the Consequent would be true ; hence 
the second rule ; the consequent being denied, the ante- 
cedent may be denied ; for the Antecedent must in that 
case be false ; since if it were true, the Consequent 
(which is granted to be false) would be true also : e. g. 
" if this man has a fever, he is sick ;" here, if you grant 
the antecedent, the first rule applies, and you infer the 
truth of the Consequent ; " he has a fever, therefore he 



Chap. IV. § 3.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 109 

is sick ;" if A is B, C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is D, 
(and this is called a constructive Conditional Syllogism ;) 
but if you deny the consequent, (i. e. grant its contradictory,) 
the second rule applies, and you infer the contradictory of 
the antecedent; " he is not sick, therefore he has not a 
fever ;" this is the destructive Conditional Syllo- _ 

' ^ Constructive 

gism: if A is B, C is D; C is not D, there- f. nd Destruc- 

S ' ? ' tive. 

fore A is not B. Again, " if the crops are not 
bad, corn must be cheap," for a major; then, "but the 
crops are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is 
Constructive. " Corn is not cheap, therefore the crops 
are bad," is Destructive. " If every increase of popula- 
tion is desirable, some misery is desirable ; but no misery 
is desirable ; therefore some increase of population is net 
desirable," is Destructive. But if you affirm the conse- 
quent, or deny the antecedent, you can infer nothing ; for 
the same Consequent may follow from other Antecedents : 
e. g. in the example above, a man may be sick from other 
disorders besides a fever; therefore it does not follow, 
from his being sick, that he has a fever ; or (for the same 
reason) from his not having a fever, that he is not sick. 
There are, therefore, two, and only two, kinds of Condi- 
tional Syllogisms ; the constructive, founded on the first 
rule, and answering to direct Reasoning ; and the destruc- 
tive, on the second, answering to indirect ; being in fact a 
mode of throwing the indirect form of reasoning into the 
direct : e. g. If C be not the centre of the circle, some 
other point must be ; which is impossible : therefore C is 
the centre. (Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1.) 

And note, that a Conditional Proposition Convers i ono f 
may (like the categorical A) be converted y Con<iltlo ™ ls - 
negation; i. e. you may take the contradictory of the 
10 



110 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

consequent, as an antecedent, and the contradictory of the 
antecedent, as a consequent : e. g. " if this man is not sick, 
he has not a fever." By this conversion of the major Pre- 
miss, a Constructive Syllogism may be reduced to a De- 
structive, and vice versa,. (See § 6, p. 76.) 

Of Disjunctives. 

H 

A Disjunctive Proposition may consist of any number 
of categoricals ; and of these, some one, at least, must be 
true, or the whole Proposition will be false : if, therefore, 
one or more of these categoricals be denied, (i e. granted 
to be false,) you may infer that the remaining one, or (if 
several) some one of the remaining ones, is true: e.g. 
"either the earth is eternal, or the work of chance, or 
the work of an intelligent Being; it is not eternal, nor 
the work of chance ; therefore it is the work of an intel- 
ligent Being." " It is either spring, summer, autumn, or 
winter ; but it is neither spring nor summer ; therefore it 
is either autumn or winter." Either A is B, or C is D ; 
but A is not B, therefore C is D. Note, that in these 
examples (as well as in very many others) it is implied 
not only that one of the members (the categorical Propo- 
sitions) must be true, but that only one can be true ; so 
that, in such cases, if one or more members be affirmed, 
the rest may be denied ; [the members may then be 
called exclusive :] e. g. " it is summer, therefore it is 
neither spring, autumn, nor winter ;" " either A is B, or 
C is D; but A is B, therefore C is not D." But this is 
by no means universally the case ; e. g. " virtue tends to 
procure us either the esteem of mankind, or the favour of 



Chap. IV. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. Ill 

God :" here both members are true, and consequently from 
one being affirmed we are not authorized to deny the 
other. 

It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism may easily be 
reduced to a conditional ; e. g. if it is not spring or summer, 
it is either autumn or winter, <J-c. 

The Dilemma* 

§5, 

is a complex kind of Conditional Syllogism. 

1st. If you have in the major Premiss several antece- 
dents all with the same consequent, then these Antece- 
dents, being (in the minor) disjunctively granted (i. e. it 
being granted that some one of them is true,) the one 
common consequent may be inferred, (as in the case of a 
simple Constructive Syllogism :) e. g. if A is B, C is D ; 
and if X is Y, C is D ; but either A is B, or X is Y ; 
therefore C is D. " If the blest in heaven have no de- 



* The account usually given of the Dilemma in Logical 
treatises is singularly perplexed and unscientific. Aldrich, in 
speaking of it, abstains from all use of Logical terms, and speaks 
in a loose, vague, and rhetorical manner. And it is remarkable 
that all the rules he gives respecting it, and the faults against 
which he cautions us, relate exclusively to the Subject-matter : as 
if one were to lay down as rules respecting a Syllogism in Bar- 
bara, " 1st. Care must be taken that the major Premiss be true ; 
2dly. that the minor Premiss be true !" 

Most, if not all, writers on this point either omit to tell us 
whether the Dilemma is a kind of conditional, or of disjunctive 
argument ; or else refer it to the latter class, on account of its 
having one disjunctive Premiss ; though it clearly belongs to the 
class of conditionals. 



112 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

sires, they will be perfectly content ; so they will, if their 

desires are fully gratified ; but either they will have no 

desires, or have them fully gratified: therefore 

Simple con- ... 

structive Di- they will be perfectly content. Note, .in this 

lemma. J 

case, the two conditionals which make up the 
major Premiss may be united in one Proposition by means 
of the word " whether :" e. g. " whether the blest, dfc. 
have no desires, or have their, desires gratified, they will 
be content." 

2d. But if the several antecedents have each 
structive Di"" a different consequent, then the Antecedents, 
being, as before, disjunctively granted, you can 
only disjunctively infer the consequents : e. g. if A is B, 
C is D; and if X is Y, E is F: but either A is B, or 
X is Y ; therefore either C is D, or E is F. " If ^Es- 
chines joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent ; 
if he did not, he is unpatriotic: but he either joined, or 
not, therefore he is either inconsistent, or unpatriotic." 
(Demost. For the Crown.) This case, as well as the 
foregoing, is evidently constructive. 

In the Destructive form, whether you have one Ante- 
cedent with several Consequents, or several Antecedents 
either with one, or with several Consequents ; in all these 
cases, if you deny the whole of the Consequent or Con- 
sequents, you may in the conclusion deny the whole of 
the . Antecedent or Antecedents : e. g. " if the world 
were eternal, the most useful arts, such as printing, Spc. 
would be of unknown antiquity : and on the same suppo- 
sition, there would be records long prior to the Mosaic; 
and likewise the sea and land, in all parts of the globe, 
might be expected to maintain the same relative situations 
now as formerly: but none of these is the fact: therefore 



Chap. IV. § 5.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 113 

the world is not eternal." Again, "if the world existed 
from eternity, there would be records prior to the Mosaic ; 
and if it were produced by chance, it would not bear 
marks of design: there are no records prior to the 
Mosaic; and the world does bear marks of design: 
therefore it neither existed from eternity, nor is the work 
of chance," These are commonly called Dilemmas, but 
hardly differ from simple conditional Syllogisms, two or 
more being expressed together. Nor is the case different 
if you have one antecedent with several consequents, 
which consequents you disjunctively deny ; for that comes 
to the same thing as wholly denying them ; since if they 
be not all true, the one antecedent must equally fall to the 
ground ; and the Syllogism will be equally simple : e. g* 
" if we are at peace with France by virtue of the treaty 
of Paris, we must acknowledge the sovereignty of Bona- 
parte; and also we must acknowledge that of Louis: but 
we cannot do both of these; therefore we are not at 
peace," tyc. ; which is evidently a simple Destructive. 
The true Dilemma is, " a conditional Syllogism with 
several^ antecedents in the major, and a disjunctive 
minor;'''' hence, 

3d. That is most properly called a destruc- D estruct ive 
tive Dilemma, which has (like the constructive iemma- 
ones) a disjunctive minor Premiss; i. e. when you have 
several Antecedents with each a different Consequent ; 
which Consequents (instead of wholly denying them, as 
in the case lately mentioned) you disjunctively deny ; and 

* A. D. 1815. 

t The name Dilemma implies precisely lico antecedents ; and 
hence it is common to speak of "the horns of a dilemma;" but 
it is evident there may be either two or more. 

io* 



114 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

thence, in the Conclusion, deny disjunctively the Antece* 
dents : e. g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is Y, E is F : 
but either C is not D, or E is not F; therefore, either A 
is not B, or X is not Y. " If this man were wise, he 
would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest ; and 
if he were good, he would not do so in earnest ; but he 
does it either in jest, or earnest; therefore he is either 
not wise or not good." 
Resolution of Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or 

a Dilemma. mQre gimple Conditi(mal Syllogisms • e. g. "If 

iEschines joined, fyc. he is inconsistent; he did join, fyc. 
therefore he is inconsistent;" and again, "if iEschines 
did not join, §c. he is unpatriotic ; he did not, fyc. there- 
fore he is unpatriotic." Now an opponent might deny 
either of the minor Premises in the above Syllogisms, but 
he could not deny both; and therefore he must admit one 
or the other of the Conclusions : for, when a Dilemma is 
employed, it is supposed that some one of the Antecedents 
must be true, (or, in the destructive kind, some one of the 
Consequents false,) but that we cannot tell which of them 
is so ; and this is the reason why the argument is stated 
in the form of a Dilemma. 

Sometimes it may happen that both antecedents may 
be true, and that we may be aware of this ; and yet there 
may be an advantage in stating (either separately or con- 
jointly (both arguments, even when each proves the same 
conclusion, so as not to derive any additional confirmation 
from the other ; — still, I say, it may sometimes be ad- 
visable to state both, because, of two proposition's equally 
true, one man may deny or be ignorant of the one, while 
he admits the other, and another man, vice versfa 



Chap. IV. § 6.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 115 

From what has been said, it may easily be seen that all 
Dilemmas are in fact conditional syllogisms ; and that 
Disjunctive Syllogisms may also be reduced to the form 
of Conditionals: but as it has been remarked, that all 
Reasoning whatever may ultimately be brought to the one 
test of Aristotle's " Dictum," it remains to show how a 
Conditional Syllogism may be thrown into such a form, 
that that test will at once apply to it ; and this is called the 

Reduction of Hypotheticals* 

For this purpose we must consider every Conditional 
Proposition as a universal affirmative categorical Proposi- 
tion, of which the Terms are entire Propositions, viz. the 



* Aldrich has stated, through a mistake, that Aristotle utterly 
despised Hypothetical Syllogisms, and thence made no mention 
of them; but he did indicate his intention to treat of them in 
some part of his work,, which either was not completed by him 
according to his design, or else (in common with many of his 
writings) has not come down to us. 

Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid 
which cannot be reduced to a categorical form ; and this is ev> 
dently- agreeable to what has been said at the beginning of 
Chap. iii. ; but then he has unfortunately omitted to teach us 
how to reduce Hypotheticals to this form ; except in the case 
where the Antecedent and Consequent chance to have each the 
same subject ; in which case, he tells us to take the minor Premiss 
and Conclusion as an Enthymeme, and fill that up categorical- 
ly; e.g. " If Caesar was a tyrant, he deserved death: he was a 
tyrant ; therefore he deserved death ;" which may easily be re- 
duced to a categorical form, by taking as a major Premiss, " all 
tyrants deserve death." But when (as is often the case) the An- 
tecedent and Consequent have not each the same subject, (as in 



116 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

antecedent answering to the Subject, and the consequent 
to the Predicate ; e. g. to say, " if Louis is a good king, 
France is likely to prosper," is equivalent to saying, " the 
case of Louis being a good king, is a case of France 
being likely to prosper :" and if it be granted, as a minor 
Premiss to the Conditional Syllogism, that "Louis is a 
good king," that is equivalent to saying, " the present case 
is the case of Louis being a good king ;" from which you 
will draw a conclusion in Barbara, (viz. " the present 
case is a case of France being likely to prosper,") exactly 
equivalent to the original Conclusion of the Conditional 
Syllogism; viz. "France is likely to prosper." As the 
Constructive Condition may thus be reduced to Barbara, 
so may the Destructive, in like manner, to Celarent : e. g. 
" if the Stoics are right, pain is no evil : but pain is an 
evil; therefore the Stoics are not right;" is equivalent to 
— " the case of the Stoics being right, is the case of pain 



the very example lie gives, " if A is B, C is P,") he gives no 
rule for reducing such a syllogism as has a Premiss of this kind ; 
and indeed leads us to suppose that it is to be rejected as invalid, 
though he has just before demonstrated its validity. And this 
is likely to have been one among the various causes which 
occasion many learners to regard the whole system of Logic as 
a string of idle reveries, having nothing true, substantial, or prac- 
ticall}'- useful in it; but of the same character with the dreams 
of Alchymy, Demonology, and judicial Astrology. Such a mis- 
take is surely the less inexcusable in a learner, when his master 
first demonstrates the validity of a certain argument, and then 
tells him that after all it is good for nothing j (porsus repudian- 
dum.') In the late editions of Aldrich's Logic, all that he says 
of the reduction of Hypotheticals is omitted ; which certainly 
would have been an improvement, if a more correct one had 
been substituted ; but as it is, there is a complete hiatus in the 
system, 



Chap. IV. § 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 117 

being no evil; the present case is not the case of pain 
being no evil; therefore the present case is not the case 
of the Stoics being right." This is Camestres, which, of 
course, is easily reduced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all 
Conditional Syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara by 
considering them all as constructive ; which may be done, 
as mentioned above, by converting by negation the major 
Premiss (See p. 109.) 

The reduction of Hypotheticals may always be effected 
in the manner above stated; but as it produces a circuit- 
ous awkwardness of expression, a more convenient form 
may in some cases be substituted: e. g. in the example 
above, it may be convenient to take " true!'' for one of the 
Terms : " that pain is no evil is not true ; that pain is no 
evil is asserted by the Stoics ; therefore something assert- 
ed by the Stoics is not true." Sometimes again it may 
be better to unfold the argument into two syllogisms : 
e. g. in a former example ; first, " Louis is a good king ; 
the governor of France is Louis ; therefore the governor 
of France is a good king." And then, secondly, " every 
country governed by a good king is likely to prosper," fyc. 
[A Dilemma is generally to be reduced into two or more 
categorical Syllogisms.] And when the antecedent and 
consequent have each the same Subject, you may some- 
times reduce the Conditional by merely substituting a cate- 
gorical major Premiss for the conditional one : e. g. in- 
stead of "if Cassar was a tyrant, he deserved death; he 
was a tyrant, therefore he deserved death ;" you may put for 
a major, " all tyrants deserve death ;" <SfC. But it is of no 
great consequence, whether Hypotheticals are reduced in 
the most neat and concise manner or not ; since it is not 
intended that they should be reduced to categoricals, in 



118 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

ordinary practice, as the readiest way of trying their vali- 
dity, (their own rules being quite sufficient for that pur- 
pose ;) but only that we should be able, if required, to sub- 
ject any argument whatever to the test of Aristotle's 
Dictum, in order to show that all Reasoning turns upon 
one simple principle. 

Of Enthymeme, Sorites, <SfC 

$7. 

There are various abridged forms of Argument which 
may be easily expanded into regular Syllogisms : such as, 
1st. The Enthymeme, which is a Syllogism 
ymeme. w ^ one p re miss suppressed. As all the Terms 
will be found in the remaining Premiss and Conclusion, it 
will be easy to fill up the Syllogism by supplying the Pre- 
miss, that is wanting, whether major or minor : e. g. " Cae- 
sar was a tyrant ; therefore he deserved death." " A 
free nation must be happy ; therefore the English are 
happy." 

This is the ordinary form of speaking and writing. It 
is evident that Enthymemes may be filled up hypotheti- 
cally.* 



* It is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly syl- 
logistic; i. e. its conclusiveness is not apparent from the mere 
form of expression, without regard to the meaning of the Terms ; 
because it is from that we form our judgment as to the truth of 
the suppressed Premiss. The expressed Premiss may be true, 
and yet the Conclusion false. The Sorites, on the other hand, 
is strictly syllogistic ; as may be seen by the examples. If the 
Premises stated be true, the Conclusion must be true. 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 119 

2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms, in the first 
figure, in which the Conclusion of each is made the Pre- 
miss of the next, till you arrive at the main or ultimate Con- 
clusion of all, you may sometimes state these briefly, in a 
form called Sorites ; in which the predicate of 

... . c Sorites. 

the first proposition is made the subject of the 
next; and so on, to any length, till finally the Predicate of 
the last of the Premises is predicated (in the Conclusion) 
of the Subject of the first : e. g. A is B, B is C, C is D, 
D is E ; therefore A is E. " The English are a brave 
people ; a brave People are free ; a free people are hap- 
py ; therefore the English are happy." A Sorites, then, 
has as many middle Terms as there are intermediate 
Propositions between the first and the last; and conse- 
quently, it may be drawn out into as many separate Syllo- 
gisms ; of which the first will have, for its major Premiss, 
the second, and for its minor, the first of the Proposi- 
tions of the Sorites ; as may be seen by the example. The 
reader will perceive also by examination of that example, 
and by framing others, that the first proposition in the Sori- 
tes is the only minor premiss that is expressed ; when the 
whole is resolved into distinct- syllogisms, each conclusion 
becomes the minor premiss of the succeeding syllogism. 
Hence, in a Sorites, the first proposition, and that alone, 
of all the premises, may be particular; because in the 
first figure the minor may be particular, but not the major, 
(see Chap. iii. § 4 ;) and all the other propositions, prior to 
the conclusion, are major premises. It is also evident 
that there may be, in a Sorites, one and only one, negative 
premiss, viz. the last: for if any of the others were nega- 
tive, the result would be that one of the syllogisms of the 
Sorites would have a negative minor premiss ; which is 



1-30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

(in the 1st Fig.) incompatible with correctness. (See 
Chap. iii. § 4.) 

Hypothetical A strm g" of Conditional Syllogisms may in 
Somes. like manner be abridged into a Sorites; e. g. 
if A is B, C is D; if C is D, E is F; if E is F, G is 
H ; but A is B, therefore G is H. " If the Scriptures are 
the word of God, it is important that they should be well 
explained; if it is important, fyc. they deserve to be dili- 
gently studied : if they deserve, tyc. an order of men 
should beset aside for that purpose; but the Scriptures 
are the word, <J*c. ; therefore an order of men should be 
set aside for the purpose, tyc. :"* in a destructive Sorites, 
you, of course, go back from the denial of the last conse- 
quent to the denial of the first antecedent : " G is not H J 
therefore A is not B." 

induction. Those who have spoken of Induction or of 
Example. Example, as a distinct kind of argument in a 
Logical point of view, have fallen into the common error 
of confounding Logical with Rhetorical distinctions, and 
have wandered from their subject as much as a writer on 
the orders of Architecture would do who should introduce 
the distinction between buildings of brick and of marble. 
Logic takes no cognizance of Induction, for instance, or 
of d priori reasoning, fyc, as distinct Forms of argument ; 
for when thrown into the syllogistic form, and when letters 
of the alphabet are substituted for the Terms (and it is 
thus that an argument is properly to be brought under the 
cognizance of Logic,) there is no distinction between 

* Hence it is evident how injudicious an arrangement has 
been adopted by former writers on Logic, who have treated of 
the Sorites and Enthymeme before they entered on the subject of 
Hypothetical. 






Chap. IV. §7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. tsSt 

them ; e. g. a " Property which belongs to the ox, sheep, 
deer, goat, and antelope, belongs to all horned animals ; 
rumination belongs to these ; therefore to all." This, 
which is an inductive argument, is evidently a Syllogism 
in Barbara. The essence of an inductive argument (and 
so of the other kinds which are distinguished from it) con- 
sists not in the form of the Argument,' hut in the relation 
which the Subject-matter of the Premises bears to that of 
the Conclusion.* 

3d. There are various other abbreviations Abbrevia . 
commonly used, which are so obvious as hardly tl0ns * 
to call for explanation : as where one of the Premises 
of a Syllogism is itself the Conclusion of an Enthymeme 
which is expressed at the same time : e. g. " All useful 
studies deserve encouragement^ Logic is such (since it 
helps us to reason accurately,) therefore it deserves en- 
couragement ;" here the minor Premiss is what is called 
an Enthymematic sentence. The antecedent in that minor 
Premiss (i. e. that which makes it Enthymematic) is called 
by Aristotle the Prosyllogism. 

It is evident that you may, for brevity, substitute for 
any term an equivalent; as in the last exam- 

J Equivalents. 

pie, " it" for "Logic; " such, for "a use- 
ful study/' 4*c. The doctrine of Conversion, laid down 
in the Second Chapter, furnishes many equivalent propo- 
sitions, since each is equivalent to its illative converse. 
The division of nouns also {for which see Chap, v.) sup- 

* See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. § G. Nothing probably has 
tended more to foster the prevailing error of considering Syllo- 
gism as a particular kind of argument, than the inaccuracy just 
noticed, which appears in all or most of the logical works ex- 
tant. See Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, Ch. i 
11 



123 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

piiee many equivalents ; e. g. if A is the genus of B, B 
must be a species of A: if A is the cause of B, B must 
be the effect of A. 

4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first 

Syllogisms - * ' 

apparently sight appear faulty, will often be found, on 

incorrect. . . 

examination, to contain correct reasoning, and, 
consequently, to be reducible to a regular form; e. g. 
when you have, apparently, negative Premises, it may 
happen, that by considering one of them as affirmative, 
(see Chap. ii. § 4, p. 59.) the Syllogism will be regular : 
e. g. " no man is happy who is not secure : no tyrant is 
secure; therefore no tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism in 
Celarent* Sometimes there will appear to be too many 
terms ; and yet there will be no fault in the Reasoning, 
only an irregularity in the expression : e. g. " no irrational 
agent could produce a work which manifests design ; the 
universe is a work which manifests design ; therefore no 
irrational agent could have produced the universe." 
Strictly speaking, this Syllogism has five terms; but if you 
look to the meaning, ) r ou will see, that in the first Premiss 
(considering it as a part of this Argument) it is not, 
properly, " an irrational agent" that you are speaking of, 
and of which you predicate that it could not produce a 
work manifesting design ; but rather it is this " work," fyc. 

* If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has really 
negative Premises, the only effect will be to change that fault 
into another : viz. an excess of Terms, or (which is substantially 
the same) an undistributed middle ; e. g. " an enslaved people is 
not happy ; the English are not enslaved ; therefore they are 
happy:" if '"'enslaved" be regarded as one of the Terms, and 
"not enslaved" as another, there will manifestly be four. 
Hence you may see how very little difference there is in reality 
between the different faults which are enumerated. 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 123 

of which you are speaking, and of which it is predicat- 
ed that it could not be produced by an irrational agent ; 
if, then, you state the Propositions in that form, the Syl- 
logism will be perfectly regular. (See § 1, of this Sup- 
plement.) 

Thus, such a Syllogism as this, "every true patriot is 
disinterested ; few men are disinterested ; therefore few 
men are true patriots;" might appear at first sight to 
be in the second Figure, and faulty; whereas it is Bar- 
bara, with the Premises transposed : for you do not really 
predicate of "few men," that they are "disinterested," 
but of " disinterested persons" that they are " few." 
Again, "none but candid men are good reasoners ; few 
infidels are candid ; few infidels are good reasoners." 
In this it will be most convenient to consider the major 
Premiss as being, " all good reasoners are candid," (which 
of course is precisely equipollent to its illative converse 
by negation;) and the minor Premiss and Conclusion 
may in like manner be fairly expressed thus — "most in- 
fidels are not candid ; therefore most infidels are not good 
reasoners:" which is a regular Syllogism in Camestres* 
Or, if you would state it in the first Figure, thus : " those 
who are not candid (or uncandid) are not good reasoners; 
most infidels are not candid; most infidels are not good 
reasoners." 



* The reader is to observe that the term employed as the 
Subject of the minor premiss, and of the conclusion, is " most- 
infidels :" he is not to suppose that " most" is a sign of dis- 
tribution ; it is merely a compendious expression for " the 
greater part of." 



124 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Chap. V. 

SUPPLEMENT TO^CHAP. I. 

[ This Supplement may be studied either before or after the Com- 
pendium.] 

ii. 

The usual divisions of nouns into univocal, equivocal, 
and analogous, and into nouns of the first and second in- 
tention, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but 
divisions of the manner of employing them ; the same 
word may be employed either univocally, equivocally, or 
analogously ; either in the first intention or in the second. 
The ordinary logical treatises often occasion great per- 
plexity to the learner, by not noticing this circumstance, 
but rather leading him to suppose the contrary. (See 
Book III. § 8.) Some of those other divisions of nouns, 
which are the most commonly in use, though not appro- 
priately and exclusively belonging to the Logical system, 
i. e. to the theory of reasoning, it may be worth while 
briefly to notice in this place. 

Let it be observed then, that a noun expresses the view 
we take of an object. And its being, viewed as an object, 
i. e. as one, or again as several, depends on our arbitrary 
choice ; e. g. we may consider a troop of cavalry as one 
object ; or we may make any single horse with its rider, 
or any separate man or horse, or any limb of either, the 
subject of our thoughts. 

1. When then any one object is considered 

Common according to its actual existence, as numerically 

one, the noun denoting it is called Singular ; 

as "this tree," the "city of London," <$fc. When it is 



Chap. V. § 1 j SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 125 

considered as to its nature and character only, as being 
of such a description as will equally apply to other single 
objects, the inadequate or incomplete view (see Analytical 
Outline, § 6,) thus taken of an individual is expressed by a 
Common noun ; as " tree," " city." 

2. When any object is considered as a part ^ b gJ" te an( ' 
of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole 

or to another part, of a more Gomplex object of thought, 
the noun expressing this view is called Relative : and 
to Relative noun is opposed Absolute; as denoting an 
object considered as a whole, and without reference to 
any thing of which it is a part, or to any other part 
distinguished from it. Thus, " Father," and " Son," 
" Rider," " Commander," fyc. are Relatives, being re- 
garded, each as a part of the complex objects, Father- 
and-Son, §c. ; the same object designated absolutely would 
be termed a Man, Living-Being, 6fC. 

Nouns are Correlative to each other, which 
denote objects related to each other, and 
viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King is a 
ruler of men, "King" and "Man" are not correlative, 
but King and Subject are. 

3. When there are two views which cannot compatible 
be taken of one single object at the same time, ^ nd ° pposlte * 
the terms expressing these views are said to be Opposite, 
or Inconsistent; (repugnantia ;) as, "black and white;" 
when both may be taken of the- same object at the same 
time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible ; (conve- 
nientia;) as "white and cold." Relative terms are Op- 
posite, only when applied with reference to the same sub- 
ject ; as one may be both Master and Servant, but not at 
the same time to the same person. 

11* 



126 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Concrete and ^' When the notion derived from the view 
Abstract. taken of any object, is expressed with a refer- 
ence to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnish- 
ed the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term; as, 
"foolish," or "fool;" when without any such reference, 
by an Abstract term ; as, " folly." 

5. A term which denotes a certain view of 

Positive, 

Privative, a n object as being- actually taken of it, is called 

and Negative. J ° J 

Positive ; as, " speech" " a man speaking :" 
a term denoting that this view might conceivably be taken 
of the object, but is not, is Privative : as, " dumbness" a 
"man silent" Spc* That which denotes that such a no- 
tion is not and could not be formed of the object, is called 
Negative ; as, a " dumb statute," a "lifeless carcass," fyc. 

It is to be observed that the same term may be re- 
garded either as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, 
according to the quality or character which we are refer- 
ring to in our minds: thus, of "happy" and "miser- 
able," we may regard the former as Positive, and the 
latter (chappy) as Privative; or vice versa; according 
as we are thinking of enjoyment or of suffering. 
Definite and & A Privative or Negative term is also called 
indefinite. Indefinite (infinitum) in respect of its not de- 

* Many Privative epithets are such that by a little ingenuity 
the application of them may be represented as an absurdity. 
Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced in this treatise) that a jest is 
generally a mock-fallacy, i. e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, 
but so palpable as only to furnish amusement, might be 
speciously condemned as involving a contradiction: for "the 
design to deceive" it might be said, " is essential to a fallacy." 
In the same way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of 
"a dead man;" e.g. "every man is a living creature; nothing 
dead is a living creature : therefore no man is dead !" 



Chap. V. § 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 127 

finding and marking out an object ; in contradistinction to 
this, the Positive term is called Definite (finitum) because 
it does thus define or mark out. Thus, " organized be-» 
ing," or " Caesar," are called Definite, as marking out, 
and limiting our view to, one particular class of Beings, or 
one single person ;' " unorganized," or " not-Csesar," are 
called Indefinite, as not restricting our view to any class, 
or individual, but only excluding one, and leaving it unde- 
termined, what other individual the thing so spoken of 
may be, or what other class it may belong to. 
It is to be observed, that the most perfect op- 

. .. Contradic- 

position between nouns exists between any two tory opposi- 

'."."". . tion of terms. 

which differ only in respectively wanting and 
having the particle not (either expressly, or in sense) at- 
tached to them ■ as, " organized," and " not-organized," 
"corporeal," and "incorporeal;" for not only is it im- 
possible for both these views to be taken at once of the 
same thing, but also, it is impossible but that one or other 
should be applicable to every object ; as there is nothing 
that can be both, so there is nothing that can be neither. 
Every thing that can be even conceived must be either 
"Caesar," or " not-C»sar ;" either "corporeal," or "in- 
corporeal." And in this way a complete twofold division 
may be made of any subject, being certain (as the ex- 
pression is) to exhaust it. And the repetition of this pro- 
cess, so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there is oc- 
casion, is thence called by Logicians " abscissio infiniti;" 
i. e. the repeated cutting off of that which the object to 
be examined is not; e. g. 1. This disorder either is, or 
is not, a dropsy ; and for this or that reason, it is not ; 
2. Any other disease either is, or is not, gout ; this is 
not :, then, 3. It either is, or is not, consumption, <$ c. Sfc. 
This procedure is very common in Aristotle's works. 



128 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11. 

Sucn terms may be said to be in contradictory opposi- 
tion to each other. 

On the other hand, Contrary terms, i. e. Contrar 
those which, coming under some one class, are Terms - 
the most different of all that belong to that class, as " wise" 
and u foolish," both denoting mental habits, are opposed, 
but in a different manner: for though both cannot be 
applied to the same object, there may be other objects to 
which neither can be applied-: nothing can be at once both 
" wise" and " foolish :" but a stone cannot be either. 

». a. 

The notions expressed by Common terms, we are en- 
abled (as has been remarked in the Analytical Outline) 
to form by the faculty of abstraction: for by it, in con- 
templating any object, (or objects,) we can attend exclu- 
sively to some particular circumstances belonging to it, 
[some certain parts of its nature as it were,] and quite 
withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, 
we are thus contemplating several individuals which re~ 
semble each other in some part of their nature, we can (by 
attending to that part alone, and not to those points in 
which they differ) assign them one common name, which 
will express or stand for them merely as far as they all 
agree ; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or 
any of them ; (which process is called general- Generaliji:a . 
ization ;) and each of these names is called a tlon * 
common term, from its belonging to them all alike ; or 
a predicable, because it may be predicated aI "" Predicabies 
rirmatively of them, or of any one of them. 






Chap. V. § 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 1. 129 

Generalization (as has been remarked) implies abstrac- 
tion, but it is not the same thing ; for there may be abstrac- 
tion without generalization : when we are speaking of an 
Individual, it is usually an abstract notion that we form ; 
e. g. suppose we are speaking of the present King ol 
France ; he must actually be either at Paris or elsewhere ; 
sitting, standing, or in some other posture ; and in such 
and such a dress, fyc. Yet many of these circumstances, 
(which are separable Accidents [vide § 6] and consequent- 
ly) which are regarded as non-essential to the individual, 
are quite disregarded by us ; and we abstract from them 
what we consider as essential ; thus forming an abstract 
notion of the Individual. Yet there is here no generaliza- 
tion. * 



§3. 



Whatever term can be affirmed of several things, must 
express either their whole essence, which is called the 
Species ; or a part of their essence (viz. either 

r . Species. 

the material part, which is called the Genus, or 

\e -,.... . Genus. 

the formal and distinguishing part, which is 
called Differentia, or in common discourse, „ 

.;..., Differentia. 

characteristic) or something joined to the essence ; 

whether necessarily (i. e. to the whole species, or, in other 

words, universally, to every individual of it,) which is 

called a Property ; or contingently, (i. e. to' 

some individuals only of the species,) which is 

Accident 

an Accident. 



130 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

Every predicable expresses either 



[Book II. 



The whole essence 
of its subject : 
viz. : Species 



or part of its 
essence 
_l 

Genus — Difference 



or something 
joined to its 
essence 



Property 



Accident 



universal [peculiar 

but not but not 

peculiar universal]* 



universal 
and pe- 
culiar 



inseparable — separable. 

It is evident, from what has been said, that the Genus 

and Difference put together make up the Species: e. g. 

"rational" and "animal" constitute "man;" so that, in 

reality the. Species contains the Genus, (i. e. implies it;) 



• * And, consequently, not correctly called a Property, as is 
remarked below; but inserted here as having been usually 
reckoned such by logical writers. They have also added a 
fourth kind of Property ; viz. that which is peculiar to a Species, 
and belongs to every Individual of it, but not at every time. But 
this is, in fact, a contradiction; since whatever does not always 
belong to a Species, does not belong to it universally. It is 
through the ambiguity of words that they have fallen into this 
confusion of thought; c. g. the example commonly given is, 
" homini canescere;" " to become gray" being, they say, 
(though it is not,) peculiar to man, and belonging to every indi- 
vidual, though not always, but only in old age, fyc. Now, if by 
" canescere" be meant the very circumstance of becoming gray, 
this manifestly does not belong to every man; if again it be 
meant to signify the libaility to become gray hereafter, this does 
belong always to man. And the same in other instances. In- 
deed the very Proprium fixed on by Aldrich, "risibility," is 
nearly parallel to the above. Man is " always capable of laugh- 
ing ;" but he is not " capable of laughing always." 



Ghap.V.§3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 131 

and when the Genus is called a whole, and is said to con- 
tain the Species, this is only a metaphorical expression, 
signifying that it comprehends the Species, in its own more 
extensive signification : e. g. if I predicate of Ceesar that he 
is an animal, I say the truth indeed, but not the whole 
truth; for he is not only an animal, but a man; so that 
" man," is a more full and complete expression than 
"animal;" which for the same reason is more extensive, 
as it contains, (or rather comprehends,) and may be 
predicated of, several other species, viz. ''beast," "bird," 
fyc. In the same manner the name of a species is a more 
extensive, but less full and complete term than that of an 
individual, (viz. a singular term;) since the species may 
be predicated of each of these.* [Note, that geaus and 
species are commonly said to be predicated in quid (ri) 
(i. e. to answer to the question, "what?" as, "what is 
Caesar?" Answer, "a man;" "what is a man?" 
Answer, "an animal.") Difference, in "quale quid;' 1 '' 
{itoXov ™) Property and Accident in quale (™roi\)] 



* " The impression produced on the mind by a Singular Term, 
may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye, of 
any object (suppose some particular man) near at hand, in a 
clear light, which enables us to distinguish the features of the 
individual: in a fainter light, or rather farther off, we merely 
perceive that the object is a man: this corresponds with the 
idea conveyed by the name of the Species: yet farther off, or 
in a still feebler light, we can distinguish merely some living 
object; and at length, merely some object; these views corres- 
ponding respectively with the terms denoting the Genera, less 
or more remote." Rhet. Part III. Chap. ii. § 1. 



132 ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. [Book U. 

A genus, which is also a species, is called a 

Subaltern ° ... 

genus and subaltern genus or species; as "bird," which is 

species. D r ' 

the genus of "pigeon" (i e. of which "pigeon" 
is a species) is itself a species of " animal." A genus, 
which is not considered as a species of any thing, is called 
summum (the highest) genus ; a species which is not con- 
sidered as a genus of any thing, i. e. is regarded as con- 
taining under it only individuals is called infima (the 
lowest) species. 

When I say of a Magnet, that it is- "a kind of iron-ore" 
that is called its proximum genus, because it is the closest 
(or lowest) genus that is predicated of it : " mineral" is 
its more remote genus. 

When I say that the Differentia of a magnet is its 
"attracting iron," and that its Property is "polarity" 
these are called respectively a Specific Difference and 
Property; because magnet is an infima species, (i. €. 
only a species.) 

When I say that the Differentia of iron ore is its " con- 
taining iron" and its property " being attracted by the 
magnet" these are called respectively, a generic Difference 
and Property, because iron ore is a subaltern species or 
genus, being both the genus of magnet, and a species 
of mineral. 

That is the most strictly called a Property, which 
belongs to the whole of a Species, and to that Species 
alone ; as polarity to the magnet. [And such a property 
it is often hard to distinguish from the differentia; but 
whatever you consider as the most essential to the nature 
of a Species, with respect to the matter you are engaged 



Chap. V.§4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 133 

in, you must call the differentia; as " rationality" to 
" man ;" and whatever you consider as rather an accom- 
paniment (or result) of that difference, you must call the 
'property ; as the " use of speech" seems to be a result 
of rationality.] But very many properties which belong 
to the whole of a species are not peculiar to it ; as, " to 
breathe air" belongs to every man ; but not to man alone ; 
and it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so much a 
property of the Species " man," as of the higher, i. e, 
more comprehensive, Species, which is the genus of that, 
viz. of " land-animal." Other Properties, as some 
logicians call them, are peculiar to a species, but do not 
belong to the whole of it ; e. g. man alone can be a poet, 
but it is not every man that is so. These, however, are 
more commonly and more properly reckoned as accidents. 
For that is most properly called an Accident, 

Accidents se- 

which may be absent or present, the essence of parable and 

J inseparable. 

the Species continuing the same ; as, for a man 
to be "walking" or a "native of Paris ;" of these two 
examples, the former is what logicians call a separable 
Accident, because it may be separated from the individ- 
ual: (e. g. he may sit down;) the latter is an insepara- 
ble Accident, being not separable from the individual, 
(£. e. he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise :) 
"from the individual," I say, because every accident must 
be separable from the species, else it would be a property.* 

* This seems to me a clearer and more correct description of 
the two kinds of accident than the one given by Aldrich ; viz. 
that a Separable Accident may be actually separated, and an 
Inseparable, only in thought, " ut Mantuanum esse, a Virgil io." 
For surely " to be the author of the iEneid" was another In- 
separable Accident of the same individual; "to be a Roman 
12 



134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Let it here be observed, that both the general name 
" Predicable," and each of the classes of Predicables, 
(viz. Genus, Species, fyc.) are relative; i. e. we cannot 
say what predicable any term is, or whether it is any at 
all, unless it be specified of what it is to be predicated ; 
e. g. the term "red" would be considered a genus, in 
relation to the terms "pink," "scarlet," tyc: it might 
be regarded as the differentia., in relation to "red rose;" 
— as a property of " blood," — as an accident of " a 
house," <SfC. 

And universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, that 
no "common terms" have, as the names of individuals 
have, any real thing existing in nature corresponding to 
them (t6Ss ti, as Aristotle expresses it, though he has been 
represented as the champion of the opposite opinion : 
vide Cat eg. c. 3.,) but that each of them is merely a name 
denoting a certain inadequate notion which our minds 
have formed of an Individual, and which, consequently, 
not including any thing wherein that individual differs from 
certain others, is applicable equally well to all or any of 
them : thus " man" denotes no real thing (as the sect of 
the Realists maintained) distinct from each individual, but 
merely any man, viewed inadequately, i. e. so as to omit, 
and abstract from, all that is peculiar to each- individual ; 
by which means the term becomes applicable alike to any 



citizen" another ; and " to live in the days of Augustus" anoth- 
er : now can we in thought separate all these things from the 
essence of that individual? To do so would be to form the 
idea of a different individual. We can indeed conceive a man y 
and one who might chance to bear the name of Virgil, without 
any of these Accidents ; but then it would plainly not be the 
same man. 



Chap. V. §5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 1. 135 

one of several individuals, or (in the plural) to seve- 
ral together; and we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance 
which we thus choose to abstract and consider separately, 
disregarding all the rest : so that the same individual may 
thus be referred to any of several different Species, and 
the same Species to several Genera, as suits our purpose. 
Thus it suits the Farmer's purpose to class his 
cattle with his ploughs, carts, and other pos- modes of 

classification 

sessions, under the name of " stock ;" the 
Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, classes them as " quadru- 
p-eds," which term would include wolves, deer, Sfc, which 
to the farmer would be a most improper classification: 
the Commissary, again, would class them with corn, 
cheese, fish, fyc, as " provision ;" that which is most 
essential in one view, being subordinate in another. 

$ 5. 

An individual is .so called because it is inca- 
pable of logical division ; which is a metaphor- 
ical expression to signify " the distinct (i. e. separate) 
enumeration of several things signified by one common 
name." This operation is directly opposite to generali- 
zation, (which is performed by means of abstraction;) 
for as, in that, you lay aside the differences by which sev- 
eral things are distinguished, so as to call them all by one 
common name, so, in division, you add on the Differences, 
so as to enumerate them by their several particular names. 
Thus, " mineral" is said to be divided into " stones, 
metals," fyc. ; and metals again into " gold, iron," tyc. ; 
and these are called the Parts (or Members) of the di- 
vision. 



136 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. {Book II. 

r The rules for Division are three: 1st. each of the 
Parts, or any of them short of all, must contain less (i. e. 
have a narrower signification) than th« thing divided. 
2d. All the Parts together must he exactly equal to the 
thing divided ; (therefore we must be careful to ascertain 
that the summum genus may be predicated of every term 
placed under it, and of nothing else.) 3d. The Parts or 
Members must be opposed; i. e. must not be contained 
in one another : e. g. if you were to divide " book" into 
" poetical, historical, folio, quarto, French, Latin," fyc. the 
members would be contained in each other ; for a French 
book may be a quarto, and a quarto, French, fyc. You 
must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the principle 
of division with which you set out : e. g. whether you 
begin dividing hooks according to their matter, their lan- 
guage, or their size, Spc. all these being so many cross 
divisions. And when any thing is capable (as in the 
above instance) of being divided in several different ways, 
we are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or 
right one, without specifying what the object is which we 
have in view : for one mode of dividing may be the most 
suitable for one purpose, and another for another ; as, e. g. 
one of the above modes of dividing books would be the 
most suitable to a book-binder; another in a philosophi- 
ca , and the other in a philological view. 

It must be carefully remembered, that the word " Di- 
vision," as employed in Logic, is, as has been observed 
already, metaphorical; for to divide, means, originally 
and properly, to separate the component parts of any 
thing; each of which is of course absolutely less than the 
whole: e. g. a tree (i. e. any individual tree) might be 
divided " physically," as it is called, into root, trunk, 



Chap. V.§6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 137 

branches, leaves, §c. Now it cannot be said that a root 
or a leaf is a tree : whereas in a Logical Division each of 
the Members is, in reality, more than the whole ; e. g. if 
you divide tree ( i. e. the genus, tree) into oak, elm, ash, 
Sfc. we may say of the oak, or of any individual oak, that 
" it is a tree ;" for by the very word li oak," we express 
not only the general notion of a tree, but more, viz. the 
peculiar Characteristic (i. e. Difference) of that kind of 
tree. 

It is plain, then, that it is logically only, i. e. in our 
mode of speaking, that a Genus is said to contain (or 
rather comprehend) its Species ; while metaphysically, 
(i. e. in our conceptions,) a Species contains, i. e. implies, 
its Genus. 

Care must be taken not to confound a physical Division 
with a logical; which beginners are apt to do, by intro- 
ducing in the course of a Division, the mention of the real 
Parts of which an Individual consists, and of each which 
accordingly the whole cannot be affirmed. 

$6. 

Definition is another metaphorical word, Definition 
which literally signifies, " laying down a boun- 
dary;" and is used in Logic to signify " an expression 
which explains any term, so as to separate it from every 
thing else," as a boundary separates fields. A Nominal 
Definition (such as are those usually found in a diction- 
ary of one's own language) explains only the meaning of 
the term, by giving some equivalent expression, which 
may happen to be better known. Thus you might de- 
fine a " Term," that which forms one of the extremes 
ox boundaries of a " proposition ;-" and " Predicable," 
12* 



138 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IL 

that which . may be predicated ; " decalogue," ten com- 
mandments ; " telescope," an instrument for viewing dis- 
tant objects, 6fc. A Real Definition is one which ex- 
plains and unfolds the nature of the thing; and each of 
these kinds of definition is either accidental or essential. 
An essential Definition assigns (or lays down) the con- 
stituent farts of the essence (or nature.) An accidental 
Definition (which is commonly called a description) as- 
signs the circumstances belonging to the essence, viz. 
Properties and Accidents (e. g. causes, effects, tifc. :) 
thus, " man" may be described as " an animal that uses 
Two divi fire to dress his food," fyc. [And here note, 
&Stion fde " tna * * n describing a species, you cannot mention 
any thing which is strictly an accident, because, 
if it does not belong to the whale of the Species, it can- 
not define it : in describing an individual, on the contrary, 
you enumerate the accidents, because by them it is that 
one individual differs from another, and in this case you 
add the species : e. g. " Philip was a man, of Macedon, 
who subdued Greece," <fyc. Individuals, it is evident,, can 
be defined (i. e. described) in this Avay alone.] 

Lastly, the Essential Definition is divided into physical 
(i. e. natural) and logical or metaphysical ; the physical 
Definition lays down the real parts of the essence which 
are actually separable; the logical, lays down the ideal 
parts of it, which cannot be separated except in the mind : 
thus, a plant would be defined physically, by enumerating 
the leaves, stalks, roots, Spc. of which it is composed : 
logically, it would be defined "an organized Being, des- 
titute of sensation;" the former of these expressions de- 
noting the Genus^ the latter the Difference; for a logi- 
cal defi?iition must always consist of the genus and dif- 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 139 

ferentia, which are the parts of which Logic considers 
every species as consisting, and which evidently are sepa- 
rable in the mind alone. Thus " man" is defined " a 
rational animal," fyc. So also a " Proposition" might be 
defined, physically, " a subject and predicate combined 
by a copula:" the parts here enumerated being actually 
separable ; but logically it would be defined " a sentence 
which affirms or denies ;" and these two parts^ of the es- 
sence of a Proposition (which are the genus and differen- 
tia of it) can be separated in the mind only. And note, 
that the Difference is not always one quality, but is fre- 
quently compounded of several together, no one of which 
would alone suffice. 

Definitions are divided into Nominal and Real, accord- 
ing to the object accomplished by them ; whether to ex- 
plain, merely, the meaning of the word, or the nature 
of the thing: on the other hand, they are divided into 
Accidental, Physical, and. Logical, according to the means 
employed by each for accomplishing their respective ob- 
jects; whether it be the enumeration of attributes, or of 
the physical, or the metaphysical parts of the essence. 
These, therefore, are evidently two cross divisions. In 
this place we are concerned with nominal definitions only, 
(except, indeed, of logical terms,) because all that is 
requisite for the purposes of reasoning (which is the 
proper province of Logic) is, that a term shall not be 
used in different senses: a real definition of any thing 
belongs to the science or system which is employed about 
that thing. It is to be noted, that in mathematics (and 
indeed in all strict Sciences) the Nominal, and the Real 
Definition exactly coincide ; the meaning of the word, and 
the nature of the thing, being exactly the same. This 



140 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

holds good also with respect to Logical terms, most Le- 
gal, and many Ethical terms. 

It is scarcely credible how much confusion has arisen 
from the ignorance of these distinctions which has pre- 
vailed among logical writers.* 

The principal rules for definition are three; viz. 1st. 
The definition must be adequate; i. e. neither too ex- 
tensive nor too narrow for the thing defined: e. g. to 
define "fish," "an animal that lives in the water," would 
be too extensive, because many insects, fyc. live in the 
water; to define it, "an animal that has an air-bladder," 
would be too narrow; because many fish are without any. 

2d. The definition must be in itself plainer than the 
thing defined, else it would not explain it: I say, "in 
itself," (i. e. generally,) because, to some particular per- 
son, the term defined may happen to be even more fa- 
miliar and better understood, than the language of the 
definition. 

3d. The Third Rule usually given by Logicians for a 
definition, is, that it should be couched in a convenient 
number of appropriate words (if such can be found suit- 
able for the purpose:) since figurative words (which are 

* In Chap, ii, § 3, of Book IV. the doctrine here laid down 
will be more fully developed. 

Aldrieh, having given us an instance of a Nominal Definition, 
the absurd one of "homo, qui ex humo," has led some to con- 
clude that the Nominal Definition must be founded on the ety- 
mology ; or at least that such was his meaning. But that it was 
not, is sufficiently plain from the circumstance that Wallis (from 
whose work his is almost entirely abridged) expressly says the 
contrary. Be this as it may, however, it is plain that the ety- 
mology of a term has nothing to do with any logical considera- 
tion of it. See note to § 8, of Book III. 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 141 

opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce ambiguity or 
indistinctness; too great brevity may occasion obscurity; 
and too great prolixity, confusion. But this perhaps is 
rather an admonition with respect to Style, than a strictly 
logical rule ; nor can we accordingly determine with pre- 
cision, in each case, whether it has been complied with 
or not ; there is no drawing the line between " too long" 
and " too concise," <$fc. Nor would a definition unneces- 
sarily prolix be censured as incorrect, but as inelegant, 
inconvenient, fyc. If, however, a definition be chargeable 
with Tautology, (which is a distinct fault from prolixity 
or verbosity,) it is properly incorrect, though without of- 
fending against the two first rules. Tautology consists in 
inserting too much, not in mere words, but in sense ; yet 
not so as too much to narrow the definition (in opposition 
to Rule 1.) by excluding some things which belong to 
the class of the thing defined; but only, so as to state 
something which has been already implied. Thus, to de- 
fine a Parallelogram " a four-sided figure whose opposite 
sides are parallel and equal" would be tautological; be- 
cause, though it is true that such a figure, and such alone, 
is a- parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in 
their being parallel, and may be proved from it. Now 
the insertion of the words " and equal," leaves, and in- 
deed leads, a reader to suppose that there may be a four- 
sided figure whose opposite sides are parallel but not 
equal.* Though therefore such a definition asserts no- 

* This would be inferred according to the principle of " ex- 
ceptio probat regulum," an exception proves a rule. The force 
of the maxim is this, (for it is not properly confined to the case 
where an exception, strictly so called, is mentioned,) that the 
mention of any circumstance introduced into the statement of a 



142 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

thing false, it leads to a supposition of what is false ; and 
consequently is to be regarded as an incorrect definition. 



precept, law, remark, <frc. (for the application of the maxim is 
not confined to the case of Definitions) is to be presumed neces- 
sary to be inserted ; so that the precept, fyc. would not Tiold 
good if this circumstance were absent. If e. g. it be laid dawn 
that he who breaks into an" empty house shall receive a certain 
punishment, it would be inferred that this punishment would not 
^e incurred by breaking into an occupied house: if it were told 
us that some celestial phenomenon could not be seen by the 
naked eye, it would be inferred that it would be visible through a 
telescope: tyc. 

And much is often inferred in this manner, which was by no 
means in the Author's mind; from his having inaccurately in- 
serted what chanced to be present to his thoughts. Thus, he 
who says that it is a crime for people to violate the property of 
a humane Landlord who lives among them, may perhaps not 
mean to imply that it is no crime to violate the property of an 
absentee-landlord, or of one who is not humane ; but he leaves 
an opening for being so understood. Thus again (to recur, to 
the case of definitions) in saying that " an animal which breathes 
through -gills and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false is as- 
serted, a presumption is afforded that you mean to give too 
narrow a definition ; in violation of Rule I. 

And Tautology, as above described, is sure to mislead any 
one who interprets what is said, conformably to the maxim that 
the exception proves a rule. 



BOOK III. 

OF FALLACIES. 

Introduction. 

By a Fallacy is commonly understood, " any Definition oi 
unsound mode of arguing, which appears to fallac y- 
demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the ques- 
tion in hand, when in fairness it is not." Considering 
the ready detection and clear exposure of Fallacies to be 
both more extensively important, and also more difficult, 
than many are aware of, I propose to take a Logical view 
of the subject; referring the different Fallacies to the 
most convenient heads, and giving a scientific analysis of 
the procedure which takes place in each. 

After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each in- 
dividual fallacy, much must depend on natural and ac- 
quired acuteness ; nor can any rules be given, the mere 
learning of which will enable us to apply them with me- 
chanical certainty and readiness: but still we shall find 
that to take correct general views of the subject, and to 
be familiarized with scientific discussions of it, will tend, 
above all things, to engender such a habit of mind, as will 
best fit us for practice. 

Indeed the case is the same with respect to Logic in 
general ; scarcely any one would, in ordinary practice, 



144 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

state to himself either his own or another's reasoning-, in 
Syllogisms in Barbara at fall length ; yet a familiarity 
with Logical principles tends very much (as all feel, who 
are really Avell acquainted with them) to beget a habit of 
dear and sound reasoning. The truth is, in this, as in 
many other things, there are processes going on in the 
mind (when we are practising any thing quite familiar to 
vis) with such rapidity as to leave no trace in the memory • 
and we often apply principles which did not, as far as we 
are conscious, even occur to us at the time. 

It would be foreign, however, to the present 

Inaccurate ° r 

forme^wri- P ur P 0Se » to investigate fully the manner in which 
ters. certain studies operate in remotely producing 

certain effects on the mind : it is sufficient to establish the 
fact, that habits of scientific analysis (besides the intrinsic 
beauty and dignity of such studies) lead to practical ad- 
vantage. It is on Logical principles therefore that I pro- 
pose to discuss the subject of Fallacies; and it may, 
indeed, seem to have been unnecessary to make any apol- 
ogy for so doing, after what has been formerly said, gene- 
rally, in defence of Logic : but that the generality of Log- 
ical writers have usually followed- so opposite a plan : 
whenever they have to treat of any thing that is beyond 
the mere elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all refer- 
ence to the principles they have been occupied in estab- 
lishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, 
vague, and popular kind of language; such as would be 
the best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but 
seems strangely incongruous in a professed Logical treatise. 
What should we think of a Geometrical writer, who, 
after having gone through the elements with strict defini- 
tions and demonstrations, should, on proceeding to Me- 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 145 

chanics, totally lay aside all reference to scientific princi- 
ples, — all use of technical terms, — and treat of the 
subject in undefined terms, and with probable and pop- 
ular arguments 1 It would be thought strange, if even a 
Botanist, when addressing those whom he had been in- 
structing in the principles and the terms of his system. 
should totally lay these aside when he came to describe 
plants, and adopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it 
affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of those 
who scoff at Logic altogether, that the very writers who 
profess to teach it should never themselves make any 
application of, or reference to, its principles, on those very 
occasions, when, and when only, such application and 
reference are to be expected. If the principles of any 
system are well laid down, — if its technical language is 
judiciously framed, — then, surely, those principles and 
that language will afford (for those who have once thor- 
oughly learned them) the best, the most clear, simple, and 
concise method of treating any subject connected with 
that system. Yet even the accurate Aldrich, in treating 
of the Dilemma and of the Fallacies, has very much for- 
gotten the Logician, and assumed a loose and rhetorical 
style of writing, without making any application of the 
principles he had formerly laid down, but, on the contrary, 
sometimes departing widely from them.* 

* He is far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies than 
in any other part of his treatise ; of which this one instance may 
serve : after having distinguished Fallacies into those in the 
expression, and those in the matter (" in dictione," and " extra 
dictionem,") he observes of one or two of these last, that they 
are not properly called Fallacies, as not being Syllogisms faulty 
in form (" Syllogismi forma peccantes,") as if any one, which 
was such, could be " Fallacia extra dictionem." 
13 



146 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

The most experienced teachers, when addressing those 
who are familiar with the elementary principles of Logic, 
think it requisite, not indeed to lead them, on each occa- 
sion, through the whole detail of those principles, when 
the process is quite obvious, but always to put them on 
the road, as it were, to those principles, that they may 
plainly see their own way to the end, and take a scientific 
view of the subject : in the same manner as mathematical 
writers avoid indeed the occasional tediousness of going 
all through a very simple demonstration, which the learner, 
if he will, may easily supply; but yet always speak in 
strict mathematical language, and with reference to mathe- 
matical principles, though they do not always state them 
at full length. I would not profess, therefore, any more 
than they do, to write (on subjects connected with the 
science) in a language intelligible to those who are igno- 
rant of its first rudiments : to do so, indeed, would imply 
that one was not taking a scientific view of the subject, 
nor availing one's-self of the principles that had been 
established, and the accurate and concise technical lan- 
guage that had been framed. 

The rules already given enable us to de- 
Mistakes as 
ic » tiMMjffice velop the principles on which all reasoning is 

conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter of 
it, and to ascertain the validity or fallaciousness of any 
apparent argument, as far as the form of expression is con- 
cerned ; that being alone the proper province of Logic. 

But it is evident that we may nevertheless remain 
liable to be deceived or perplexed in Argument by the 
assumption of false or doubtful Premises, or by the em- 
ployment of indistinct or ambiguous Terms ; and, accord- 
ingly, many Logical writers, wishing to make their sys- 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 147 

terns appear as perfect as possible, have undertaken to 
give rules "for attaining clear ideas," and for "guiding 
the judgment;" and fancying or professing themselves 
successful in this, have consistently enough denominated 
Logic, the "Art of using the Reason;" which in truth 
it would be, and would nearly supersede all other studies, 
if it could of itself ascertain the meaning of every Term, 
and the truth or falsity of every Proposition, in the same 
manner as it actually can the validity of every Argument. 
And they have been led into this, partly by the considera- 
tion that Logic is concerned about the three operations 
of the mind — simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Rea- 
soning; not observing that it is not equally concerned 
about all: the last operation being alone its appropriate 
province ; and the rest being treated of only in reference 
to that. 

The contempt justly due to such pretensions has most 
unjustly fallen on the Science itself; much in the same 
manner as Chemistry was brought into disrepute among 
the unthinking, by the extravagant pretensions of the Al- 
chymists. And those Logical writers have been censured, 
not (as they should have been) for making such profes- 
sions, but for not fulfilling them. It has been objected, 
especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at a loss 
as to the most important and difficult point in Reasoning ; 
viz. the ascertaining the sense of the terms employed, and 
removing their ambiguity. A complaint resembling that 
made (according to a story told by Warburton,* and 
before alluded to) by a man who found fault with all the 
reading-glasses presented to him by the shopkeeper; th© 



148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 111. 

iact being that he never learned to read. In the present 
case, the complaint is the more unreasonable, inasmuch 
as there neither is, nor ever can possibly be, any such 
system devised as will affect the proposed object of clear- 
ing up the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however, no small 
advantage, that the rules of Logic, though they cannot, 
alone, ascertain and clear up ambiguity in any Term, yet 
do point out in which Term of an Argument it is to be 
sought for; directing our attention to the middle Term, 
as the one on the ambiguity of which a Fallacy is likely 
to be built. 

It will be useful, however, to class and describe the 
different kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with; 
and also the various ways in which the insertion of false, 
or, at least, unduly assumed, Premises, is most likely to 
elude observation. And though the remarks which will 
be offered on these points may not be considered as strictly 
forming a part of Logic, they cannot be thought out of 
place, when it is considered how essentially they are con' 
nected with the application of it. 

Division of The division of Fallacies into those in the 
words (IN DICTIONE) and those in the 
matter (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not been, by any 
writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct principle: at 
least, not on any that they have themselves adhered to. 
The confounding together, however, of these two classes 
is highly detrimental to all clear notions concerning Logic ; 
being obviously allied to the prevailing erroneous views 
which make Logic the art of employing the intellectual 
faculties in general, having the discovery of truth for its 



§ 1.] OF FALLACIES. 149 

object, and all kinds of knowledge for its proper subject- 
matter; with all that train of vague and groundless 
speculations which have led to such interminable confusion 
and mistakes, and afforded a pretext for such clamorous 
censures. 

It is important, therefore, that rules should be given for 
a division of Fallacies into Logical and Non-logical, on 
such a principle as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness 
and perplexity. 

If any one should object, that the division about to be 
adopted is in some degree arbitrary, placing under the 
one head Fallacies, which many might be disposed to 
place under the other, let him consider not only the in- 
distinctness of all former divisions, but the utter impos- 
sibility of framing any that shall be completely secure 
from the objection urged, in a case where men have 
formed such various and vague notions, from the very 
want of some clear principle of division. Nay, from the 
elliptical form in which all reasoning is usually expressed, 
and the peculiarly involved and oblique form in which 
Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course 
be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary choice, 
not only to which genus each kind of Fallacy should be 
referred, but even to which kind to refer any one indivi- 
dual Fallacy : for since, in any course of Argument, one 
Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens, in 
the case of a Fallacy, that the hearers are left to the 
alternative of supplying either a Premiss which is not 
true, or else, one which does not prove the Conclusion ; 
e . g. if a man expatiates on the distress of the fodeternf i. 
country, and thence argues that the government ferof fS? 6 " 
is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume 
13* 



150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

either that " every distressed country is under a tyranny," 
which is a manifest falsehood, or, merely that "every 
country under a tyranny is distressed," which, however 
true, proves nothing, the Middle Term being undistributed. 
Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would be referred 
to the head of "extra dictionem;" in the latter to that 
of "in dictione:" which are we to suppose the speaker 
meant us to understand? Surely just whichever each of 
his hearers might happen to prefer : some might assent to 
the false Premiss; others, allow the unsound Syllogism: 
to the Sophist himself it is in different, as long as they can 
bat be brought to admit the Conclusion. 

Without pretending, then, to conform to every one's 
mode of speaking on the subject, or to lay down rules 
which shall be in themselves (without any call for labor 
or skill in the person who employs them) readily applica- 
ble to, and decisive on each individual case, I propose a 
division which is at least perfectly clear in its main princi- 
ple, and coincides, perhaps, as nearly as possible with the 
established notions of Logicians on the subject. 

§2. 

Logical Fai- * n ever y Fallacy, the Conclusion either does, 
lacies. or £ oes not j n ow j rom th e Premises. Where 

the Conclusion does not follow from the Premises, it is 
manifest that the fault is in the Reasoning, and in that 
alone ; these, therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as be- 
ing, properly, violations of those rules of reasoning which 
it is the province of Logic to lay down. 



* In the same manner as we call that a criminal court in which 

crimes are judged. 



§ 2.] OF FALLACIES. 151 

Of these, however, one kind are more purely Logical, 
as exhibiting their fallaciousness by the bare form of the 
expression, without any regard to the meaning of the 
Terms: to which class belong: 1st. Undistributed Mid 
die; 2d. Illicit Process; 3d. Negative Premises, or Af- 
firmative Conclusion from a negative Premiss, and vice 
versa: to which may be added, 4th. Those which have 
palpably (i. e. expressed) more than three Terms. 

The other kind may be most properly called semi- 
logical ; viz. all the cases of ambiguous middle Term 
except its non-distribution: for though in such cases the 
conclusion does not, follow, and though the rules of Logic 
show that it does not as soon as the ambiguity of the 
middle Term is ascertained, yet the discovery and ascer- 
tainment of this ambiguity requires attention to the sense 
of the term, and knowledge of the Subject-matter ; so 
that here, Logic " teaches us not how to find the Fallacy, 
but only where to search for it," and on what principles to 
condemn it. 

Accordingly it has been made a subject of bitter com- 
plaint against Logic, that it presupposes the most difficult 
point to be already accomplished, viz. the sense of the 
Terms to be ascertained. A similar objection might be 
urged against every other art in existence; e. g. against 
Agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of land 
presuppose the possession of a farm; or against Perspec- 
tive, that its rules are useless to a blind man. The 
objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when urged against 
Logic, because the object which it is blamed for not 
accomplishing cannot possibly be within the province of 
any one art whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceivable 
that there should be any method, science or system, that 



152 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III, 

should enable one to know the full and exact meaning of 
every term in existence? The utmost that can be done 
is to give some general rules that may assist us in this work ; 
which is done in the first two chapters of Book II. 

The very author of the objection says, " This (the 
comprehension of the meaning of general Terms) is a 
study which every individual must carry on for himself; 
and of which no rules of Logic (how useful soever they 
may be in directing our labors) can supersede the ne- 
cessity." (D. Stewart, Phil Vol. II. Chap. ii. § 2.) 

Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal from men their 
imperfect conception of the meaning of a term, than the 
circumstance of their being able fully to comprehend a 
process of reasoning in which it is involved, without 
attaching any distinct meaning at all to that Term; as is 
evident when X Y Z are used to stand for Terms, in a 
regular Syllogism : thus a man may be familiarized with a 
Term, and never find himself at a loss from not compre- 
hending it; from which he will be very likely to infer 
that he does comprehend it, when perhaps he does not, 
but employs it vaguely and incorrectly ; which leads to 
fallacious Reasoning and confusion. It must be owned, 
however, that many Logical writers have, in great measure, 
brought on themselves the reproach in question, by call- 
ing Logic "the right use of Reason," laying down "rules 
for gaining clear ideas," and such-like aXa&vda, as Aris- 
totle calls it. (Rhet. Book I. Chap, ii.) 



* 3. 



Material Fai- ^ ne remamm g c ^ ass ( v ^ z - where the Conclu- 
lacies. g | on ( j oeg f ij ow f rom the Premises) may be 



§ 3. J OF FALLACIES. 153 

called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies : of these 
there are two kinds ; * 1st. when the Premises are such 
as ought not to have been assumed; 2d. when the Con- 
clusion is not the one required, but irrelevant; which 
Fallacy is called " ignoratio elenchi" because your 
Argument is not the " elenchus" (i. e. proof of the con- 
tradictory) of your opponent's assertion, which it should 
be; but proves, instead of that, some other proposition 
resembling it. Hence, since Logic defines what Contra- 
diction is, some may choose rather to range this with the 
Logical Fallacies, as it seems, so far, to come under the 
jurisdiction of that art ; nevertheless, it is perhaps better 
to adhere to the original division, both on account of its 
clearness, and also because few would be inclined to 
apply to the Fallacy in question the accusation of being 
inconclusive, and consequently illogical reasoning : besides 
which, it seems an artificial and circuitous way of speak- 
ing, to suppose in all cases an opponent and a contradic- 
tion; the simple statement of the matter being this, — I 
am required, by the circumstances of the case, (no mat- 
ter why,) to prove a certain Conclusion ; I prove, not that, 
but one which is likely to be mistaken for it ; — in this 
lies the Fallacy. . 

It might be desirable therefore to lay aside the name 
of " ignoratio elenchi" but that it is so generally adopted 
as absolutely to require some mention to be made of it. 
The other kind of Fallacies in the Matter will compre- 
hend (as far as the vague and obscure language of Logical 



* For it is manifest that the fault, if there be any, must be 
either 1st. in the Premises, or 2dly, in the Conclusion, or 3dly 
in the Connexion between them, 



154 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

writers will allow us to conjecture) the fallacy of " non 
causa pro causa," and that of " petitio principii :" of 
these, the former is by them distinguished into " a non 
vera pro vera" and " & non tali pro tali;" this last 
would appear to be arguing from a case not parallel as if 
it were so ; which, in Logical language, is, having the 
suppressed Premiss false ; for it is in that the parellelism 
is affirmed; and the "non vera pro vera" will in like 
manner signify the expressed Premiss being false ; so that 
this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain terms r neither more 
nor less than falsity (or unfair assumption) of a Premiss. 

The remaining kind, "petitio principii" (begging the 
question,) takes place when a Premiss, whether true or 
false, is either plainly equivalent to the Conclusion, or 
depends on it for its own reception. It is to be observed, 
however, that in all correct Reasoning the Premises must, 
virtually, imply the Conclusion ; so that it is not possible 
to mark precisely the distinction between the Fallacy in 
question and fair Argument; since that may be correct 
and fair reasoning to one person, which would be to 
another, "begging the question;" inasmuch as to one, 
the Conclusion might be more evident than the Premiss, 
and to the other, the reverse. The most plausible form 
of this Fallacy is arguing in a circle; and the greater the 
circle, the harder to detect. 

H- 

There is no Fallacy that may not properly be included 
under some of the foregoing heads: those which in the 
Logical treatises are separately enumerated* and contra- 
distinguished from these, being in reality instances of 
them, and therefore more properly enumerated in the 
subdivision thereof; as in the scheme annexed : — 






*4.] 



OF FALLACIES. 



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156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

1 5. 

On each of the Fallacies which have been thus enume- 
rated and distinguished, I propose to offer some more par- 
ticular remarks; but before I proceed to this, it will be 
proper to premise two general observations, 1st. on the 
importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detecting and de- 
scribing Fallacies : both have been already slightly alluded 
to : but it is requisite that they should here be somewhat 
more fully and distinctly set forth. 

1st. It seems by most persons to be taken for granted 
that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a 

Importance 

of detecting weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful soph- 

IT iilicLC 163t 

ist ; or, if they allow that a man may with 
honest intentions slide into one unconsciously, in the heat 
of argument, still they seem to suppose that where there 
is no dispute, there is no cause to dread Fallacy ; 
whereas there is much danger, even in what may be 
called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares into some 
Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to 
act upon the conclusion thus obtained. By solitary rea- 
soning I mean the case in which one is not seeking for ar- 
guments to prove a given question, but laboring to elicit 
from one's previous stock of knowledge some useful in- 
ference.* To select one from innumerable examples that 
might be cited, and of which some more will occur in the 
subsequent part of this essay; it is not improbable that 
many indifferent sermons have been produced by the am- 
biguity of the word "plain:" a young divine perceives 
the truth of the maxim, that "for the lower orders one's 

* See the chapter on " inferring and proving," (Book IV. 
Ch. iii) in the Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning. 



§5.] OF FALLACIES. 157 

language cannot be too plain:" (i. e. clear and perspicu- 
ous, so as to require no learning nor ingenuity to under- 
stand it;) and when he proceeds to practise, the word 
" plain" indistinctly flits before him, as it were, and often 
checks him in the use of ornaments of style, such as 
metaphor, epithet, antithesis, &c, which are opposed to 
" plainness" in a totally different sense of the word ; be- 
ing by no means necessarily adverse to perspicuity, but 
rather, in many cases, conducive to it ; as may be seen in 
several of the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which are 
the very ones that are the most richly adorned with figu- 
rative language. So far indeed is an ornamented style 
from being unfit for the vulgar, that they are pleased with 
it even in excess. Yet the desire to be " plain," com- 
bined with that dim and confused notion which the ambi- 
guity of the word produces in such as do not separate in 
their minds, and set before themselves, the two meanings, 
often causes them to write in a dry and bald style, which 
has no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all 
suited to the taste of the vulgar. The above instance is 
not drawn from mere conjecture, but from actual expe- 
rience of the fact. 

Another instance of the strong influence of. 



words on our ideas may be adduced from a JJ ord jL° n 



Influence of 
words c 
thought; 

widely different subject: most persons feel a 
certain degree of surprise on first hearing of the result of 
some late experiments of the Agricultural Chemists, by 
which they have ascertained that universally what are 
called heavy soils are specifically the lightest; and vice 
versd. Whence this surprise? for no one ever distinctly 
believed the established names to be used in the literal 
and primary sense, in consequence of the respective soils 
14 



158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III, 

having been weighed together ; indeed it is obvious on a 
moment's reflection that tenacious clay-soils (as well as 
muddy roads) are figuratively called heavy, from the dif- 
ficulty of ploughing, or passing over them, which produces 
an effect like that of bearing or dragging a heavy weight ; 
yet still the terms " light'' and " heavy," though used 
figuratively, have most undoubtedly introduced into men's 
minds something of the ideas expressed by them in their 
primitive sense. The same words, when applied to arti- 
cles of diet, have produced important errors ; many sup- 
posing some article of food to be light of digestion from 
its being specifically light. So true is the ingenious ob- 
servation of Hobbes, that "words are the counters of wise 
men, and the money of fools."* 



* " Men imagine," says Bacon, " that their minds have the 
command of Language; but it often happens that Language 
bears rule over their mind." Some of the weak and absurd ar- 
guments which are often urged against Suicide may be traced 
to the influence of words on thoughts. When a Christian 
moralist is called on for a direct Scriptural precept against sui- 
cide, instead of replying that the Bible is not meant for a com- 
plete code of laws, but for a system of motives and principles, the 
answer frequently given is, " thou shalt do no murder;" and it 
is assumed in the arguments drawn from Reason, as well as in 
those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of Murder; viz. 
because it is called self-murder; and thus, deluded by a name, 
many are led to rest on an unsound argument, which, like all 
other fallacies, does more harm than good, in the end, to the 
cause of truth. Suicide, if any one considers the nature and 
not the name of it, evidently wants the most essential charac- 
teristic of murder, riz. the hurt and injuiy done to one's neigh- 
bour, in depriving him of life, as well as to others by the insecu- 
rity they are in consequence liable to feel. And since no one 
can, strictly speaking, do injustice to himself, he cannot, in the 



§ 5.] OF FALLACIES. 159 

More especially deserving of attention is the influence 
of Analogical Terms in leading men into erroneous no- 
tions in Theology ; where the most important terms are 
analogical ; and yet they are continually employed in Rea- 
soning, without due attention (oftener through want of 
caution than by unfair design) to their analogical nature ; 
and most of the errors into which theologians have fallen 
may be traced, in part, to this cause* 

In speaking of the importance of refuting Fallacies, 
(under which name I include, as will be seen, any false 
assumption employed as a premiss) this consideration 
ought not to be overlooked; that an unsound Principle, 



literal and primary acceptation of the words, be said either to 
rob or to murder himself. He who deserts the post to which 
he is appointed by his great Master, and presumptuously cuts 
short the state of probation graciously allowed him for working 
out his salvation, (whether by action or by patient endurance,) is 
guilty indeed of a greivous sin, but of one not the least analo- 
gous in its character to murder. It implies no inhumanity. It 
is much more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in indo- 
lence, or in trifling pursuits, — that life which is bestowed as a 
seed-time for the harvest of immortality. What is called in fa- 
miliar phrase " killing time," is, in truth, an approach, as far 
as it goes, to the destruction of one's own life : for " Time is 
the stuff life is made of." 

It is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such argu- 
ments as will bear the test of a close examination, than to re- 
sort to such as may indeed at the first glance be more specious 
and appear stronger, but which, when exposed, will too often 
leave a man a dupe to the fallacies on the opposite side. But 
it is especially the error of controversialists to urge every thing 
that can be urged ; to snatch up the first weapon that comes to 
hand ; (" furor arma ministrat ;") without waiting to consider 
what is TRUE. 
* See the notes to Ch. v. § 1, of the Dissertation subjoined, 



160 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

which has been employed to establish some mischievously 
false Conclusion, does not at once become harmless, and 
too insignificant to be worth refuting, as soon as that con- 
clusion is given up, and the false Principle is no longer 
employed for that particular use. It may equally well 
lead to some other no Less mischievous result. " A false 
premiss, according as it is combined with this, or with 
that, true one, will lead to two different false conclusions. 
Thus, if the principle be admitted, that any important re- 
ligious errors ought to be forcibly suppressed, this may 
lead either to persecution on the one side, or to latitudina- 
rian indifference on the other. Some may be led to jus- 
tify the suppression of heresies by the civil sword; and 
others, whose feelings revolt at such a procedure, and 
who see persecution reprobated and discountenanced by 
those around them, may be led by the same principle to 
regard religious errors as of little or no importance, and 
all religious persuasions as equally acceptable in the sight 
of God."* 

Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of 
Fallacies, and the consequent high importance of detect- 
ing and exposing them. 

$ 6. 

2dly. The second remark is, that while sound 

Difficulty of J _ 

detecting reasoning- is ever the more readily admitted, the 

Fallacies. ° J ' 

more clearly it is perceived to be such, Fallacy, 
on the contrary, being rejected as soon as perceived, will, 
of course, be the more likely to obtain reception, the 
more it is obscured and disguised by obliquity and com- 

* The Errors of Romanism, Ch. v. § 2, p. 228. 



§ 6.] OF FALLACIES. 161 

plexity of expression : it is thus that it is the most likely 
either to slip accidentally from the careless reasoner, or 
to be brought forward deliberately by the Sophist. Not 
that he ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to be 
perceived; on the contrary, it is for his purpose that the 
expression should appear as clear and simple as possible, 
while in reality it is the most tangled net he can con- 
trive. Thus, whereas it is usual to express our reason- 
ing, elliptically, so that a Premiss (or even two or three 
entire steps in a course of argument) which may be readi- 
ly supplied, as being perfectly obvious, shall be left to 
be understood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses 
what is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of 
the argument : and uses every other contrivance to with- 
draw our attention (hia art closely resembling the jug- 
gler's) from the quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the 
uncertainty before mentioned, to which class any individual 
Fallacy is to be referred: and hence it is that the dif- 
ficulty of detecting and exposing Fallacy, is so much 
greater than that of comprehending and developing a pro- 
cess of sound argument. It is like the detection and ap- 
prehension of a criminal in spite of all his arts of con- 
cealment and disguise; when this is accomplished, and he 
is brought to trial with all the evidence of his guilt pro- 
duced, his conviction and punishment are easy ; and this 
is precisely the case with those Fallacies which are given 
as examples in Logical treatises ; they are in fact already 
detected, by being stated in a plain and regular form, and 
are, as it were, _only brought up to receive sentence. Or 
again, fallacious reasoning may be compared to a perplex- 
ed and entangled mass of accounts, which it requires much 
sagacity and close attention to clear up, and display in a 
14* 



162 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

regular and intelligible form ; though when this is once ac- 
complished, the whole appears so perfectly simple, that 
the unthinking are apt to undervalue the skill and pains 
which have been employed upon it. 

Moreover, it should be remembered that a very long 
discussion is one of the most effectual veils of Fallacy. 
Sophistry, like poison, is at once detected, and nauseated, 
when presented to us in a concentrated form ; but a Fal- 
lacy which when stated barely, in a few sentences, would 
not deceive a child, may deceive half the world, if diluted 
in a quarto volume. For, as in a calculation, one single 
figure incorrectly stated will enable us to arrive at any re- 
sult whatever, though every other figure, and the whole 
of the operations, be correct, so, a single false assumption 
in any process of reasoning, though every other be true, 
will enable us to draw what conclusion we please; and 
the greater the number of true assumptions, the more 
likely it is that the false one will pass unnoticed.* But 



* I have seen a long argument to prove that the potatoe is not 
a cheap article of food; in which there was an elaborate, and 
perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per acre of potatoes 
and of wheat, — the quantity lost in bran, — expense of grind- 
ing, dressing, &c, and an assumption slipped in, as it were inci- 
dentally, that a given quantity of potatoes contains but one-tenth 
fart of nutritive matter equal to bread : from all which (and there 
is probably but one groundless assertion in the whole) a most 
triumphant result was deduced. This, however, gained the un- 
doubted assent of a Review by no means friendly to the author, 
and usually noted more for skepticism than for ready assent ! 
" All things," says an apocryphal writer, " are double, one 
against another, and nothing is made in vain:" unblushing as- 
serters of falsehood seem to have a race of easy believers pro- 
vided on purpose for their use : men who will not indeed be- 



§ 6.] OF FALLACIES, 163 

when you single out one step in the course of the reason- 
ing, and exhibit it as a Syllogism Avith one Premiss true 
and the other false, the sophistry is easily perceived. To 
use another illustration, it is true in a course of argument 
as in Mechanics, that " nothing is stronger than its weak 
est part ;" and consequently a chain which has one faulty 
link will break : but though the number of the sound links 
adds nothing to the strength of the chain, it adds much t3 . 
the chance of the faulty one's escaping observation. 

To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies that have ever 
been enumerated, as too glaring and obvious to need even 
being mentioned, because the simple instances given in 
logical treatises, and there stated in the plainest and con- 
sequently most easily detected form, are such as would (in 
that form) deceive no one; — this, surely, shows extreme 
weakness, or else unfairness. It may readily be allowed, 
indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and bring 
them under the general rules, is a harder task than to lay 
down those general rules; but this does not prove that the 
latter office is trifling or useless, or that it does not essen- 
tially conduce to the performance of the other : there may 
be more ingenuity shown in detecting and arresting a 
malefactor, and convicting him of the fact, than in laying 
down a law for the trial and punishment of such persons ; 
but the latter office, i. e. that of a legislator, is surely 
neither unnecessary nor trifling. 

It should be added that a close observation and Logical 
analysis of Fallacious arguments, as it tends (according to 
what has been already said) to form a habit of mind well 
suited for the practical detection of Fallacies ; so, for that 

lieve the best-established truths of religion, but are ready to be- 
lieve any thing- else. 



164 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book III. 

very reason, it will make us the more careful in making 
allowance for them : i. e. to bear in mind how much men 
in general are liable to be influenced by them. E. G. a 
refuted argument ought to go for nothing; but in fact it 
will generally prove detrimental to the cause, from the 
Fallacy which will be presently explained. Now, no one 
is more likely to be practically aware of this, and to take 
precautions accordingly, than he who is most versed in 
the whole theory of Fallacies ; for the best Logician is 
the least likely to calculate on men in general being such. 

»r. 

Of Fallacies in form, 

enough has already been said in the preceding Compen- 
dium : and it has been remarked above, that it is often 
left to our choice to refer an individual Fallacy to this 
head or to another. 

To the present class we may the most conveniently re- 
fer those Fallacies so common in practice, of supposing 
the conclusion false, because the Premiss is false, or be- 
cause the argument is unsound ; and inferring the truth of 
the Premiss from that of the Conclusion ; e. g. if any 
one argues for the existence of a God, from its being uni- 
versally believed, a man might perhaps be able to refute 
the argument by producing an instance of some nation 
destitute of such belief; the argument ought then (as has 
been observed above) to go for nothing : but many would 
go further, and think that this refutation had disproved the 
existence of a God ; in which they would be guilty of an 
illicit process of the major term ; viz. " whatever is uni- 
versally believed must be true ; the existence of a God is 



§ 7.] OF FALLACIES. 165 

not universally believed ; therefore it is not true." Others 
again from being convinced of the truth of the conclusion 
would infer that of the Premises ; which would amount 
to the Fallacy of an undistributed middle : viz. " what 
is universally believed, is true ; the existence of a God is 
true ; therefore it is universally believed." Or, these Fal- 
lacies might be stated in the hypothetical form ; since the 
one evidently proceeds from the denial of the antecedent 
to the denial of the consequent ; and the other from the 
establishing of the consequent to the inferring of the an- 
tecedent 5 which two Fallacies will often be found to cor- 
respond respectively with those of Illicit process of the 
major, and Undistributed middle. 

Fallacies of this class are very much kept out of sight, 
being seldom perceived even by those who employ them ; 
but of their practical importance there can be no doubt, 
since it is notorious that a weak argument is always, in 
practice, detrimental; and that there is no absurdity so 
gross which men will not readily admit, if it appears to 
lead to a conclusion of which they are already convinced. 
Even a candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to be, 
by this means, misled, when he is seeking for arguments 
to support a conclusion which he has long been fully con- 
vinced of himself; i. e. he will often use such arguments 
as would never have convinced himself, and are not likely 
to convince others, but rather (by the operation of the 
converse Fallacy) to confirm in their dissent those who 
before disagreed with him. 

It is best therefore to endeavour to put yourself in the 
place of an opponent to your own arguments, and consider 
whether you could not find some objection to them. The 
applause of one's own party is a very unsafe ground for 



166 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

judging the real force of an argumentative work, and con- 
sequently of its real utility. To satisfy those who were 
doubting, and to convince those who were opposed, are 
the only sure tests : but these persons are seldom very 
loud in their applause, or very forward in bearing their 
testimony. 

Of Ambiguous middle. 

That case in which the middle is undistributed belongs 
of course to the preceding head, the fault being perfectly 
manifest from the mere form of the expression : in that case 
the extremes are compared with two parts of the same 
terms ; but in the Fallacy which has been called semi-logi- 
cal, (which we are now to speak of,) the extremes are 
compared with two different terms, the middle being used 
in two different senses in the two Premises.* 

And here it may be remarked, that when the argument 
is brought into the form of a regular Syllogism, the con- 
trast between these two senses will usually appear very 
striking, from the two Premises being placed together ; 
and hence the scorn with which many have treated the 
very mention of the Fallacy of Equivocation, deriving 
their only notion of it from the exposure* of it in Logical 
treatises ;. whereas, in practice it is common for the two 
Premises to be placed very far apart, and discussed in 
different parts of the discourse; by which means the in- 
attentive hearer overlooks any ambiguity that may exist in 
the middle term. Hence the advantage of Logical habits, 

* For some instances of important ambiguities, see Appendix, 



5 8.] OF FALLACIES. 167 

to fix our attention strongly and steadily on the important 
terms of an argument. 

One case, which may be regarded as coming p 
under the head of Ambiguous middle, is, what words - 
is called, "Fallacia Figura Dictionis" the Fallacy built 
on the grammatical structure of language, from men's 
usually taking for granted that paronymous words (i. «. 
those belonging to each other, as the substantive, adjec- 
tive, verb, <$fc. of the same root) have a precisely corre- 
spondent meaning ; which is by no means universally the 
case. Such a fallacy could not indeed be even exhibited 
in strict Logical form, which would preclude even the 
attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as 
well as sense: but nothing is more common in practice 
than to vary continually the terms employed, with a view 
to grammatical convenience ; nor is there any thing unfair 
in such a practice, as long as the meaning is preserved 
unaltered : e. g. " murder should be punished with death ; 
this man is a murderer ; therefore he deserves to die," <fyc. 
£fc. Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case 
just) that to commit murder and to be a murderer, — to 
deserve death and to be one who ought to die, are, re- 
spectively, equivalent expressions : and it would frequent- 
ly prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind 
of liberty ; but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in 
question : e. g. " projectors are unfit to be trusted ; this 
man has formed a project, therefore he is unfit to be 
trusted :"* here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis 
that he who forms a project must be a projector : where- 
as the bad sense that commonly attaches to the latter 
word, is not at all implied in the former. 

* Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations : Usury. 



168 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not in 
the middle, but in one of the terms of the conclusion; 
so that the conclusion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all 
warranted by the Premises, though it will appear to be 
so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words: 
e. g. " to be acquainted with the guilty is a presumption 
of guilt; this man is so acquainted; therefore we may 
presume that he is guilty:" this argument proceeds on 
the supposition of an exact correspondence between "pre- 
sume" and "presumption" which, however, does not 
really exist ; for " presumption," is commonly used to 
express a kind of slight suspicion ; whereas " to pre- 
sume" amounts to absolute belief. 

The above remark will apply to some other cases of 
ambiguity of terms ; viz. the conclusion will often contain 
a term, which (though not, as here, different in expression 
from the corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is liable 
to be understood in a sense different from what it bears 
to the Premiss ; though, of course, such a Fallacy is less 
common, because less likely to deceive, in those cases than 
in this ; where the term is used in the conclusion, though 
professing to correspond with one in the Premiss, is not 
the very same in expression, and therefore is more certain 
to convey a different sense ; which is what the Sophist 
wishes. 

There are innumerable instances of a non-correspon- 
dence in paronymous words, similar to that above in- 
stanced ; as between art and artful, design and designing, 
faith and faithful, S$-c. ; and the more slight the varia- 
tion of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be 
successful; for when the words have become so widely 
removed in sense as "pity" and "pitiful," every one 



18.] OF FALLACIES. 169 

would perceive such a Fallacy, nor could it be employed 
but in jest. 

This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, by stating 
merely the impossibility of reducing such an argument to 
the strict Logical form ; (unless indeed you are address- 
ing regular Logicians) you must find some way of point- 
ing out the non-correspondence of the terms in question ; 
e. g. with respect to the example above, it might be re- 
marked, that we speak of strong or faint " presumption," 
but we use no such expression in conjunction with the 
verb " presume," because the word itself implies strength. 

No fallacy is more common in controversy than the 
present, since in this way the Sophist will often be able 
to misinterpret the propositions which his opponent admits 
or maintains, and so employ them against him. Thus in 
the examples just given, it is natural to conceive one of 
the Sophist's Premises to have been borrowed from his 
opponent.* 

The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or 

Etymology. 

rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch of 
that founded on etymology; viz. when a Term is used at 
one time, in its customary, and at another, in its etymo- 
logical sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found 
that is more extensively and mischievously employed than 
in the case of the word representative : assuming that its 
right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and 
original sense of the verb, " represent," the Sophist per- 
suades the multitude, that a member of the House of 
Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the 

* Perhaps a dictionary of such paionymous words as do not 
regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly as useful as 
one of synonyms ; u e. properly speaking, of pseudo-synonyms. 
15 



170 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIL 

«* 

opinion of his constituents : and, in short, to be merely 
their spokesman : whereas law and custom, which in this 
case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the 
Term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative 
to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on 
his own responsibility.* 

It is to be observed, that to the head of 

Fallacy of 

interroga- Ambiguous middle should be referred what is 

tions. ° 

called " Fallacia plurium Interro gationum" 
which may be named simply, " the Fallacy of Interroga- 
tion ;" viz. the Fallacy of asking several questions which 
appear to be but one; so that whatever one answer is 
given, being of course applicable to one only of the im- 
plied questions, may be interpreted as applied to the 
other; the refutation is, of course, to reply separately to 
each question, i. e. to detect the ambiguity. 

I have said, several "questions which appear to be but 
one," for else there is no Fallacy; such an example, 
therefore, as " estne homo animal et lapis . ? " which 
Aldrich gives, is foreign to the matter in hand; for there 
is nothing unfair in asking two distinct questions (any 



* Home Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such 
weapons for any Sophist who may need them ; and has fur- 
nished some specimens of the employment of them. He con- 
tends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or immutable "Truth," 
because the word is derived from to" trow," i. e. believe. He 
might on as good grounds have censured the absurdity of speak- 
ing of sending a letter by the " post," because a post, in its 
primary sense, is a pillar ; or have insisted that " Sycophant" 
can never mean any thing but " Fig-shower." 



§ 9.] OF FALLACIES. 171 

more than in asserting two distinct propositions) distinctly 
and avowedly. 

This Fallacy may be referred, as has been said, to 
the head of Ambiguous middle. In all Reasoning it is 
very common to state one of the Premises in form of a 
question, and when that is admitted, or supposed to be 
admitted, then to fill up the rest; if then one of the 
Terms of that question be ambiguous, whichever sense 
the opponent replies to, the Sophist assumes the other 
sense of the Term in the remaining Premiss. It is 
therefore very common to state an equivocal argument, 
in form of a question so worded, that there shall be 
little doubt which reply will be given; but if there be 
such doubt, the Sophist must have two Fallacies of 
equivocation ready; e. g. the question "whether any 
thing vicious is expedient," discussed in Cic. Off. Book 
III. (where, by the by, he seems not a little perplexed 
with it himself) is of the character in question, from the 
ambiguity of the word " expedient" which means some- 
times, " conducive to temporal prosperity," sometimes, 
" conducive to the greatest good :" whichever answer 
therefore was given, the Sophist might have a Fallacy of 
equivocation founded on this term; viz. if the answer be 
in the negative, his argument, Logically developed, will 
stand thus, — "what is vicious is not expedient; whatever 
conduces to the acquisition of wealth and aggrandizement 
is expedient; therefore it cannot be vicious:" if in the 
affirmative, then thus, — "whatever is expedient is desira- 
ble ; something vicious is expedient, therefore desirable." 

This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed 

J • ,- Distribution 

in such a manner, that the uncertainty shall be, and non-dis- 

J tnbution. 

not about the mean,ing % but the extent of a 



172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

Term, i. e. whether it is distributed or not : e. g. " did 
A B in this case act from such and such a motive?" 
which may imply either, "was it his sole motive;" or 
" was it one of his motives ?" in the former case the 
term " that-which-actuated-A B" is distributed ; in the 
latter, not: now if he acted from a mixture of motives, 
whichever answer you give, may be misrepresented, and 
thus disproved. 

§ 10. 
In some cases of ambiguous middle, the 

Intnnsic and 

incidental Term in question may be considered as having 

equivocations. ■*■ - •» => 

in itself, from its own equivocal nature, two 
significations ; (which apparently constitutes the " Fallacia 
equivocationis" of Logical writers;) others again have a 
middle Term which is ambiguous from the context, i.e. 
from what is understood in conjunction with it. This 
division will be found useful, though it is impossible to 
draw the line accurately in it. The elliptical character 
of ordinary discourse causes many Terms to become 
practically ambiguous, which yet are not themselves em 
ployed in different senses, but with different applications, 
which are understood. Thus, " The Faith" would be 
used by a Christian writer to denote the Christian Faith, 
and by a Mussulman, the Mahometan ; yet the word 
Faith, has not in these cases, of itself, two different 
significations. So Ik^ektoi, " elect," or " chosen," is 
sometimes applied to such as are " chosen," to cer- 
tain privileges and advantages; (as the Israelites were, 
though "they were overthrown in the wilderness" for 
their disobedience ; and as all Christians are frequently 
called in the New Testament;) sometimes again to those 



§ 10.] OF FALLACIES. 173 

who are " chosen," as fit to receive a final reward, having 
made a right use of those advantages ; as when our Lord 
says, " many are called, but few chosen." * 

There are various ways in which words come Accidenta i 
to have two meanings: 1st. by accident; (i. 6. ^vocation, 
when there is no perceptible connexion between the two 
meanings ;) as " light" signifies both the contrary to 
" heavy," and the contrary to " dark." Thus, such 
proper names as John or Thomas, fyc. which happen to 
belong to several different persons, are ambiguous, be- 
cause they have a different signification in each case where 



* What Logicians have mentioned under the title of " Falla- 
cia amphibolise" is referable to this last class; though in real 
practice it is not very likely to occur. An amphibolous sentence 
is one that is capable of two meanings, not from the double 
sense of any of the words, but from its admitting of a double 
construction: as in the instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslat- 
able; "quod tangitur a Socrate, illud sentit ;" where " illud' 
may be taken either as the nominative or accusative. So also the 
celebrated response of the oracle ; " Aio te, iEacida, Romanos 
vincere posse :" which closely resembles (as Shakspeare remarks) 
the witch-prophecy, " The Duke yet lives that Henry shall 
depose." A similar effect is produced by what the French call 
"construction louche," a squinting construction; i. e. where 
some word or words may be referred either to the former or 
latter clause of the sentence; of which an instance occurs in 
the rubric prefixed to the service of the 30th January. " If this 
day shall happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be 
used] and the fast kept the next day following :" the clause in 
brackets may belong either to the former or the latter part of 
the sentence. In the Nicene Creed, the words " by whom all 
things were made" are grammatically referable either to the 
Father or the Son. 
15* 



174 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

they are applied. Words which fall under this first head 
are what are the most strictly called equivocal. 

2dly. There are several terms in the use of 

First and ... 

second inten- which it is necessary to notice the distinction 

tion. J 

between first and second intention.* The 
"first-intention" of a Term (according to the usual ac- 
ceptation of this phrase) is a certain vague and general 
signification of it, as opposed to one more precise and 
limited, which it bears in some particular art, science, or 
system, and which is called its " second-intention." Thus, 
among farmers, in some parts, the word "beast" is ap- 
plied particularly and especially to the ox kind; and 
"bird," in the language of many sportsmen, is in like 
manner appropriated to the partridge: the common and 
general acceptation (which every one is well acquainted 
with) of each of those two words, is the First-intention of 
each ; the other, its Second-intention. 



* I am aware that there exists another opinion as to the 
meaning of the phrase "second-intention;" and that Aldrich 
is understood by some persons to mean (as indeed his expression 
may very well be understood to imply) that every predicable 
must necessarily be employed in the Second-intention. I do 
not undertake to combat the doctrine alluded to, because I must 
confess that, after the most patient attention devoted to the 
explanations given of it, I have never been able to comprehend 
what it is that is meant by it. It is one, however, which, whether 
sound or unsound, appears not to be connected with any Logical 
processes, and therefore may be safely passed by on the present 
occasion. 

For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word " Spe- 
cies," when applied to organized beings, (viz. as denoting those 
plants or animals, which it is conceived may have descended 
from a common stock,) see the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. 
Chap. v. § 1. 



§ 10.] OP FALLACIES. 175 

It is evident that a Term may have several Second- 
intentions, according to the several systems into which it 
is introduced, and of which it is one of the technical 
Terms: thus "line" signifies, in the Art-military, a cer- 
tain form of drawing up ships or troops : in Geography, 
a certain division of the earth ; to the fisherman, a string 
to catch fish, fyc. fyc. ; all which are so many distinct 
Second-intentions, in each of which there is a certain 
signification " of extension in length" which constitutes 
the First-intention, and which corresponds pretty nearly 
with the employment of the Term in Mathematics.* 

It will sometimes happen, that a Term shall he em- 
ployed always in some one or other of its second inten- 
tions; and never, strictly in the first, though that first 
intention is a part of its signification in each case. It is 
evident, that the utmost care is requisite to avoid con- 
founding together, either the first and second intentions, or 
the different second intentions with each other 

3dly. When two or more things are con- Resemblancd 
nected by resemblance or analogy, they will andanal °sy- 
frequently have the same name. Thus a " blade of 
grass," and the contrivance in building called a "dove- 
tail" are so called from their resemblance to the blade\ 

* In a few instances the Second-intention, or philosophical 
employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First-inten- 
tion, or popular use : thus " affection" is limited in popular use 
to " love ;" " charity," to " alms-giving ;" " flower," to those 
which have conspicuous petals ; and " fruit," to such as are 
eatable. ^ 

t Unless, indeed, the primary application of the Term be to 
the leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting instruments, 
which is perhaps more probable ; but the question is unimpor 
tant in the present case. 



176 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book ill. 

of a sword, and the tail of a real dove. But two things 
may be connected by analogy, though they have in 
themselves no resemblance: for analogy is the resem- 
blance of ratios (or relations :) thus, as a sweet taste grati- 
fies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear ; and 
hence the same word, " sweet" is applied to both, though 
no flavour can resemble a sound in itself: so, the leg of a 
table does not resemble that of an animal ; nor the foot 
of a mountain that of an animal ; but the leg answers the 
same purpose to the table, as the leg of an animal to that 
animal ; the foot of a mountain has the same situation 
relatively to the mountain, as the foot of an animal to the 
animal ; this analogy therefore may be expressed like a 
mathematical analogy (or proportion) " leg : animal : : 
supporting stick: table." 

In all these cases (of this 3rd head) one of the mean- 
ings of the word is called by Logicians proper, i. e. orig- 
inal or primary ; the other improper, secondary, or trans- 
ferred : thus, sweet is originally and properly applied to 
tastes; secondarily and improperly (i. e. by analogy) to 
sounds : thus, also, dove-tail is applied secondarily (though 
not by analogy, but by direct resemblance) to the con- 
trivance in building so called. When the secondary 
meaning of a word is founded on some fanciful analogy, 
and especially w r hen it is introduced for ornament sake, 
we call this a metaphor ; as when we speak of " a ship's 
ploughing the deep." The turning up of the surface 
being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to 
the ship ; but if the analogy be a more important and 
essential one, and especially if we have no other word to 
express our meaning but this transferred one, we then 
call it merely an analogous word (though the metaphor is 



§ 10.] OF FALLACIES. 177 

analogous also,) e. g. one would hardly call it metaphorical 
or figurative language to speak of the leg of a table, or 
mouth of a river.* 

4thly. Several things may be called by the Connexion 
same name (though they have no connexion Jk™ eor 
of resemblance or analogy) from being con- 
nected by vicinity of time or place ; under which head 
will come the connexion of cause and effect, or of part 
and whole, &c. Thus a door signifies both an opening in 
the wall (more strictly called the door-way) and a 
board which closes it ; which are things neither similar 
nor analogous. When I say, " the rose smells sweet ;" 
and u I smell the rose ;" the word " smell" has two 
meanings : in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a cer- 
tain sensation in my own mind ; in the former of a cer? 
tain quality in the flower, which produces that sensation, 
but which of course cannot in the least resemble it ; and 
here the word smell is applied with equal propriety to 
both.f Thus, we speak of Homer, for " the works of 
Homer ;" and this is a secondary or transferred meaning . 
and so it is when we say, " a good shot," for a good 
marksman ; but the word " shot" has two other mean- 
ings, which are both equally proper ; viz. the thing put 
into a gun in order to be discharged from it, and the 
act of discharging it. 



* See Dr. Copleston's account of Analogy in the notes to his 
" Four Discourses." 

t On this ambiguity have been founded the striking paradox- 
es of those i who have maintained that there is no heat in fire, 
no cold in ice, &c. The sensations of heat, cold, &c. can of course 
only belong to a Sentient Being 



178 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

Thus, " learning^ signifies either the act of acquiring 
knowledge, or the knowledge itself; e. g. " he neglects 
his learning;" "Johnson was a man of learning." "Pos- 
session" is ambiguous in the same manner, and a multi- 
tude of others. 

Much confusion often arises from ambiguity of this 
kind, when unperceived ; nor is there any point in which 
the copiousness and consequent precision of the Greek 
language, is more to be admired than in its distinct terms 
for expressing an act, and the result of that act ; e. g. 
nps%is, " the doing of anything ;" *p*ypa, the " thing done ;" 
so, ^ocrts and ScSpov, Xt/ipis and A^a. fyc. 

It will very often happen, that two of the meanings of 
a word will have no connexion with one another, but will 
each have some connexion with a third. Thus, " martyr" 
originally signified a witness ; thence it was applied to 
those who suffered, in bearing testimony to Christianity; 
and thence again it is often applied to " sufferers" in gen- 
eral: the first and third significations are not the least 
connected. Thus, " post" signifies originally a pillar, 
(postum, from pono,) then a distance marked out by posts ; 
and then the carriages, messengers, &c. that travelled 
over this distance. It would puzzle any one, proceeding 
on mere conjecture, to make out how the word " premi- 
ses" should have come to signify a building. 

Ambiguities of this kind belong practically to the first 
head : there being no perceived connexion between the 
different senses. 

The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of the Term 
which is suspected of being used in two senses; viz. a 
Nominal, not necessarily a Real Definition : as was re- 
marked in Book II. Chap. v. 



§ 11.] OF FALLACIES. 179 

But here it may be proper to remark, that for the avoid- 
ing- of Fallacy or of verbal controversy, it is only requi- 
site that the term should be employed uniformly in the 
same sense as far as the existing question is concerned; 
thus, two persons might, in discussing the question, wheth- 
er Caesar was a great man, have some such differer ce in 
their acceptation of the epithet " great," as would be non- 
essential to that question ; e. g. one of them might t mder- 
stand by it nothing- more than eminent intellectual and 
moral qualities ; while the other might conceive it to 
imply the performance of splendid actions: this abstract 
difference of meaning- would not produce any disagree- 
ment in the existing question, because both those circum- 
stances are united in the case of Cassar; but if oie (an I 
not the other) of the parties understood the epithet 
"great" to imply pure patriotism, generosity cf char- 
acter, fyc, then there would be a disagreement as to tie 
application of the Term, even between those who mig'it 
think alike of Caesar's character. Definition, the spe- 
cific for ambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded 
with a view to this principle ; it is sufficient on each 
occasion to define a Term as far as regards the question 
in hand. 

Hi. 

Of those cases where the ambiguity arises from the 
context, there are several species ; some of which Logi- 
cians have enumerated, but have neglected to refer them, 
in the first place, to one common class; (viz. the one voi- 
der which they are here placed ;) and have even arranged 
some under the head of Fallacies " in dictione" and eth- 
ers under that of " extra, dictionem." 



180 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

We may consider, as the first of these spe- 

FaUacyof J . 

Division and c ies, the Fallacy of " Division" and that of 

Composition. J 

"Composition," taken together, since in each of 
these the middle Term is used in one Premiss collectively, 
in the other, distributively : if the former of these is the 
major Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this is called the 
" Fallacy of Division ;" the Term which is first taken 
collectively being afterwards divided; and vice versd. 
The ordinary examples are such as these ; " All the an- 
gles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: ABC 
is an ang]e of a triangle; therefore A B C is equal to 
two right angles." "Five is one number; three and two 
are five; therefore three and two are one number;" or, 
"three and two are two numbers, five is three and two, 
therefore five is two numbers :" it is manifest that the 
middle Term, "three and two," (in this last example,) is 
ambiguous, signifying, in the major Premiss, "taken dis- 
tinctly," in the minor, " taken together :" and so of the 
rest. 

To this head may be referred the Fallacy by which 
men have sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to ad- 
mit, the doctrine of Necessity; e. g. "he who necessa- 
rily goes or stays (i. e. in reality, 'who necessarily goes, 
or who necessarily stays'} is not a free agent; you must 
necessarily go or stay, (i. e. 'you must necessarily take 
the alternative?) therefore you are not a free agent." 
Such also is the Fallacy which probably operates on most 
adventurers in lotteries; e. g. "the gaining of a high 
prize is no uncommon occurrence; and what is no un- 
common occurrence may reasonably be expected; there- 
fore the gaining of a high prize may reasonably be ex- 
pected;" the Conclusion, when applied to the individual 



§ 11.] OF FALLACIES. 181 

(as in practice it is,) must be understood in the sense of 
" reasonably expected by a certain individual ;" there- 
fore for the major Premiss to be true, the middle Term 
must be understood to mean, "no uncommon occurrence 
to some one particular person ;" whereas for the minor 
(which has been placed first) to be true, you must under- 
stand it of " no uncommon occurrence to some one or 
other;" and thus you will have the Fallacy of Compo- 
sition. 

There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to 
deceive, than the one now before us ; the form in which 
it is most usually employed, is, to establish some truth, 
separately, concerning each single member of a certain 
class, and thence to infer the same of the whole collective- 
ly : thus some infidels have labored to prove concerning' 
some one of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been 
the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circum- 
stances : next, they endeavor to prove the same concern- 
ing another ; and so on ; and thence infer that all of 
them might have been so. They might argue in like 
manner, that because it is not very improbable one may 
throAv sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore 
it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hun- 
dred times running. 

This Fallacy may often be considered as turning on 
the ambiguity of the word " all ;" which may easily be 
dispelled by substituting for it the word " each" or " eve- 
ry," where that is its signification; e. g. "all these trees 
make a thick shade," is ambiguous, meaning, either, 
" every one of them," or " all together." 

This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to 

deceive themselves : for when a multitude of particulars 
16 



182 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIL 

are presented to the mind, many are too weak or too in- 
dolent to take a comprehensive view of them ; but eon- 
fine their attention to each single point, by turns; and 
then decide, infer, and act, accordingly : e. g. the im- 
prudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford this, 
or that, or the other expense, forgets that all of them to- 
gether will ruin him. - 

To the same head may be reduced that fallacious rea- 
soning, by which men vindicate themselves to their own 
conscience and to others, for the neglect of those unde- 
fined duties, which, though indispensable, and therefore 
not left to our choice whether we will practise them or 
not, are left to our discretion as to the mode, and the par- 
ticular occasions, of practising them ; e. g. "I am not 
bound to contribute to this charity in particular ; nor to 
that ; nor to the other :" the practical conclusion which 
they draw, is, that all charity may be dispensed with. 

As men are apt to forget that any two circumstances 
(not naturally connected) are more rarely to be met with 
combined than separate, though they be not at all incom- 
patible; so also they are apt to imagine, from finding that 
they are rarely combined, that there is an incompatibility; 
e. g. if the chances are ten to one against a man's pos- 
sessing strong reasoning powers, and ten to one against 
exquisite taste, the chances against the combination of 
the two (supposing them neither connected nor opposed) 
will be a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from finding 
them so rarely united, will infer that they are in some 
measure incompatible ; which Fallacy may easily be ex- 
posed in the form of Undistributed middle : " qualities 
unfriendly to each other are rarely combined ; excellence 
in the reasoning powers, and in taste, are rarely com- 



§12.] OF FALLACIES. 183 

bined; therefore they are qualities unfriendly to each 
other." 

§ 12. 

The other kind of ambiguity arising from the Fallacia ac . 
context, and which is the last case of Am- cl entls * 
biguous middle that I shall notice, is the " fallacia acci- 
dentis," together with its converse, "fallacia a dicta se- 
cundum quid ad dictum simpliciter ,*" in each of which 
the middle Term is used, in one Premiss to signify some- 
thing considered simply, in itself, and as to its essence ; 
and in the other Premiss, so as to imply that its Accidents 
are taken into account with "it : as in the well-known ex- 
ample, " what is bought in the market is eaten ; raw meat 
is bought in the market ; therefore raw meat is eaten." 
Here the middle has understood in conjunction with it, 
in the major Premiss, " as to its substance merely :" in 
the minor, " as to its condition and circumstances" 

To this head, perhaps, as well as to any, may be re- 
ferred the Fallacies which are frequently founded on the 
occasional, partial, and temporary variations in the ac- 
ceptation of some Term, arising from circumstances of 
person, time, and place, which will occasion something to 
be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict lite- 
ral signification ; e. g. the phrase " Protestant-aseendan- 
cy," having become a kind of watch-word or gathering- 
cry of a party, the expression of good wishes for it would 
commonly imply an adherence to certain measures not 
literally expressed by the words ; to assume therefore that 
one is unfriendly to " Protestant-ascendancy" in the lite- 
ral sense, because he has declared himself unfriendly to it 
when implying and connected with such and such other 



184 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

sentiments, is a gross Fallacy; and such a one as per- 
haps the authors of the above would much object to, if it 
were assumed of them that they were adverse to " the 
cause of liberty throughout the world," and to " a fair 
representation of the people," from their objecting to join 
with the members of a factious party in the expression of 
such sentiments. 

Such Fallacies may fairly be referred to the present 
head. 

§ 13. 

Of the Non-logical (or material) Fallacies : and first, 
of " begging the question ;" Petitio Principii. 

Begging the The indistinct and unphilosophical account 
question. w hich has been given by Logical writers of the 
Fallacy of " non causa" and that of " petitio principii," 
makes it very difficult to ascertain wherein they conceived 
them to differ, and what, according to them, is the na- 
ture of each; without therefore professing to conform ex- 
actly to their meaning, and with a view to distinctness 
only, which is the main point, let us confine the name 
" petitio principii" to those cases in which the Premiss 
either appears manifestly to be the same as the Conclu- 
sion, or is actually proved from the Conclusion, or is such 
as would naturally and properly so be proved ; (as if one 
should attempt to prove the being of a God from the 
authority of Holy- writ ;) and to the other class be re- 
ferred all other cases, in which the Premiss (whether the 
expressed or the suppressed one) is either proved false, 
or has no sufficient claim to be received as true. Let it 
however be observed, that in such cases (apparently) as 



§ 13.] OF FALLACIES. 185 

this, we must not too hastily pronounce the argument fal- 
lacious ; for it may be perfectly fair at the commencement 
of an argument to assume a Premiss that is not more evi- 
dent than the Conclusion, or is even ever so paradoxical, 
provided you proceed to prove fairly that Premiss : and 
in like manner it is both usual and fair to begin by de- 
ducing your Conclusion from a Premiss exactly equiva- 
lent to it ; which is merely throwing the proposition in 
question into the form in which it will be most convenient- 
ly proved. Arguing in a Circle, however, must neces- 
sarily be unfair; though it frequently is practised unde- 
signedly; e. g. some Mechanicians attempt to prove, 
(what they ought to lay down as a probable but doubtful 
hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates equal- 
ly; "why?" because those bodies which contain more 
particles ever gravitate more strongly, i. e. are heavier- 
" but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not 
always more bulky;" "no, but still they contain more 
particles, though more closely condensed ;" " how do you 
know that?" "because they are heavier;" "how does 
that prove it ?" " because all particles of matter gravitating 
equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must 
needs have the more of them in the same space." 

Obliquity and disguise being of course most obUquity of 
important to the success of the petitio principii ex P ression - 
as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will in general 
either have recourse to the circle, or else not venture to 
state distinctly his assumption of the point in question, but 
will rather assert some other proposition which implies it ;* 

* Gibbon affords the most remarkable instances of this kind of 
style. That which he really means to speak of, is hardly ever 
16* 



186 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does 
stolen goods) the point in question, at the very moment 
when he is taking it for granted. Hence the frequent 
union of this Fallacy with " ignoratio elenchi :" {vide 
§ 15.] The English language is perhaps the more suit- 
able for the Fallacy of petitio principii, from its being 
formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in 
synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in 
sound, and no connexion in etymology ; so that a Sophist 
may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of 
Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the very same 
proposition stated in words of Norman origin ; e. g. " to 
allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must 
always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for 
it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, 
that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unli- 
mited, of expressing his sentiments." 

§ 14. 

Undue as- The next neac * i s > tne falsity, or, at least, un- 
sumption. ^ ue assuiri ption, of a Premiss, when it is not 
equivalent to, or dependent on, the Conclusion; which, 
as has been before said, seems to correspond nearly with 
the meaning of Logicians, when they speak of " non causa 
pro causa." This name indeed would seem to imply a 
much narrower class: there being one species of argu- 
ments which are from co/use to effect; in which, of course, 
two things are necessary; 1st, the sufficiency of the cause; 
2d, its establishment ; these are the two Premises ; if 



made the subject of his proposition. His way of writing reminds 
one of those persons who never dare look you full in the face. 



§ 14.] OF FALLACIES. 187 

therefore the former be unduly assumed, we are arguing 
from that which is not a sufficient cause as if it were so : 
e. g. as if one should contend from such a man's having 
been unjust or cruel, that he will certainly be visited with 
some heavy temporal judgment, and come to an untimely 
end. In this instance the Sophist, from having assumed, 
in the Premiss, the (granted) existence of a pretended 
cause, infers in the conclusion the existence of the pre- 
tended effect, which we have supposed to be the Ques- 
tion. Or, vice versd, the pretended effect may be em- 
ployed to establish the cause ; e. g. inferring sinfulness 
from temporal calamity. But when both the pretended 
cause and effect are granted, i. e. granted to exist, then 
the Sophist will infer something from their pretended con- 
nexion ; i. e. he will assume as a Premiss, that " of these 
two admitted facts, the one is the cause of the other:" 
as the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it was 
the cause of the troubles which took place at that period, 
and thence inferred that it was an evil* In like manner, 



* In many cases, a Sign (see Rhet. Part I.) from which one 
might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for the 
Cause of it : as if one should suppose the falling of mercury to be 
a cause of rain, of which it certainly is an indication. Whereas 
the fact will often be the very reverse ; e. g. a. great deal of 
money in a country is a pretty sure proof of its wealth, and thence 
has been often regarded as the cause of it; whereas in truth 
it is an eifect. The same, with a numerous and increasing 
population. So also exposure to want and hardship in youth, 
has been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of those 
men and brutes which have been brought up in barren countries 
of ungenial climate. Yet the most experienced cattle-breeders 
know that animals are, ceteris paribus, the more hardy for hav- 
ing been well fed and sheltered in youth; but early hardships, 



188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III 

nothing is more common than to hear a person state con- 
fidently, as from his own experience, that such and such 
a patient was cured by this or that medicine : whereas all 
that he absolutely knows, is, that he took the medicine, 
and that he recovered. Such an argument as either of 
these might strictly be called " non causa pro causa ;" 
but it is not probable that the Logical writers intended 
any such limitation, (which indeed would be wholly un- 
necessary and impertinent,) but rather that they were con- 
founding together cause and reason ; the sequence of 
Conclusion from Premises being perpetually mistaken for 
that of effect from physical cause* It may be better, 
therefore, to drop the name which tends to perpetuate this 
confusion, and simply to state (when such is the case) 
that the Premiss is unduly assumed; i. e, without being 
either self-evident, or satisfactorily proved. 

The contrivances by which men may deceive them- 
selves or others, in assuming Premises unduly, so that 
that undue assumption shall not be perceived, (for it is in 
this the Fallacy consists) are of course infinite. Some- 
times (as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss is 
suppressed, as if it were too evident to need being proved, 
or even stated, and as if the whole question turned on the 
establishment of the other Premiss. Thus Home Tooke 
proves, by an immense induction, that all particles were 
originally nouns or verbs; and thence concludes, that in 
reality they are so still, and that the ordinary division of 
the parts of speech is absurd ; keeping out of sight, as 

by destroying all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors. 
So, loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle, and firing it, does not give 
it strength : but proves, if it escape, that it was strong. 
* See Appendix, No. I. article Reason. 



§ 14.] OF FALLACIES. 189 

self-evident, the other Premiss, which is absolutely false ; 
viz. that the meaning and force of a word, now, and for 
ever, must be that which it, or its root, originally bore. 

Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfound- 
ed assertion, by being confidently told that it is so evident, 
that it would argue great weakness to doubt it. In gene- 
ral, however, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a direct 
assertion of what he means unduly to assume; because 
that might direct the reader's attention to the consideration 
of the question whether it be true or not ; since that which 
is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted: it 
succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the proposition, as 
something curious and remarkable ; just as the Royal 
Society were imposed on by being asked to account for 
the fact that a vessel of water received no addition to its 
weight by a live fish put into it ; while they were seeking 
for the cause, they forgot to ascertain the fact, and thus 
admitted without suspicion a mere fiction. Thus an emi- 
nent Scotch writer, instead of asserting that "the advo- 
cates of Logic have been worsted and driven from the 
field in every controversy," (an assertion which, if made, 
would have been the more readily ascertained to be per- 
fectly groundless,) merely observes, that "it is a circum- 
stance not a little remarkable." 

One of the many contrivances employed for Fallac of 
this purpose, is what may be called the " Fal- references - 
lacy of references ;" which is particularly common in 
popular theological works. It is of course a circumstance 
which adds great weight to any assertion, that it shall 
seem to be supported by many passages of Scripture: 
now when a writer can find few or none of these, that dis- 
tinctly and decidedly favor his opinion, he may at least 



190 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boos III. 

find many which may be conceived capable of being so 
understood, or which, in some way or other, remotely re- 
late to the subject; but if these texts were inserted at 
length, it would be at once perceived how little they bear 
on the question ; the usual artifice therefore is, to give 
merely references to them; trusting that nineteen out of 
twenty readers will never take the trouble of turning to 
the passages, but, taking for granted that they afford, each, 
some degree of confirmation to what is maintained, will be 
overawed by seeing every assertion supported, as they sup- 
pose, by five or six Scripture-texts. 
„ . . . Frequently the Fallacy of is-noratio elenchi is 

Combination i - j j o 

c^SthtSf ca ll e d in to the aid of this ; i. e. the Premiss is 
following assumed on the ground of another proposition, 
somewhat like it, having been proved. Thus, in arguing 
by example, fyc. the parallelism of two cases is often as- 
sumed from their being in some respects alike, though per- 
haps they differ in the very point which is essential to 
the argument. JE. G. From the circumstance that some 
men of humble station, who have been well educated, are 
apt to think themselves above low drudgery, it is argued, 
that universal education of the lower orders would beget 
general idleness : this argument rests, of course, on the 
assumption of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the past, 
and the future; whereas there is a circumstance that is 
absolutely essential, in which they differ ; for when educa- 
tion is universal it must cease to be a distinction ; which 
is probably the very circumstance that renders men too 
proud for their work. 

This very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the op- 
posite side: an attempt is 'made to invalidate some argu- 
ment from Example, by pointing out a difference between 



§ 14] OF FALLACIES. 191 

the two cases : though they agree in every thing that is 
essential to the question. 

It should be added that we. may often be de- calculation of 
ceived, not only by admitting a Premiss which P rol)abilities - 
is absolutely unsupported, bat. also, by attributing to one 
which really is probable, a greater degree of probability 
than rightly belongs to it. And this effect will often be 
produced by our omitting to calculate the probability in 
each successive step of a long chain of argument. Each 
link may have an excess of chances in its favor, and yet 
the ultimate conclusion may have a great preponderance 
against it; e. g. "All Y is (probably) X: all Z is (proba- 
bly) Y : therefore Z is (probably) X :" now suppose the 
truth of the major premiss to be more probable than not ; 
in other words, that the chances for it are more than £ ; 
say 4 ; and for the truth of the minor, let the chances be 
greater still; sayf: then by multiplying together the nu- 
merators, and also the denominators of these two fractions, 
{Xfwe obtain ^f, as indicating the degree of probability 
of the conclusion; which is less than i; i. e. the con- 
clusion is less likely to be true than not. E. G. "The 
reports this author heard are (probably) true ; this (some- 
thing which he records) is a report which (probably) he 
heard ; therefore it is true :" suppose, first, The majo- 
rity of the reports he heard, as 4 out of 7, (or 12 of 
21,) to be true; and, next, That he generally, as twice 
in three times, (or 8 in 12,) reports faithfully what he 
heard; it follows that of 21 of his reports, only 8 are true. 
Of course, the results are proportionably striking when 
there is a long series of arguments of this description. 
And yet weak and thoughtless reasoners are often influ- 
enced by hearing a great deal urged, — a great number 



192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

of 'probabilities brought forward, — in support of some 
conclusion; i. e. a long chain, of which each successive 
link is weaker than the foregoing ; instead of (what they 
mistake it for) accumulation of arguments, each, separately 
proving the probability of the conclusion. 

Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with 
what has been formerly said, that it will often be left to 
your choice whether to refer this or that fallacious argu- 
ment to the present head, or that of Ambiguous middle; 
" if the middle term is here used in this sense, there is 
an ambiguity ; if in that sense, the proposition is false." 

§ 15. 

irrelevant ^ ne ^ ast kind of Fallacy to be discussed is 

conclusion. ^ Q j i rre } evant Conclusion, commonly railed 
ignoratio elenchi. Various kinds of propositions are, ac- 
cording to the occasion, substituted for the one of which 
proof is required. 

Sometimes the Particular for the Universal; some- 
times a proposition with different Terms : and various are 
the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this 
substitution, and to make the Conclusion which the Soph- 
ist has drawn, answer, practically, the same purpose as 
the one he ought to have established. I say, " practi- 
cally the same purpose," because it will very often hap- 
pen that some emotion will be excited, — some sentiment 
impressed on the mind, — (by a dexterous employment 
of this Fallacy,) such as shall bring men into the dispo- 
sition requisite for your purpose, though they may not 
have assented to, or even stated distinctly in their own 
minds, the proposition which it was yeur business to esta- 
blish. Thus if a Sophist has to defend one who has been 



* 15.] OF FALLACIES. 193 

guilty of some serious offence, which he wishes to extenu- 
ate, though he is unable distinctly to prove that it is not 
such, yet if he can succeed in making the audience laugh 
at some casual matter, he has gained practically the same 
point. So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating 
circumstances in some particular case of offence, so as to 
show that it differs widely from the generality of the same 
class, the Sophist, if he find himself unable to disprove 
these circumstances, may do away the force of them, by 
simply referring the action to that very class, which no 
one can deny that it belongs to, and the very name of 
which will excite a feeling of disgust sufficient to coun- 
teract the extenuation; e. g. let it be a case of pecula- 
tion, and that many mitigating circumstances have been 
brought forward which cannot be denied ; the sophistical 
opponent will reply, " well, but after all, the man is a 
rogue, and there is an end of it ;" now in reality this was 
(by hypothesis) never the question; and the mere asser- 
tion of what was^ never denied, ought not, in fairness, to 
be regarded as decisive; but practically, the odiousness 
of the word, arising in great measure from the association 
of those very circumstances which belong to most of the 
class, but which we have supposed to be absent in this 
particular instance, excites precisely that feeling of dis- 
gust, which in effect destroys the force of the defence. 
In like manner we may refer to this head, all cases of 
improper appeals to the passions, and every thing else 
which is mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the mat- 
ter in hand (Ifa rov Trpayparoj.) 

In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the 
fallacy we are now treating of be employed for the ap- 
parent establishment, not of the ultimate Conclusion, but 
17 



194 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

(as it very commonly happens) of a Premiss, (i. e. if the 
Premiss required be assumed on the ground that some 
proposition resembling it has been proved,) then there will 
be a combination of this Fallacy with the last mentioned. 

A good instance of the employment and exposure of 
this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of 
Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mitylenaeans : the 
former (over and above his appeal to the angry passions 
of his audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters 
to death; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to 
the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in judg- 
ment, but in deliberation, of which the proper end is expe- 



It is evident, that ignoratio elenchi may be 

This fallacy ° J 

used in refu- employed as well for the apparent refutation 
of your opponent's proposition, as for the ap- 
parent establishment of your own ; for it is substantially 
the same thing, to prove what was not denied, or to dis- 
prove what was not asserted : the latter practice is not 
less common, and it is more offensive, because it fre- 
quently amounts to a personal affront in attributing to a 
person opinions, 6fc. which he perhaps holds in abhor- 
rence. Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, 
on the ground of general expediency, a particular instance 
of resistance to Government in a case of intolerable op- 
pression," the opponent may gravely maintain, that " we 
ought not to do evil that good may come:" a proposi- 
tion which of course had never been denied ; the point 
in dispute being " whether resistance in this particular 
case were doing evil or not." In this example it is to be 
remarked, (and the remark will apply very generally,) that 
the Fallacy of petitio principii is combined with that of 



§ 15.] OF FALLACIES. 195 

ignoratio elenchi, which is a very common and successful 
practice; viz. the Sophist proves, or disproves, not the 
proposition which is really in question, but one which so 
implies it as to proceed on the supposition that it is al- 
ready decided, and can admit of no doubt ; by this means 
his " assumption of the point in question" is so indirect 
and oblique, that it may easily escape notice ; and he 
thus establishes, practically, his Conclusion, at the very 
moment he is withdrawing your attention from it to ano- 
ther question. 

There are certain kinds of argument recounted and 
named by Logical writers, which we should by no means 
universally call Fallacies ; but which when unfairly used, 
and so far as tliey are fallacious, may very well be re- 
ferred to the present head ; such as the " ar- 

Argumentum 

gumentum ad hominem" or personal argument, ad hominem, 
" argumentum ad verecundiam" " ar gumentum 
ad populum" tyc. ail of them regarded as contradistin- 
guished from " argumentum ad rem" or, according to 
others, (meaning probably the very same thing,) ** ad 
judicium." These have all been described in the lax and 
popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically: 
the " argumentum ad hominem" they say, " is addressed 
to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, 
or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a 
reference to him only, and does not bear directly and ab- 
solutely on the real question, as the ' argumentum ad rem 
does :" in like manner, the " argumentum ad verecurt- 
diam" is described as an appeal to our reverence for 
some respected authority, some venerable institution, Sfc. 
and the " argumentum ad populum" as an appeal to the 
prejudices, passions, Sfc. of the multitude; and so of the 



196 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

rest. Along with these is usually enumerated " argumen- 
tum ad ignorantiam" which is here omitted, as being 
evidently nothing more than the employment of some 
kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards 
such as are likely to be deceived by it. It appears then 
(to speak rather more technically) that in the " argumen- 
tum ad hominem" the conclusion which actually is esta- 
blished, is not the absolute and general one in question, but 
relative and particular ; viz. not that " such and such is 
the fact," but that " this man is bound to admit it, in con- 
formity to his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency 
with his own conduct, situation," fyc* Such a Conclu- 



* " The argunientum ad hominem" will often have the effect 
of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to the adversary. 
(See Rhet.) A common instance is the defence, certainly the 
readiest and most concise, frequently urged by the Sportsman, 
when accused of barbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or 
trout to his amusement: he replies, as he may safely do, to 
most of his assailants, " why do you feed on the flesh of ani- 
mals V and that this answer presses hard, is manifested by 
its being usually opposed by a palpable falsehood; viz. that the 
animals which are killed for food are sacrificed to our necessi- 
ties ; though not only men can, but a large proportion (probably 
a great majority) of the human race actually do, subsist in 
health . and vigor without flesh-diet; and the earth would sup- 
port a much greater human population were such a practice 
universal. When shamed out of this argument they sometimes 
urge that the brute creation would overrun the earth, if we did 
not kill them for food ; an argument, which, if it were valid at 
all, would not justify their feeding on fish; though, if fairly 
followed up, it would justify Swift's proposal for keeping down 
the excessive population of Ireland. The true reason, viz. that 
they eat flesh for the gratification of the palate, and have a taste 
for the pleasures of the table, though not for the sports of the field, 
is one which thev do not like to assign. 



§ 15.] OF FALLACIES. 197 

sion it is often both allowable and necessary to establish 
in order to silence those who will not yield to fair general 
argument; or to convince those whose weakness and 
prejudices would not allow them to assign to it its due 
weight: it is thu& that our Lord on many occasions silen- 
ces the cavils of the Jews ; as in the vindication of heal- 
ing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the authorized 
practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into a pit. 
All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be 
done plainly, and avowedly; but if you attempt to sub- 
stitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more gene- 
ral one — if you triumph as having established your propo- 
sition absolutely and universally, from having established 
it, in reality, only as far as it relates to your opponent, then 
you are guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now 
treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which 
was, by your own account, proposed to be proved : the fal- 
laciousness depends upon the deceit or attempt to deceive. 
The same observations will apply to " argumentum ad 
verecundiam" and the rest. 

It is very common to employ an ambiguous Term for 
the purpose of introducing the Fallacy of irrelevant Con- 
clusion: i. e. when you cannot prove your proposition in 
the sense in which it was maintained, to prove it in some 
other sense; e. g. those who contend against the efficacy 
of faith, usually employ that word in their arguments in 
the sense of mere belief, unaccompanied with any moral 
or practical result, but considered as a mere intellectual 
process ; and when they have thus proved their Conclu- 
sion, they oppose it to one in which the word is used in a 
widely different sense,* 

* u When the occasion or object in question is not such ns 
17* 



198 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 



$16. 

The Fallacy of ignoratio elenchi is nowhere more 
common than in protracted controversy, when one of the 
parties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his posi- 
tion, shifts his ground as covertly as possible to another, 
instead of honestly giving up the point. An instance oc- 
curs in an attack made on the system pursued at one of 
our Universities. The objectors, finding themselves un- 
able to maintain their charge of the present neglect of 



calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers or 
hearers, the emotions required, it is a common Rhetorical artifice 
to turn their attention to some object which will call forth these 
feelings ; and when they are too much excited to be capable of 
judging calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their Passions, 
once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view 
the case before them in a very different light. When the 
metal is heated, it may easily be moulded into the desired form. 
Thus vehement indignation against some crime, may be direct- 
ed against a person who has not been proved guilty of it ; and 
vague declamations against corruption, oppression, &c. or against 
the mischiefs of anarchy ; with high-flown panegyrics on liberty, 
rights of man, fyc. or on social order, justice, the constitution, 
law, religion, fyc. will gradually lead the hearers to take for 
granted without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to 
these evils or these advantages; and it will in consequence be- 
come the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For 
the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of what 
may be called stimulating ideas associated with them, will operate 
like a charm on the minds, especially of the ignorant and unthink- 
ing, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind 
their judgment; so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric will 
often have the effect of a train of sound Argument." Rhetoric } 
Part II. Chap. ii. § 6. ' 



§ 16. J OF FALLACIES. 199 

Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect they attribut- 
ed the late general decline in those studies,) shifted their 
ground, and contended that that University was never 
famous for Mathematicians: which not only does not 
establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own original, 
assertion; for if it never succeeded in those pursuits, 
it could not have caused their late decline. 

A practice of this nature is common in oral 
controversy especially ; viz. that of combating combating 

thetwoPrem- 

both your opponent s Premises alternately, and isesaiter- 
shifting the attack from the one to the other, 
without waiting to have either of them decided upon before 
you quit it. 

It has been remarked above, that one class of the 
propositions that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted for 
the one required, is the particular for the universal : sim- 
ilar to this, is the substitution of a conditional with a uni- 
versal antecedent, for one with a particular antecedent, 
which will usually be the harder to prove : e. g. you are 
called on, suppose, to prove that " if any private interests 
are hurt by a proposed measure, it is inexpedient ;" and 
you pretend to have done so by showing that " if all pri- 
vate interests are hurt by it, it must be inexpedient." 

Nearly akin to this is the very common case of proving 
something to be possible when it ought to have been 
proved highly probable; or probable, when it ought to 
have been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the very 
same, proving it to be not necessary, when it should, have 
been proved not probable ; or improbable, when it should 
have been proved impossible. Aristotle (in Rhet. Book II.) 
complains of this last branch of the Fallacy, as giving an 
undue advantage to the respondent ; many a guilty per- 



200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book HI. 

son owes his acquittal to this; the jury considering that 
the evidence brought does not demonstrate the absolute 
impossibility of his being innocent, though perhaps the 
chances are innumerable against it. 

§17. 

Fallacy of Similar to this case is that which may be 
objections. ca n e( j the Fallacy of objections: i. e. showing 
that there are objections against some plan, theory, or 
system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected ; 
when that which ought to have been proved is, that there 
are more, or stronger objections, against the receiving 
than the rejecting of it. This is the main and almost 
universal fallacy of infidels, and is that of which men 
should be first and principally warned. This is also the 
strong hold of bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose all 
reforms and alterations indiscriminately ; for there never 
was, nor will be, any plan executed or proposed, against 
which strong and even unanswerable objections may not 
be urged ; so that unless the opposite objections be set in 
the balance on the other side, we can never advance a 
step. " There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, " against 
a plenum, and objections against a vacuum ; but one of 
them must be true."* 



* This is, as has been said, the principal engine employed by 
the adversaries of our Faith: they find numerous "objections" 
against various parts of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfac- 
tory answer can be given ; and the incautious hearer is apt, 
while his attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are 
infinitely more, and stronger objections against the supposition 
that the Christian Religion is of human origin ; and that where 
we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason and 



§ 17.] OF FALLACIES. 201 

The very same Fallacy indeed is employed on the other 
side, by those who are for overthrowing whatever is esta- 
blished as soon as they can prove an objection against it, 
without considering whether more and weightier objec- 
tions may not lie against their own schemes: but their 
opponents have this decided advantage over them, that 
they can urge with great plausibility, " we do not call 
upon you to reject at once whatever is objected to, but 
merely to suspend your judgment, and not come to a de- 
cision as long as there are reasons on both sides :" now 
since there always will be reasons on both sides, this non- 
decision is practically the very same thing as a decision 
in favor of the existing state of things ; the delay of trial 
becomes equivalent to an acquittal* 



in candor to adopt the hypothesis which labors under the least. 
That the case is as I have stated, I am authorized to assume, 
from this circumstance: that no complete and consistent account 
has ever been given of the manner in which the Christian Reli- 
gion, supposing it a human contrivance, could have arisen and 
prevailed as it did. And yet this may obviously be demanded 
with the utmost fairness, of those who deny its divine origin. 
The Religion exists : that is the phenomenon ; those who will 
not allow it to have come from God, are bound to solve the 
phenomenon on some other hypothesis less open to objections ; 
they are not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise 
in this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently with acknow- 
ledged facts) some probable way in which it may have arisen 
reconcileable with all the circumstances of the case. That in- 
fidels have never done this, though they have had near 2000 
years to try, amounts to a confession that no such hypothesis 
can be devised, which will not be open to greater objections 
than lie against Christianity. 

* " Not to resolve, is to resolve." Bacon. 

How happy it is for mankind that in the most momentous 



202 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

§ 18. 
Faiiac of Another form of ignoratio elenchi, which is 
partoTthe a ^ so rather the more serviceable on the side 
question. Q ^ ^ reS p 0n( j ent) j s? to p r0V e or disprove some 
part of that which is required, and dwell on that, suppress- 
ing all the rest. 

Thus, if a University is charged with cultivating only 
the mere elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list 
of the books studied there is produced, should even any 
one of those books be not elementary, the charge is in 
fairness refuted ; but the Sophist may then earnestly con- 
tend that some of those books are elementary ; and thus 
keep out of sight the real question, viz. whether they are 
all so. This is the great art of the answerer of a book ; 
suppose the main positions in any work to be irrefragable, 
it will be strange if some illustration of them, or some sub- 
ordinate part in short, will not admit of a plausible objec- 
tion ; the opponent then joins issue on one of these inciden- 
tal questions, and comes forward with " a Reply" to such 
and such a work. 

Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can 
be well maintained ;* since the refutation of that will 



concerns of life their decision is generally formed for them by 
external circumstances : which thus saves them not only from the 
perplexity of doubt and the danger of delay, but also from the pain 
of regret ; since we acquiesce much more cheerfully in that which 
is unavoidable. 

* The Quakers would perhaps before now have succeeded in 
doing away our superfluous and irreverent oaths, if they had not, 
besides many valid and strong arguments, adduced so many that 
are weak and easily refuted. 



§ 19.] OP FALLACIES. 203 

often quash the whole : a guilty person may often escape 
by having too much laid to his charge ; so he may also 
by having too much evidence against him, i. e. some that 
is not in itself satisfactory : thus, a prisoner may sometimes 
obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses against 
him is an infamous informer and spy; though perhaps if 
that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would 
have been sufficient for conviction. 

Cases of this nature might very well be referred also 
to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the Fal- 
sity of the Conclusion from the Falsity of a Premiss ; which 
indeed is very closely allied to the present Fallacy : the 
real question is, " whether or not this Conclusion ought 
to be admitted ;" the Sophist confines himself to the ques- 
tion, " whether or not it is established by this particular 
argument ;" leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he 
has carried his point as to the latter question, that the former 
is thereby decided. 



§ 19. 



It will readily be perceived that nothing is gu ressef] 
less conducive to the success of the Fallacy in Conclusion - 
question than to state clearly, in the outset, either- the 
proposition you are about to prove, or that which you 
ought to prove ; it answers best to begin with the Premis- 
es, and to introduce a pretty long chain of argument before 
you arrive at the Conclusion. The careless hearer takes 
for granted, at the beginning, that this chain will lead to 
the Conclusion required; and by the time you are come 
to the end, he is ready to take for granted that the Con- 
clusion which you draw is the one required ; his idea of 



204 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 111. 

the question having gradually become indistinct. This 
Fallacy is greatly aided by the common practice of sup- 
pressing the Conclusion and leaving it to be supplied by the 
hearer, who is of course less likely to perceive whether it 
be really that " which was to be proved," than if it were 
distinctly stated. The practice therefore is at best sus- 
picious : and it is better in general to avoid it, and to give 
and require a distinct statement of the Conclusion in- 
tended. 



§20. 



Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it 

, . , . , Jests. 

may not be improper to mention the just and 
ingenious remark, that Jests are Fallacies ;* i. e. Falla- 
cies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any one, 
but yet bearing just that resemblence of argument which 
is calculated to amuse by the contrast ; in the same man- 
ner that a parody does, by the contrast of its levity with 
the serious production which it imitates. There is indeed 
something laughable even in Fallacies which are intended 
for serious conviction, when they are thoroughly exposed. 
There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, 
which will be found to correspond with the different kinds 
of Fallacy : the pun (to take the simplest and most obvi- 
ous case) is evidently, in most instances, a mock argu- 
ment founded on a palpable equivocation of the middle 
Term : and the rest in like manner will be found to cor- 
respond to the respective Fallacies, and to be imitations 
of serious argument. 

* See Wallis's Logic. 



§ 20.] OF FALLACIES. 205 

It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games, 
(iraiSiai) properly so called, will be found, on examina- 
tion, to be imitative of serious transactions ; as of War or 
Commerce.* But to enter fully into this subject would be 
unsuitable to the present occasion. 

I shall subjoin some general remarks on the legitimate 
province of Reasoning, and on its connexion with Induc- 
tive philosophy, and with Rhetoric : on which pcints 
much misapprehension has prevailed, tending to throw 
obscurity over the design and use of the Science under 
consideration. 

* See some excellent remarks on " Imitation," in Dr. A. 
Smith's posthumous Essays. 
18 



BOOK IV. 

DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF 
REASONING. 

Logic being concerned with the theory of Reasoning, 
it is evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view 
of this Science, that all misapprehensions should be re- 
moved relative to the occasions on which the Reasoning 
process is employed, — the purposes it has in view, — 
and the limits within which it is confined. 

Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to 
those who have not thought much on the subject, they 
will appear on further consideration to be involved in much 
perplexity and obscurity, from the vague and inaccurate 
language of many popular writers. To the confused and 
incorrect notions that prevail respecting the Reasoning- 
process may be traced most of the common mistakes 
respecting the Science of Logic, and much of the unsound 
and unphilosophical argumentation which is so often to be 
met with in the works of ingenious writers. 

These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the 
foregoing part of this work ; but it may be desirable, 
before we dismiss the subject, to offer on these points 
some further remarks, which could not have been there in- 
troduced without too great an interruption to the devel- 



Chap. I. § 1.] OF INDUCTION. 207 

opment of the system. Little or nothing indeed remains 
to be said that is not implied in the principles which have 
been already laid down ; but the results and applications 
of those principles are liable in many instances to be over- 
looked, if not distinctly pointed out. These supplemen- 
tary observations will neither require, nor admit of, so 
systematic an arrangement as has hitherto been aimed at ; 
since they will be such as are suggested principally by the 
objections and mistakes of those who have misunderstood, 
partially or entirely, the nature of the Logical system. 



Chap. I. 

Of Induction. 

§ i. 



Much has been said by some writers of the Mistakeof 
superiority of the Inductive to the Syllogistic ffiS t0 
method of seeking truth, as if the two stood s y u °s lsm - 
opposed to each other; and of the advantage of substi- 
tuting the Organon of Bacon for that of Aristotle, fyc. fyc. 
which indicates a total misconception of the nature of 
both. There is, however, the more excuse for the eon- 
fusion of thought which prevails on this subject, because 
eminent Logical writers have treated, or at least have 
appeared to treat, of Induction as a distinct kind of argu- 
ment from the Syllogism; which if it were, it certainly 
might be contrasted with the Syllogism: or rather the 
whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the ground, since 



208 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

one of the very first principles it establishes, is, that all 
Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same pro- 
cess, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of Syl- 
logisms. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that this 
was the deliberate meaning of those writers ; though it 
must be admitted that they have countenanced the error 
in question, by their inaccurate expressions. This inac- 
curacy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in 
the use of the word " Induction," which is sometimes em- 
ployed to designate the process of investigation and of 
collecting facts ; sometimes, the deducing of an inference 
from those facts. The former of these processes (viz. 
that of observation and experiment) is undoubtedly dis- 
tinct from that which takes place in the Syllogism; but 
then it is not a process of argument ; the latter again is 
an argumentative process ; but then it is, like all other 
arguments, capable of being Syllogistically expressed. 
And hence Induction has come to be regarded as a dis- 
tinct kind of argument from the Syllogism. This Fallacy 
cannot be more concisely or clearly stated, than in the 
technical form with which we may now presume our 
readers to be familiar. 

" Induction is distinct from Syllogism : 

Induction is a process of Reasoning ;" therefore 
" There is a process of Reasoning distinct from Syllogism." 

Here, " Induction," which is the middle Term, is used 
in different senses in the two Premises. 
Analysis of I n the process of reasoning by which we 
deduce, from our observation of certain known 
cases, an inference with respect to unknown ones, we 
are employing a Syllogism in Barbara, with the ma- 



Chap. I. §1.] OF INDUCTION. 209 

jor* Premiss suppressed ; that being always substantially 
the same, as it asserts, that " what belongs to the individual 
or individuals we have examined, belongs to the whole 
class under which they come :" e. g. from an examination 
of the history of several tyrannies, and finding that each 
of them was of short duration, we conclude, that " the 
same is likely to be the case with all tyrannies :" the sup- 
pressed major Premiss being easily supplied by the hearer : 
viz. "that what belongs to the tyrannies in question is 
likely to belong to all." 

Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an 

Two senses 

argument, may, of course, be stated Syllogisti- of the word 
cally: but so far forth as it is a process of in- 
quiry with a view to obtain the Premises of that argu- 
ment, it is, of course, out of the province of Logic, f 
Whether the Induction (in this last sense) has been suffi- 
ciently ample, i. e. takes in a sufficient number of indi- 
vidual cases, — whether the character of those cases has 
been correctly ascertained, — and how far the individuals 
we have examined are likely to resemble, in this or that 
circumstance, the rest of the elass, fyc. fyc, are points 
that require indeed great judgment and caution; but this 



* Not the minor, as Aldrieh represents it. The instance he 
gives will sufficiently prove this : " This, that, and the other 
magnet attract iron: therefore so do all." If this were, as he as- 
serts, an Enthymeme whose minor is suppressed, the only Premiss 
which we could supply, to fill it up, would be, " All magnets are 
this, that, and the other ;" which is manifestly false. 

t And this is the original and strict sense of the word. Induc- 
tion means, properly, not the deducing of the conclusion, but the 
bringing in, one by one, of instances, bearing on the point in <jues- 
iion, till a sufficient number has been collected, 
18* 



210 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

judgment and caution are not to be aided by Logic, 
because they are, in reality, employed in deciding whether 
or not it is fair and allowable to lay down your Premises ; 
i. e. whether you are authorized or not, to assert, that 
" what is true of the individuals you have examined, is 
true of the whole class :" and that this or that is true of 
those individuals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing 
to do with the truth or ialsity of the Premises, except of 
course when they are the conclusions of former arguments ; 
but merely teach us to decide, not whether the Premises 
are fairly laid down, but whether the Conclusion follows 
fairly from the Premises or not. 

§2. 

Whether the Premiss may fairly be assumed, 

Assumption . _ 

of Premises r not, is a pomt which cannot be decided 

in Induction. r 

without a competent knowledge of the nature 
of the subject ; e. g. in Natural Philosophy, in which the 
circumstances that in any case affect the result, are usually 
far more clearly ascertained, a single instance is often 
accounted a sufficient Induction ; e. g. having once ascer- 
tained that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are 
authorized to conclude that this property is universal : in 
the affairs of human life, on the other hand, a much fuller 
Induction is required, as in the former example. In short, 
the degree of evidence for any propositions we originally 
assume as a Premiss (whether the expressed or the sup- 
pressed one) is not to be learned from Logic, nor indeed 
from any one distinct Science ; but is the province of 
whatever Science furnishes the subject-matter of your 
argument. None but a Politician can judge rightly of the 



Chap. I. § 2.] OF INDUCTION. 211 

degree of evidence of a proposition in Politics : a Natu- 
ralist, in Natural History, <$fc. $c. E. G. from lnvestiga . 
examination of many horned animals, as sheep, tlon - 
cows, <$-c, a Naturalist finds that they have cloven feet ; 
now his skill as a Naturalist is to be shown in judging 
whether these animals are likely to resemble in the form 
of their feet all other horned animals ; and it is the exer- 
cise of this judgment, together with the examination of 
individuals, that constitutes what is usually meant by the 
Inductive process; which is that by which we gain, 
properly, new truths, and which is not connected with 
Logic ; being not what is strictly called Reasoning, but 
Investigation. But when this major Premiss is granted 
him, and is combined with the minor, viz. that the animals 
he has examined have cloven feet, then he draws the 
Conclusion Logically ; viz. that " the feet of all horned 
animals are cloven." * Again, if from several times 
meeting with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded that 
Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, one would object 
to his Induction ; and yet it would not be, as an argument 
illogical ; since the Conclusion follows fairly, if you grant 
his implied Premiss, that the events which happened on 
those particular Fridays are such as must happen on all 
Fridays ; but we should object to his laying clown this 
Premiss : and therefore should justly say that his Induc- 
tion was faulty, though his argument were correct. 

* I have selected an instance in which Induction is the only 
ground we have to rest on ; no reason, that I know of, having 
ever been assigned that could have led us to conjecture this 
curious fact a priori. 



212 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

™ And here it may be remarked, that the or- 

The more J ' 

nSSsup Pre 'binary rule for fair argument, viz. that in an 
FnEtion n Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss should be 
always the one of whose truth least doubt can 
exist, is not observed in Induction : for the Premiss which 
is usually the more doubtful of the two, is, in that, the 
major; it being in few cases quite certain that the indi- 
viduals, respecting which some point has been ascertained 
are to be fairly regarded as a sample of the whole class ; 
the major Premiss, nevertheless, is seldom expressed, for 
the reason just given, that it is easily understood, as being, 
mutatis mutandis, the same in every Induction. 

What has been said of Induction will equally apply to 
Example : which differs from it only in having a singular 
instead of a general Conclusion ; e. g. in the instance 
above, if the Conclusion had been drawn, not respecting 
tyrannies in general, but respecting this or that tyranny, 
that it was not likely to be lasting, each of the cases 
adduced to prove this would have been called an Example. 



Chap. II. 
On the Discovery of Truth. 

M- 

Whether it is by a process of Reasoning that New 
Truths are brought to light, is a question which seems 
to be decided in the negative by what has been already 
said ; though many eminent writers seem to have taken 
for granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a great 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 213 

measure, a dispute concerning the use of words ; but it is 
not, for that reason, either uninteresting or unimportant, 
since an inaccurate use of language may often, in matters 
of Science, lead to confusion of thought, and to erroneous 
conclusion. And, in the present instance, much of the 
undeserved contempt which has been, bestowed on the 
Logical system may be traced to this source ; for when 
any one has laid down, that " Reasoning is important in 
the discovery of Truth," and that " Logic is of no service 
in the discovery of Truth," (each of which propositions 
is true in a certain sense of the terms employed, but not 
in the same sense,) he is naturally led to conclude, that 
there are processes of Reasoning to which the Syllogistic 
theory does not apply, and, of course, to misconceive al- 
together the nature of the Science. 

In maintaining the negative side of the above question, 
three things are to be premised : first, that it is not con- 
tended that discoveries of any kind of Truth can be made 
(or at least are usually made) without Reasoning; only, 
that Reasoning is not the whole of the process, nor the 
whole of that which is important therein ; secondly, that 
Reasoning shall be taken in the sense, not of every exer- 
cise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in which we 
have all along used it, and in which it has been defined 
by all the Logical writers, viz. " from certain granted 
propositions to infer another proposition as the conse- 
quence of them :" thirdly, that by a " New Truth," be 
understood something neither expressly nor virtually as- 
serted before, — not implied and involved in any thing al- 
ready known. 

To prove, then, this point demonstratively becomes in 
this manner perfectly easy; for since all Reasoning (in 



214 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

the sense above defined) may be resolved into Syllo- 
gisms; and since even the objectors to Logic make it a 
subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the Premises do 
virtually assert the Conclusion, it follows at once that no 
New Truth (as above defined) can be elicited by any 
process of Reasoning. 

It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly-celebrated 
author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric objects to the Syllo- 
gism altogether, as necessarily involving a petitio princi- 
pii ; an objection which, of course, he w T ould not have 
been disposed to bring forward, had he perceived that, 
whether well or ill-founded, it lies against all arguments 
whatever. Had he been aware that a Syllogism is no dis- 
tinct kind of argument otherwise than in form, but is, in 
fact, any argument whatever, stated regularly and at full 
length, he would have obtained a more correct view of 
the object of all Reasoning ; which is, merely to expand 
and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as it were, and im- 
plied in those with which we set out, and to bring a per- 
son to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that 
which he has admitted ; to contemplate it in various points 
of view; to admit in one shape what he has already ad- 
mitted in another, and to give up and disallow whatever is 
inconsistent with it. 

Nor is it always a very easy task even to bring before 
the mind the several bearings, — the various applica- 
tions, — of any one proposition. A common Term com- 
prehends several, often numberless individuals ; and these 
often, in some respects, widely differing from each other ; 
and no one can be, on each occasion of his employing 
such a Term, attending to and fixing his mind on each 
of the individuals, or even of the species so comprehend- 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 215 

ed. It is to be remembered, too, that both Division and 
Generalization are in a great degree arbitrary ; i. e. that 
we may both divide the same genus on several different 
principles, and may refer the same species to several dif- 
ferent classes, according to the nature of the discourse 
and drift of the argument ; each of which classes will fur- 
nish a distinct middle Term for an argument, according 
to the question. E. G. If we wished to prove that " a 
horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen example from the 
above writer,) we might refer it to the genus "animal;" 
to prove that " it has only a single stomach," to the ge- 
nus of "non-ruminants;" to^prove that it is " likely to 
degenerate in a very cold climate," we should class it 
with " original productions of a hot climate," tyc. fyc. 
Now, each of these, and numberless others to which the 
same thing might be referred, are. implied by the very 
term, "horse;" yet it cannot be expected that they can 
all be at once present to the mind whenever that term is 
uttered. Much less, when, instead of such a Term as 
that, we are employing Terms of a very abstract and, 
perhaps, complex signification,* as " government, jus- 
tice," <SfC. 

The ten Categories! or Predicaments, which 
Aristotle and other Logical writers have treated 



* On this point there are some valuable remarks in the Philoso- 
phy of Rhetoric itself, Book IV. Chap. vii. 

t The Categories enumerated by Aristotle, are ovaia, ttogw, 

ttoiov, irpoGTt, ttov, rrorf, KeTadai, «%£(»', irouTv, naa-^etv ; which are usual- 
ly rendered, as adequately as, perhaps, they can be in our lan- 
guage, Substance, Quantity, duality, Relation, Place, Time, 
Situation, Possession, Action, Suffering. The Catalogue has 
been by some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be 



216 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

of, being certain general heads or summa genera, to one 
or more of which every Term may be referred, serve the 
purpose of marking out certain tracks, as it were, which 
are to be pursued in searching for middle Terms, in each 
argument respectively; it being essential that we should 
generalize on a right principle, with a view to the question 
before us ; or, in other words, that we should abstract that 
portion of any object presented to the mind, which is im- 
portant to the argument in hand. There are expressions in 
common use which have a reference to this caution ; such 
as, " this is a question, not as to the nature of the object, 
but the magnitude of it :" " this is a question of time, or of 
place" <$fc, i. e. " the subject must be referred to this or to 
that Category." 

With respect to the meaning of the Terms in question, 
" Discovery," and " New Truth;" it matters not whether 
Ave confine ourselves to the narrowest sense, or admit the 
widest, provided we do but distinguish: there certainly 
Two kinds of are tw0 kinds of " New Truth" and of " Dis- 
Discovery. cover y» jf we take those words in the widest 
sense in which they are ever used. First, such Truths 
as were, before they were discovered, absolutely unknown, 
being not implied by any thing we previously knew, though 
we might perhaps suspect them as probable; such are all 
matters of fact strictly so called, when first made known 
to one who had not any such previous knowledge, as 
would enable him to ascertain them d priori; i. e. by 
Reasoning ; as, if we inform a man that we have a colony 

done by subdividing some of the heads ; and by others curtailed, 
as it is no less evident that all may ultimately be referred to the 
two heads of Substance and Attribute, or (in the language of some 
Logicians) Accident. 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 217 

at Botany Bay; or that the earth is at such a distance 
from the sun ; or that platina is heavier than gold. The 
communication of this kind of knowledge is most usually, 
and most strictly called information; we gain 

, . Information.' 

it from observation, and from testimony; no 
mere internal workings of our own minds, (except when 
the mind itself is the very object to be observed,) or mere 
discussions in words, will make these known to us ; though 
there is great room for sagacity in judging what testimony 
to admit, and forming conjectures that may lead to profit- 
able observation, and to experiments with a view to it. 

The other class of Discoveries is of a very different na- 
ture. That which may be elicited by Reasoning, and 
consequently is implied in that which we already know, 
we assent to on that ground, and not from observation or 
testimony : to take a Geometrical truth upon trust, or to 
attempt to ascertain it by observation, would betray a tota. 
ignorance of the nature of the Science. In the longest 
demonstration, the Mathematical teacher seems 
only to lead us to make use of our own stores, 
and point out to us how much we had already admitted; 
and, in the case of many Ethical propositions, we assent 
at first hearing, though perhaps we had never heard or 
thought of the proposition before ; so also do we readily 
assent to the testimony of a respectable man, who tell us 
that our troops have gained a victory ; but how different 
is the nature of the assent in the two cases. In the latter 
we are ready to thank the man for his information, as be- 
ing such as no wisdom or learning would have enabled us 
to ascertain ; in the former, we usually exclaim, " very 
true!" "that is a valuable and just remark; that never 
struck me before!" implying at once our practical igtiQ* 
19 



213 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

ranee of it, and also our consciousness that _ we possess, in 
what we alreacty know, the means to ascertain the truth of 
it ; that we have a right, in short, to bear our testimony to 
its truth. 

To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth of this de- 
scription may be as completely unknown to a man as the 
other ; but as soon as it is set before him, and the argu- 
ment by which it is connected with his previous notions is 
made clear to him, he recognises it as something conform- 
able to, and contained in, his former belief. 

It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of Reminis- 
cence arose from a hasty extension of what he had ob- 
served in this class, to all acquisition of knowledge what- 
ever. His Theory of ideas served to confound together 
matters of fact respecting the nature of things {which 
may be perfectly new to us) with propositions relating to 
our own notions, and modes of thought; (or to speak, 
perhaps, more correctly, our ow T n arbitrary signs ;) which 
propositions must be contained and implied in those very 
complex notions themselves ; and whose truth is a con- 
formity, not to the nature of things, but to our own hy- 
pothesis. Such are all propositions in pure Mathematics, 
and many in Ethics, viz. those which involve no assertion 
as to real matters of fact. It has been rightly remarked,* 
that Mathematical propositions are not properly true or 
false, in the same sense as any proposition respecting real 
fact is so called ; and hence the truth (such as it is) 
of such propositions is necessary and eternal ; since it 
amounts only to this, that any complex notion which you 
have arbitrarily framed, must be exactly conformable to 

* Dugald Stewart's Philosophy, Vol. II. 



Chap. II. §1] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 219 

itself. The proposition, that " the belief in a future state, 
combined with a complete devotion to the present life, is 
not consistent with the character of prudence," would be 
not at all the less true if a future state were a chimera, 
and prudence a quality which was nowhere met with j 
nor would the truth of the Mathematician's conclusion be 
shaken, that " circles are to each other as the squares of 
their diameters," should it be found that there never had 
been a circle, or a square, conformable to the definition in 
rerum naturd* 

The Ethical proposition, just instanced, is one of those 
which Locke calls " trifling," because the Predicate is 
merely a part of the complex idea implied by the subject . 
and he is right, if by " trifling" he means that it gives 
not, strictly speaking, any information : but he should con- 
sider, that to remind a man of what he had not, and what 
he would not have thought of, may be, practically, as 
valuable as giving him information ; and that most propo- 
sitions in the best sermons, and all, in pure Mathematics, 
are of the description which he censures. 



* Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke, and others, to 
demonstrate (in the mathematical sense) the existence of a 
Deity. This can only be done by covertly assuming in the 
Premises the very point to be proved. No matter of fact can 
be mathematically demonstrated; though it may be proved in 
such a manner as to leave no doubt on the mind. E. G. I have 
no more doubt that I met such and such a man, in this or that 
place, yesterday, than that the angles of a triangle are equal tc 
two right angles: but the kind of certainty I have of these twc 
truths is widely different; to say, that I did not meet the man 
would be false indeed, but it would not be any thing inconceiv- 
able, self-contradictory, and absurd; but it would be so, to deny 
the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles. 



220 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 
It is, indeed, rather remarkable that he should speak so 
often of building- Morals into a demonstrative Science, 
and yet speak so slightingly of those very propositions to 
which we must absolutely confine ourselves, in order to 
give to Ethics even the appearance of such a Science ; 
for the instant you come to an assertion respecting a mat- 
ter of fact, as that " men (i. e. actually existing men) are 
bound to practise virtue," or " are liable to many tempta- 
tions," you have stepped off the ground of strict demonstra- 
tion, just as when you proceed to practical Geometry. 

But to return : it is of the utmost importance 

Information , . . 

andinstruo to distinguish these two kinds of Discovery of 
Truth. In relation to the former, as I have 
said, the " word information" is most strictly applied ; 
the communication of the latter is more properly called 
" instruction." I speak of the usual practice ; for it 
would be going- too far to pretend that writers are uni- 
form and consistent in the use of these, or of any other 
term. We say that the Historian gives us information 
respecting past times ; the Traveller, respecting foreign 
countries : on the other hand, the Mathematician gives 
instruction in the principles of his Science; the Moralist 
instructs us in our duties ; and we generally use the 
expressions " a well-informed man," and " a well-instruct- 
ed man," in a sense conformable to that which has been 
here laid down. However, let the words be used as they 
may, the things are evidently different, and ought to be 
distinguished. It is a question comparatively unimportant, 
whether the term " Discovery" shall or shall not be ex- 
tended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being 
implied in our previous knowledge, may be established 
by mere strict Reasoning. Similar verbal questions, 



Chap. II. § 1] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 221 

indeed, might be raised respecting many other cases : 
e, g. one has forgotten (i. e. cannot recollect) the name of 
some person or place : perhaps we even try to think of it, 
but in vain ; at last some one reminds us, and we instantly 
recognise it as the one we wanted to recollect ; it may be 
asked, was this in our mind or not ? The answer is, that 
in one sense it was, and in another sense, it was not. 
Or, again, suppose there is a vein of metal on a man's 
estate, which he does not know of; is it part of his pos- 
sessions or not? and when he finds it out and works it, 
does he then acquire a new possession or not ? Certainly 
not, in the same sense as if he has a fresh estate bequeath- 
ed to him, which he had formerly no right to ; but to all 
practical purposes it is a new possession. This case, 
indeed, may serve as an illustration of the one we have 
been considering; and in all these cases, if the real 
distinction be understood, the verbal question will not be 
of much consequence. To use one more illustration. 
Reasoning has been aptly compared to the piling together 
of blocks of stone ; on each of which, as on a pedestal, a 
man can raise himself a small, and but a small, height 
above the plain; but which, when skilfully built up, will 
form a flight of steps, which will raise him to a great 
elevation. Now (to pursue this analogy) when the ma- 
terials! are all ready to the builder's hand, the blocks 
ready dug and brought, his work resembles one of the 
two kinds of Discovery just mentioned, viz. that to which 
we have assigned the name of instruction : but if hig 
materials are to be entirely, or in part, provided by him- 
self,— if he himself is forced to dig fresh blocks from 
the quarry,— this corresponds to the other kind of Dis- 
covery. 



222 ON THE PROVINCE OP REASONING. [Book IV. 

Physical Dis- * nave hitherto spoken of the employment of 
covenes. argument in the establishment of those hypo- 
thetical Truths (as they may be called) which relate only 
to our own abstract notions ; it is not, however, meant to 
be insinuated that there is no room for Reasoning in the 
establishment of a matter of fact; but the other class of 
Truths have first been treated of, because, in discussing 
subjects of that kind, the process of Reasoning is always 
the principal, and often the only thing to be attended tc, 
if we are but certain and clear as to the meaning of the 
terms; whereas, when assertions respecting real existence 
are introduced, we have the additional and more impor- 
tant business of ascertaining and keeping in mind the 
degree of evidence for those facts; since, otherwise, our 
Conclusions could not be relied on, however accurate our 
Reasoning; but, undoubtedly, we may by Reasoning 
arrive at matters of fact, if we have matters of fact to set 
out with as data ; only that it will very often happen that, 
" from certain facts," as Campbell remarks, " we draw 
only probable Conclusions ;" because the other Premiss 
introduced (which he overlooked) is only probable. He 
observed that in such an instance, for example, as the one 
lately given, we infer from the certainty that such and 
such tyrannies have been short-lived, the probability that 
others will be so ; and he did not consider that there is 
an understood Premiss which is essential to the argument ; 
[viz. that all tyrannies will resemble those we have already 
observed) which being only of a probable character, 
must attach the same degree of uncertainty to the Con- 



Chap. II. § 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 223 

elusion.* An individual fact is not ^infrequently elicited 
by skilfully combining, and Reasoning from, those already 
known; of which many curious cases occur in the de- 
tection of criminals by officers of justice, and Barristers, 
who acquire by practice such dexteruy in that particular 
department, as to draw sometimes the right Conclusion 
from data, which might be in the possession of others, 
without being applied to the same use. In all cases of 
the establishment of a general fact from Induction, that 
general fact (as has been formerly remarked) is ultimately 
established by Reasoning; e. g. Bakewell, the celebrated 
cattle-breeder, observed, in a great number of individual 
beasts, a tendency to fatten readily, and in a great number 
of others the absence of this constitution: in every indi- 
vidual of the former description, he observed a certain 
peculiar make, though they differed widely in size, color, 
tyc. Those of the latter description differed no less in 
various points, but agreed in being of a different make 
from the others : these facts were his data ; from which, 
combining them with the general principle, that nature is 
steady and uniform in her proceedings, he logically drew 
the conclusion that beasts of the specified make have 
universally a peculiar tendency to fattening: but then his 
principle merit consisted in making the observations, and 
in so combining them as to abstract from each of a mul* 

* And the doubtfulness is multiplied, if both Premises are 
uncertain. For since it is only on the supposition of both 
Premises being true, that we can calculate on the truth of the 
Conclusion, we must state in numbers the chances against each 
Premiss being true, and then multiply these together, to judge 
of the degree of evidence of the Conclusion. See Book III. 
<§ 14. 



224 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

titude of cases, differing widely in many respects, the 
circumstances in which they all agreed; and also in con- 
jecturing skilfully how far the circumstances were likely 
to he found in the whole class : the making of such 
observations, and still more the combination, abstraction, 
and judgment employed, are what men commonly mean 
(as was above observed) when they speak of Induction ; 
and these operations are certainly distinct from Reasoning.* 
The same observations will apply to numberless other 
cases ; as, for instance, to the Discovery of the law of 
" vis inertia, " and the other principles of Natural Phi- 
losophy. 

But to what class, it may be asked, should be referred 
the Discoveries thus made? All would agree in calling 
them, when first ascertained, " New Truths," in the 
strictest sense of the word ; which would seem to imply 
their belonging to the class which may be called by way 
of distinction, " Physical Discoveries ;" and yet their 
being ultimately established by reasoning, would seem, 
according to the foregoing rule, to refer them to the other 
class, viz. what may be called " Logical Dis? 

Logical dis- . _ m v . 

joveries. coveries ;" since whatever is established by Rea- 
soning must have been contained and virtually asserted. 
in the Premises. In answer to this, it is to be observed, 
that they certainly do belong to the latter class, relatively 
to a person who is in possession of the data : but to him 
who is not, they are New Truths of the other class ; for 
it is to be remembered, that the words "Discovery" and 
" New Truths" are necessarily relative : there may be a 
proposition which is to one person absolutely known; to 

■■^ ■ ' , ' "-- ■ . ■ — — — — m 

See Book I. § 1. note, 






Chap. II. § 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 225 

another (viz. one to whom it has never occurred, though 
he is in possession of all the data from which it may be 
proved) it will be (when he comes to perceive it, by a 
process of instruction) what we have called a Logical 
Discovery: to a third (viz. one who is ignorant of these 
data) it will be absolutely unknown, and will have been, 
when made known to him, a perfectly and properly New 
Truth, — a piece of information, — a Physical Discovery, 
as we have called it.* To the Philosopher, therefore, 
who arrives at the Discovery by Reasoning from his ob- 
servation, and from established principles combined with 
them, the Discovery is of the former class ; to the multi- 
tude, probably, of the latter, as they will liave been most 
likely not possessed of all his data. 

It follows from what has been said, that in ' 

Character of 

Mathematics, and in such Ethical propositions scientific 
as we were lately speaking of, we do not allow 
the possibility of any but a Logical Discovery ; i. e. no 
proposition of that class can be true, which was not im- 
plied in the definitions and axioms we set out with, which 
are the first principles : for since these propositions do 
not profess to state any matter of fact, the only Truth they 



* It may be worth while in this place to define what is properly 
to^ be called Knowledge : it implies three things ; 1st, firm belief, 
2dly, of what is true, 3dly, on sufficient grounds. If any one 
e. g, is in doubt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he 
cannot be said to know the proposition proved by it; if, again, 
he is fully convinced of any thing that is not true, he is mistaken 
in supposing himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are each 
fully confident, one that the moon is inhabited, and the other 
that it is not, (though one of those opinions must be true,) neither 
of them could properly be said to know the truth, since he cannot 
have sufficient proof of it. 



224 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 
can possess, consists in conformity to the original princi- 
ples : to one, therefore, who knows these principles, such 
propositions are Truths already implied, since they may 
be developed to him by Reasoning, if he is not defective 
in the discursive faculty; and again, to one who does 
'not understand those principles, [i. e. is not master of the 
definitions,) such propositions are in great measure, if not 
wholly, unmeaning. On the other hand, propositions re- 
lating to matters of fact, may be, indeed, implied in what 
he already knew ; (as he who knows the climate of the 
Alps, the Andes, dfc. fyc. has virtually admitted the gen- 
eral fact, that "the tops of mountains are comparatively 
cold;") but as these possess an absolute and physical 
Truth, they may also be absolutely "new," their Truth 
not being implied by the mere terms of the propositions. 
The truth or falsity of any proposition concerning a trian- 
gle is implied, by the meaning of that and of the other 
Geometrical terms ; whereas, though one may understand 
(in the ordinary sense of that word) the full meaning of 
the terms " planet." and " inhabited," and of all the other 
terms in the language, he cannot thence be certain that the 
planets are, or are not, inhabited. 

$3. 

It has probably been the source of much perplexity, 

that the term " true" has been applied indiscriminately 

to two such different classes of propositions. The term 

definition is used with the same laxitv ; and 

Definitions. 

much confusion has thence resulted. Such 
Definitions as the Mathematical, must imply every attri- 
bute that belongs to the thing defined ; because that thing 



Chap. II. § 3.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 227 

is merely our meaning; which meaning the Definition 
lays down : whereas, real substances, having an inde- 
pendent existence, may possess innumerable qualities (as 
Locke observes) not implied in the meaning we attach to 
their names, or, as Locke expresses it, in our ideas of 
them. " Their nominal essence (to use his lan- 

i-7 ii Real and 

guage) is not the same as their real essence ; Nominal De- 
finitions. 
whereas the nominal essence, and the real es- 
sence, of a Circle, <J-c. are the same. A Mathematical 
Definition, therefore, cannot properly be called true, since 
it is not properly a proposition* (any more than an arti- 
cle in a Dictionary,) but merely an explanation of the 
meaning of a Term. Perhaps in Definitions of this class, it 
might be better to substitute (as Aristotle usually does) the 
imperative mood for the indicative : thus bringing them 
into the form of postulates ; for the Definitions and the 
Postulates in Mathematics differ in little or nothing but the 
form of expression : e. g. " let a four-sided figure, of 
equal sides and right angles, be called a square," would 
clearly imply that such a figure is conceivable, and that 
the writer intended to employ that term to signify such a 
figure : which is precisely all that is meant to be asserted. 
If, indeed, a Mathematical writer mean to assert that the 
ordinary sense of the term is that which he has given, 
that, certainly, is a proposition, which must be either true 
or false ; but in defining a new term, though the term 

* I mean in this place, that expression of a Definition in 
which the name is conjoined with that which is, properly speak- 
ing, the Definition of it, in the form of a proposition: as, e. g. " a 
Triangle is a plane superficial figure bounded by three straight 
li?ies:" the words in italics are what, strictly speaking, consti- 
tute the Definition ; but what I am here speaking of is the whole 
sentence. 



228 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

indeed may be ill chosen and improper, or the Definition 
may he self-contradictory, and consequently unintelligible, 
the words "true," and "false," do not apply. The same 
may be said of what are called nominal Definitions of 
other things, i. e. those which merely explain the mean- 
ing of the word ; viz. they can be true or false only when 
they profess (and so far as they profess) to give the ordi- 
nary and established meaning of the term. But those 
which are called real Definitions, viz. which unfold the 
nature of the thing, (which they may do in various de- 
grees,) to these the epithet " true" may be applied ; and 
to make out such a Definition will often be the very end 
(not as in Mathematics the beginning) of our study.* 

In Mathematics there is no such distinction between 
nominal and real Definition ; the meaning of the term, and 
the nature of the thing, being one and the same: so that 
no correct definition whatever of any Mathematical term 
can be devised, which shall not imply every thing which 
belongs to the term. 

H 

When it is asked, then, whether such great 
the word Discoveries, as have been made in Natural Phi- 

Reasoniug. 

losophy, were accomplished, or can be accom- 
plished, by Reasoning ? the inquirer should be reminded, 
that the question is ambiguous ; it may be answered in 
the affirmative, if by " Reasoning" is meant to be in- 
cluded the assumption of Premises. To the right per- 
formance of that work, is requisite, not only, in many 

* Burke on Taste, in the Introduction to his "Essay on the Sub- 
lime and Beautiful." 



Chap. II. § 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 229 

cases, the ascertainment of facts, and of the degree of 
evidence for doubtful propositions, (in which observation 
and experiment will often be indispensable,) but also a 
skilful selection and combination of known facts and prin- 
ciples ; such as implies, amongst other things, the exer- 
cise of that powerful abstraction which seizes the common 
circumstances — the point of agreement — in a number of, 
otherwise, dissimilar individuals ; and it is in this that the 
greatest genius is shown. But if "Reasoning" be under- 
stood in the limited sense in which it is usually defined, then 
we must answer in the negative ; and reply that such Dis- 
coveries are made by means of Reasoning combined with 
other operations. 

In the process I have been speaking of, there is much 
Reasoning throughout; and thence the whole has been 
carelessly called a " process of Reasoning." 

It is not, indeed, any just ground of complaint that the 
word " Reasoning" is used in two senses ; but that the two 
senses are perpetually confounded together : and hence it 
is that some Logical writers fancied that Reasoning {viz. 
that which Logic treats of) was the method of discovering 
Truth ; and that so many other writers have accordingly 
complained of Logic for not accomplishing that end ; 
urging that " Syllogism" (i. e. Reasoning ; though they 
overlooked the coincidence) never established any thing 
that is, strictly speaking, unknown to him who has granted 
the Premises: and proposing the introduction of a cer- 
tain " rational Logic" to accomplish this purpose ; i. e. to 
direct the mind in the process of investigation. Supposing 
that some such system could be devised — that it could 
even be brought into a scientific form, (which he must be 
more sanguine than scientific who expects,) — that it were 
20 



230 ON THE PROVINCE OP REASONING. [Book IV. 

of the greatest conceivable utility, — and that it should be 
allowed to bear the name of " Logic," (since it would not 
be worth while to contend about a name,) still it would not, 
as these writers seem to suppose, have the same object 
proposed with the Aristotelian Logic ; or be in any respect 
a rival to that system. A plough may be a much more 
ingenious and valuable instrument than a. flail: but it 
never can be substituted for it. 

Those Discoveries of general laws of Nature, &c. of 
which we have been speaking, being of that character 
which we have described by the name of " Logical Dis- 
coveries," to him tvho is in possession of all the Premises 
from which they are deduced; but being, to the multitude 
(who are unacquainted with many of those Premises) 
strictly " New Truths," hence it is, that men in general 
give to the general facts, and to them, most peculiarly, 
the name of Discoveries ; for to themselves they are such, 
in the strictest sense ; the Premises from which they were 
inferred being not only originally unknown to them, but 
frequently remaining unknown to the very last ; e. g. the 
general conclusion concerning cattle, which Bakewell 
made known, is what most Agriculturists (and many 
others also) are acquainted with ■ but the Premises he 
set out with, viz. the facts respecting this, that, and the 
other, individual ox, (the ascertainment of -which facts 
was his first Discovery,) these are what few know, or care 
to know, with any exact particularity. 

And it may be added, that these discoveries 
and experi- of particular facts, which are the immediate re- 
salt of observation, are, in themselves, uninter- 
esting and insignificant, till they are combined so as to 
lead to a grand general result; those who on each occa- 



Chap. II. § 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 231 

sion watched the motions, and registered the times of oc- 
cultation of Jupiter's satellites, little thought, perhaps, them- 
selves, what magnificent results they were preparing the 
way for.* So that there is an additional cause which has 
confined the term " Discovery" to these grand general con- 
clusions ; and, as was just observed, they are, to the gen- 
erality of men, perfectly New Truths in the strictest sense 
of the word, not being implied in any previous knowledge 
they possessed. Very often it will happen, indeed, that 
the conclusion thus drawn will amount only to a probable 
conjecture ; which conjecture will dictate to the inquirer 
such an experiment, or course of experiments, as will 
fully establish the fact : thus Sir H. Davy, from finding 
that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated 
through a long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter 
but still slenderer tube would answer the same purpose; 
this led him to try the experiments, in which, by continu- 
ally shortening the tube, and at the same time lessening 
its bore, he arrived at last at the wire-gauze of his safety- 
lamp. 

It is to be observed also, that whatever credit is con- 
veyed by the word " Discovery," to him who is regarded 
r as the author of it, is well deserved by those who skilfully 
select and combine known Truths {especially such as have 
been long and generally known) so as to elicit important, 
and hitherto unthought-of, conclusions ; theirs is the mas- 
ter-mind : — apxiTexTovixri (ppovriais. Whereas men of very 
inferior powers may sometimes by immediate observation, 
discover perfectly new facts, empirically ; and thus be of 

* Hence, Bacon urges us to pursue Truth, without always 
requiring to perceive its practical application. 



232 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

service in furnishing materials to the others ; to whom they 
stand in the same relation (to recur to a former illustration) 
as the brickmaker or stone-quarrier to the architect. It is 
peculiarly creditable to Adam Smith, and to Mr. Malthus, 
that the data from which they drew such important Con- 
clusions had been in every one's hands for centuries. 

As for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as we have 
before said) must always be of the description to which 
we have given the name of " Logical Discoveries ;" since 
to him who properly comprehends the meaning of the 
Mathematical terms, (and to no other are the Truths 
themselves, properly speaking, intelligible,) those results 
are implied in his previous knowledge, since they are 
Logically deducible therefrom. It is not, however, meant 
to be implied, that Mathematical Discoveries are effected 
by pure Reasoning, and by that singly. For though 
there is not here, as in Physics, any exercise of judgment 
as to the degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any 
experiments and observations, yet there is the same call 
for skill in the selection and combination of the Premises 
in such a manner as shall be best calculated to lead to a 
new, that is, unperceived and unthought-of Conclusion. 

In following, indeed, and taking in a demonstration, 
nothing is called for but pure Reasoning ; but the assump- 
tion of Premises is not a part of Reasoning, in the strict 
and technical sense of that term. Accordingly, there are 
many who can follow a Mathematical demonstration, or 
any other train or argument, who would not succeed well 
in framing one of their own.* 

* Hence, the Student must not confine himself to this passive 
kind of employment, if he would truly become a Mathema- 
tician. 



Chap. 11.55.] DISCOVERY OP TRUTH. 233 

For both kinds of Discovery then, the Log- 0perationg 
ical, as well as the Physical, certain operations ^^Reason- 
are requisite, beyond those which can fairly be ins- 
comprehended under the strict sense of the word " Rea- 
soning ;" in the Logical, is required a skilful selection and 
combination of known Truths : in the Physical, we must 
employ, in addition (generally speaking) to that process, 
observation and experiment. It will generally happen, 
that in the study of nature, and, universally in all that 
relates to matters of fact, both kinds of investigation will 
be united ; i. e. some of the facts or principles you rea- 
son from as Premises, must be ascertained by observation ; 
or, as in the case of the safety-lamp, the ultimate Con- 
clusion will need confirmation from experience; so that 
both Physical and Logical Discovery will take place in 
the course of the same process : we need not, therefore, 
wonder, that the two are so perpetually confounded. In 
Mathematics, on the other hand, and in great part of the 
discussion relating to Ethics and Jurisprudence, there 
being no room for any Physical Discovery whatever, we 
v have only to make a skilful use of the propositions in our 
possession, to arrive at every attainable result. 

The investigation, however, of the latter class of sub- 
jects differs in other points also from that of the former. 
For, setting aside the circumstance of our having, in 
these, no question as to facts,— no room for observation, 
•—there is also a considerable difference in what may be 
called, in both instances, the process of Logical investiga- 
tion; the Premises on which we proceed being of so 
different a nature in the two cases. 
20* 



234 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

Mathematical ^° ta ^ G ^ exam pl e of Mathematics, the 
Reasoning. Definitions, which are the principles of our 
Reasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still 
fewer; and both are, for the most part, laid down and 
placed before the student in the outset ; the introduction of 
a new Definition or Axiom, being' of comparatively rare 
occurrence, at wide intervals, and with a formal state- 
ment ; besides which, there is no room for doubt concern- 
ing- either. On the other hand, in all Reasonings which 
regard matters of fact, we introduce, almost at every step, 
fresh and fresh propositions (to a very great number) 
which had not been elicited in the course of our Reason- 
ing, but are taken for granted ; viz. facts and laws of 
Nature, which are here the principles of our Reasoning, 
and maxims, or " elements of belief," which answer to the 
axioms in Mathematics. If, at the opening of a Treatise, 
for example, on Chemistry, on Agriculture, on Political 
Economy, 6fc. the author should make, as in Mathemat- 
ics, a formal statement of all the propositions he intended 
to assume, as granted throughout the whole work, both 
he and his readers would be astonished at the number ; 
and, of these, many would be only probable, and there 
would be much room for doubt as to the degree of proba- 
bility, and for judgment in ascertaining that degree. 

Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always employed 
precisely in the same simple form ; e. g. the axiom that 
" things equal to the same are equal to one another," is 
cited, whenever there is need, in those very words; 
whereas the maxims employed in the other class of sub- 
jects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in the 
application of them ; e. g. " the stability of the laws of 
Nature," which is our constant assumption in inquiries 



Chap. II. § 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 235 

relating- to Natural Philosophy, assumes many different 
shapes, and in some of them does not possess the same 
absolute certainty as in others; e. g. when, from having 
always observed a certain sheep ruminating, we infer 
that this individual sheep will continue to ruminate, we 
assume that " the property which has hitherto belonged to 
this sheep will remain unchanged ;" when we infer the 
same property of all sheep, we assume that " the prop- 
erty which belongs to this individual belongs to the 
whole species :" if, on comparing sheep with some other 
kind of horned animals, and finding that all agree in 
ruminating, we infer that " all horned animals ruminate," 
we assume that " the whole of a genus or class are likely 
to agree in any point wherein many species of that 
genus agree ;" or in other words, " that if one of two prop- 
erties, 6fc. has often been found accompanied by another, 
and never without it, the former will be universally ac- 
companied by the latter:" now all these are merely 
different forms of the maxim, that " nature is uniform in 
her operations," which, it is evident, varies in expression 
in almost every different case where it is applied, and 
admits of every degree of evidence, from absolute moral 
'certainty, to mere conjecture. 

The same may be said of an infinite number of prin- 
ciples and maxims appropriated to, and employed in, each 
particular branch of study. Hence, all such Reasonings 
are, in comparison of Mathematics, very complex; re- 
quiring so much more than that does, beyond the process 
of merely deducing the conclusion Logically from the 
Premises : so that it is no wonder that the longest Mathe- 
matical demonstration should be so much more easily 
constructed and understood, than a much shorter train of 



236 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

just Reasoning concerning real facts. The former has 
been aptly compared to a long and steep, but even and 
regular flight of steps, which tries the breath, and the 
strength, and the perseverance only; while the latter 
resembles a short, but rugged and uneven, ascent up a 
precipice, which requires a quick eye, agile limbs, and a 
firm step ; and in which we have to tread now on this 
side, now on that — ever considering, as we proceed, 
whether this or that projection will afford room for our 
foot, or whether some loose stone may not slide from 
under us. There are probably as many steps of pure 
Reasoning in one of the longer of Euclid's demonstra- 
tions, as in the whole of an argumentative treatise on 
some other subject, occupying perhaps a considerable 
volume. 

As for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings which were 
lately mentioned as in some respects resembling those of 
Mathematics, (viz. such as keep clear of all assertions 
respecting facts,) they have this difference ; that not only 
men are not so completely agreed respecting the maxims 
and principles of Ethics and Law, but the meaning also 
of each term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed by 
an arbitrary definition ; on the contrary, a great part of 
our labor consists in distinguishing accurately the various 
senses in which men employ each term, — ascertaining 
which is the most proper, — and taking care to avoid 
confounding them together, 



Chap. I. §3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 237 

Chap. III. 

Of Inference a?id Proof 

j.i. 

Since it appears, from what has been said, that univer- 
sally a man must possess something else besides the 
Reasoning-faculty, in order to apply that faculty properly 
to his own purpose, whatever that purpose may be ; it may 
be inquired whether some theory could not be made out, 
respecting those " other operations 11 and " intellectual 
processes, distinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary 
for us sometimes to employ in the investigation of truth ;"* 
and whether rules could not be laid down for conducting 
them. 

Something has, indeed, been done in this 
way by more than one writer ; and more might plications of 
probably be accomplished by one who should 
fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind the princi- 
ples of Logic, properly so called ; but it would hardly be 
"possible to build up any thing like a regular Science re- 
specting these matters, such as Logic is, with respect to 
the theory of Reasoning. It may be useful, however, to 
observe, that these " other operations 11 of which we have 
been speaking, and which are preparatory to the exercise 
of Reasoning, are of two kinds, according to the nature 
of the end proposed; for Reasoning comprehends In- 
ferring and Proving ; which are not two different things, 
but the same thing regarded in two different points of 

* D. Stewart, 



238 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

view : like the road from London to York, and the road 
from York to London. He who infers,* proves ; and he 
who proves, infers ; but the word " infer" fixes the mind 
first on the Premiss, and then on the Conclusion; the 
word " prove," on the contrary, leads the mind from the 
conclusion to the Premiss. Hence, the substantives de- 
rived from these words respectively are often used to 
express that which, on each occasion, is last in the mind ; 
Inference being- often used to signify the Conclusion, (i. e. 
Proposition inferred,) and Proof, the Premiss. We say, 
also, " How do you prove that ?" and " What do you 
infer from that ?" which sentences would not be so prop- 
erly expressed if we were to transpose those verbs. One 
might, therefore, define Proving, " the assigning of a 
reason or argument for the support of a given proposi- 
tion ;" and Inferring, " the deduction of a Conclusion 
from give?i Premises." In the one case our Conclusion 
is given, (i. e. set before us,) and we have to seek for argu- 
ments ; in the other, our Premises are given, and we have 
to seek for a Conclusion : i. e. to put together our own 
propositions, and try what will follow from them; or, to 
speak more Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer 
the Subject of which we would predicate something, to a 
class to which that Predicate will (affirmatively or nega- 
tively) apply ; in the other, we seek to find comprehended, 
in the Subject of which we have predicated something, 
some other term to which that Predicate had not been 
before applied.! Each of these is a definition of Rea- 
soning. 

* I mean, of course, when the word is understood to imply correct 
Inference, 
t " Proving" may be compared to the act of putting away 



Ciup. til. 5 2.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 239 

* 2. 
To infer, then, is the business of the Philoso- T „ , 

J Investigator 

pher ; to prove, of the Advocate ; the former, JJf e ^ dvo " 
from the great mass of known and admitted 
truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional truth what- 
ever, that has been hitherto unperceived ; and perhaps, 
without knowing, with certainty, what will be the terms of 
his Conclusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks to 
ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each other, or what 
is the line whose square will be equal to a given circle ; 
the Advocate, on the other hand, has a proposition put 
before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can : 
his business, therefore, is to find middle terms, (which is 
the inventio of Cicero;) the Philosopher's to combine 
and select known facts, or principles, suitably, for gaining 
from them Conclusions which, though implied in the 
Premises, were before unperceived : in other words, for 
making " Logical Discoveries." 

To put the same thing in another point of view, we 
may consider all questions as falling under two classes ; 
viz. " What shall be predicated of a certain subject V 
and ivhich Copula, affirmative or negative, shall connect a 
certain Subject and Predicate: we inquire, in short, either, 
1st, "What is A?" or, 2d, "Is A, B, or is it not?" 
The former class of questions belongs to the Philosopher ; 
the latter to the Advocate.* — (See Rhet. Appendix G. 
p. 387.) 

any article into the proper receptacle of goods of that descrip- 
tion; "inferring," to that of bringing out the article when 
needed. 

* The distinction between these two classes of questions is 
perhaps the best illustrated by reference to some case in which our 



240 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

Such are the respective preparatory processes in these 
two branches of study. They are widely different ; they 
arise from, and generate, very different habits of mind; 
and require a very different kind of training and precept.* 
The Pleader, or Controversialist, or, in short, the Rheto- 
rician in general, who is, in his own province, the most 



decision of each of the questions involved in some assertion is 
controverted by different parties. E. G. Paul says, that the 
apostles preached " Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling- 
block, and to the Greeks, foolishness :" that Jesus, who had 
suffered an ignominious death, was the Messiah, the Saviour of 
the World, was a doctrine opposed both by Jews and Gentiles ; 
though on different grounds, according to their respective preju- 
dices : the Jews, who " sought after a sign," (i. e. the coming 
of the Messiah in the clouds to establish a splendid temporal 
kingdom,) were "offended," — "scandalized," — at the doctrine 
of a suffering Messiah : the Greeks, who " sought after "Wis- 
dom," (i. e. the mode of themselves exalting their own nature, 
without any divine aid,) ridiculed the idea of a Heavenly Saviour 
altogether ; which the Jews admitted. In logical language, the 
Gentiles could not comprehend the Predicate ; the Jews denied 
the Copula. 

It may be added, that in modern phraseology, the operations 
of corresponding prejudices are denoted, respectively by the 
words " paradox" (a " stumbling-block") and " nonsense" 
(" foolishness") ; which are often used, the one, by him who has 
been accustomed to hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, 
the other, by him who has formed no opinion on the subject. 

* It is evident that the business of the Advocate and that of 
the Judge are in this manner opposed ; the one being to find ar- 
guments for the support of his client's cause ; the other to as- 
certain the truth. And hence it is, that those who have ex- 
celled the most in the former department, sometimes manifest a 
deficiency in the latter, though the siilject-matter, in which they 
are conversant, remains the same. 



Chap. III. § 2.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 241 

skilful, may be but ill-fitted for Philosophical investigation, 
even where there is no observation wanted : — when the 
facts are all ready ascertained for him. And again, the 
ablest Philosopher may make an indifferent disputant; 
especially, since the arguments which have led him to the 
conclusion, and have, with him, the most weight, may 
not, perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy. The 
commonest fault, however, by far, is to forget the Philoso- 
pher or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, im- 
properly. It is therefore of great use to dwell on the dis- 
tinction between these two branches. As for the bare 
process of Reasoning, that is the same in both cases ; \yjt. 
the preparatory processes which are requisite, in order U 
employ Reasoning profitably, these, we see, branch off 
into two distinct channels. In each of these, undoubted- 
ly, useful rules may be laid down; but they should not be 
confounded together. Bacon has chosen the department 
of Philosophy; giving rules in his Organon, vh{losOT>Y i c ^ 
not only for the conduct of experiments to as- lnqmfy ' 
certain new facts, but also for the selection and combina- 
tion of known facts and principles, with a view of obtain- 
ing valuable Inferences; and it is probable that a system 
of such rules is what some writers mean (if they hav2 
any distinct meaning) by their proposed " Logic." 

In the other department, precepts have been Rhetor; „. d; 
given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical writers, in( * uir y- 
as a part of their plan. How far these precepts are to 
be considered as belonging to the present system, — 
whether_ " method " is to be regarded as a part of 
Logic, — whether the matter of Logic is to be included 
in the system, — whether Bacon's is properly to be reel^ 

oned a kind of Logic; all these are merely verbal ques- 
21 



242 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 
tions, relating to the extension, not of the Science, but of 
the name. The bare process of Reasoning, i. e. dedueing 
a Conclusion from Premises, must ever remain a distinct 
operation from the assumption of Premises, however use- 
ful the rules may be that have been given, dt may be 
given, for conducting this latter process, and others con- 
nected with it ; and however properly such rules may be 
subjoined to the precepts of that system to which the 
name of Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. Such 
rules as I now allude to may be of eminent service ; 
but they must always be, as I have before observed, com- 
paratively vague and general, and incapable of being 
built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of 
the Syllogism ; to which theory they bear much the 
same relation as the principles and rules of Poetical and 
Rhetorical criticism to those of Grammar ; or those of 
practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. I find no fault 
with the extension of a term; but I would suggest a 
caution against confounding together, by means of a com- 
mon name, things essentially different^ and above all I 
would deprecate the sophistry of striving to depreciate 
what is called " the school-Logic," by perpetually con- 
trasting it with systems Avith which it has nothing in com- 
mon but the name, and whose object is essentially dif- 
ferent. 

It is not a little remarkable that writers, whose 

Aristotle's 

ch-ganon and expressions tend to confound together, by means 

of a common name, two branches of study 

which have nothing else in common, (as if they were two 

different plans for attaining one and ihz same object,) have 



Chap. III. § 3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 243 

themselves complained of one of the effects of this con- 
fusion, viz. the introduction, early in the career of Aca- 
demical Education, of a course of Logic; under which 
name, they observe, " men now* universally comprehend 
the works of Locke, Bacon, <J*c." which, as is justly re- 
marked, are unfit for beginners. Now this would not 
have happened, if men had always kept in mind the 
meaning or meanings of each name they used. And it 
may be added, that, however justly the word " Logic" may 
be thus extended, we have no ground for applying to the 
Aristotelian Logic the remarks above quoted respecting 
the Baconian ; whjch the ambiguity of the word, if not 
carefully kept in view, might lead us to do. Grant that 
Bacon's work is a part of Logic ; it no more follows, from 
the unfitness of that for learners, that the Elements of the 
Theory of Reasoning should be withheld from them, than 
it follows that the elements of Euclid, and common Arith- 
metic, are unfit for boys, because Newtoris Principia, 
which also bears the title of Mathematical, is above their 
grasp. Of two branches of study which bear the same 
name, or even of two parts of the same branch, the one 
may be suitable to the commencement, the other to the 
close of the Academical career. 

- At whatever period of that career it may be proper to 
introduce the study of such as are usually called Meta- 
physical writers, it may be safely asserted, that those who 
have had the most experience in the business of giving 
instruction in Logic, properly so called, as well as in other 
branches of knowledge, prefer and generally pursue the 
plan of letting their pupils enter on that study, next in or 
der after the elements of Mathematics. 

*-L' ' ■' ■ - ' - J ■ ■ ■ ■ ! _. 

* i. e. in the Scptch universities, 



244 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

Chap. IV. 

Of Verbal and Real Questidns. 

i i- 

The ingenious author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
having maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is appli- 
cable to Verbal controversy alone, there may be an ad- 
vantage (though it has been my aim throughout to show 
the application of it to all Reasoning) in pointing out the 
difference between Verbal and Real Questions, and the 
probable origin of Campbell's mistake; for to trace any 
error to its source, will often throw more light on the sub- 
ject in hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with 
merely detecting and refuting it. 

Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question 
whether a certain Predicate is or is not applicable to a 
certain subject, or what Predicate is applicable ;* and 
whatever other account may be given by any writer, of 
the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found. 
Difference ultimately to resolve itself into this. But some- 
verbafanda times the Question turns on the meaning and 
re question. extent f fa e f erms employed ; sometimes, on 
the things signified by them. If it be made to appear, 
therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain Question 
may be held by persons not differing in their opinion of 
the matter in hand, then that Question may be pronounced 
Verbal ; as depending on the different senses in which 
they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, 

* See Chap. hi. § 2. 



Chap. IV. § 1.] VERBAL AND REAL GtUESTIONS. 245 

it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, 
but still differ as to the application of one of them to the 
other, then it may be pronounced that the Question is 
Real, — that they differ as to the opinions they hold of 
the things in Question. 

If, for instance, two persons contend whether Augustus 
deserved to be called a " great man," then, if it appeared 
that the one included, under the term " great," disinter- 
ested patriotism, and on that ground excluded Augustus 
from the class, as wanting in that quality ; and that the 
other also gave him no credit for that quality, but under- 
stood no more by the term " great," than high intellectual 
qualities, energy of character, and brilliant actions, it 
would follow that the parties did not differ in opinion, ex- 
cept as to the use of a term, and that the Question was 
Verbal. Tf, again, it appeared that the one did give Au- 
gustus credit for such patriotism, as the other denied him, 
both of them including that idea in the term " great," then 
the Question would be Real. Either kind of Question, 
it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical principles ; 
but the middle terms employed would be different ; and for 
this reason, among others, it is important to distinguish 
Verbal from Real controversy. In the former case, e. g. 
it might be urged with truth, that the common use of the 
expression " great and good, 1 ' proves that the idea of 
good is not implied in the ordinary sense of the word 
great ; an argument which could have, of course, no place 
in deciding the other Question, 

2i* •, lx' 



246 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

\% 

verbal Ques- ^ * s % n0 means to ^ e supposed that all 
tekSi'for Verbal Questions are trifling and frivolous. It 
is often of the highest importance to settle cor- 
rectly the meaning of a word, either according to ordinary- 
use, or according to the meaning of any particular writer 
or class of men : but when Verbal Questions are mistaken 
for Real, much confusion of thought and unprofitable 
wrangling will be generally the result. Nor is it always 
so easy and simple a task, as might at first sight ap- 
pear, to distinguish them from each other: for several 
objects to which one common name is applied will often 
have many points of difference, and yet that name may 
perhaps be applied to them all in the same sense, and 
may be fairly regarded as the genus they come under, 
if it appear that they all agree in what is designated by 
that name, and that the differences between them are in 
points not essential to the character of the genus. A 
cow and a horse differ in many respects, but agree in 
ail that is implied by the term " quadruped," which is 
therefore applicable to both in the same sense.* So also 

* Yet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly 
brought against a writer, in consequence of a gratuitous as- 
sumption of our own. An Eastern writer, e. g. may be speaking 
of u beasts of burden ;" and the reader may chance to have the 
idea occur to his mind of Horses and Mules ; he thence takes 
for granted that these were meant ; and if it afterwards come 
out that it was Camels, he perhaps complains of the writer for 
misleading him by not expressly mentioning the species ; say- 
ing, " I could not know that he meant Camels." He did not 
mean Camels, in particular ; he meant, as he said, " beasts of 
burden;" and Camels are such, as well as Horses and Mules. 
He is not accountable for your suppositions. 



Chap. IV. § 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 247 
the houses of the ancients differed in many respects from 
ours, and their ships still more; yet no one would con- 
tend that the terms " house" and " ship," as applied to 
both, are ambiguous, or that o~i« os might not fairly be ren- 
dered house, and vavs ship; because the essential charac- 
teristic of a house is, not its being of this or that form or 
materials, but its being a dwelling for men; these there- 
fore would be called two different kinds of houses ; and 
consequently the term " house" would be applied to each, 
without any equivocation, in the same sense: and so in 
the other instances. On the other hand, two or more 
things may bear the same name, and may also have a re- 
semblance in many points, and may from that resem- 
blance have come to bear the same name, and yet if tbe 
circumstance which is essential to each be wanting in 
the other, the term may be pronounced ambiguous. 
E. G. The word " Plantain" is the name of a common 
herb in Europe, and of an Indian fruit-tree : both are 
vegetables ; yet the term is ambiguous, because it does not 
denote them so far forth as they agree. Again, the word 
" Priest" is applied to the Ministers of the Jewish and of 
the Pagan religions, and also to those of the Christian; 
and doubtless the term is so used in consequence of their 
Being both ministers (in some sort) of religion. Nor 
would every difference that might be found between the 
Priests of different religions constitute the term ambiguous, 
provided such differences were non-essential to the idea 
suggested by the word Priest ; as e. g. the Jewish Priest 
served the true God, and the Pagan, false Gods : this is 
a most important difference, but does not constitute the 
term ambiguous, because neither of these circumstances is 
implied and suggested by the term 'I^v?; which accord- 



248 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

ingly was applied both to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But 
the term 'hptis does seem to have implied the office of 
offering sacrifice, atoning for the sins of the people, and 
acting as mediator between man and the object of his wor- 
ship; and accordingly that term is never applied to any 
one under the Christian system, except to the ONE great 
Mediator. The Christian ministers not having that office 
which was implied as essential in the term 'lepevs, were 
never called by that name, but by that of vpcfffcrcpos* It 
may be concluded, therefore, that the term Priest is ambig- 
uous, as corresponding to the terms Upev s and npec/torc 
pos respectively, notwithsatnding that there are points in 
which these two agree. These therefore should be reck- 
oned, not two different kinds of Priests, but Priests in two 
different senses; since (to adopt the phraseology of 
Aristotle) the definition of them, so far forth as they are 
Priests, would be different. 

It is evidently of much importance to keep in mind the 
above distinctions, in order to avoid, on the one hand, 
stigmatizing as Verbal controversies, what in reality are 
not such, merely because the Question turns on the ap- 
plicability of a certain Predicate to a certain subject ; 
or, on the other hand, falling into the opposite error of 
mistaking words for things, and judging of men's agree- 
ment or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely 
from their agreement or disagreement in the terms em- 
ployed. 



* From which our word Priest is derived, but which (it is 
remarkable) is never translated " Priest" in our version of the 
Scriptures, but " Elder." 



Chap. V. § l.J REALISM. 



Chap. V. 



Of Realism. 

\\. 

Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to the mistake 
just noticed, and thus to produce undetected Verbal Ques- 
tions and fruitless Logomachy, than the prevalence of the 
notion of the Realists,* that genus and species are some 
real Things, existing independently of our conceptions 
and expressions ; and that, as in the case of singular 
terms there is some real individual corresponding to each, 
so in common terms, also, there is something correspond- 
ing to each, which is the object of our thoughts when we 
employ any such term.f 



* It is well known what a long, and furious controversy long 
existed in all the universities of Europe between the sects of the 
Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat of which was allayed by 
the Reformation, which withdrew men's attention to a more im- 
portant question. 

t A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to Aristotle, 
who expressly contradicts it. He calls individuals "primary 
Substances" (irp&Tai ovoiat,) Genus and Species " secondary," as 
not denoting (t66e ti) a " really-existing thing," Uaaa 61 ovoia 6oku 

t66l ti crifiaiveiv. 'Etti p.hv ovv rwf irpajrcjv ovaiuv dva[i<pi(r(ifirriTov *al 
d\r)Qeg loriv, oti ro6e ti (Trjjxaivsi' arofiov yap xal ev dptfytej to 6rj\ovpev6v 
io-riv. 'Etti 61 ToJv 6evT£pcJV ovaiaiv, $AINETAI [xlv hjioius rw a^ripaTt 
-fjs irpoariyopias r66e ti ar]paip£iv, otciv enrjj, avdpcjiros, rj ^wov" OY MHN 
TE AAH0EL* dXKa pd"K\ov iroTov ti aripaivei' k. t. X. Aristotle, 
Categ. § 3. 



250 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

There is one circumstance which ought to be noticed, 
as having probably contributed not a little to foster this 
Technical error : ' mean the peculiar technical sense of 
des S wi/en Pe * tne wor & "Species" when applied to organized 
organized Beings. It has been laid down in the course of 
this work, that when several individuals are ob- 
served to resemble each other in some point, a common 
name may be assigned to them denoting that point, — 
applying to all or any of them so far forth as respects that 
common attribute, — and distinguishing them from all 
others ; as, e. g. the several individual buildings, which, 
however different in other respects, agree in being con- 
structed for men's dwelling, are called by the common 
name of " House :" and it was added, that as we select 
at pleasure the circumstance that we choose to abstract, 
we may thus refer the same individual to several different 
species, according as it suits our purpose; and the same 
in respect of the reference of Species to Genus: whence 
it seems plainly to follow that Genus and Species are no 
real things existing independent of our thoughts, but are 
creatures of our own minds. Yet in the case of Species of 
organized Beings, it seems at first sight as if this rule did 
not hold good ; but that the Species to which each individual 
belongs could not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us, 
but must be something real, unalterable, and independent 
of our thoughts. Caesar or Socrates, for instance, it may 
be said, must belong to the Species Man, and can belong 
to no other ; and the like, with any individual Brute, or 
Plant. On the other hand, if any one utters such a propo- 
sition as " Argus was a mastiff," to what head of Predi- 
cables would this Predicate be referred? Surely our 
logical principles would lead us to answer, that it is the 



ChAP. V. 5 1.] REALISM. 251 

species; since it could hardly be called an Accident, and 
is manifestly no other Predicable. And yet every Natu- 
ralist would at once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct 
Species, but only a variety of the Species Dog. This 
however does not satisfy our inquiry as to the head of 
Predicables to which it is to be referred. 

The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the con- 
sideration of the peculiar technical sense of the word 
"Species" when applied to organized beings : g edes 
in which case it is always applied (when w'SSSSS!^ 
are speaking strictly, as naturalists) to such indi- fromvarie£ y- 
viduals as are supposed to be descended from a common 
stock, or which might have so descended ; viz. which 
resemble one another (to use M. Cuvier's expression) as 
much as those of the same stock do. Now this being a 
point on which all (not merely Naturalists) are agreed 
and since it is a matter of fact that such and _ . , 

J Questions of 

such individuals are, or are not, thus connected, ^estions oi 
it follows, that every question whether a certain arran s emcnt - 
individual Animal or Plant belongs to a certain Species or 
not, is a question not of mere arrangement, but of fact. 
But in the case of questions respecting Genus it is other- 
wise. If, e. g. two Naturalists differed, in the one placing 
(as Linnaeus) all the species of Bee under one Genus, 
which the other subdivided (as later writers have done) 
into several genera, it would be evident that there was no 
question of fact debated between them, and that it was 
only to be considered which was the more convenient 
arrangement ; if, on the other hand, it were disputed 
whether the African and the Asiatic Elephant are distinct 
Species, or merely varieties, it would be equally manifest 
that the question is one of fact; since both would allow 



25-2 ON THE PROVINCE OP REASONING. [Book IV. 

that if they were descended (or might have descended) 
from the same stock, they were of the same Species, and if 
otherwise, of two : this is the fact, which they endeavour 
to ascertain, by such indications as are to be found. 

For it is to be further observed, that this fact being one 
which cannot be directly known, the consequence is, that 
the marks by which any Species of Animal or Plant is 
known, are not the very Differentia which constitutes that 
Species. Now, in the case of unorganized beings, these 
„ , , two coincide ; the marks bv which a diamond, 

Mark by ' J ' 

speciesSs e - & * s distinguished from other minerals, being 
SwJyttS tne vei T Differentia that constitutes the Species 
erentia. jji am0 nd. And the same is the case in the 
Genera of organized beings likewise: the Linnsean Genus 
" Felis," e. g. (when considered as a Species, i. e. as fall- 
ing under some more comprehensive class) is distinguish- 
ed from others under the same Order, by those very 
marks which constitute its Differentia. But in the Infims 
Species (according to the view of a Naturalist) of plants 
and animals, this, as has been said, is not the case ; since 
here the Differentia which constitutes each Species in- 
cludes in it a circumstance which cannot be directly as- 
certained, (viz. the being sprung from the same stock,) 
but which we conjecture from circumstances of resem- 
blance ; so that the marks by which a Species is known, 
are not in truth the whole of the Differentia itself, but in- 
dications of the existence of that Differentia ; viz. . indica- 
tions of descent from a common stock.* 



* There are few, and but a few, other Species to which the 
same observations will in a great degree apply ; I mean in which 
the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and the mark bj 



Chap. V. § 1.] REALISM. 253 

Hence it is that Species, in the case of organized beings, 
appears to be something real, and independent of our 
thoughts and language; and hence, naturally enough, the 
same notions have been often extended to the Genera 
also, and to Species of other things : so that men have 
an idea of each individual of every description truly 
belonging to some one Species and no other; and each 
Species in like manner to some one Genus; whether we 
happen to be right or not in the ones to which we refer 
them. 

Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and main- 
tain this doctrine ; but those who are not especially on their 
guard, are perpetually sliding into it unawares. 

Nothing so much conduces to this as the transferred and 
secondary use of the words "same,"* "one and Ambi it f 
the same," " identical," <£c. when it is not clearly JI 1 ^^ 8 
perceived and carefully borne in mind, that they one ' 
are employed in a secondary sense, and that more frequent- 
ly even than in the primary. 

Suppose, e. g. a thousand persons are thinking of the 
Sun, it is evident it is one and the same individual object 
on which all these minds are employed; so far all is 
clear: but suppose all these persons are thinking of a 
Triangle; — not any individual triangle, but Triangle in 



which the Species is known, are not the same: e.g. "Murder:" 
the Differentia of which is that it be committed " with malice 
aforethought ;" this cannot be directly ascertained ; and therefore 
we distinguish murder from any other homicide by circumstances 
of preparation, <frc. which are not in reality the Differentia, but 
indications of the Differentia ; i. e. grounds for concluding that the 
malice did exist. 
* See Appendix, No. I. art. Same. 
22 



254 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

general; — and considering, perhaps, the equality of its 
angles to two right angles; it would seem as if, in this 
case also, their minds were all employed on " one and 
the same" object: and this object of their thoughts, it 
may be said, cannot be the mere word " triangle," but that 
which is meant by it; nor again, can it be every thing 
that the word will apply to, for they are not thinking of 
triangles, but of one thing. Those who do not acknow- 
ledge that this " one thing" has an existence independent 
of the human mind, are in general content to tell us, by 
way of explanation, that the object of their thoughts is 
the abstract " idea" of a triangle ;* an explanation which 
satisfies, or at least silences many ; though it may be 
doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort 
of a thing an M idea" is, which may thus exist in a thou- 
sand different minds at once, and yet be " one and the 
same." 

The fact is, that •' unity" and " sameness" are in such 
cases employed, not in the primary sense, but to denote 
perfect similarity'. When we say that ten thousand diffe- 
rent persons have all " one and the same" Idea in their 
minds, or are all of "one and the same" Opinion, we 
mean no more than that they are all thinking exactly 
alike; when we say that they are all in the "same" 
posture, we mean that they are all placed alike ; and so 
also they are said all to have the " same" disease, when 
they are all diseased alike. 

One instance of the confusion of thought and endless 
logomachy which may spring from inattention to this am- 



* Conceptualists is a name sometimes applied to those who 
adopt this explanation ; to which class Locke is referred. 



Chap. V. § 1.] REALISM. 255 

biguity of the words " same," <J*c, is afforded by the con- 
troversy arising out of a sermon of Dr. King, (Archbishop 
of Dublin,) published about a century ago. He re- 
marked, (without expressing himself perhaps with so much 
guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents 
rendered needful,) that " the attributes of the Deity (viz. 
Wisdom, Justice, <$fc.) are not to he regarded as the same 
with those human qualities which hear the same names, 
but are called so by resemblance and analogy only." 
For this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley and a host 
of other objectors, down to the present time, as an Athe- 
ist, or little better. If the divine attributes, they urged, 
are not precisely the same in kind (though superior in 
degree) with the human qualities which bear the same 
name, we cannot imitate the Deity as the Scriptures 
require ; — we cannot know on what principles we shall 
be judged; — we cannot be sure that God exists at all; 
with a great deal more to the same purpose ; all of which 
would have been perceived to be entirely needless, had 
the authors but recollected to ascertain the meaning of 
the principal word employed. For, 1st, When any two 
persons (or other objects) are said to have the " same" 
quality, accident, tyc, what we predicate of them is evi- 
dently a certain resemblance, and nothing else. One man, 
e. g. does not feel another's sickness ; but they are said to 
have the " same" disease, if they are precisely similar in 
respect of their ailments : and so also they are said to 
have the same complexion, if the hue and texture of their 
skins be alike. 2dly, Such qualities as are entirely rela- 
tive, — which consist in the relation borne by the subject 
to certain other things, — in these, it is manifest, the only 
resemblance that can exist, is, resemblance of relation, i, e % 



256 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

ANALOGY. Courage, e. g. consists in the relation in 
which one stands (h r<3 ovx*v ir&s irpds, Arist.) towards 
dangers; Temperance or Intemperance, towards bodily 
pleasures, tyc. When it is said, therefore, of two coura- 
geous men, that they have both the same quality, the 
only meaning this expression can have, is, that they are, 
so far, completely analogous in their characters ; — hav- 
ing similar ratios to certain similar objects. In short, as, 
in all qualities, sameness can mean only strict resemblance, 
so, in those which are of a relative nature, resemblance 
can mean only analogy. Thus it appears, that what 
Dr. King has been so vehemently censured for asserting 
respecting the Deity, is literally true even with respect to 
men themselves ; viz. that it is only by Analogy that two 
persons can be said to possess the same virtue, or other 
such quality. 3dly, But what he means is plainly, that 
this analogy is far less exact and complete in the case of a 
comparison between the Deity and his creatures, than be- 
tween one man and another ; which surely no one would 
venture to deny. But the doctrine against which the 
attacks have been directed, is self-evident, the moment we 
consider the meaning of the term employed.* 

In the Introduction and Notes to the last edition of 
Archbishop King's Discourse, I have considered the mat- 
ters in debate more fully ; but this slight notice of them 
has been introduced in this place, as closely connected 
with the present subject. 

* See Dr. Copleston's excellent Analysis and Defence of 
Archbishop King's principles, in the Notes to his "Four Dis- 



Chap. V. 8 &] REALISM. 257 

The origin of this secondary sense of the 

Origin of the .. . ,„ „ , 

ambiguity of words, " same, " one, " identical, Of-z. (an 
attention to which would clear away an incalcu- 
lable mass of confused Reasoning and Logomachy,) is 
easily to be traced to the use of Language and of other 
signs, for the purpose of mutual communication. If any one 
utters the " one single" word " triangle," and gives " one 
single" definition of it; each of the persons who hear 
him forms a certain notion in his own mind, not differing 
in any respect from that of each of the rest; they are 
said therefore to have all "one and the same" notion, 
because resulting from, and corresponding v/ith, (that 
which is, in the primary sense ) " one and the same" 
expression; and there is said to be "one single" idea of 
every triangle (considered merely as a triangle) because 
one single name or definition is equally applicable to each. 
In like manner, all the coins struck by the same single 
die, are said to have " one and the same " impression, 
merely because the (numerically) one description which 
suits one of these coins, will equally suit any other that 
is exactly like it. 

It is not intended to recommend the disuse of the 
words " same 3 " " identical," fyc. in this transferred sense ; 
which, if it were desirable would be utterly impracticable ; 
but merely a steady attention to the ambiguity thus intro- 
duced, and watchfulness against the errors thence arising.* 

* It is ■with words as with money. Those who know the 
value of it best, are not therefore the least liberal. We may 
lend readily and largely ; and though this be done quietly and 
22* 



258 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 
The difficulties and perplexities which have involved the 
questions respecting- personal identity, among others, may- 
be traced principally to the neglect of this caution.* 
But a full consideration of that question would be unsuita- 
ble to the subject of this work. 



without ostentation, there is no harm in keeping an exact ac- 
count in our private memorandum-book of the sums, the persons, 
and the occasions on which they were lent. It may be, we 
shall want them again for our own use ; or they may be em- 
ployed by the borrower for a wrong purpose ; or they may have 
been so long in his possession that he begins to look upon them 
as his own. In either of which eases it is allowable, and even 
right, to call them in. " Logic Vindicated." Oxford, 1809. 

* I mean that many writers have sought an explanation of the 
primary sense of identity (viz. personal) by looking to the second- 
ary. Any grown man, e. g. is, in the primary sense, the same per- 
son he was when a child: this sameness is, I conceive, a simple 
notion, which it is vain to attempt explaining by any other more 
simple ; but when philosophers seek to gain a clearer notion of it 
by looking to the cases in which sameness is predicated in another 
sense, viz. similarity, such as exists between several individuals 
denoted by a common name, (as when we say that there are grow- 
ing on Lebanon some of the same trees with which the Temple was 
built, meaning cedars of that species,) this is surely as idle as if 
we were to attempt explaining the primary sense, e. g. of " rage," 
as it exists in the human mind, by directing our attention to the 
" rage" of the sea. Whatever personal identity does consist in, 
it is plain that it has nothing to do with similarity ; since every one 
would be ready to say, " When I WAS a child, I thought as a child. 
— I spake as a child, — I understood as a child ; but when I became 
a man, I put away childish things." 



APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX. 



LIST OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING 
APPENDIX. 



Argument. Hence. — See Reason 


, Same. 


Authority. Why. 


Sin. 


Can. — See May. Identical. — See One 


, Therefore.— See Why 


Capable. — See Possi- Same. 


Truth. 


ble, Impossible, Ne- Impossibility, 
cessary. Indifference. 


Why. 


Whence.— See Why. 


Case. Law. 




Cause. — See Reason, May. — See Must. 




Why. Necessary. 




Certain. Old. 


Value. 


Church. One. 


Wealth. 


Election. Person. 


Labor. 


Expect. Possible. 


Capital. 


Experience. Priest. 
Falsehood.-- See Truth.Reason. 


Aent. 


Wages. 


Gospel. Regeneration. 


Profits. 



No. I. 



ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO 
BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY. 

It has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the impor- 
tance of attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater 
number of instances than could have been conveniently 
either inserted in the context or introduced in a note, 
without too much interrupting the course of the discus- 
sion of Fallacies. 

I have purposely selected instances from various sub- 
jects, and some from the most important; being con- 



262 APPENDIX. 

vinced that the disregard and contempt with which logi- 
cal studies are usually treated, may be traced, in part, to 
a notion, that the science is incapable of useful applica- 
tion to any matters of real importance, and is merely cal- 
culated to afford an exercise of ingenuity or insignificant 
truisms ; — syllogisms to prove that a horse is an animal, 
and distinctions of the different senses of " canis" or 
" gallus ;" a mistake which is likely to derive some coun- 
tenance (however unfairly) from the exclusive employ- 
ment of such trifling exemplifications. 

The words and phrases which may be employed as 
ambiguous middle terms are of course innumerable: but 
it may be in several respects of service to the learner, to 
explain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently 
occurring in the most important discussions, and whose 
double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked : 
and this, not by entering into an examination .of all the 
senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those 
only which are the most liable to be confounded together. 

It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity 
is the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the 
greatest amount of confusion, of thought and fallacy, are 
among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the 
generality consider there is the least room to doubt. It 
is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger 
arises ; words in very common use are both the most liable, 
from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one 
sense into another, and also the least likely to have that 
ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetu- 
ally mistaken for accurate knowledge. 

It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not 
unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, 
"such an author uses such a word in this or that sense," 
or " means so and so, by this word. " We should not use 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 263 

these expressions,^ (as some have inadvertently done,) in 
reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in 
the author's mind, of the object in question ; of which the 
notions conveyed to others by the word may often fall short ; 
nor again should we regard the sense in which they un- 
derstand him, as necessarily his sense (though it is theirs) 
of the word employed, since they may mistake his meaning ; 
but we must consider what sense it is likely he expected 
and intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed 
himself. And a judicious writer will always expect each 
word to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow, 
in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has estab- 
lished, except so far as he may have given some different 
explanation. But there are many who, from various causes, 
frequently fail of conveying the sense they design. 

It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my read- 
ers; that one who takes pains to ascertain and explain 
the sense of the words employed in any discussion, what- 
ever care he may use to show that what he is inquiring 
after, is the received sense, is yet almost sure to be 
charged, by the inaccurate, and the sophistical, with at- 
tempting to introduce some new sense of the words in 
question, in order to serve a purpose. 

ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been de- 
fined in the foregoing treatise; (Compendium, Book II. 
Ch. iii. § 1 ;) in that sense it includes (as is there remark- 
ed) the Conclusion as well as the Premises : and thus it 
is, that we say a syllogism consists of three propositions ; 
viz. the Conclusion which is proved, as -well as those by 
which it is proved. 

But in ordinary discourse, argument is very often used 
for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Con- 
clusion ; e. g. " the Conclusion w r hich this Argument is 
intended to establish is so and so." 



264 APPENDIX. 

It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly 
speaking, a course or series of such Arguments ; when a 
certain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are 
themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other pro- 
positions, and perhaps those again, by others; the whole 
of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove 
the ultimate conclusion designed to be established ; though 
in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, 
e. g. that we speak of " Warburton's Argument to prove 
the divine legation of Moses," <SfC 

Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be 
properly called a Disputation ; i. e. two trains of argu- 
ment opposed to each other : as when we say that A and 
B had a long Argument on such and such a subject ; and 
that A had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use 
of the word in this sense has contributed to foster the no- 
tion entertained by many, that Logic is the " art of 
wrangling," that it makes men contentious, fyc. : they 
have heard that it is employed about Arguments ; and 
hastily conclude that it is confined to cases where there 
is opposition and contest. 

It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the va- 
rious forms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken 
of as different kinds of Argument : as when we speak of 
a Categorical or Hypothetical Argument, or of one in the 
first or some other figure ; though every logician knows 
that the same individual Argument may be stated in va- 
rious figures, <$fc. 

This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those 
who speak of the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argu 
ment ; and of " Syllogistic Reasoning," as a distinct 
mode of Reasoning, instead of being only a certain form 
of expressing any argument. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 265 

AUTHORITY. — This word is sometimes employed 
in its primary sense when we refer to any one's example, 
testimony, or judgment : as when, e. g. we speak of cor- 
recting a reading in some book, on the Authority of an 
ancient MS. — giving a statement of some fact, on the 
Authority of such and such historians, fyc. 

In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the 
Latin " Auctoritas." 

Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to " Po- 
testas," Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a 
Magistrate, fyc. 

Many instances may be found in which writers have 
unconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another, 
so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas. 
In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened 
than when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church : 
in which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article 
Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Author- 
ity (in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i. e. Universal 
Church, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in 
support of this or that doctrine or practice : and it is, 
justly, supposed that the opinion of the great body of the 
Christian World affords a presumption (though only a pre- 
sumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpreta- 
tion of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any 
ceremony, regulation, fyc. 

On the other hand, each particular Church has Au- 
thority in the^ other sense, viz. Power, over its own mem- 
bers, to enforce any thing not contrary to God's Word. 
But the Catholic or Universal Church, not being one re- 
ligious community on earth, can have no Authority in the 
sense of Power ; since, whatever the Romanists may pre- 
tend, there never was a time when the power of the Pope, 
of a Council, or of any other human Governors, over all 
23 



APPENDIX. 



Christians, was admitted, or could be proved to have any 
just claim to be admitted. 

Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas may have 
every degree of weight, from absolute infallibility, (such 
as, in religious matters, Christians attribute to the Scrip- 
tures,) down to the faintest presumption. See Hawkins 
on Tradition. Hinds's History of the Early Progress of 
Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Er- 
rors of Romanism, Chap. iv. And Essay on the Omis- 
sion of Creeds, fyc. in the New Testament. 

CAtf.—See " May." 

CAPABLE.— See " Possible," " Impossible," and 
" Necessary." 

CASE. — Sometimes Grammarians use this word to 
signify (which is its strict sense) a certain ** variation in 
the writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the rela- 
tion in which it stands to some other part of the sentence ;" 
sometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicat- 
ed by the termination, or by a preposition, or oy its col- 
location ; and there is hardly any writer on the subject 
who does not occasionally employ the term in each sense, 
without explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and 
frivolous debate has hence resulted. Whosover would see 
a specimen of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek 
Grammar; in which the Authors insist on giving the 
Greek language an Ablative case, with the same termi- 
nation, however, as the Dative: (though, by the way, 
they had better have fixed on the Genitive, which oftener 
answers to the Latin Ablative,) urging, and with great 
truth, that if a distinct termination be necessary to con- 
stitute a case, many Latin Nouns will be without an Ab- 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 261 

lative, some without a Genitive or without a Dative, and 
all Neuters without an Accusative. And they add, that 
since it is possible, in every instance, to render into Greek 
the Latin Ablative, consequently there must be an Abla- 
tive in. Greek. If they had known and recollected that 
in the language of Lapland there are, as we are told, thir- 
teen Cases, they would have hesitated to use an argument 
which would prove that there must therefore be thirteen 
Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All this confusion might 
have been avoided, if it had but been observed that the 
word " Case" is used in two senses. 

CAUSE.— Sec " Reason" and "Why." 

CERTAIN. — This is a word whose ambiguity, to- 
gether with that of many others of kindred signification, 
(as ** may," " can," " must," " possible," fyc.) has oc- 
casioned infinite perplexity in discussions on some of the 
most important subjects ; such as the freedom of human 
actions, the divine foreknowledge, fyc. 

In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its ety- 
mology from cerno) to the state of a person's mind; de- 
noting any one's full and complete conviction; and, 
generally, though not always, implying that there is suf- 
ficient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily 
transferred to the truths or events, respecting which this 
conviction is rationally entertained. And Uncertain (as 
well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these 
adjectives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, " it is 
certain that a battle has been fought :" " it is certain 
that the moon will be full on such a day :" "it is uncer- 
tain whether such a one is alive or dead :" " it is uncer- 
tain whether it will rain to-morrow :" meaning, in these 
and in all other cases, that we are certain or uncertain 



268 APPENDIX. 

respectively; not indicating- any difference in the charac- 
ter of the events themselves, except in reference to our 
knowledge respecting them; for the same thing may be, 
at the same time, both certain and uncertain, to different 
individuals ; e. g. the life or death at a particular time, 
of any one, is certain, to his friends on the spot ; uncer- 
tain or contingent, to those at a distance. 

From not attending to this circumstance, the words 
" uncertain" and " contingent" (which is employed near- 
ly in the same sense as "uncertain" in its secondary 
meaning) have been considered by many writers* as de- 
noting some quality in the things themselves ; and have 
thus become involved in endless confusion. " Contin- 
gent" is indeed applied to events only, not to persons : 
but it denotes no quality in the events themselves ; only, 
as has been said, the relation in which they stand to a 
person who has no complete knowledge respecting them. 
It is from overlooking this principle, obvious as it is when 
once distinctly stated, that Chance or Fortune has come 
to be regarded as a real agent, and to have been, by the 
ancients, personified as a Goddess, and represented by 
'statues. 

CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church, 
i. e. the Universal or Catholic Church, — the Society 
comprehending in it all Christians, who are " Members 
one of another," and who compose the Body, of which 

* Among others, Archbishop King, in his discourse on Predestina- 
tion, has fallen into this error : as is explained in the Notes and 
the Appendix to my edition of that work. 

It may be allowable to mention in this place, that I have been 
represented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a 
note to Mr. Davison's work on Prophecy ; through a mistake, which 
the author candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. SCO 

Christ is the Head; which, collectively taken, has no 
visible supreme Head or earthly governor, either indi- 
vidual, or council; and which is one, only in reference 
to its One invisible Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of 
Christ, dwelling in it. See Hinds's History of the Rise 
of Christianity, and Blanco White's Preservative against 
Popery. 

Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church; 
i. e. any one branch of that general Society ; having gov- 
ernors on earth, and existing as a community possessing 
authority over its own members ; in which sense we read 
of the " Seven Churches in Asia;"— of Paul's having 
" the care of all the Churches," fyc. This ambiguity 
has often greatly favored the cause of the Church of 
Rome; which being admitted by her opponents to be a 
Church, i. e. a branch, though an unsound and corrupt 
one, of the universal Church of Christ, is thence as- 
sumed to be the Chureh, — the Society in which all 
men are called upon to enrol themselves. — See the ar^ 
tide " Truth." 

The Church is also not unfrequently used to denote 
the Clergy, in contradistinction to the Laity; as, when 
we speak of any one's being educated for the Church, 
meaning, "for the Ministry." Some would perhaps add 
that it is in this sense we speak of the endowments of the 
Church; since the immediate emolument of these is re- 
ceived by clergymen. But if it be considered that they 
receive it in .the capacity of public instructors and spirit- 
ual pastors, these endowments may fairly be regarded as 
belonging, in a certain sense, to the whole body, for 
whose benefit they are, in this way, calculated; in the 
same manner as we consider, e. g. the endowment of a 
professorship in a university, as a benefaction, not to the 
professors alone, but to the university at large. 



S70 APPENDIX. 

ELECTION. — This is one of the terms which is often 
to all practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed, 
strictly speaking, in two different senses, but with dif- 
ferent applications, according to that which is understood 
in conjunction with it. — See Book III. § 10. See also 
Essays on some of the Difficulties, fyc. Essay III. " On 
Election." 

EXPECT. — This word is liable to an ambiguity, 
which may sometimes lead, in conjunction with othei 
causes, to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used 
in the sense of " anticipate," — " calculate on," fyc. 
(eXtti^w) in short, " consider as probable ;" sometimes 
for " require, or demand as reasonable," — " consider as 
right" (af«w.) 

Thus, I may fairly "expect" (d{io>) that one who has 
received kindness from me, should protect me in dis- 
tress; yet I may have reason to expect (foirigstv) that he 
will not : " England expects every man to do his duty ;" 
but it would be chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a 
universal performance of duty. Hence, when men of 
great revenues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the 
splendor and sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to 
plead that this is expected of them : which is true, in the 
sense that such conduct is anticipated as probable ; not 
true, as implying that it is required or approved. Thus 
\lso, because it would be romantic to expect (i. e calcu- 
late upon) in public men a primary attention to the pub- 
lic good, or in men in general an adherence to the rule 
of doing as you would be done by, many are apt to flat- 
ter themselves that they cannot reasonably be c xpected 
(i. e. fairly called upon) to act on such principles. What 
*iay reasonably be expected (in one sense of the word) 
aust be precisely the practice of the majority; since it 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 271 

is the majority of instances that constitutes probability : 
what may reasonably be expected (in the other sense) is 
something much beyond the practice of the generality ; 
as long at least as it shall be true that "narrow is the 
way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that rind it." 

EXPERIENCE. — This word, in its strict sense, ap- 
plies to what has occurred within a person's own knowl- 
edge. Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to 
the past alone. Thus it is that a man knows by expe- 
rience what sufferings he has undergone in. some disease, 
or what height the tide reached at a certain time and 
place. 

More frequently the word is used to denote that Judg- 
ment which is derived from experience in the primary 
sense, by reasoning from that, in combination with other 
data. Thus, a man may assert, on the ground of Expe- 
rience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medi- 
cine, — that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that 
disorder, — that the tide may always be expected, under 
such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly 
speaking, none of these can be known by Experience, 
but are conclusions derived from Experience. It is in 
this sense ouly that Experience can be applied to the 
future, or, which comes to the same thing, to any general 
fact; as, e. g. when it is said that we know by Expe- 
rience that water exposed to a certain temperature will 
freeze. 

There are again two different applications of the word 
(see Book III. § 10,) which, when not carefully distin 
guished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the 
employment of it in two senses ; viz. we sometimes un- 
derstand our own personal experience ; sometimes, gene- 
ral Experience. Hume has availed himself of this (prac- 



272 APPENDIX. 

tical) ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles ; in which he 
observes, that we have experience of the frequent falsity 
of Testimony, but that the occurrence of a miracle is 
contrary to our Experience, and is consequently what no 
testimony ought to be allowed to establish. Now had he 
explained whose Experience he meant, the argument 
would have come to nothing : if he means the Expe- 
rience of mankind universally, i. e. that a Miracle has 
never come under the Experience of any one, this is pal- 
pably begging the question : if he means the Experience 
of each individual who has never himself witnessed a 
Miracle, this would establish a rule, (viz. that we are to 
believe nothing of which we have not ourselves expe- 
rienced the like,) which it would argue insanity to act 
upon. Not only was the King of Bantam justified (as 
Hume himself admits) in listening to no evidence for the 
existence of Ice, but no one would be authorized on this 
principle to expect his own death. His Experience in- 
forms him, directly, only that others have died. Every 
disease under which he himself may have labored, his Ex- 
perience must have told him has not terminated fatally ; 
if he is to judge strictly of the future by the past, accord- 
ing to this rule, what should hinder him from expecting 
the like of all future diseases % 

Some have never been struck with this consequence 
of Hume's principles ; and some have even failed to per- 
ceive it when pointed out: but if the reader thinks it 
worth his while to consult the author, he will see that 
his principles, according to his own account of them, 
are such as I have stated. 

Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any dis- 
tinct meaning, something intermediate between univer- 
sal, and individual experience; viz. the Experience of 
the generality, as to what is common and of ordinary 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 273 

occurrence ; in which sense the maxim will only amount 
to this, that false Testimony is a thing of common occur- 
rence, and that Miracles are not; an obvious truth, in- 
deed; but too general to authorize, of itself, a conclusion 
in any particular case. In any other individual question, 
as to the admissibility of evidence, it would be reckoned 
absurd to consider merely the average chances for the 
truth of Testimony in the abstract, without inquiring 
what the Testimony is, in the particular instance before 
us. As if, e. g. any one had maintained that no testi- 
mony could establish Columbus's account of the discove- 
ry of America, because it is more common for travellers 
to lie, than for new Continents to be discovered. See 
Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte. 

It is to be observed by the way, that there is yet an 
additional ambiguity in the entire phrase " contrary to 
experience ;" in one sense, a miracle, or any other event, 
may be called contrary to the experience of any one who 
has never witnessed the like ; as the freezing of water was 
to that of the King of Bantam; in another and stricter 
sense, that only is contrary to a man's experience, which 
he knows by experience not to be true ; as if one should 
be told of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he hav- 
ing seen it administered without effect. No testimony 
can establish what is, in this latter sense, contrary to ex- 
perience. We need not wonder that ordinary minds 
should be bewildered by a sophistical employment of 
such a mass of ambiguities. 

Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and 
profound, on account of the Subject on which they are 
employed ; if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they 
would be deemed unworthy of serious notice. 

The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of 
Hume's Essay on Miracles was my object in this Article. 



274 APPENDIX. 

That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the 
way of a " reductio ad absurdum," by mere reference 
to the case of the King of Bantam adduced by the author 
himself. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often 
perhaps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian 
sophist at the expense of those unable to expose its fal- 
lacy, never probably made one convert. The author 
himself seems plainly to have meant it as a specimen of 
his ingenuity in arguing on a given hypothesis; for he 
disputes against miracles as against the Course of Na- 
ture ; whereas, according to him, there is no such thing 
as a Course of Nature; his skepticism extends to the 
whole external world ; — to every thing, except the ideas 
or impressions on the mind of the individual ; so that a 
miracle which is believed, has, in that circumstance 
alone, on his principles, as much reality as any thing 
can have. 

But my object has been to point out, by the use of 
this example, the fallacies and blunders which may re- 
sult from inattention to the ambiguity of the word " Expe- 
rience :" and this cannot be done by a mere indirect ar- 
gument; which refutes indeed, but does not explain, an 
error. 

FALSEHOOD and FALSITY.— See " Truth." 

GOSPEL. — This is instanced as one of the words 
which is practically ambiguous, from its different appli- 
cations, even though not employed (as it sometimes is) 
in different senses. 

Conformably to its etymological meaning of " Good- 
tidings," it is used to signify (and that especially and 
exclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to 
man, as preached by our Lord and his followers. But 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 275 

it was afterwards transitively applied to each of the four 
histories of our Lord's life, published by those who are 
called the Evangelists. And the term is often used to ex- 
press collectively the Gospel-doctrines ; i. e. the instruc- 
tions given men how to avail themselves of the offer of 
salvation; and preaching the Gospel, is accordingly 
often used to include, not only the proclaiming of the 
good tidings, but the teaching of what is to be believed 
and done, in consequence. This ambiguity is one source 
of some important theological errors: many supposing 
that Gospel truth is to be found exclusively, or chief- 
ly, in the Gospels; to the neglect of the other Sacred 
Writings. 

Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the " Gos- 
pel," and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclu- 
sion is often hence drawn, that the discourses of our 
Lord and the Apostolic Epistles must exactly coincide; 
and that in case of any apparent difference, the former 
must be the standard, and the latter must be taken to 
bear no other sense than what is implied by the other ; 
a notion which leads inevitably and immediately to the 
neglect of the Apostolic Epistles, when every thing they 
contain must be limited and modified into a complete 
coincidence Avith our Lord's Discourses. Whereas it is 
very conceivable, that though both might be in a certain 
sense " good tidings," yet one may contain a much more 
full development of the Christian scheme than the other ; 
which is confirmed by the consideration, that the prin- 
cipal events on which the Religion is founded (the 
atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ) had not 
taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our Lord, 
when he preached, saying, " the Kingdom of Heaven is 
at hand ;" not that it was actually established ; as it was, 
when his Apostles were sent forth to preach to all na- 
tions. See Essays on the Difficulties, S^c. Essay II. 



276 APPENDIX. 

HENCE.— See " Reason" and "Why." 

IDENTICAL.— See " One" and "Same." 

IMPOSSIBILITY.— According to the definition we 
may choose to give of this word, it may be said either 
that there are three Species of it, or that it may be used 
in three different senses. 1st. What may be called a 
mathematical impossibility, is that which involves an ab- 
surdity and self-contradiction : e. g. that two straight 
lines should enclose a space, is not only impossible, but 
inconceivable, as it would be at variance with the defi- 
nition of a straight line. And it should be observed, 
that inability to accomplish any thing which is, in this 
sense, impossible, implies no limitation of power, and is 
compatible, even with omnipotence, in the fullest sense 
of the word. If it be proposed, e. g. to construct a tri- 
angle having one of its sides equal to the other two, or 
to find two numbers having the same ratio to each other, 
as the side of a square and its diameter, it ^s not from a 
defect of power that we are precluded from solving such 
a problem as these ; since in fact the problem is in itself 
unmeaning and absurd : it is, in reality, nothing, that Is 
required to be done. 

2dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is 
something at variance with the existing Laws of Nature, 
and which consequently no Being, subject to those Laws, 
(as we are) can surmount ; but we can easily conceive a 
Being capable of bringing about what in the ordinary 
course of Nature is impossible: e. g. to multiply five 
loaves into food for a multitude, or to walk on the sur- 
face of the waves, are things physically impossible, but 
imply no contradiction ; on the contrary, we cannot but 
suppose that the Being, if there be such a one, who 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 277 

created the Universe, is able to alter at will the proper- 
ties of any of the Substances it contains.* 

And an occurrence of this character we call miracu- 
lous. Not but that one person may perform without su- 
pernatural power what is, to another, physically impossi- 
ble ; as, e. g. a man may lift a great weight, which it would 
be physically impossible for a child to raise; because it 
is contrary to the Laws of Nature that a muscle of this 
degree of strength should overcome a resistance which 
one of that degree is equal to. But if any one perform 
what is beyond the natural powers of man universally, 
he has performed a miracle. Much Sophistry has been 
founded on the neglect of the distinction between these 
two senses. It has even been contended, that no evi- 
dence ought to induce a man of sense to admit that a 
miracle has taken place, on the ground that it is a thing 
impossible ; in other words, that it is a miracle ; for if it 
were not a thing impossible to man, there would be no 
miracle in the case: so that such an argument is palpa- 
bly begging the question ; but it has often probably been 
admitted from an indistinct notion being suggested of 
Impossibility in the first sense ; in which sense {viz. that 
of self-contradiction) no evidence certainly would justify 
belief. 

3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high de- 
gree of improbability which leaves no room for doubt. In 
this sense we often call a thing impossible, which implies 
no contradiction, or any violation of the Laws of Nature, 
but which yet we are rationally convinced will never oc- 
cur, merely from the multitude of chances against it; as, 
c. g. that unloaded dice should turn up the same faces 

* See an able disquisition on Miracles, subjoined to the Life of 
Apolonious Tyanaeus, in the Encyclopedia Metropolitans, 
24 



278 APPENDIX. 



one hundred times successively. And in this sense, we 
cannot accurately draw the line, so as to determine at 
what point the improbability amounts to an Impossibility ; 
and hence we often have occasion to speak of this or that 
as almost impossible, though not quite, §c. The other 
Impossibilities do not admit of degrees. That a certain 
throw should recur two or three times successively, we 
should not call very improbable; the improbability is in- 
creased at each successive step ; but we cannot say ex- 
actly when it becomes impossible ; though no one would 
scruple to call one hundred such recurrences impossible. 

In the same sense we often call things impossible which 
are completely within the power of known agents to bring 
about, but which we are convinced no one of them ever 
will bring about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people 
in the world should with one accord forsake their habita- 
tions and wander about the world as savages, every one 
would call an impossibility ; though it is plain they have 
the power to do so, and that it depends on their choice 
which they will do. In like manner, if we were told of a 
man's having disgracefully fled from his post, whom we 
knew to be possessed of the most undaunted courage, we 
should without scruple (and with good reason, supposing 
the idea formed of his character to be a just one) pro- 
nounce this an Impossibility ; meaning that there is suf- 
ficient ground for being fully convinced that the thing 
could never take place ; not from any idea of his not hav- 
ing povier and liberty to fly if he would ; for our certain- 
ty is built on the very circumstance of his being free to 
act as he will, together with his being of such a disposi- 
tion as never to have the will to act disgracefully. If, 
again, a man were bound hand and foot, it would be, in 
the other sense, impossible for him to fly; viz. out of his 
poicer. " Capable" has a corresponding ambiguity. 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 279 

The performance of any thing that is morally impossible 
to a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if 
the impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally im- 
possible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such 
a scheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel 
exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell 
distant and improbable future events with the exactitude of 
many of the prophecies in the Old Testament. 

Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, 
and has interminably protracted the discussions respect- 
ing the long-agitated question of human freedom, has 
arisen from inattention to the ambiguity which has been 
here noticed. If the Deity, it is said, " foresees exactly 
what I shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for 
me to act otherwise;" and thence it is inferred that 
man's actions cannot be free. The middle term employ- 
ed in such an argument as this is "impossible," or "im- 
possibility" employed in two senses: he to whom it is in 
one sense impossible, (viz. physically,) to act otherwise 
than he does, (i. e. who has it not in his power,) is not a 
free agent; correct foreknowledge implies impossibility 
in another sense, viz. moral impossibility; — the absence 
of all room for doubt* And the perplexity is aggravated 
by resorting, for the purpose of explanation, to such 
words as " may," " can," " possible," " must," tyc, all 

* It should be observed, that many things which are not usually 
termed " mathematically" necessary or impossible, will at once ap- 
pear such when stated, not abstractedly, but with all their real cir- 
cumstances : e. g. that " Brutus stabbed Caesar," is a fact, the denial 
of which, though a falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contra- 
dictory, (like the denial of the equality of two right angles ;) because, 
abstractedly, we can conceive Brutus acting otherwise : but if we {in- 
sert the circumstances (which of course really existed) of his having 
complete power, liberty, and also a predominant will, to do so, then, 
the denial of the action amounts to a " mathematical" impossibility, 



280 APPENDIX. 

of which are affected by a corresponding ambiguity. 
(See Tucker's Light of Nature, in the Chapters on Prov- 
idence, on Free-will, and some others.) I have endeav- 
oured to condense and to simplify some of the most 
valuable parts of his reasonings in the notes and appen- 
dix to an edition of Archbishop King's Discourse on Pre- 
destination. 

1 INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the 
Will, and of the Judgment, is subject to an ambiguity 
which some of my readers may perhaps think hardly 
worth noticing; the distinction between unbiassed candor 
and impartiality, on the one side, and carelessness on the 
other, being so very obvious. But these two things nev- 
ertheless have been, from their bearing the same name, 
confounded together ; or at least represented as insepara- 
bly connected. I have known a person maintain, with 
some plausibility, the inexpediency, with a view to the 
attainment of truth, of educating people, or appointing 
teachers to instruct them, in any particular systems or 
theories, of astronomy, medicine, religion, politics, <SfC, on 
the ground, that a man must tois h to believe and to find 
good reasons for believing, the system in which he has been 
trained, and which he has been engaged in teaching ; and 
this wish must prejudice his understanding in favour of it, 
and consequently render him an incompetent judge of truth. 
Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as 
this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the am- 
biguity of the word " Indifference, " and others connected 
with it. For it would follow, from such a principle, that 

or self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily against the dictates of a 
predominant will, implies an effect without a cause. 

Of future events, that Being, and no other, can have the same 
knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the causes, re- 
mote or immediate, internal and external, on which each depends. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 281 

no physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in 
a certain mode of treating any disorder, because he must 
wish to think the theory correct which he has learned : 
nay, no physician should be trusted who is not utterly in- 
different whether his patient recovers or dies; since else, 
he must wish to find reasons for hoping favorably from 
the mode of treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit 
of the public, proposed by a 'philanthropist, should be 
listened to ; since such a man cannot but wish it may be 
successful; §c. 

No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclina- 
tions; but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, 
to guard against this bias.* If a scheme be proposed to 
any one for embarking his capital in some speculation 
which promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to 
find that the expectations held out are well-founded: but 
every one would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) 
he should suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and 

* It is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation of this 
bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, in opposite 
cases. Such writers, e. g. as I have just alluded to, disparage the 
judgment of those who have been accustomed to study and to teach 
the Christian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it ; 
on the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be ad- 
mitted that their authority shall go for nothing ; and that the ques- 
tion shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced. But then, on the 
yame principle, how strong must be the testimony of the multitudes 
who admit the truth of Christianity, but to whom it is a source of un- 
easiness or of dismay : who have not adopted any antinomian system 
to quiet their conscience while leading an unchristian life ; but, when 
they hear of " righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, 
tremble," and try to dismiss such thoughts till a more convenient 
season. The case of these, who have every reason to wish Christi- 
anity untrue, is passed by, by the very same persons who are insist- 
ing on the influence of the opposite bias. According to the homely 
but expressive proverb, they are " deaf on one ear." 
24* 



282 APPENDIX. 

should believe, on insufficient grounds, the fair promises 
held out to him. But we should not think such impru- 
dence an inevitable consequence of his desire to increase 
his property. His wishes, Ave should say, were both nat- 
ural and wise ; but since they could not render the event 
more probable, it was most unwise to allow them to influ- 
ence his decision. In like manner, a good man will in- 
deed wish to find the evidence of the Christian religion 
satisfactory; but a wise man does not for that reason 
take for granted that it is satisfactory ; but weighs the 
evidence the more carefully on account of the importance 
of the question. 

And it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to 
suppose that the bias is always in favour of the conclu- 
sion wished for: it is often in the contrary direction. 
The proverbial expression of " too good news to be true," 
bears witness to the existence of this feeling. There is 
in some minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases 
where their wishes are strong ; — a morbid distrust of ev- 
idence which they are especially anxious to find conclu- 
sive : &. g. groundless fears for the health or safety of an 
ardently-beloved child, will frequently distress anxious 
parents. 

Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the 
state of health of each individual) lead towards these op- 
posite miscalculations, — the over-estimate or under-esti- 
mate of the reasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to 
find true. 

Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and 
to decide according to the evidence ; preserving the In- 
difference of the Judgment, even where the Will neither 
can, nor should be indifferent. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 283 

LAW is, etymologically, that which is " laid " down ; 
and is, used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify some 
general injunction, command, or regulation, addressed 
to certain Persons, who are called upon to conform to it. 
It is in this sense that we speak of " the Law of Moses," 
" the Law of the Land," &c. 

It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the 
statement of some general fact, the several individual in- 
stances of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, 
analogous to the conduct of persons in respect to a Law 
which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak of 
" the Laws of Nature :" when we say that " a seed in 
vegetating directs the radicle downwards and the plumule 
upwards, in compliance with a Law of Nature," we only 
mean that such is universally the fact ; and so, in other 
cases. 

It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformi- 
ty of individual cases to the general rule is that which 
constitutes a Law of Nature. If water should henceforth 
never become solid, at any temperature, then the freez- 
ing of water would no longer be a Law of Nature : where- 
as in the other sense, a Law is not the more or the less a 
Law from the conformity or non-conformity of individu- 
als to it : if an ret of our Legislature were to be disobey- 
ed and utterly disregarded by every one, it would not on 
that account be the less a Law. 

This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly 
stated, as hardly to need mention : yet writers of great 
note and ability have confounded these two senses to- 
gether; I need only mention Hooker (in the opening of 
his great work) and Montesquieu: the latter of whom 
declaims on the much stricter observance in the Uni- 
verse of the Laws of Nature, than in mankind, of the 
divine and human laws laid down for their conduct: 



284 APPENDIX. 

not considering that, in the former case, it is the observ- 
ance that constitutes the Law. 

MAY, and likewise MUST and CAN, (as well as 
CANNOT,) are each used in two senses, which are very 
often confounded together. They relate sometimes to 
Poioer, sometimes to Contingency. 

When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum 
of money, " now he may purchase the field he was wish- 
ing for," we mean that it is in his power ; it is plain that 
he may, in the same sense, hoard up the money, or spend 
it on something else; though perhaps we are quite sure, 
from our knowledge of his character and situation, that 
he will not. When again we say, " it may rain to-mor- 
row," or "the vessel may have arrived in port," the ex- 
pression does not at all relate to power, but merely to 
contingency: i. e. we mean, that though we are not 
sure such an event will happen or has happened, we are 
not sure of the reverse. 

When, again, we say "this man, of so grateful a 
disposition, must have eagerly embraced such an op- 
portunity of requiting his benefactor," or " one who 
approves of the slave-trade must be very hard-hearted," 
we only mean to imply the absence of all doubt on these 
points. The very notions of gratitude and of hard- 
heartedness exclude the idea of compulsion. But when 
Ave say that " all men must die," or that " a man must 
go to prison who is dragged by force," we mean " wheth- 
er they will or not" — that there is no power to resist. 
So also if we say that a Being of perfect goodness " can- 
not" act wrong, we do not mean that it is out of his 
power ; since that would imply no goodness of character » 
but that there is sufficient reason for feeling sure that 
he will not. It is in a very different sense that we say of 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 285 

a man fettered in a prison, that he " cannot" escape : 
meaning, that though he has the will, he wants the 



These words are commonly introduced, in questions 
connected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human 
actions, to explain the meaning of " necessary," " im- 
possible," Sfc. ; and having themselves a corresponding 
ambiguity, they only tend to increase the perplexity. 

" Chaos umpire sits, 

And by deciding worse embroils the fray." 

MUST.— See " May." 

NECESSARY. — This word is used as the contrary 
to " impossible" in all its senses, and is of course liable 
to a corresponding ambiguity. Thus it is " mathemati- 
cally Necessary" that two sides of a triangle should be 
greater than the third ; there is a " physical Necessity" 
for the fall of a stone ; and a " moral Necessity" that a 
Being of a certain character should act, when left per- 
fectly free, conformably to that character; i. e. we are 
sure he will act so ; though of course it is in his power 
to act otherwise; else there would be no moral agency.* 
This ambiguity is employed sophistically to justify im- 
moral conduct ; since no one is responsible for any thing 
done under " necessity, " — i. e. physical necessity ; as 
when a man is dragged any where by external force, or 
falls down froin being too weak to stand ; and then the 
same excuse is fallaciously extended to " moral necessi- 
ty" also. 

There are likewise numberless different applications 
of the word " necessary" (as well as of those derived 

* See the article " Impossibility ;" note, 



286 APPENDIX. 

from it) in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the 
difference of the things understood in conjunction with 
it : e. g. food is " necessary" viz. — to life : great 
wealth is " necessary" — to the gratification of a man 
of luxurious habits; the violation of moral duty is in 
many cases "necessary" — for the attainment of certain 
worldly objects ; the renunciation of such objects, and 
subjugation of the desires is " necessary" — to the 
attainment of the Gospel-promises, Spc. And thus it is 
that " necessity" has come to be " the tyrant's plea ;" 
for as no one is at all responsible for what is a matter of 
physical necessity, — what he has no power to avoid, — 
so, a degree of allowance is made for a man's doing 
what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be the 
least of two evils ; as, e. g. when a man who is famish- 
ing takes the first food he meets with, as " necessary" 
to support life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it 
is " necessary," in order to save the ship. But if the 
plea of necessity be admitted without inquiring for what 
the act in question is necessary, any thing whatever may 
be thus vindicated ; since no one commits any crime 
which is not, in his view, " necessary" to the attain- 
ment of some supposed advantage or gratification. 

The confusion of thought is further increased by the 
employment on improper occasions of the phrase " abso- 
lutely necessary;" which, strictly speaking, denotes a 
case in which there is no possible alternative. It is 
necessary for a man's safety, that he should remain in a 
house which he cannot quit without incurring danger : 
it is absolutely, or simply, necessary that he should re- 
main there, if he is closely imprisoned in it. 

I have treated more fully on this fruitful source of 
sophistry in the Appendix (No. 1.) to King's "Discourse 
on Predestination." In the course of it, I suggested an 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 267 

etymology of the word, which I have reason to think is 
not correct ; but it should be observed, that this makes 
no difference in the reasoning, which is not in any de- 
gree founded on that etymology ; nor have I, as some 
have represented, attempted to introduce any new or un- 
usual sense of the word, but have all along appealed to 
common use, — the only right standard, — and merely 
pointed out the senses in which each word has actually 
been employed. See the introduction to this Appendix. 

OLD. — This word, in its strict and primary sense, de- 
notes the length of time that any object has existed; and 
many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in 
any other. It is, however, very frequently employed in- 
stead of " Ancient," to denote distance of time. The 
same transition seems to have taken place in Latin. 
Horace says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient 
Roman authors, but who did not live to be old — 

■" quo fit ut omnis 



Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella 
Vita Senis." 

The present is a remarkable instance of the influence of 
an ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who 
are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully 
on the watch against its effects ; the impressions and 
ideas associated by habit with the word when used in 
one sense, being always apt to obtrude themselves una- 
wares when it is employed in another sense, and thus to 
affect our reasonings : e. g. " Old times," — " the Old 
World," §c. are expressions in frequent use, and wh*ch, 
oftener than not, produce imperceptibly the associated 
impression of the superior wisdom resulting from expe- 
rience, which, as a general rule, we attribute to Old men. 



288 APPENDIX. 

Yet no one is really ignorant that the world is older now 
than ever it was ; and that the instruction to he derived 
from observations on the past (which is the advantage 
that Old persons possess) must be greater, supposing 
other things equal, to every successive generation : and 
Bacon's remark to this purpose appears, as soon as dis- 
tinctly stated, a mere truism; yet few, perhaps, that he 
made, are more important. There is always a tendency 
to appeal with the same kind of deference, to the authority 
of " Old times," as of aged men. 

It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient cus- 
toms, institutions, Sfc. when they still exist, may be literal- 
ly called Old ; and have this advantage attending them, 
that their effects may be estimated from long experience ; 
whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-es- 
tablished Law or System, whether it may not produce in 
time some effects which were not originally contemplated. 

ONE — is sometimes employed to denote strict and 
proper numerical Unity, sometimes, close resemblance ; 
— correspondence with one single description. — See 
" Same." 

" Facies non omnibus UNA, 



Nee diversa tamen ; qualem decet esse sororum." 

Ov. Metam. b. ii. 

It is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and 
proper sense of this word, that men are exhorted to "be 
of one mind ;" i. e. to agree in their faith, pursuits, mu- 
tual affections, fyc. 

It is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck 
from a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be " of 
one and the same form and weight," and also, " of one 
and the same substance." In this secondary or im- 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 289 

proper sense also, a child is said to be " of one and the 
same (bodily) substance with its mother :" or simply 
" of the substance of its mother :" for these two pieces 
of money, and two human Beings, are numerically distinct. 
It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, 
and to explain on proper occasions, these different uses 
of the word ; lest men should insensibly slide into error 
on the most important of all subjects, by applying, in the 
secondary sense, expressions which ought to be under- 
stood in the primary and proper. — See " Person." 

PERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, invariably 
implies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is 
one person, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar 
theological sense, in which we speak of the " three Per- 
sons" of the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus em- 
ployed by our Divines as a literal, or perhaps etymologi- 
cal, rendering of the Latin word " Persona." I am in- 
clined to think, however, from the language of Wallis 
(the Mathematician and Logician) in the following ex- 
tract, as well as from that of some other of our older 
writers, that the English word " Person" was formerly not 
so strictly confined as now, to the sense it bears in com- 
mon conversation among us. 

'•' That which makes these expressions" (viz. respecting the 
Trinity) " seem harsh to some of these men, is because they 
have used themselves to fancy .that notion only of the word 
Person, according to which three men are accounted to be 
three persons, and these three persons to be three men. But 
he may consider that there is another notion of the word Per- 
son, and in common use too, wherein the same man may be 
said to sustain divers persons, and those persons to be the same 

* Most of the following observations will apply to the word " Per- 
sonality." 

25 



290 APPENDIX. 

man: that is, the same man as sustaining divers capacities. 
As was said but now of Tully, TVes Personas Unus sustineo ; 
meam, adversarii, judicis. And then it will seem no more 
harsh to say, The three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, 
are one God, than to say, God the Creator, God the Redeem- 
er, and God the Sanctifier, are one God it is much 

the same thing whether of the two forms we use." — Letters 
an the Trinity, p. 63. 

" The word Person {persona) is originally a Latin word, and 
doth not properly signify a Man, (so that another person must 
needs imply another man,) for then the word Homo would have 
served, and they needed not have taken in the word Persona ; 
but rather, one so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if 
considered in other circumstances (considerably different) is 
reputed another person. And that this is the true notion of the 
word Person, appears by those noted phrases, personam induere, 
personam dcponere, personam dgere, and many the like in ap- 
proved Latin authors. Thus the same man may at once sus- 
tain the Person of a King and a Father, if he be invested 
both with regal and paternal authority. Now because the King 
and the Father are for the most part not only different persons, 
but different men also, (and the like in other cases,) hence it 
comes to pass that another Person is sometimes supposed to im- 
ply another man; but not ulways, nor is that the proper sense 
of the word. It is Englished in our dictionaries by the state, 
quality, or condition, whereby one man differs from another ; and - 
§o, as the condition alters, the Person alters, though the man 
be the same. 

" The hinge of the controversy is that notion concerning 
the three somcwhals, which the Fathers "(who first used it) did 
intend to design by the name Person-, so that we are not from 
the word Person to determine what was that Notion; but from 
that Notion which they would express, to determine, in what 
sense the word Person is here used," tyc. fyc. — Letter V. in 
Answer to the Arian's Vindication* 



* Dr. Wallis's theological works, considering his general celebrity, 
ire wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, in his day, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 291 

What was precisely the notion which these Latin 
Fathers intended to convey, and how far it approached 
the classical signification of the word " Persona," it may 
not be easy to determine. But we must presume that 
they did not intend to employ it in what is, now, the ordi- 
nary sense of the word Person ; both because " Persona" 
never, I believe, bore that sense in pure Latinity, and 
also because it is evident that, in that sense, "three di- 
vine Persons" would have been exactly equivalent to 
" three Gods ;" a meaning which the orthodox always 
disavowed. 

It is probable that they had nearly the same view with 
which the Greek theologians adopted the word " Hypos- 
tasis ;" which seems calculated to express " that which 
stands under (i. e. is the subject of) Attributes." They 
meant, it may be presumed, to guard against the sus- 
picion of teaching, on the one hand, that there are three 
Gods, or three Parts of the one God; or, on the other 
hand, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are no more than 
three Names, all of the same signification ; and they 
employed accordingly a term which might serve to de- 
note, that (though divine Attributes belong to all and 
each of these, yet) there are Attributes of each, respec- 
tively, which are not so , strictly applicable to either of 

one of the ablest Defenders of the Church's doctrine, against the 
Arians and Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the 
censure, not only of them, but of all who, though not professedly 
Arian, gave such an exposition of the doctrine as amounts virtually 
to Tritheism. I beg to be understood, however, as not demanding 
an implicit deference for his, or for any other human authority, how- 
ever eminent. We are taught to " call no man Master on earth." 
But the reference to Dr. Wallis may serve both to show the use of 
the word in his days, and to correct the notion, should any have 
entertained it, that the views of the subject here taken are, in our 
Clhurch, any thing novel. 



292 APPENDIX. 

the others, as such ; as when, for instance^ the Son is 
called especially the " Redeemer," and the Holy Spirit, 
the " Comforter or Paraclete," tyc. The notion thus 
conveyed is indeed very faint and imperfect ; but is per- 
haps for that very reason, (considering what Man is, and 
what God is,) the less likely to lead to error. One may 
convey to a blind man, a notion of seeing, correct as far 
as it goes, and instructive to him, though very imperfect : 
if he form a more full and distinct notion of it, his ideas 
will inevitably be incorrect, — See Essay VII. § 5, Second 
Series.* 

It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in ren- 
dering the Latin " Persona," used the word Person, 
whose ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs 
in a most important point from the theological sense, and 
yet is not so remote from it as to preclude all mistake 
and perplexity. If " Hypostasis," or any other complete- 
ly foreign term, had been used instead, no idea at all 
would have been conveyed except that of the explanation 
given ; and thus the danger at least of being misled by 
a word, would have been avoided.! 

Our Reformers however did not introduce the word 
into their Catechism ; though it has been (I must think, 
injudiciously) employed in some popular expositions of 
the Catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion 
to. its being used in a peculiar sense. 

* It is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance 
to be placed on etymology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that 
" Hypostasis," " Substantia," and " Understanding," so widely dif- 
ferent in their sense, correspond in their etymology. 

1 1 wish it to be observed, that it is the ambiguity of the word Per- 
son which renders it objectionable ; not, its being nowhere employed 
in Scripture in the technical sense of theologians ; for this circum- 
stance is rather an advantage. — See Essay VI. (Second Series,) 
§4, note* 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 293 

As it is, the danger of being not merely not under- 
stood, but wmunderstood, should be guarded against most 
sedulously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of er- 
ror, but to inculcate important truth ; by seldom or never 
employing this ambiguous word without some explanation 
or caution. For if we employ, without any such care, 
terms which we must be sensible are likely to mislead, at 
least the unlearned and the unthinking, we cannot stand 
acquitted on the plea of not having directly inculcated 
error. 

I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, 
may be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It 
is not wonderful that some should be led to renounce a 
doctrine, which, through the ambiguity in question, may 
be represented to them as involving a self-contradiction 
or as leading to Tritheism ; — that others should insen- 
sibly slide into this very error ; — or that many more 
(which I know to be no uncommon case) should for fear 
of that error, deliberately, and on principle, keep the 
doctrine of the Trinity out of their thoughts, as a point 
of speculative belief, to which they have assented once 
for all, but which they find it dangerous to . dwell on ; 
though it is in fact the very faith into which,* by our 
Lord's appointment, we are baptized. 

Nor should those who do understand, or at least have 
once understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satis- 
fied that they are thenceforward safe from all danger in 
that quarter. It should be remembered that the thoughts 
are habitually influenced, through the force of associa- 
tion, by the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any word 
to the mind of those who are not - especially on their 
guard against it. See "Fallacies," $ 5.f 

* «s to ovofia " into the Name ;" not " in the Name." Matt, xxviii. 19, 
+ The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is 
25* 



294 APPENDIX. 

Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God, 
of itself a sufficient safeguard ; since, from the addition- 
al ambiguities of " One" and " Unity," (noticed in the 
preceding Article,) we may gradually fall into the notion 
of a merely figurative Unity; such as Unity of substance 
merely, (see the preceding Article,) — Unity of purpose, — 
concert of action, fyc, such as is often denoted by the 
phrase " one mind." See " Same," in this appendix, 
and " Dissertation," Book IV. Chap. v. 

When however I speak of the necessity of explanations, 
the reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, 
not explanations of the nature of the Deity, but, of our own 
use of words. On the one hand we must not content 
ourselves with merely saying that the whole subject is 
mysterious and must not be too nicely pried into; while 
we neglect to notice the distinction between divine reve- 
lations, and human explanations of them; — between M- 
quiries into the mysteries of the Divine nature, and into 
the mysteries arising from the ambiguities of language, 
and of a language too, adopted by uninspired men. For, 
whatever Scripture declares, the Christian is bound to 
receive implicitly, however unable to understand it: but 
to claim an uninquiring assent to expressions of man's fram- 
ing, (however judiciously framed,) without even an at- 



not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the habit- 
ual impressions on the mind. Romanists natter themselves that they 
are safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge the 
truth, that " God only is to be served ;" viz. with " Latria ;" though 
they allow Adoration, (" hyperdulia" and " dulia") to the Virgin 
and other Saints, — to Images,— and to Relics : to which it has 
been justly replied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself, it 
-would be, in practice, nugatory ; since the mass of the people must 
soon, (as experience proves) lose sight of it entirely in their habitual 
devotions. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 295 

tempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one of the 
worst errors of the Romanists. 

On the other hand, to require explanations of what God 
is in Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of 
the human faculties, and foreign from the apparent de- 
sign of Scripture-revelation;* which seems to be, chiefly, 
if not wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among 
the essential articles of faith,) with a view to our practical 
benefit, and to the influencing of our feelings and con- 
duct, not so much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, 
what He is relatively to us. Scripture teaches us (and 
our Church-Catechism directs our attention to these points) 
to "believe in God, who, as the Father, hath made us 
and all the World, — as the Son, hath redeemed us and 
all mankind, — as the Holy Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all 
the elect people of God."f And this distinction is, as I 
have said, pointed out in the very form of Baptism. 
Nothing indeed can be more decidedly established by 
Scripture, — nothing more indistinctly explained (except 
as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of the Trinity ; % 
nor are we perhaps capable, with our present faculties, 
of comprehending it more fully. 

* In. these matters our inquiry, at least our first inquiry, should 
always be, what is revealed : nor if any one refuses to adopt as an 
article of faith, this or that exposition, should he be understood as 
necessarily maintaining its falsity. For we are sure that there must 
be many truths relative to the Deity, which we have no means of 
ascertaining : nor does it follow that even every truth which can be 
ascertained, must be a part of the essential faith of a Christian. 

t Hawkins's Manual, p. 12. 

t Compare together, for instance, such passages as the following, 
for it is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on 
insulated texts, that the Word of God is to be rightly understood: 
Luke i. 35, and John xiv. 9 ; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 
20 ; John xvi. 7, Coloss. ii. 9; Philipp. i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19 ; Matt. x. 
20, and John xiv. 23. 



296 APPENDIX. 

And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such in- 
structions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, 
it seems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this 
our state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects 
in which even the ablest of human minds can but " see 
through a glass, darkly." On these, the Learned can have 
no advantage over others ; though we are apt to forget that 
any mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, — sur- 
passing the utmost reach of human intellect, — must be such 
to the learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the 
simple alike ; — that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, 
and the weakest, are on a level.* 



* tl Sir, m these matters," (said one of the most eminent of our 
Reformers, respecting another mysterious point,) "I am so fearful, that 
I dare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scrip- 
ture doth as it were lead me by the hand" 

And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take it 
for 3. guide, than to resort to it merely for confirmations, contained in 
detached texts, of the several parts of some System of Theology, 
which the student fixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact 
made the guide which he permits to " lead him by the hand ;" while 
passages culled out from various parts of the Sacred Writings in sub- 
serviency to such system, are formed into what may be called an 
anagram of Scripture : and then, by reference to this system as a stan- 
dard, each doctrine or discourse is readily pronounced Orthodox, or 
Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or Nestorian, <$*c. ; and all this, on the 
ground that the theological scheme which the student has adopted, is 
supported by Scripture. The materials indeed are the stones of the 
Temple; but the building constructed with them is a fabric of human 
contrivance. If instead of this, too common, procedure, students would 
fairly search the Scriptures with a view not merely to defend then- 
opinions, but to form them,— not merelyfor arguments but for truth — 
keeping human expositions to their own proper purposes, [See Essay VI. 
First Series,] and not allowing these to become, practically, a stan-= 
dard,— if, in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on the side of 
Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on their side, how 
much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their conclusions 
often be ! 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 297 

With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded 

to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and 

indeed during, the Apostolical times,* seem to have been 

alike chargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the 

particular explanations adopted by each: 

" Unus utrique 
Error; sed variis illudit partibus." 

The Gnostics! introduced a theory of iEons, or sue 
cessive emanations from the divine " Pleroma" or Ful 
ness ; one of whom was Christ, and became incarnate in 
the man Jesus. J The Sabellians are reported to have 
described Christ as bearing the same relation to the Father, 
as the illuminating (^rto-rt/cov) quality, does to the Sun ; 
while the Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming 
quality (Oa\-dv : ) or again, the Three as corresponding 
to the Body, Soul, and Spirit of a man; or again, to 
Substance, — Thought or Reason, — and Will or Action. 
The Arians again appear to have introduced in reality 
three Gods; the Son and the Holy Spirit, created Be- 
ings, but with a certain imparted divinity. The Nesto- 
rians and Eutychians, gave opposite, but equally fanciful 
and equally presumptuous explanations of the Incarna- 
tion, §c. tyc. 

*It is important to remember,— what we are very liable to lose sight 
of,— the circumstance, that not only there arose grievous errors during 
the time of the Apostles, and consequently such were likely to exist in 
the times immediately following, but also that when these inspired 
guides were removed, there was no longer the same infallible authority to 
decide what was error. In the absence of such a guide, some errors 
might be received as orthodox, and some sound doctrines be condemned 
as heterodox. 

f Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but 
those of their opponents ; which however we may presume to contain 
more or less of approximation to what was really maintained. 

t These heretics appear to have split into many different sects, teach- 
ing various modifications of the same absurdities.— See Burton's Bamp- 
ton Lectures. 



298 APPENDIX. 

Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, alto- 
gether exempt from the same fault of presumptuous specu- 
lation. " Who," says Chrysostom, " was he to whom God 

said, Let us make man ? who but he the Son of 

God ?" And Epiphanius, on the same passage, says, " this 
is the language of God to his Word." Each of these 
writers, it may be observed, in representing God (under 
that title) as addressing Himself to the Son as to a dis- 
tinct Being previously to the birth of Jesus on earth, ap- 
proaches very closely to the Arian tritheism. And Justin 
Martyr in a similar tone, expressly speaks of God as 
" One, not in number, but in judgment or designs."* I 
will not say that such passages as these may not be so in- 
terpreted as to exclude both the Arian and every other 
form of tritheism ; but it is a dangerous thing, to use (and 
that, not in the heat of declamation, but in a professed 
exposition) language of such a nature that it is a mere 
chance whether it may not lead into the most unscriptural 
errors. If the early writers had not been habitually very 
incautious in this point, that could hardly have taken 
place which is recorded respecting the council held at 
Rimini, (a. d. 360,) in which a Confession of Faith was 
agreed upon, which the Arians soon after boasted of as 
sanctioning their doctrine, and " the Church," we are told, 
"was astonished to find itself unexpectedly become Arian." f 

The fact is, that numberless writers, both of those whc 
were, and who were not, accounted heretics, being displeased, 
and justly, with one another's explanations of the mode of 
existence of the Deity, instead of taking warning aright 



* Ovtos ytypanfiivog Qcvs erepos irn rov ra navra iroii}<ravTOS Qeov, 

dpidfjioj Myw, dXX' ov yvo>yr\ ; <$~C. 

t See Essay VI. (Second Series) § 2. Note b, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 299 

from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, the reme- 
dy, in some other explanation instead, concerning matters 
unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found nothing 
to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and indis- 
tinct, though decisive, declarations of Scripture, that " God 
was in Christ, reconciling the World unto Himself;" — 
that " in Him dwelleth all the Fulness of the Godhead, 
bodily ;" — that " it is God that worketh in us both to will 
and to do of his good pleasure ;" — that if we " keep 
Christ's saying, He dwelleth in us, and we in Him ;" — 
that " if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is 
none of his;" — and that "the Lord is the Spirit," fyc* 
They wanted something more full, and more philosophi- 
cal, than all this ; and their theology accordingly was 
" spoiled, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the 
tradition of men, after the rudiments of the World, and 
not after Christ." Hostile as they were to each other, 
the grand mistake in principle was common to many of 
all parties. 

And in latter ages the Schoolmen kept up the same 
Spirit, and even transmitted it to protestants. " Theology 
teaches," (says a passage in a Protestant work,) "that 
there is in God, one Essence, two Processions, three Per- 
sons, four Relations, five Notions, and the Circumincession, 
which the Greeks call Periehoresis." .... What follows 
is still more to my purpose ; but I cannot bring myself to 
transcribe any further. " Who is this that darkeneth 
counsel by words without knowledge?" 

But the substance of great part of what I have been say- 
ing, has been expressed in better language than mine, in a 
late work which displays no ordinary ability, Mr. Douglas's 
Errors regarding Religion. 



* Not, ah in our version "thai Spirit ;" "O 6e Kipios TO irpsvpd Ictiv. 



300 APPENDIX. 

" The radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical 
uT orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scanda- 
lous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds from 
the disposition so natural in man of being wise above what is 
written. They are not satisfied with believing a plain declara- 
tion of the Saviour, ' I and the Father are one.' They under- 
take with the utmost presumption and folly to explain in what 
manner the Father and the Son are one ; but man might as well 
attempt to take up the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as endea- 
vour by his narrow understanding to comprehend the manner of 
the Divine existence." .... P. 50. 

" Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox. 
While the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth 
by every subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms, 
the orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine 
nature with a profusion of words, which either had no meaning, 
or were gross mistakes, or inapplicable metaphors when applied 
to the infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content 
with using such arguments against the heretics as generally 
produced a new heresy without refuting the former one, as 
soon as they obtained the power they expelled them from the 
Roman empire, and sent them with all the zeal which persecu- 
tion confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity, had 
lost, to spread every variety of error amongst the nations of the 
barbarians. 

" Orthodoxy was become a very nice affair, from the rigor of 
its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the 
highway for the simple, which the Gospel permits. A slip in a 
single expression was enough to make a man a heretic. The 
use or omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Chris- 
tianity. Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed 

a new heresy Never does human folly and learned 

ignorance appear in a more disgusting point of view than in 
these disputes of Christians amongst themselves; nor does any 
study appear so well calculated to foster infidelity as the history 
of Christian sects, unless the reader be guided bv light from 
above, and carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible from 
the miserable disputes of pretended Christians." — P. 53. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 301 

To discuss this important subject more fully (or per- 
haps indeed as fully as it has been here treated of) is 
hardly suitable to a logical work : and yet the impor- 
tance of attending to the ambiguity I have now been 
considering, cannot be duly appreciated, without offering 
some remarks on the subject-matter with which that 
ambiguity is connected ; and such remarks again, if 
scantily and imperfectly developed, are open to cavil or 
mistake. I must take the liberty therefore of referring 
the reader to such works, both my OAvn, and those of 
others, as contain something of a fuller statement of 
the same views. — See Essays, (First Series,) Essay II. 
§ 4, and Essays IV. and V. ; — Second Series, Essay VI. 
\% p. 199; VII. §3; and IX. § I.— Origin of Ro- 
mish Errors, Chap. ii. § 1. Archbishop King's Sermon 
on Predestination, fyc, and Encyclop. Metropol. His- 
tory, Chap, xxvii. p. 589, and Chap, xxxiv. p. 740. 

POSSIBLE.— This word, like the others of kindred 
meaning, relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to 
power; and these two senses are frequently confounded. 
In the first sense we say, e. g. " it is possible this patient 
may recover," not meaning, that it depends on his choice ; 
but that we are not sure whether the event will not be such. 
In the other sense it is " possible" to the best man to vio- 
late every rule of morality ; since if it were out of his power 
to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness 
in the case ; though we are quite "sure that such never 
will be his choice. — See " Impossible." 

PRIEST.— See " Dissertation, ' Book IV. Ch. iv. 

Etymologically, the word answers to Presbyter, i. e. 
Elder in the Christian Church; and is often applied to 
26 



302 APPENDIX. 

the second order of Christian Ministers at the present 
day. But it is remarkable that it never occurs in this 
sense, m our translation of the Scriptures : the word 
rrpecBvrepos being always rendered by Elder ; and its 
derivative, Priest, always given as the translation of 
'hpevs. This latter is an office assigned to none under 
the Gospel-scheme, except the ONE great High Priest, of 
whom the Jewish Priests were types, and who offered a 
sacrifice (that being the most distinguishing office of a 
Priest in the sense of 'lepete,) which is the only one under 
the Gospel. 

It is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from 
confounding together the two senses of the word Priest, 
and thence, the two offices themselves. 

I have enlarged accordingly on this subject in a Ser- 
mon, preached before the University of Oxford, and sub- 
joined to the last edition of the Bampton Lectures. See 
also Errors of Romanism, Chap. ii. 

REASON. — This word is liable to many ambiguities, 
of which I propose to notice only a few of the most im- 
portant. Sometimes it is used to signify all the intellec- 
tual powers collectively ; in which sense it can hardly be 
said to be altogether denied to brutes; since several of 
what we reckon intellectual processes in the human 
mind, are evidently such as some brutes are capable of. 

Reason is, however, frequently employed to denote 
those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs 
from brutes ; though what these are no one has been 
able precisely to define. The employment at will of the 
faculty of Abstraction seems to be the principal; that 
being, at least, principally concerned in the use of Lan- 
guage. The Moral faculty, or power of distinguishing 
right from wrong, (which appears also to be closely con- 



I 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 303 

nected with Abstraction,) is one of which brutes are des- 
titute ; but then Dr. Paley and some other ethical writers 
deny it to man also. The description given by that 
author of our discernment of good and bad conduct, (viz. 
as wholly dependent on expectation of reward and pun- 
ishment,) would equally apply to many of the brute-crea- 
tion, especially the more intelligent of domestic animals, 
as dogs and horses. It is in this sense, however, that 
some writers speak of " Reason 11 as enabling us to judge 
of virtue and vice; not, as Dr. Campbell in his Philoso- 
phy of Rhetoric has understood them, in the sense of the 
power of argumentation. 

Reason, however, is often used for the faculty of car- 
rying on the third operation of the mind ; viz. Reasoning. 
And it is from inattention to this ambiguity (which has 
been repeatedly noticed in the course of the foregoing 
treatise,) that some have treated of Logic as the art of 
rightly employing the mental faculties in general. 

Reason is also employed to signify the Premiss or 
Premises of an argument; especially the minor Premiss; 
and it is from Reasoning in this sense that the word " Rea- 
soning" is derived 

It is also very frequently used to signify a Cause ; as 
when we say, in popular language, that the " Reason of 
an eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed be- 
tween it and the earth." This should be strictly called 
the cause. On the other hand, "Because" (i. e. by 
Cause) is used to introduce either the Physical Cause 
or the Logical Proof : and " Therefore," " Hence," 
u Since," " Follow," " Consequence," and many other 
kindred words, having a corresponding ambiguity: e. g. 
" the ground is wet, because it has rained ;" or " it has 
rained, and hence the ground is wet ;" this is the assign- 
ment of the Cause; again, "it has rained, because the 



304 APPENDIX. 

ground is wet ;" " the ground is wet, and therefore it 
has rained;" this is assigning the logical proof; the 
wetness of the ground is the cause, not of the rain having 
fallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen. And this 
probably it is that has led to the ambiguous use in all 
languages of almost all the words relating to these two 
points. It is an ambiguity which has produced incalcu- 
lable confusion of thought, and from which it is the 
harder to escape, on account of its extending to those 
very forms of expression which are introduced in order 
to clear it up. 

. What adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often 
employed as a Proof of the effect:* as when we infer, 
from a great fall of rain, that there is, or will be, a flood : 
which is at once the physical effect, and the logical con- 
clusion. The case is just reversed, when from a flood 
Ave infer that the rain has fallen. 

The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity, 
the more extensive and important is results will ap- 
pear. — See Analytical Outline, § 2. 

REGENERATION.— This word is employed by 
some Divines to signify the actual new life and character 
.which ought to distinguish the Christian; by others, a 
release from a state of condemnation, — a reconciliation 
to God, — adoption as his children, S$c., f which is a 
necessary 'preliminary to the entrance on such a state ; 
(but which, unhappily, is not invariably followed by it:) 

* See " Fallacies." " Non causa pro causa." Book III. § 14. 

t " . . . . Baptism, wherein I was made a member of Christ, a 
child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom < f Heaven." .... 

" A death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness, <f«c." . . . 

" We being regenerate, and made thy children by adoption and 
grace, <£c." 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 305 

and these are, of course, as different things as a grain of 
seed sown, and " the full corn in the ear." 

Much controversy has taken place as to the time at 
which, and the circumstances under which, " Regenera- 
tion" takes place ; the greater part of which may be 
traced to this ambiguity. 

SAME (as well as "One," "Identical," and other 
words derived from them) is used frequently in a sense 
very different from its primary one ; (as applicable to a 
single object;) viz, it is employed to denote great simi- 
larity. When several objects are undistinguishably alike, 
One single description will apply equally to any of them ; 
and thence they are said to be all of one and the same 
nature, appearance, &c. : as, e. g. when we say, " this 
house is built of the same stone with such another," we 
only mean that the stones are undistinguishable in their 
qualities ; not, that the one building was pulled down, 
and the other constructed with the materials. Whereas 
Sameness, in the primary sense, does not even necessari- 
ly imply Similarity ; for if we say of any man that he is 
greatly altered since such a time, we understand, and in- 
deed imply by the very expression, that he is One perso?i, 
though different in several qualities, else it would not be 
he. It is worth observing also, that "Same," in the 
secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage, of 
degrees : we speak of two things being nearly the same, 
but not entirely: personal identity does not admit of 
degrees. 

Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of 
Realism than inattention to this ambiguity. When seve- 
ral persons are said to have One and the Same opinion — 
thought — or idea, — many men, overlooking the true 
simple statement of the case, which is, that they are all 

26* 



306 APPENDIX. 

thinking alike, look for something more abstruse and mys- 
tical, and imagine there must be some One thing, in the 
primary sense, though not an individual, which is present 
at once in the mind of each of these persons : and thence 
readily sprung Plato's theory of Ideas, each of which 
w^as, according to him, one real, eternal object, existing 
entire and complete in each of the individual objects that 
are known by one name. Hence, first in poetical my- 
thology, and ultimately, perhaps, in popular belief, For- 
tune, Liberty, Prudence, (Minerva,) a Boundary, (Ter- 
minus,) and even the Mildew of Corn, (Rubigo,) &c, 
became personified, deified, and represented by Statues ; 
somewhat according to the process which is described by 
Swift, in his humorous manner, in speaking of Zeal, (in 
the Tale of a Tub,) "how from a notion it became a 
word, and from thence, in a hot summer, ripened into a 
tangible Substance." We find Seneca thinking it neces- 
sary gravely to combat the position of some of his Stoical 
predecessors, "that the Cardinal Virtues are Animals:" 
while the Hindoos of the present day, from observing the 
similar symptoms which are known by the name of Small- 
pox, and the communication of the like from one patient 
to another, do not merely call it (as we do) one disease, 
but believe (if we may credit the accounts given) that 
the Small-pox is a Goddess, who becomes incarnate in 
each infected patient. All these absurdities are in fact 
but the extreme and ultimate point of Realism. — See Dis- 
sertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 

SIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual 
transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral 
law, or of a positive divine precept. It has also, what 
may be called, a theological sense, in which it is used for 
that sinfulness or fraility, — that liability, or proneness, to 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 307 

transgression, which all men inherit from their first pa- 
rents, and which is commonly denominated " original" 
Sin ;* in which sense we find such expressions as " in 
Sin hath my mother conceived me." The word seems 
also to be still further transferred, to signify the state of 
condemnation itself * in which the children of Adam are, 
"by nature born," in consequence of this sinful tenden- 
cy in them: (or, according to some divines, in conse- 
quence of the very guilt of Adam's offence being actually 
imputed to each individual of his posterity. ) f It must 
be in the sense of a " state of condemnation" that our 
Church, in her office for Infant Baptism, speaks of " re- 
mission of Sins," with reference to a child, which is no 
moral agent : " following the innocency of children," 
(i. e. of actual Sin) being mentioned within a few sen- 
tences. And as it is plain that actual Sin cannot, in the 
former place, be meant, so neither can it be, in this 
place, man's proneness to Sin : since the baptismal office 
would not pray for, and hold out a promise of, " release" 
and " remission" of that t?4»itpa uapKds which, according to the 
Article, " remains even in the regenerate." 

Though all Theologians probably are aware of these 
distinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted 
from their not being always attended to. 

* Of the degree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts 
are given ; some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the 
moral faculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake ; oth- 
ers making it to consi st in a certain undue preponderance of the 
lower propensities over the nobler sentiments, <f-c. But these seem 
to be not differences as to the sense of the word, (with which alone 
we are here concerned,) but as to the state of the fact. 

1 1 must again remind the reader that I am inquiring only into the 
senses in which each word has actually been used ; not into the truth 
or falsity of each doctrine in question. On the present question, see 
Essays on the Difficulties in St. PauVs Writings. Essay VI. 



306 APPENDIX. 

THEREFORE.— .See " Reason," and " Why." 

TRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to Propo- 
sitions, and to nothing else; and consists in the con- 
formity of the declaration made to the actual state of 
the case ; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of a " true" 
proposition — vera est, quae quod res est dicit. 

It would be an advantage if the word " Trueness" or 
" Verity" could be introduced and employed in this 
sense, since the word " Truth" is so often used to de- 
note the true Proposition itself. " What I tell you is 
the Truth ; the Truth of what I say shall be proved :" 
the term is here used in these two senses. In like man- 
ner Falsehood is often opposed to Truth in both these 
senses ; being commonly used to signify the quality of a 
false proposition. But as we have the word Falsity, 
which properly denotes this, I have thought it best, in a 
scientific treatise, always to employ it for that purpose. 

In its etymological sense, Truth signifies that which 
the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The 
etymology of the word AAH9E2 seems to be similar: 
denoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to 
a Lie : and may be called Moral, as the other may Logi* 
cal, Truth. A witness therefore may comply with his 
oath to speak the Truth, though it so happen that he is 
mistaken in some particular of his evidence, provided he 
is fully convinced that the thing is as he states it, 

Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inac- 
curate language, to arguments; where the proper ex- 
pression W'Ould be "correctness," "conclusiveness," or 
" validity." 

Truth, again, is often used in the sense of Reality. 
People speak of the Truth or Falsity of facts ; properly 
speaking, they are either real or fictitious : it is the state' 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 309 

merit that is " true" or " false." The " true " cause of 
any thing, is a common expression; meaning "that 
which may with Truth be assigned as the cause." The 
senses of Falsehood correspond. 

44 Truth" in the sense of "reality" is also opposed to 
shadows, — types, — pictures, &c. Thus, "the Law was 
given by Moses, but grace and 4 truth' came by Jesus 
Christ : " for the Law had only a " shadow of good things 
to come." 

The present is an ambiguity of which the Romanists 
have often availed themselves with great effect ; the am- 
biguity of the word " Church " (which see) lending its aid 
to the fallacy. " Even the Protestants," they say, " dare 
not deny ours to be a TRUE CHURCH; now there 
can be but ONE TRUE CHURCH;" (Avhich they 
support by those passages of Scripture which relate to 
the collective body of- Christians in all those several 
branches which also are called in Scripture Churches;) 
41 ours therefore must be the true church ; if you for- 
sake us, you forsake the truth and the Church, and con- 
sequently shut yourself out from the promises of the Gos- 
pel." Those who are of a logical and accurate turn of 
mind will easily perceive that the sense in which the 
Romish Church is admitted by her opponents to be a 
true Church, is that of reality; — it is a real, not a pre- 
tended Church; — it may be truly said to be a Church. 
The sense in which the Romanists seize the concession 
is, that of a Church teaching true doctrines ; which was 
never conceded to the Church of Rome by the Protes- 
tants; who hold, that a Church may err without ceasing 
to be a Church. 

WHENCE .—See " Why " and " Reason." 



310 APPENDIX. 

WHY ? — As an interrogative, this word is employed 
in three senses : viz. " By what proof?" (or Reason) 
" From what Cause ?" " For what purpose ?" This 
last is commonly called the " final cause." E. G. " Why 
is this prisoner guilty of the crime?" "Why does a 
stone fall to the earth?" "Why did you go to Lon- 
don?" Much confusion has arisen from not distinguish- 
ing these different inquiries.' See " Reason." 



N. B. As the words which follow are all of them con- 
nected together in their significations, and as the expla- 
nations of their ambiguities have been furnished by the 
kindness of the Professor of Political Economy, it seemed 
advisable to place them by themselves, and in the order 
in which they appeared to him moist naturally to arrange 
themselves. 

The foundations of Political Economy being a few 
general propositions deduced from observation or from 
consciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, 
it might have been expected that there would be as lit- 
tle difference of opinion among Political-Economists as 
among Mathematicians ; — that, being agreed in their 
premises, they could not differ in their conclusions, but 
through some error in reasoning, so palpable as to be 
readily detected. And if they had possessed a vocabu- 
lary of general terms as precisely defined as the mathe- 
matical, this would probably have been the case. But as 
the terms of this Science are drawn from common dis- 
course, and seldom carefully defined by the writers who 
employ themv hardly one of them has any settled and in- 
variable meaning, and their ambiguities are perpetu- 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 311 

ally overlooked. The principal terms are only seven : 
viz. Value, Wealth, Labor, Capital, Rent, Wages, 
Profits. 

1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which 
Political Economy is conversant, we might expect all 
Economists to be agreed as to its meanimg. There is no 
subject as to which they are less agreed. 

The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the 
word, is to signify the capacity of being given and re- 
ceived in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. 
The value of any one thing must consist in the several 
quantities of all other things which can be obtained in ex- 
change for it, and can never remain fixed for an instant. 
Most writers admit the propriety of this definition at the 
outset, but they scarcely ever adhere to it. 

Adam Smith defines Value to mean either the utility 
of a particular object, or the power of purchasing other 
goods which the possession of that object conveys. The 
first he calls " Value in use," the second " Value in ex- 
change." But he soon afterwards says, that equal quan- 
tities of labor at all times and places are of equal Value 
to the laborer, whatever may be the quantity of goods he 
receives in return for them ; and that labor never varies 
in its own Value. It is clear that he affixed, or thought 
he had affixed, some other meaning to the word; as the 
first of these propositions is contradictory, and the second 
false, whichever of his two definitions we adopt. 

Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam 
Smith's definition of Value in exchange. But in the 
greater part of his " Principles of Political Economy," 
he uses the word as synonymous with Cost : and by 
this one ambiguity has rendered his great work a long 



312 APPENDIX. 

Mr. Malthus* defines Value to be the power of pur- 
chasing. In the very next page he distinguishes abso- 
lute from relative Value, a distinction contradictory to 
his definition of the term, as expressive of a relation. 

Mr. M'Cullochf distinguishes between real and ex- 
changeable, or relative, Value. And in his nomencla- 
ture, the exchangeable, or relative, Value of a commodity 
consists in its capacity of purchasing; — its real Value 
in the quantity of labor required for its production or ap- 
propriation. 

All these differences appear to arise from a confusion 
of cause and effect. Having decided that commodities 
are Valuable in proportion to the labor they have respec- 
tively cost, it was natural to call that labor their Value. 

2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth 
to be I all that man desires." Mr. Malthus, \ " those 
material objects which are necessary, useful, or agree- 
able." Adam Smith confines the term to that portion of 
the results of land and labor which is capable of being 
accumulated. The French Economists, to the net pro- 
duct of land. Mr. M'Culloch § and M. Storch, || to those 
material products which have exchangeable value; ac- 
cording to Colonel Torrens 1" it consists of articles which 
possess utility and are produced by some portion of volun- 
tary effort. M. Say** divides wealth into natural and 
social, and applies the latter term to whatever is suscep- 

* " Measure of Value," p. 1. 

t" Principles of Political Economy," Part III. sect. 1. 

X " Principles of Political Economy," page 28. 

§ " Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica," Vol. VI. p. 217. 

!i " Cours d'Economie Politique,'. Tome I. p. 91. Paris edit. 

IT " Production of Wealth," p. 1. 

** " Traite d'Economie Pol." Liv. II. Chap. ii. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 313 

tible of exchange. It will be observed that the principal 
difference between these definitions consists in the ad- 
mission or rejection of the qualifications " exchange- 
able," and u material." 

It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done 
no more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave 
birth to the mercantile system. In common language, 
to grow rich is to get money; to diminish in fortune is 
to lose money ; a rich man is said to have a great deal of 
money ; a poor man, very little ; and the terms " Wealth" 
and " Money" are in short employed as synonymous. 
In consequence of these popular notions (to use the 
words of Adam Smith) all the different nations of Eu- 
rope have studied every means of accumulating gold and 
silver in their respective countries. This they have 
attempted by prohibiting the exportation of money, 
and by giving bounties on the exportation, and imposing 
restrictions on the importation, of other commodities, in 
the hope of producing what has been called a " favourable 
balance of trade ;" that is, a trade in which, the imports 
being always of less value than the exports, the difference 
is paid in money : a conduct as wise as that of a trades- 
man who should part with his goods only for money ; 
and instead of employing their price in paying his work- 
men's wages, or replacing his stock, should keep it for 
ever in his tilL The attempt to force such a trade has 
been as vain, as the trade, if it could have been obtained, 
would have been mischievous. But the results have 
been fraud, punishment, and poverty at home, and dis- 
cord and war without. It has made nations consider 
the Wealth of their customers a source of loss instead of 
profit ; and an advantageous market a curse instead of a 
blessing. By inducing them to refuse to profit by the 
peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, pos- 
27 



314 APPENDIX. 

sessed by their neighbours, it has forced them in a great 
measure to give up their own. It has for centuries done 
more, and perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to 
retard the improvement of Europe than all other causes 
put together. 

3. LABOR. The word " Labor" signifies both the 
act of laboring, and the result of that act. It is used in 
the first sense when we talk of the wages of labor; in 
the second when we talk of accumulated labor. When 
used to express the act of laboring, it may appear to have 
a precise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity. 
Say's definition* is, " action suivie, dirigee vers un 
but." Storch's,f "Taction des facultes humaines dirigee 
vers un but utile." These definitions include a walk 
taken for the purposes of health, and even the exertions 
of an agreeable converser. 

The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own 
economists in general, is the want of definitions. There 
is, perhaps, no definition of Labor by any British Econo- 
mist. If Adam Smith had framed one, he would proba- 
bly have struck out his celebrated distinction between 
" productive" and " unproductive" laborers ; for it is 
difficult to conceive any definition of Labor which will 
admit the epithet " unproductive" to be applied to any 
of its subdivisions, excepting that of misdirected labor. 
On the other hand, if Mr. M'Culloch or Mr. Mill had 
defined Labor, they would scarcely have applied that 
term to the growth of a tree, or the improvement of wine 
in a cellar. 

* " Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 506. 
t " Cours," &c. Liv. I. Chap. iv. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 315 

4. CAPITAL. This word, as might have been ex* 
pected, from the complexity of the notions which it im- 
plies, has been used invery different senses. 

It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general 
meaning which he attached to it will however appear 
from his enumeration of its species. He divides it* 
into Fixed and Circulating : including in the first what the 
capitalist retains, in the second what he parts with. Fixed 
Capital he subdivides into — 1. Machinery; 2. Shops and 
other buildings used for trade or manufacture ; 3. Improve- 
ments of land ; 4. Knowledge and skill. Circulating Cap- 
ital he subdivides into — 1. Money; 2. Provisions in the 
hands of the provision-venders; 3. Unfinished materi- 
als of manufacture ; 4. Finished work in the hands of the 
merchant or manufacturer; such as furniture in a cab- 
inet-maker's shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller. 

The following is a list of the definitions adopted by 
some of the most eminent subsequent economists. 

Ricardo f — " that part of the wealth of a country which 
is employed in production ; consisting of food, clothing, 
tools, raw materials, machinery, Sfc.-, necessary to give 
effect to labor." 

Malthus \ — " that portion of the material possessions 
of a country which is destined to be employed with a 
view to profit." 

Say § — " accumulation de valeurs soustraites a la con- 
somption unproductive." Chap. iii. " Machinery, neces- 
saries of the workman, materials." 

Storch || — '* un fonds de richesses destine a la production 
materielle." 

* Book II. Chap. i. 

t " Principles of Political Economy," p. 89, 3$ edit. 

t " Principles," &c. p. 293. 

§ " Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 454. 

II " Cours," &c. Liv. II. Chap. i. 



316 APPENDIX. 

M'Culloch* — " that portion of the produce of industry, 
which can be made directly available to support human 
existence or facilitate production." 

Mill f — " something produced, for the purpose of being 
employed as the mean towards a further production." 

Torrens J — " those things on which labor has been 
bestowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate 
supply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other articles 
of utility." 

It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coin- 
cide. Adam Smith's (as implied in his use of the term, 
for he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessaries 
of the laborer, when in his own possession; all the rest 
(and perhaps with better reason) admit them. On the 
other hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to 
be right) those things which are incapable of productive 
consumption, provided they have not yet reached their 
consumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps 
that of Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to 
the inconsistency of affirming that a diamond, and the 
gold in which it is to be set, are Capital while the jewel- 
ler keeps them separate, but cease to be so when he has 
formed them into a ring ; almost all of them, also, point- 
edly exclude knowledge and skill. The most objectiona- 
ble, perhaps, is that of Mr. M'Culloch, which, while it ex- 
eludes all the finished contents of a jeweller's shop, would 
include a racing-stud. 

Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in 
his use of the word ; thus, in the beginning of his second 
book he states, that all Capitals are destined for the main- 
tenance of productive labor only. It is difficult to see 

* " Principles," &c. p. 92. 

t " Elements," &c. p. 19, 3d edit. 

t " Production of Wealth," p. & 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317 

what labor is maintained by what is to be unproductively 
consumed. 



5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT. 

Adam Smith first divided revenue into Rent, Wages, 
and Profit ; and his division has been generally followed. 
The following definitions will best show the degree of 
precision with which these three terms have been em- 
ployed. 

Adam Smith. 

1. Rent. What is paid for the license to gather the 
produce of the land. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

2. Wages. The price of labor. — Book I. Chap. v. 

3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the per- 
son who manages or employs it. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

Say. (Traite oVEconomie Politique,) 4eme Edit. 

1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la 
terre. — Tome II. p. 169. 

2. Wages. Le prix de 1' achat d'un service productif 
industriel. — Tome II. p. 503. 

3. Profit. La portion de la valeur produite, retiree par 
le capitaliste. — Tome I. p. 71, subdivided into interet, 
profit industriel, and profit capital. 

Storch. (Cours d'Economie Politique.) Paris, 1823. 

1. Rent. Le prix qu'on paye pour l'usage d'un fondf 
de terre. — Tome I. p. 354, 

% Wages. Le prix du travail,~p. 283. 
27* 



318 APPENDIX. 

3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by 
Storch, under the heads, rente de capital, and profit de 
1' entrepreneur. The first he divides into loyer, the hire 
of fixed capital, and interet, that of circulating capital. 
The second he considers as composed of, 1st, remunera- 
tion for the use of capital; 2d, assurance against risk; 
3d, remuneration for trouble. — Liv. III. Chap. ii. viii. xiii. 

Sismondi. (Nouveau Principes, <£c.) 

1. Rent. La part de la recolte annuelle du sol qui 
revient au proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui 
l'ont fait naitre; and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la com- 
pensation du travail de la terre ; 2d, le prix de monopole ; 
3d, la mieux valeur que le proprietaire obtient par la com- 
paraison d'une terre de nature superieure a, une terre in- 
ferieure ; 4th, le revenu des capitaux qu'il a fixes lui-meme 
sur la terre, et ne peut plus en retirer. — Tome I. p. 280. 

2. Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 91. 

3. Profit. La valeur dont l'ouvrage acheve surpasse 
les avances qui l'ont fait faire. L'avantage qui resulte 
des travaux passes. Subdivided into interet and profit 
mercantile. — p. 94, 359. 



Malthus. (Principles, Sf-c.) 

t. Rent. That portion of the value of the whole pro- 
duce of land which remains to the owner after payment 
of all the outgoings of cultivation, including average 
profits on the capital employed. The excess of price 
above wages and profits. — p. 134. 

2. Wages. The remuneration of the laborer for his 
personal exertions. — p. 240. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 319 

3. Profit. The difference between the value of the ad- 
vances necessary to produce a commodity, and the value of 
the commodity when produced. — p. 293. 

Mill. (Elements, $c.) 3d Ed. 

1. Rent. The difference between the return made to 
the most productive, and that which is made to the least 
productive portion of capital employed on the land. — 
p. 33. 

2. Wages. The price of the laborer's share of the com- 
modity produced. — p. 41. 

3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labor and 
stock which is received by the owner of stock after re- 
placing the capital consumed. The portion of the whole 
annual produce which remains after deducting rent and 
wages. Remuneration for hoarded labor. — Chap. ii. iii. 

Torrens. (Corn Trade.) 3d Ed. 

1. Rent. That part of the produce which is given to 
the land-proprietor for the use of the soil. — p. 130. 

2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the laborer 
receives in exchange for his labor. — p. 83. 

3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished 
work possesses above the value of the material, imple- 
ments, and subsistence expended. The surplus remaining 
after the cost" of production has been replaced. — Produc- 
tion of Wealth, p. 53. 

M'Culloch. (Principles, fyc.) 

1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth 
which is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use of 
the natural and inherent powers of the soil. — p. 265. 



320 APPENDIX. 

2. Wages. The compensation paid to laborers in return 
for their services. — Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1. 

3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by 
the expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that 
quantity of capital. — Principles, p. 366. 

Ricardo. (Principles, Sfc.) 3d Ed. 

1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth 
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original 
and indestructible powers of the soil. — p. 53. 

2. Wages. The laborer's proportion of the produce,^ — 
Chap. v. 

3. Profit. The capitalist's proportion of the produce. — 
Chap. vi. 

The first observation to be made on these definitions 
is, that the Rent of land, which is only a species of an 
extensive genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate 
species are either omitted, or included under genera to 
which they do not properly belong. Wages and Profits 
are of human creation: they imply a sacrifice of ease or 
immediate enjoyment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice 
which is indicated by the common expressions of " the 
rate of wages," and the " rate of profits :" a ratio which 
has a strong tendency to uniformity. But there is another 
and a very large source of revenue which is not the 
creation of man, but of nature; which owes its origin, 
not to the will of its possessor, but to accident; which 
implies no sacrifice, has no tendency to uniformity, and 
to which the term " rate" is seldom applied. This reve- 
nue arises from the exclusive right to some instrument of 
production, enabling the employment of a given amount 
of labor or capital to be more than usually productive, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 321 

The principal of these instruments is land ; but all extra- 
ordinary powers of body or mind, — all processes in ma- 
nufacture which are protected by secrecy or by law, — 
all peculiar advantages from situation or connexion, — in 
short, every instrument of production which is not uni- 
versally accessible, affords a revenue distinct in its origin 
from Wages or Profits, and of which the Rent of land is 
only a species. In the classification of revenues, either 
Rent ought to have been omitted as a genus, and con- 
sidered only as an anomalous interruption of the general 
uniformity of wages and profits, or all the accidental 
sources of revenue ought to have been included in one 
genus, of which the Rent of land would have formed the 
principal species. 

Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of 
Profit include the wages of the labor of the Capitalist. 
The continental Economists have in general been aware 
of this, and have pointed it out in their analysis of the 
component parts of Profit. The British Economists have 
seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has 
been a great cause of obscurity. 

On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to 
Profit and Rent is generally included under Wages. Al- 
most all Economists consider the members of the liberal 
professions under the class of laborers. The whole sub- 
sistence of such persons, observes Mr. M'Culloch,* is de- 
rived from Wages ; and they are as evidently laborers as 
if they handled the spade or the plough. But it should 
be considered, that those who are engaged in any occu- 
pation requiring more skill than that of a common hus 
bandman, must have expended capital, more or less, on 
the acquisition of their skill; their education must have 



* " Principles," &c. p. 228. 



323 APPENDIX. 

cost something in every case, from that of the handicraft- 
apprentice, to that of the legal or medical student; and 
a Profit on this outlay is of course looked for, as in other 
disbursements of capital; and the higher profit, in pro- 
portion to the risk ; viz. the uncertainty of a man's suc- 
cess in his business. Part, therefore, and generally far 
the greater part, of what has been reckoned the wages of 
his labor, ought more properly to be reckoned profits on 
the capital expended in fitting him for that particular 
kind of labor. And again, all the excess of gains ac- 
quired by one possessing extraordinary talents, opportu- 
nities, or patronage (since these correspond to the posses- 
sion of land, — of a patent-right — or other monopoly, — of a 
secret, fyc.) may be more properly regarded as Rent than 
as Wages. 

Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from 
the use of the word " Wages," sometimes as expressing a 
quantity, sometimes as expressing a proportion. 

In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some 
commodity, generally of silver, given to the laborer in 
seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has 
been a great cause of obscurity. 

In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the 
laborer's proportion of what- is produced, supposing that 
produce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. 
In this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is 
diminished ; though if the word be used in the other 
sense, they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly 
used the word " Wages," to express a proportion, the 
only inconvenience would have been the necessity of al- 
ways translating this expression into common language. 
But he is not consistent. When he says,* that " what- 






Principles," &c. p. 312. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 323 

ever raises the Wages of labor lowers the Profits of 
stock," he considers Wages as a proportion. When he 
says,* that " high Wages encourage population ;" he 
considers wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'Culloch, 
who has clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped 
it. He has even suffered it to affect his reasonings. In 
his valuable essay, " On the Rate of Wages,"! he ad- 
mits that " when Wages are high, the Capitalist has to 
pay a larger share of the produce of industry to his la- 
borers :" an admission utterly inconsistent with his 
general use of the word, as expressing the amount of what 
the laborer receives,, which, as he has himself observed, If 
may increase while his proportion diminishes. 

A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which 
attach to the seven terms that have been selected; and 
these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambigu- 
ous, but as the most important, in the political nomen- 
clature. " Supply and Demand," " Productive and Un- 
productive," " Overtrading," and very many others, both 
in political economy, and in other subjects, which are 
often used without any more explanation, or any more 
suspicion of their requiring it, than the words " triangle" 
or " twenty," are perhaps even more liable to ambigui- 
ties than those above treated of. But it is sufficient for 
the purpose of this Appendix to have noticed, by way of 
specimens, a few of the most remarkable terms in several 
different branches of knowledge, in order to show both 
the frequency of an ambiguous use of language, and the 
importance of clearing up such ambiguity. 



* " Principles, " &c. p. 83. t P. 161. 

* " Principles of Political Economy," p. 365. 



APPENDIX. 



No. II. 

Miscellaneous examples for the exercise of 
learners. 

N. B. In such of the following- Examples as are not in a 
syllogistic form, it is intended that the student should 
practice the reduction of them into that form ; those of 
them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound : 
viz. where it is impossible to admit the Premises and 
deny the Conclusion. Of such as are apparent syllo- 
gisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which 
it may be advisable to apply in the following order : 
1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or 
Hypothetical ; recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss 
does not necessarily imply an hypothetical Syllogism, 
unless the reasoning turns on the hypothesis. If this 
appear to be the case, the rules for hypothetical Syllo- 
gism must be applied. 2dly. If the argument be cate- 
gorical, count the terms. 3clly. If only three, observe 
whether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe 
whether the Premises are both negative; (i. e. really, 
and not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the 
Conclusion be negative also; or affirmative, if both 
Premises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms are 
distributed in the Conclusion, and whether the same 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 325 

are distributed in the Premises. 6thly. If the Syllo- 
gism is not a Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it 
to that form. 



i. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites : a 
sensualist is enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sensu- 
alist is not free. 

2. None but Whites are civilized: the ancient Ger- 
mans were Whites : therefore they were civilized. 

3. None but Wliites are civilized : the Hindoos are not 
Whites : therefore they are not civilized. 

4. None but civilized people are Whites: the Gauls 
were Whites : therefore they were civilized. 

5. No one is rich who has not enough : no miser has 
enough : therefore no miser is rich. 

6. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they 
would be aggrieved : but penal laws against them are not 
enforced : therefore the Papists are not aggrieved. 

7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, 
the popish legends are to be believed : but the popish le- 
gends are not to be believed: therefore no testimony to 
miracles is to be admitted. 

8. If men are not likely to be influenced in the per- 
formance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform 
it, the oaths commonly administered are superfluous: if 
they are likely to be so influenced, every one should be 
made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his 
life; but one or the other of these must be the case: 
therefore either the oaths commonly administered are su- 
perfluous, or every man should be made to take an oath 
to behave rightly throughout his life. 

9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to 
truth : and the Church of England is conformable to the 

28 



326 APPENDIX. 

Scriptures: A. B. is a divine of the Church of England; 
and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments: 
therefore it must be presumed to be true. 

10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture) 
pleased God ; but without faith it is impossible to please 
Him j (for he that cometh to God must believe that He 
is, and that He is a rewarder of tbem that diligently seek 
Him:) therefore, <SfC. 

11. " If Abraham were justified by works, then had he 
whereof to glory [before God ;} but not any one can have whereof 
to glory] before God :" therefore Abraham was not justified 
by works. 

12. "He that is of God heareth my words; ye therefore 
hear them not, because ye are not of God." 

13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, 
without any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and 
interesting form; and therefore, though a treatise would 
deserve much attention which should possess such excel- 
lence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve much 
attention. 

14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for 
religious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory 
on us : but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for 
religious duties ; and hence it appears that the fourth com- 
mandment is obligatory on us. 

15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference 
to the divine institution of sacrifices: one of the precepts 
delivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood: 
therefore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained 
the divine institution of sacrifices. 

16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed be- 
fore the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not 
of ceremonial sin, (which could not then exist,) but of 
moral sin : if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 327 

no less efficacy; and in that case, the atonements under 
the Mosaic law would have "made the comers thereun- 
to perfect as pertaining to the conscience;" but this was 
not the case ; therefore, SfC. [Davison on Prophecy.3 

17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians, 
if we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israel- 
ites alone, but for all men : it was designed, however, for 
the Israelites alone, and not for all men: therefore the 
adoration of images is- not forbidden to Christians. 

18. A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of 
the tenth commandment : all gaming, therefore, since it 
implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, in- 
volves a breach of the tenth commandment. 

19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscrimi- 
nate mixture of various kinds: those that were set aside 
and saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed : 
therefore those that were set aside and saved as valuable, 
were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds. 

20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as 
are arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the 
divine decree are the elect: therefore such persons as 
are arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the 
divine decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this Con- 
clusion generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major ; the 
reverse would be the more sound and the more effectual objection.] 

21. No one who lives with another on terms of confi- 
dence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him : Bru- 
tus lived on terms of confidence with Cassar: therefore 
he was not justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in kill- 
ing him. 

22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power 
in a free country deserves well of his countrymen : Bru- 
tus destroyed Csesar, who usurped despotic power in 
Rome : therefore he deserved well of the Romans. 



328 APPENDIX. 

23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary : virtue is 
voluntary : therefore so is vice. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 

24. A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards 
and punishments of a future state, or must be able to 
appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them 
regularly in this life: Moses did not do the former: 
therefore he must have done the latter. 

25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than 
the falisity of testimony can be fairly established by testi- 
mony : any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of 
less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony 
(that being very common:) therefore no extraordinary 
and unusual fact can be fairly established by testimony. 

26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very 
likely to be false: the evidence on which most men be- 
lieve that there are pyramids in Egypt is testimony : 
therefore the evidence on which most men believe that 
there are pyramids in Egypt is very likely to be false. 

27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans 
was a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless super- 
stitions, credited by the vulgar and the weak, and main- 
tained by the more enlightened, from selfish or political 
views : the same was clearly the case with the religion of 
the Egyptians : the same may be said of the Brahminical 
worship of India, and the religion of Fo professed by the 
Chinese : the same, of the romantic mythological system 
of the Peruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mex- 
icans, and those of the Britons and of the Saxons : hence 
we may conclude that all systems of religion, however 
varied in circumstances, agree in being superstitions kept 
up among the vulgar, from interested or politicial views 
in the more enlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap. i« 
§2. p. 212.] 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 329 

28. No man can possess power to perform impossibili- 
ties; a miracle is an impossibility: therefore no man can 
possess power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, p. 263.] 

29. A. B. and C. D. are each of them equal to E. F. : 
therefore they are equal to each other. 

30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the 
innocent: therefore, as you maintain that this person 
ought not to be punished, it appears that you are con- 
vinced of his innocence. 

31. All the most bitter persecutions have been relig- 
ious persecutions : among the most bitter persecutions 
were those which occurred in France during the revolu- 
tion : therefore they must have been religious persecu- 
tions. 

32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he 
does, has neither merit nor demerit in his action : a lib- 
eral and benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise 
than he does in relieving the poor: therefore such a man 
has neither merit nor demerit in his action, [See Appendix, 

pp. 278, 279.] 

33. What happens every day is not improbable: some 
things against which the chances are many thousands to 
one, happen every day : therefore some things against 
which the chances are many thousands to one, are not 
improbable. 

34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either 
from its professing to be his, and containing his name, or 
from its really being his ; since, therefore, the former of 
these is not the fact, the Epistle must be Paul's. 

35. " With some of them God was not well pleased : for 
they were overthrown in the wilderness." 

36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications 
without satiety: it is impossible to enjoy perpetual grati- 

28* 



330 APPENDIX. 

fications without satiety: therefore it is impossible for a 
sensualist to obtain his wish. 

37. If Paley's system is to be received, one who has no 
knowledge of a future state has no means of distinguish- 
ing virtue and vice: now one who has no means of dis- 
tinguishing virtue and vice can commit no sin: therefore, 
if Paley's system is to be received, one who has no 
knowledge of a future state can commit no sin. 

38. The principles of justice are variable : the appoint- 
ments of nature are invariable : therefore the principles 
of justice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v.) 

39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness : 
therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 

40. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which 
give contradictory accounts of it; the story of the life 
and exploits of Bonaparte is of this description : there- 
fore it is not to be believed. [ Vide Elements, p. 47.] 

41. When the observance of the first day -of the week, 
as a religious festival in commemoration of Christ's res- 
urrection, was first introduced, it must have been a novel- 
ty : when it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice : 
when it attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry respect- 
ing the truth of the resurrection : when it led to this in- 
quiry, it must have exposed the story as an imposture, 
supposing it not attested by living witnesses : therefore, 
when the observance of the first day of the week, tyc. was 
first introduced, it must have exposed as an imposture the 
story of the resurrection, supposing it not attested by liv- 
ing witnesses. 

42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books 
than the world could contain: the things related by the 
Evangelists are the miracles of Jesus: therefore the 
things related by the Evangelists would fill more books 
t&an the world could contain. 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 331 

43. If the. prophecies of the Old Testament had been 
written without knowledge of the events of the time of 
Christ, they could not correspond with them exactly ; 
and if they had been forged by Christians, they would 
not be preserved and acknowledged by the Jews: they 
are preserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they 
correspond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : 
therefore they were neither written without knowledge of 
those events, nor were forged by Christians. 

44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred : occasional 
turbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, 
is to be preferred to it. 

45. According to theologians, a man must possess 
faith in order to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who 
believes all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must pos- 
sess faith : therefore such an one must, according to theo- 
logians, be acceptable to the Deity. 

46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been 
either by faith or by works: now he was not justified by 
faith (according to St. James,) nor by works (according 
to St. Paul:) therefore Abraham was not justified. 

47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it : 
all punishment is an evil: therefore no punishment should 
be allowed that good may come of it. 

48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in 
repentance [Arist. Eth. B. ix. :] therefore wicked men abound in 
what is good. 

49. A person infected with the plague will (probably) 
die [suppose three in five of the infected die :] this man is (proba- 
bly) infected with the plague [suppose it an even chance :] 
therefore he will (probably) die. [Query. What is the amount 
of this probability 1 Again, suppose the probability of the major to be 
(instead of ■§■) -f> and of the minor, (instead of £) to be -f, Query. What 
will be the probability of the conclusion?] 



332 APPENDIX. 

50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has 
been accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the 
condition of a slave : many of the negroes, however, may 
be happy in the condition of slaves, because they have never 
been accustomed to enjoy liberty. 

51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: de- 
votedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that of 
gain in old age, are dictated by Nature : [Arist. Rhet. B. ii.] 
therefore they are allowable. 

52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that 
person's greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest 
good for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest 
lover of himself. [Arist. Eth, B. ix.j 

53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of ac- 
tion, exercises no self-denial in the practice of that ac- 
tion : a good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue ; there- 
fore he who exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue 
is not a good man. [Arist. Eth. B. ii.] 

54. That man is independent of the caprices of For- 
tune who places his chief happiness in moral and intel- 
lectual excellence : a true philosopher is independent of the 
caprices of Fortune : therefore a true philosopher is one 
who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual 
excellence. 

55. A system of government which extends to those 
actions that are performed secretly, must be one which 
refers either to a regular divine providence in this life, 
or to the rewards and punishments of another world : 
every perfect system of government must extend to those 
actions which are performed secretly: no system of gov- 
ernment therefore can be perfect, which does not refer 
either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the 
rewards and punishments of another world. [Warbur ton's 
Divine Legation.J 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 333 

56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds 
by diligent study, the incitement of academical honors is 
unnecessary ; and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such 
as are indifferent to mental improvement: therefore the 
incitemont of academical honors is either unnecessary or 
ineffectual. 

57. He who is properly called an actor, does not en- 
deavour to make his hearers believe that the sentiments 
he expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are really his 
own : a barrister does this : therefore he is not properly 
to be called an actor. 

58. He who bears arms at the command of the magis- 
trate does what is lawful for a Christian: the Swiss in 
the French service, and the British in the American ser- 
vice, bore arms at the command of the magistrate : there- 
fore they did what was lawful for a Christian. 

59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a 
new colony with the refuse of Jails : but this we must al- 
low not to be improper, if our method of colonizing New 
South Wales be a wise one: if this be wise, therefore, 
Lord Bacon is not right. 

60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aris- 
totle is to be regarded as infallible: but he is not : Logic 
therefore is not worthy of being cultivated. 

61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a 
man in life, or to increase national and private wealth: 
but the course, of studies pursued at Oxford has no such 
tendency : therefore it is not useful. 

62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, 
tends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the 
same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who 
have seen the most service, should have the most dread 
of death in battle : but the reverse of this is the case : 
therefore the former is not to be believed. 



334 APPENDIX. 

63. Ifthe everlasting favor of God is not bestowed at 
random, and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed 
either with respect to men's persons, or with respect to 
their conduct : but " God is no respecter of persons :" 
therefore his favor must be bestowed with respect to 
men's conduct. [Sumner's Apostolical Preaching.} 

64. If transportation is not felt as. a severe punishment, 
it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime : if it is 
so felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking 
place at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even 
come to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is de- 
signed to deter; but one or other of these must be the 
case: therefore transportation is not calculated to answer 
the purpose of preventing crime. 

65. War is productive of evil: therefore peace is like- 
ly to be productive of good. 

66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other per- 
ceptible purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers 
have great beauty; and many of them accordingly an- 
swer no other purpose but to gratify the sight. 

67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life 
of sensuality is deserving of strong reprobation: but 
those do not deliberately devote themselves to a life of 
sensuality who are hurried into excess by the impulse of 
the passions : such therefore as are hurried into excess 
by the impulse of the passions are not deserving of strong 
reprobation. [Arist. Eth. B. vii.] 

68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate de- 
sires : to conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a 
restraint of all inordinate desires : therefore it is a diffi- 
cult task to conform to the precepts of Scripture. 

69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemn- 
ing a book without reading it: some Reviewers do not 
refrain from this: therefore some Reviewers are not 
candid. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 335 

70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a 
change of established laws, no laws could reasonably be 
maintained: but some laws can reasonably be main- 
tained: therefore no objection that can be urged will 
justify a change of established laws. 

71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain 
the establishment of Christianity by human causes, such 
a theory would have been proposed before now; but 
none such ever has been proposed: therefore no such 
theory can be framed. 

72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich : 
a covetous man is not content with what he has : no 
covetous man therefore is truly rich. 

73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the 
circumstances of such an event as could not be conjec- 
tured by natural reason : this is the case with the prophe- 
cies of the Messiah contained in the Old Testament : 
therefore these are true prophecies. 

74. The connexion of soul and body cannot be com- 
prehended or explained ; but it must be believed : there- 
fore something must be believed which cannot be com- 
prehended or explained. 

75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone; Red Sandstone 
lies above Coal: therefore Lias lies above Coal. 

76. Cloven feet belonging universally to horned ani- 
mals, we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it 
appears to have had cloven feet, was horned. 

77. All that glitters is not gold: tinsel glitters: there- 
fore it is not gold. 

78. A negro is a man: therefore he who murders a 
negro murders a man. 

79. Meat and Drink are necessaries of life: the reve- 
nues of Vitellius were spent on Meat and Drink : there- 
fore the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necessa- 
ries of life. 



336 APPENDIX: 

80. Nothing is heavier than Platina : feathers are 
heavier than Nothing: therefore feathers are heavier 
than Platina. 

81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother: 
she governed her husband; he governed Athens; Athens, 
Greece ; and Greece, the world : therefore the child, of 
Themistocles governed the world. 

82. He who calls you a man speaks truly: he who 
calls you a fool, calls you a man : therefore he who calls 
you a fool speaks truly. 

83. Warm countries alone produce wines : Spain is a 
warm country : therefore Spain produces wines. 

84. It is an intensely cold, climate that is sufficient to 
freeze Quicksilver : the climate of Siberia is sufficient to 
freeze Quicksilver : therefore the climate of Siberia is 
intensely cold. 

85. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescense 
which is not a plant ; and every vegetable excrescence 
which is not a plant, is possessed of magical virtues : 
therefore Mistleto of the oak is possessed of magical vir- 
tues. 

86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (sup- 
pose a foot) before the minute-hand, this last, though 
moving twelve times faster, can never overtake the other ; 
for while the minute-hand is moving over those twelve 
inches, the hour-hand will have moved over one inch ; 
so that they will then be an inch apart ; and while the 
minute-hand is moving over that one inch, the hour-hand 
will have moved over iVinch, so that it will still be a- 
head ; and again, while the minute-hand is passing over 
that space of A inch, which now divides them, the hour- 
hand will pass over.rpf^ inch; so that it will still be a-head, 
though the distance between the two is diminished ; dfc. 
<fyc. tyc, and thus it is plain we may go on for ever : there- 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 337 

fore the minute-haiid can never overtake the hour-hand. 
[This is one of the sophistical puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving 
bodies being Achilles and a Tortoise;) but he is not happy in his 
attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the difficulty by de- 
monstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would overtake the 
Tortoise : as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem 
proposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of 
a thing palpably impossible ; to show that it is palpably impossible, is 
no solution of the problem. " 

I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the preten- 
sions of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical 
demonstiation may lead from true premises to an absurd conclusion. 
The reverse is the truth : the example before us furnishes a confirmation 
of the utility of an acquaintance with the Syllogistic form : in which 
form the pretended demonstration in question cannot possibly be exhi- 
bited. An attempt to do so will evince the utter want of connexion be- 
tween the premises and the conclusion.] 

87. Theft is a crime: theft was encouraged by the 
laws of Sparta: therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged 
erime. 

88. Every hen comes from an egg : every egg comes 
from a hen : therefore every egg comes from an egg. 

89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn : therefore the son of 
Jupiter was the grandson of Saturn. 

90. All cold is to he expelled by heat ; this person's dis- 
order is a cold : therefore it is to be expelled by heat 

91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stim 
ulants are hurtful, wine is hurtful. 

92. Opium is a poison ; but physicians advise some of 
their patients to take Opium: therefore physicians advise 
some of their patients to take poison. 

93. What we eat grew in the fields ; loaves of bread are 
what we eat : therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields. 

94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with: (as 
is shown by the practice of the Brahmins and of some 
monks;) and vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed 

29 



338 APPENDIX. 

with (as is plain from the example of the Esquimaux and 
others :) but all food consists of animal-food and vegetable- 
food : therefore all food may be dispensed with. 

95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it; 
a mining speculation is no trifling business: therefore a 
mining speculation will enrich those engaged in it. 

96. He who is most hungry eats most: he who eats 
least is most hungry : therefore he who eats least eats most. 
[See Aldrich's Compendium : Fallaciae : where this is rightly solved,] 

97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in 
the place where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither 
of these is possible : therefore there is no such thing as 
motion. [In this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, A\- 
drich mistakes the character of the difficulty j which is, not to prove 
the truth of that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent 
demonstration militating against that which nevertheless no one ever 
doubted. He says in this case, "solvitur ambulando;" but (pace 
tanti viri) this is no solution at all, but is the very thing which consti- 
tutes the difficulty in question ; for it is precisely because we know the 
possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of its impossibility produces 
perplexity. — See Introduction, p. 27.] 

98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the moon : 
hair is a vegetable : therefore hair grows most in the in- 
crease of the moon. 

99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to 
the improvement of the mind : all the works of the most 
celebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Ox- 
ford: therefore some of the works of the most celebrated 
ancients conduce to the improvement of the mind. 

100. Some poisons are vegetable: no poisons are useful 
drugs : therefore some useful drugs are not Vegetable. 

101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which 
appeals to the evidence of observation and experiment : 
Craniology appeals to this evidence: therefore, if Crani- 
ology be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 339 

the probability of one of these premises be fz~ \ and of the other £ 
Query. "What is the probability of the conclusion 1] 

102. Wilkes was a favorite with the populace: he who 
is a favorite with the populace must understand how to 
manage them : he who understands how to manage them, 
must be well acquainted with their character : he who is 
well acquainted with their character, must hold them in 
contempt : therefore Wilkes must have held the populace 
in contempt. 

103. To discover whether a man has any moral sense, he 
should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties 
are most fully developed: the civilized state is that in 
which all men's faculties are most fully developed : there- 
fore, to discover whether a man has any moral sense, he 
should be viewed in a civilized state. 

104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, &c. 
have been countenanced by public opinion in several coun- 
tries : all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery, 
Adultery, Infanticide, fyc. : therefore, all the Crimes we 
know of have been countenanced by public opinion in 
several countries. 

105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who 
are not well qualified to perform their part. None but 
veterans are well qualified to perform their part. None 
but veterans should be brought into the field. 

106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is bene- 
ficial to sugar-refiners : and of the corn-trade to corn- 
growers : and -of the silk-manufacture to silk- weavers, 
Sfc. Sfc. ; and thus each class of men are benefited by 
some restrictions. Now all these classes of men make up 
the whole community: therefore a system of restrictions 
is beneficial to the community. [See Book iii § 11.] 

107. There are two kinds of things which we ought 
not to fret about : what we can help, and what we cannot, 
\To be stated as a Dilemma.] 



APPENDIX. 



No. Ill 

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 

Some have expressed much contempt for the mode in 
which Logic is usually taught, and in which students are 
examined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enu- 
meration of technical rules, and perhaps an application 
of them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form al- 
ready syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, 
if intended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly 
certain ; though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition 
of Logic from all candidates for a Degree, has confined 
both lectures and examinations, in a greater degree than 
is desirable, to this elementary character. But the stu- 
dent who wishes to acquire, and to show that he has ac- 
quired, not only the elementary rules, but a facility of 
applying them in practice, should proceed from the study 
of such examples as the foregoing, to exercise himself in 
analyzing logically, according to the rules here given, and 
somewhat in the manner of the subjoined specimen, some 
of Euclid's demonstrations, — various portions of Aris- 
totle's Works, — the opening of Warburton's " Divine 
Legation," (which exhibits the arguments in a form very 
nearly syllogistic) — several parts of Chilling worth's De- 
fence of Protestantism, — the concluding part of Paley's 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 341 

Horss Paulina^ — Leslie's Method with the Deists, — va- 
rious portions of A. Smith's Wealth of Nations, — and 
other argumentative Works on the most dissimilar sub- 
jects. The latter part of § 1. Chap. V. of the Disserta- 
tion on the Province of Reasoning, will furnish a conve- 
nient subject of a short analysis. 

A student who should prepare himself, in this manner, 
in one or more such books, and present himself for this 
kind of examination in them, would furnish a good test 
for ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic, 



As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after 
they have been exhibited at full length in the bare ele- 
mentary form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks 
on the mode of analyzing, and reducing to that form, any 
train of argument that may be presented to us : since this 
must in general be the first step taken in an attempt to 
apply logical rules.* 

First then, of whatever length the reasoning may be, 
whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the 
concluding assertion; — not necessarily the last sentence 
expressed, but the last point established; — and this 
whether it be formally enunciated, or left to be under- 
stood. Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe- 
on what ground that assertion is made. The assertion 
will be your Conclusion ; the ground on which it rests, 
your Premises. The whole Syllogism thus obtained may 
be tried by the rules of Logic. 

If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to 
take the premises separately, and pursue with each the 

* These directions are in substance, and nearly, in words, extract*- 
ed from the Preface to Hinds's abridged Introduction to Logic, 
39* 



342 APPENDIX. 

same plan as with the conclusion you first stated, A pre- 
miss must have been used as such, either because it re- 
quired no proof, or because it had been proved. If it 
have not been proved, consider whether it be so self-evi- 
dent as to have needed no proof. If it have been proved, 
you must regard it as a conclusion derived from other as- 
sertions which are premises to it : so that the process with 
which you set out will be repeated; viz. to observe on 
what ground the assertion rests, to state these as pre- 
mises, and to apply the proper rules to the syllogism thus 
obtained. Having satisfied yourself of the correctness of 
this, proceed, as before, to state its premises, if needful, 
as conclusions derived from other assertions. And thus 
the analysis will go on (if the whole chain of argument be 
correct) till you arrive at the premises with which the 
whole commences; which of course should be assertions 
requiring no proof, or, if the chain be any where faulty 
the analysis will proceed till you come to some proposition, 
either assumed as self-evident, though requiring pooof, or 
incorrectly deduced from other assertions.* 

* Many students probably will find it a very clear and convenient 
mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, to 
draw it out in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division ; thus, 
[Ultimate Conclusion.] 
Z is X, 
proved by 





'y is X, 
proved 

fey 


Z is Y 1 , 
proved by 










l AisY, 

[suppose 

admitted.] 


Zis A, 
proved by, 

&c. 


1 1 
the argument that and by the 
t argument that 

B is X, Y is B, 1 

&c. &c. 






\ 


2isX, 
&c. 


YisC^ 
&c. 





PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 343 

It will often happen that the same assertion will have 
been proved by many different arguments ; and then, the 
inquiry into the truth of the premises will branch out ac- 
cordingly. In mathematical or other demonstrative rea- 
soning, this will of course never take place, since abso- 
lute certainty admits of no increase: and if, as is often 
the case, the same truth admits of several different de- 
monstrations, we select the simplest and clearest, and 
discard the rest. But in probable reasoning there is of- 
ten a Cumulation of arguments, each proving the same 
conclusion ; i. e. each proving it to be probable. In such 
cases therefore you will have first to try each argument 
separately ; and should each of them establish the con- 
clusion as in some degree probable, you will then have 
to calculate the aggregate probability. 

In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it ena- 
bles us to place the several items of probability in the 
most convenient form. As the degree of probability 
of each proposition that is assumed, is a point to be de- 
termined by the reasoner's own sagacity and experience 
as to the matter in hand, so, the degree of probability of 
each conclusion, (given, that of each of its premises,)* 
and also the collective probability resulting from several 
different arguments all tending to the same conclusion, 
is an arithmetical question. But the assistance afforded 
by logical rules in clearly stating the several items so as 
to prepare the way for the other operations, will not be 
thought lightly of by any who have observed the con- 
fusion of thought and the fallacy, which have often been 
introduced through the want of such a statement. 

* See " Fallacies," § 14, near the end. 



344 APPENDIX. 

Example of Analysis applied to the First Part of Paley's 
Evidences. 

The ultimate Conclusion, that "The Christian Re- 
ligion came from God," is made to rest (as far as " the 
direct historical evidence" is concerned) on these two 
premises ; that " A religion attested by Miracles, is 
from God ;" and that " The Christian Religion is so 
attested." 

Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the Mi- 
nor seems to have been admitted, while the Major was 
denied, by the unbelievers of old : whereas at present the 
case is reversed.* 

Paley's argument therefore goes to establish the Minor 
premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely 
to be any question. 

He states with this view, two propositions : viz 

Prop. I. — " That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, 
professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, 
passed their lives in labors, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily 
undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, 
and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts ; and 



* It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient argu- 
ments against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian 
writers, and also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which 
are still extant, that the original opponents of Christianity admitted 
that miracles were wrought, but denied that they proved the divine 
origin of the religion, and attributed them to Magic. This conces- 
sion, in persons living so much nearer to the times assigned to the 
miracles, should be noticed as an important evidence ; for, credulous 
as men were in those days respecting magic, they would hardly have 
resorted to this explanation, unless some, at least plausible, evidence 
for the miracles had been adduced. And they could not but be 
sensible that to prove (had that been possible) the pretended mira- 
cles to be impostures, would have been the most decisive course ; 
since that would at once have disproved the religion. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 345 

that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules 
of conduct." 

Prop. II. — " That there is not satisfactory evidence, that 
persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar 
miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the 
accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of 
their belief of the truth of those accounts." 

Of these two propositions the latter, it will easily be 
perceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by 
Negation (Book II. Chap. ii. § 4) of a universal affirma- 
tive ; the former proposition is the Minor. 

As a syllogism in Barbara therefore, the whole will 
stand thus. 

" All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy 
of credit :" (by conversion, " none which are not worthy of 
credit are so attested.") 

"The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evi- 
dence :" Therefore " they are worthy of credit." 

The Minor premiss is first proved by being taken as 
several distinct ones, each of which is separately estab- 
lished. — See Book II. Chap. iv. § 1. 

I. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity 

suffered ; by showing 

1st. A priori, from the nature of the case, that they 
were likely to suffer: [because they were preachers 
of a religion unexpected and unwelcome: 1. to the 
Jews; and 2. to Gentiles.] 

2d. From profane testimony. 

3d. From the testimony of Christian writings. [And 

. here comes in the proof of one of the premises of 

this last argument ; viz. the proof of the credibility, 

as to this point at least, of the Christian Writings] 



346 APPENDIX. 



These arguments are cumulative ; i. e. each separately 
goes to establish the probability of the one common con- 
clusion, that " the first propagators of Christianity suf- 
fered." 

By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings 
were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to. 

II. It is proved that "What they suffered for was a 
miraculous story; by 

1st. The nature of the case ; They could have had 
nothing but miracles on which to rest the claims of 
the new religion. 

2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the Resur- 
rection, both in Christian and Profane- Writers, as 
the evidence on which the religion rested. 

The same course of argument goes to show that the 
miracles in attestation of which they suffered were such 
as they professed to have witnessed. 

These arguments again are cumulative. 

III. It is proved that " The miracles thus attested are 
what we call the Christian miracles ;" in other words, 
that the story was, in the main, that which we have 
now in the Christian Scriptures, by 

§ 1st. The nature of the case ; viz. that it is im- 
probable the original story should have completely 
died aAvay, and a substantially new one have occu- 
pied its place; 

§ 2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, 
both Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing 
with those of our Scriptures, as the ones then re- 
ceived ; 

§ 3d. by The credibility of our Historical Scriptures : 
This is established by several distinct arguments, 









PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 347 

each separately tending to show that these books 
were, from the earliest ages of Christianity, well 
known and carefully preserved among Christians : 
viz. 
§ i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers, 
§ ii. with peculiar respect. 
§ iii. Collected into a distinct volume, and 
§ iv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of 

respect. 
§ v. Publicly read and expounded, and 
§ vi. had commentaries, fyc. written on them : 
§ vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ; 

<fyc. fyc* 
The latter part of the first main proposition, branches 
off into two ; viz. 1st, that the early Christians submitted 
to new rules of conduct ; 2d, that they did so, in conse- 
quence of their belief in miracles wrought before them. 

Each of these is established in various parts of the 
above course of argument, and by similar premises; viz. 
the nature of the case, — She accounts of heathen writers, 
— and the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, 6fc. 



The Major premiss, that " Miracles thus attested are 
worthy of credit," f which must be combined with the 
former, in order to establish the conclusion, that "the 

* For some important remarks respecting the different wa) r s in 
which this part of the argument is presented to different persons, 
See " Hinds on Inspiration," p. 30 — 46. 

t This is the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premiss, that 
" it is attested by real Miracles;" which, in the present day, comes 
to the same thing : since those for whom he is writing are ready at 
once to admit the truth of the religion, if convinced of the reality 
of the miracles. 



34B APPENDIX. 

Christian miracles are worthy of credit," is next to be 
established. 

Previously to his entering on the second main propo- 
sition, (which I have stated to be the Converse by nega- 
tion of this Major premiss,) he draws his conclusion 
(Ch. x. Part I.) from the Minor premiss, in combination 
with the Major, resting that Major on 

§ 1st. The d priori improbability that a false story 
should have been thus attested : viz. 

"If it be so, the religion must be true. These men could 
not be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might 
have avoided all these sufferings, and have lived quietly. Would 
men in such circumstances pretend to have seen what they 
never saw; assert facts which they had no knowledge of; go 
ibout lying, to teach virtue ; and, though not only convinced of 
Christ's being an impostor, but having seen the success of his 
imposture in his crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on; 
and so persist, as to bring upon themselves, for nothing, and 
with a full knowledge of the consequence, enmity and hatred, 
danger and death 1" 

§ 2d. That no false story of Miracles is likely to be so 
attested, is again proved, from the premiss that "no 
false story of miracles ever has been so attested;" 
and this premiss again is proved in the form of a 
proposition which includes it ; viz. that " No other 
miraculous story whatever is so attested." 

§ This assertion again, bifurcates ; viz. it is proved 
respecting the several stories that are likely to be, or 
that have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian, 
that either 

1 §. They are not so attested ; or 

2 §. They are not properly miraculous ; i. e. that ad- 
mitting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow 
that any miracle took place; as in cases that may 
be explained by false perceptions,— accidents, <$fc> 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 349 

In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the 

rest of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts 

of the argument which I have but slightly touched upon.* 

♦ When the Student considers that this is only one out of many 
branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that 
there have been intelligent men who have held out against them 
all, he may be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw 
in these arguments which he is unable to detect, or else, that there 
must be much stronger arguments on the other side than he has 
ever met with. 

To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to infidel- 
ity would be unsuitable to this occasion ; but I will notice one, as 
being more especially connected with the subject of this work, and 
as being very generally over.ooked. " In no other instance perhaps" 
(says Dr. Hawkins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition) " besides 
that of Religion, do men commit the very illogical mistake, of first 
canvassing all the objections against any particular system whose 
-pretensions to truth they would examine, before they consider the 
direct arguments in its favor." p. 82. But why, it may be asked, 
do they make such a mistake in this case 1 An answer, which I 
think would apply to a large proportion of such persons, is this : 
Because a man having been brought up in a Christian country, has 
lived perhaps" among such as have been accustomed from their in- 
fancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to 
regard an uninquiring assent as a mark of commendable faith ; and 
hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself 
the question, — Why should I receive Christianity as a divine reve- 
lation 1 Christianity being nothing new to him, he is not stimu- 
lated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted. 
And when it is controverted, — when an opponent urges — How do 
you reconcile this, and that, and the other, with the idea of a divine 
revelation 7 these objections strike by their novelty, — by their being 
opposed to what is generally received. He is thus excited to in- 
quiry ; which he sets about, naturally enough, but very unwisely, 
by seeking for answers to all these objections ; and fancies that un- 
less they can all be satisfactorily solved, he ought not to receive the 
religion. " As if," (says the Author already cited,) " there could not 
be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable arguments, and yet at 
30 



350 APPENDIX. 

It will be observed that to avoid unnecessary prolixity, 
I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one 
premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply 



the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous, plausible, and by- 
no means easy of solution. " There are objections" (said Dt. John- 
son) " against a plenum and objections against a vacuum ; but one 
of them must be true." He adds, that " sensible men, really de- 
sirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs 
i hem to examine first the argument in favor of that side of the 
question, where the first presumption of truth appears. And the 
presumption is manifestly in favor of that religious creed already 

adopted by the country Their very earliest inquiry 

therefore must be into the direct arguments for the authority of 
that book on which their country rests its religion." 

But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a 
strong temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded 
against, to adopt the opposite course ; — to attend first to the objec- 
tions which are brought against what is established, and which, for 
that very reason, rouse the mind from a state of apathy. 

When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was re- 
versed. " Seeing that all these things cannot be spoken against, ye 
ought to be quiet" was a sentiment which favored an indolent ac- 
quiescence in the old pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was 
all on the side of those who came to overthrow this, by a new re- 
ligion. The first inquiry of any one who at all attended to the sub- 
ject must have been, not, — "What are the objections to Christianit}' 
— but, On what grounds do these men call on me to receive them 
as divine messengers'? And the same appears to be the case with 
the Polynesians among whom our Missionaries are laboring : they 
begin by inquiring, — "Why should we receive this religion 1 and 
those of them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be 
Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction than 
many among us, even of those who, in general maturity of intellect 
and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders. 
I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious 
education ; but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accom- 
pany it. The Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices, 
^greater difficulties to surmount, than ours ; but they were difficul- 
ties of a different kind. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 35i 

for himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it 
will easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumula- 
tive arguments to prove that the propagators of Christian- 
ity did suffer, would at full length stand thus ; 

" Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and 
to the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ; 

The Apostles did this ; 

Therefore they were likely to suffer," fyc. tf-c. 

It is also to be observed, that the same proposition 
used in different syllogisms may require to be differently 
expressed, by a substitution of some equivalent, in order 
to render the argument in each formally correct. This 
of course is always allowable, provided the exact mean- 
ing be preserved : e. g. if the proposition be, " The per- 
sons who attested the Christian miracles underwent suf- 
ferings in attestation of them," I am authorized to state 
the same assertion in a different form, thus, " The Chris- 
tian miracles are attested by men who suffered in attesta- 
tion of their reality," fyc. 

Great care however should be used to avoid being mis- 
led by the substitution of one proposition for another, 
when the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) 
really equivalent, so that the one warrants the assump- 
tion of the other. 

Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to 
Chap. iii. § 1, p. 102, where I have treated of the state- 
ment of a proposition as several distinct ones, each im- 
plying all the rest, but differing in the division of the 
Predicate from the Subject. Of this procedure the above 
analysis affords an instance. 



INDEX 



PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS. 



Absolute terms, page 125. 

Abstraction. — The act of " drawing off" in thought, and attend- 
ing to separately, some portion of an object presented to the mind, 
128. 

Abstract terms, 126. 

Accident. — In its widest technical sense, any thing that is attributed 
to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some sub- 
stance (in which sense it is opposed to " Substance :") in its 
narrower and more properly logical sense, a Fredicable which 
may be present or absent, the essence of the Species remaining 
the same, 133. 

Accidental Definition. — A definition which assigns the Properties of 
a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual ; it is otherwise 
called a Description, 138. 

Affirmative — denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts the 
agreement of the Predicate with the Subject, 75. 

Analogous. — A term is so called whose single signification applies 
with unequal propriety to more than one object, 124, 175. 

Antecedent. — That part of a Conditional Proposition on which the 
other depends, 115. 

Apprehension {simple.') — The operation of the mind by which we 
mentally perceive or form a notion of some object, 68. 

Argument. — An expression in which, from something laid down as 
granted, something else is deduced, 84. 

Categorematic. — A word is so called which may by itself be em^ 
ployed as a Term, 71. 



354 INDEX. 

Categorical Proposition — is one which affirms or denies a Pre. 
dicate of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothe- 
sis, 75. 

Common term — is one which is applicable in the same sense to more 
than one individual object, 62, 73^ 124. 

Compatible terms, 125. 

Conclusion. — That Proposition which* is inferred from the Premises 
of an Argument, 45, 85. 

Concrete term, 126. 

Conditional Proposition — is one which asserts the dependence of 
one categorical Proposition on another. A conditional Syllo- 
gism is one in which the reasoning depends on such a Proposi- 
tion, 115. 

Consequent. — That part of a conditional Proposition which depends 
on the other. (Consequents,) 1 15. 

Consequence. — The connexion between the Antecedent and Conse- 
quent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequential 115. 

Contingent— The matter of a Proposition is so called when the 
terms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, 76. 

Contradictory Propositions — are those which, having the same 
terms, differ both in Quantity and duality, 98. 

Contrary Propositions — are two universal affirmative and nega- 
tive, with the same terms, 80. 

Contrary terms, 128. 

Converse—* 82.. 

Conversion of a Proposition — is the transposition of the terms, so 
that the subject is made the Predicate, and vice versa, 82. 

Copula. — That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the 
Predicate of the Subject; viz. is, or is not, expressed or im- 
plied^ 71. 

Definite terms, 126 

Definition. — An expression explanatory of that which is defined, 
i. e. separated, as by a boundary, from every thing else, 137 

Description. — An accidental Definition, 138. 

Difference (Differentia.) — The formal or distinguishing part of the 
essence, of a Species, 132„ 

Dilemma. — A complex kind of conditional syllogism, having more 
than one Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and a disjunctive 
Minor, 111. 

Discourse. — The third operation of the mind, Reasoning, 69. 

Disjunctive Proposition— is one which consists of two or more cate- 
goricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them must be 



INDEX. 355 

true. A syllogism is called disjunctive, the reasoning of which 
turns on such a proposition, 60. 

Distributed — is applied to a Term that is employed in its full extent, 
so as to comprehend all its significates, — every thing to which 
it is applicable, 59, 87. 

Division, logical — is the distinct enumeration of several things sig- 
nified by a common name ; and it is so called metaphorically, 
from its being analogous to the (real and properly called) divi- 
sion of a whole into its parts, 135. 

Enthymeme. — An argument having one Premiss expressed, and the 
other understood, 118. 

Equivocal. — A Term is defined to be equivocal whose different sig- 
nifications apply equally to several objects. Strictly speaking, 
there is hardly a word in any language which may not be re- 
garded as, in this sense, equivocal ; but the title is usually ap- 
plied only in any case where a word is employed equivocally ; 
e. g. where the middle term is used in different senses in the 
two Premises ; or where a Proposition is liable to be understood 
in various senses, according to the various meanings of one of 
its terms, 172. 

Essential Definition — is one which assigns, not the Properties or 
Accidents of the thing defined, but what are regarded as its es- 
sential parts, whether physical or logical, 137. 

Extreme. — -The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition are called 
its Extremes or Terms, being, as it were, the two boundaries, 
having the copula (in regular order) placed between them. In 
speaking of a syllogism, the word is often understood to imply 
the extremes of the Conclusion, 71. 

Fallacy. — Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes 
to be decisive of the matter at issue, while in reality it is 
not, 143. 

False — in its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition which 
states something not as it is, 75, 308. 

Figure, of a Syllogism — denotes a certain situation of its middle 
term in reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion — The 
Major and Minor terms, 92. 
Generalization. — The act of comprehending under a common name 
several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract 
from each of them, and which that common name serves to in- 
dicate, 128. 
Genus. — A Predicable which is considered as the material part of 
the Species of which it is affirmed, 129. 



} 5 C INDEX. 

Hypothetical Proposition — is one which asserts not absolutely, but 
under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. An hypothe- 
tical Syllogism is one of which the reasoning depends on such 
a proposition, 106. 

Illative Conversion — is that in which the truth of the Converse fol- 
lows from the truth of the Exposita, or Proposition given, 82. 

Impossible. — The Matter of a Proposition is so called when the ex- 
tremes altogether disagree, 80 — Ambiguity of, 276. 

Indefinite Proposition — is one which has for its Subject a Common 
term without any sign to indicate distribution or non-distribu- 
tion, 77. 

Indefinite terms, 126. 

■Individual. — An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, 
one, and consequently cannot be logically divided ; whence the 
name, 135. 

Induction. — A kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole 
class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more indi- 
viduals of that class, 207. 

Infer. — To draw a conclusion from granted premises, 227. — See 
Prove. 

Infima Species — is that which is not subdivided, except into indi- 
viduals, 132. 

Inseparable accident — is that which cannot be separated from the 
individual it belongs to, though it may from the Species, 133. 

Judgment. — The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro- 
nounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two of 
the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, 69. 

Logical definition — is that which assigns the Genus and Difference 
of the Species defined, 137. 

Major term of a Syllogism — is the Predicate of the conclusion. 
The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major term. 
In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Premiss is called 
the Major, 88, 107. 

Middle term of a categorical Syllogism — is that with which the two 
extremes of the conclusion are separately compared, 88, 92. 

Minor term of a categorical Syllogism — is the subject of the con- 
clusion. The Minor Premiss is that which contains the Minor 
term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical Premiss is 
called the Minor, 88, 107. 

Modal categorical proposition — is one which asserts that the Preu. 
cate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner v 75. 102. 

Mood of a categorical Syllogism — is the designation of its three 



INDEX. 357 

propositions, in the order in which they stand, according to 
their quantity and quality, 91. 
Necessary matter of a proposition— is the essential or invariable 

agreement of its terms, 80. — Necessary, ambiguity of, 285. 
Negation — conversion by (otherwise called conversion by contra- 
position,) 83. 
Negative categorical proposition — is one which asserts the disa- 
greement of its extremes, 75. 

Negative terms, 126. 

Nominal Definition— is one which explains only the meaning of 
the term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the thing 
signified by that Term than is implied by the Term itself to 
every one who understands the meaning of it, 139, 226. 

Opposed. — Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, 
when having the same Subject and Predicate, they differ either 
in quantity or quality, or both, 78. 

Opposition of terms, 126. 

Part — logically, Species are called Parts of the Genus they come 
under, and individuals, parts of the Species ; really, the Genus 
is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the Individual, 136. 

Particular proposition— is one in which the Predicate is affirmed or 
denied of some part only of the subject, 76. 

Per Accidens.— Conversion of a proposition is so called when the 
Quantity is changed, 83. 

Physical definition — is that which assigns the parts into which the 
thing defined can be actually divided, 138. 

Positive terms, 126. 

Predicate of a proposition — is that Term which is affirmed or de- 
nied of the other, 71. 

Predicable. — A Term which can be affirmatively predicated of seve- 
ral others, 130. 

Premiss. — A proposition employed to establish a certain conclu- 
sion, 85. 

Privative terms, 126. 

Probable arguments, 103, 233. 

Property.— A Predicable which denotes something essentially con- 
joined to the essence of the Species, 132. 

Proposition. — A sentence which asserts, i. e. affirms or denies, 74. 

Prove. — To adduce Premises which establish the truth of a certain 
conclusion, 237. 

Proximum Genus of any Species— is the nearest or least remote to 
which it can be referred, 132. 



r.g INDEX. 

Pure categorical proposition — is one which asserts simply that the 
Predicate is, or is not, contained in the Subject, 75, 102. 

Real definition — is one which explains the nature of the thing de- 
fined ; viz. either the whole nature of it (as in Mathematics,) or 
else something beyond what is necessarily understood by the 
Term, 139, 226. 

References — fallacy of, 189. 

Relative terms, 125. 

Quality of a Proposition — is its affirming or denying. This is the 
Cluality of the expression, which is. in Logic, the essential cir- 
cumstance. The Cluality of the matter is, its being true or 
false ; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential only in 
respect of the subject-matter treated of, 75. 

Quantity of a Proposition— is the extent in which its subject is 
taken ; viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only of its 
Significates, 76. 

Question. — That which is to be established as a Conclusion stated 
in an interrogative form, 85. 

Second intention of a term, 174L 

Separable accident — is one which mav be separated from the indi- 
vidual, 133. 

Significate.—The several things signified by a Common Term are 
its Significates (Significata,) 76. 

Singular term — is one which stands for one individual. A Singu- 
lar proposition is one which has for its Subject either a Singu- 
lar term or a Common term limited to one individual by a sin- 
gular sign, e.g. " This," 71, 77, 125. 

Sorites. — An abridged form of stating a series of Syllogisms, of 
which the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the succeed- 
ing, 119. 

Species. — A predicate which is considered as expressing the whole 
essence of the individuals of which it is affirmed, 129. — Pecu- 
liar sense of, in Natural History, 251. 

Subaltern Species and Genus — is that which is both a Species ot 
some higher Genus, and a Genus in respect of the Species intc 
which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, is between a Uni- 
versal and a Particular of the same duality. Of these, the 
Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular the Subalter- 
nate, 80, 132. 

Subcontrary opposition — is between two particulars, the affirmativt 
and the negative, 80. 



INDEX. 359 

Subject of a proposition — is that term of which the other is affirmed 

or denied, 71. 
Summum Genus — is that which is not considered as a Species of 

any higher Genus, 132. 
Syllogism. — An argument expressed in strict logical form ; viz. so 

that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of the 

expression alone, without any regard to the meaning of the 

Terms, 85. 
Sijncategorematic words — are such as cannot singly express a Term, 

but only a part of a Term, 71. 
Term. — The Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, 71. 
True Proposition — is one which states what really is, 76. 
Universal Proposition — is one whose Predicate is affirmed or denied 

of the whole of the Subject, 76. 
UnivocaL — A Common term is called Univocal in respect of those 

things to which it is applicable in the same signification, 134. 



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